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ABSTRACT 
 
“What Are Marines For?”   
The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War Era.  (May 2011) 
Michael E. Krivdo, B.A., Texas A&M University;  
M.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Joseph G. Dawson, III 
  
This dissertation provides analysis on several areas of study related to the history 
of the United States Marine Corps in the Civil War Era.  One element scrutinizes the 
efforts of Commandant Archibald Henderson to transform the Corps into a more nimble 
and professional organization.  Henderson's initiatives are placed within the framework 
of the several fundamental changes that the U.S. Navy was undergoing as it worked to 
experiment with, acquire, and incorporate new naval technologies into its own 
operational concept.  Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Henderson's programs 
are provided and comparisons drawn with those priorities established by his successor, 
Commandant John Harris.  In addition, the operations undertaken by the Corps during 
the Civil War are evaluated in terms of their relative benefit for the national military 
establishment as a whole. 
The Corps organization and operational concept is scrutinized and compared with 
that of similar military structures.  In particular, the relationship between the U.S. Marine 
Corps and the Confederate States Marine Corps are compared.  In the process, the 
iv 
South's Corps, born in part out of that of the North's, exhibited many distinct advantages 
that the USMC solidly resisted adopting during the war years.  The influence of key 
leaders, both military and civilian, reveals many problems that continued to negatively 
affect the Corps' ability to meet operational requirements as defined by senior naval and 
Army commanders.   
Yet despite these issues, the Corps' Civil War experiences served as a crucible for 
forging a new generation of leaders who earnestly fought for reforms and increased 
professionalization of the unit.  Although the Corps suffered from several problems 
related to lack of institutional vision and leadership failings of some senior officers, at a 
small unit level the officers and Marines performed their duties in a competent, 
enthusiastic, and courageous manner.  Therefore, Marines continued to be in great 
demand by naval commanders at all levels, who actively sought their service in a variety 
of operation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION

 
 
In the fall of 1859, the political leadership of the United States found itself 
unexpectedly confronted with a crisis of great consequence.  On the night of 17 October, 
a small band of radical abolitionists led by John Brown crossed into Virginia, seized the 
Federal Arsenal at Harpers Ferry, and threatened to distribute weapons and support to 
slaves in the area to encourage them to kill their masters and thereby gain their freedom. 
The raid sent shockwaves through the region and the Federal government decided it 
needed to take immediate action to "protect the public property . . . endangered by 
riotous outbreak" before the situation inflamed already sensitive sectional differences.  
Looking for a quick, yet precise response to the action, military leaders turned to the 
Marines at the barracks in nearby Washington D.C. to quell the disturbance.  Once 
orders to respond were received, the Marine Corps' headquarters quickly organized, 
equipped, and transported to the affected area a contingent of 86 men to deal with 
Brown's force.  Within only hours of arrival at Harpers Ferry, the small detachment of 
Marines efficiently and boldly killed or captured most of Brown's men, rescued thirteen 
hostages, and restored order out of chaos.1  In the process, the Marine Corps had once 
again proven itself to be an adaptable and efficient force-in-readiness capable of rapidly 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Military History. 
 
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handling difficult situations.  The unit met the high level of expectations that senior 
officials held regarding its performance.  Such would not always be the case. 
The history of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is dominated by the 
events of the twentieth century, especially since World War II (1939-1945), when it 
proved to be a flexible, innovative and highly successful military organization.  
Nonetheless, the Corps’ reputation has not always stood so high:  only a few short years 
after its exemplary performance at Harpers Ferry, in the midst of America’s divisive and 
desperate Civil War, the opinion of many military and civilian leaders regarding the 
Corps changed.  Some now hesitated to call upon the USMC; a few even argued for 
dissolution of the service.  The Marine Corps’ mixed record of 1861-1865 contrasts 
sharply with the picture of the healthy, innovative organization of only a few years 
earlier, when government officials and the American public held the Corps in high 
esteem and Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey proclaimed it to be “an indispensable 
branch of the naval service.”  By contrast, the Confederate States Marine Corps proved 
in several ways to be the more aggressive and innovative institution of the two, 
particularly in terms of its pursuit of new roles and missions and its adapting structurally 
to the operational needs of the Confederate Navy.2  What factors account for such a 
remarkable change?      
 Additionally, in comparison with other periods in the Marine Corps’ history, 
aspects of its service in the Civil War remained relatively unexplored.  Examining the 
unit’s leaders, organization, and linkage with society provides new insights into national 
military and naval developments in that war, and promotes greater understanding of the 
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process of professionalization of officers in both the Navy and Marine Corps.  These 
points are also connected with aspects of joint warfare that are germane and applicable 
to the conduct of warfare since 1865, including issues surrounding the development of 
amphibious warfare.  This study interprets the Corps’ institutional growth within the 
framework of the political, military and societal context, an approach that has not 
previously been taken.  Finally, a fresh analysis of the U.S. Marine Corps as an 
institution during the Civil War provides nuanced perspectives on the politics and public 
perceptions that shaped the naval services and influenced legislative and military 
actions.   
The lack of vision and direction manifested by some civilian, Navy, and Marine 
leaders in the war was symptomatic of the greater problems evident within the military 
itself.  For example, in almost every theater, Navy and Army commanders expressed 
disagreement with each other over issues of cooperation and argued about differing 
operational priorities.  Furthermore, civilian leaders spent great time and effort in finding 
military leaders who could implement their orders in an efficient and competent manner, 
often passing over several senior officers before finding ones that produced the required 
results.  Strangely, the deep selecting of officers with the required leadership 
characteristics occurred in every service except the Marine Corps.  This study analyzes 
why that happened.   
In particular, senior Marine leaders were unsuccessful in creating units that met 
the demonstrated needs of the Navy as it responded to the new challenges presented by 
the Civil War.  Instead, senior Marines stubbornly fixed on the tactics and operations of 
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the past, leading them to focus narrowly on filling only the most basic of roles in a less 
efficient manner.  In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps’ rival, the Confederate States 
Marine Corps, in many ways developed a more adaptive and efficient structural model 
that allowed it to become more valuable and relevant to the requirements of its navy than 
did the USMC. 
 The Corps’ mixed reputation earned in the Civil War is surprising, considering 
that in the decades prior to the war the USMC had earned respect by providing reliable 
military services that the government increasingly turned to in times of crisis.  
Domestically, the Marine Corps performed well in several instances of civil-military 
operations:  Marines helped restore order during the “Know-Nothing” civil disturbances 
in Baltimore and Washington in 1857; they quelled riots in several cities in 1858; they 
excelled in dealing with John Brown’s attempted insurrection at the Federal Armory at 
Harpers Ferry in 1859; and “leathernecks” notably manned the defenses of Washington 
in 1860-1861 following desertions of Army troops during the Secession Crisis.3  
Overseas, Marines acquitted themselves well during combat actions in Central and South 
America, Japan, China, and other Pacific locations.  Furthermore, Marines played an 
important role during the Mexican War in both the Central Mexico and Pacific 
campaigns.  In the former, a Marine battalion distinguished itself during the fight for the 
"Halls of Montezuma" in the capital city, while Marines from the Pacific Squadron 
conducted critical operations ashore from Northern to Baja California.4  In time of crisis 
the Corps appeared to be the force of choice for the Federal government, a role that 
Commandant Archibald Henderson had long nurtured.   
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Yet despite these successes, the Marine Corps’ inconsistent performance in the 
early months of the Civil War quickly dissipated that good will.  Wartime commanders 
relegated Marines to handling minor, even obsolescent tasks.  The service became an 
easy target for its detractors and even absorbed blame for failings that should properly be 
shared with higher commands.   
Several factors combined to cause that loss of faith in the Corps and each merits 
fresh analysis.  Importantly, military leaders remained uncertain as to the role expected 
of Marines and ambivalent to efforts to correct evident problems.  Concurrently, the 
naval services wrestled with the impact that emerging technologies had on naval 
operations and tactics, issues that changed the familiar paradigm and caused further 
confusion regarding mission requirements and capabilities.  This situation led some 
leaders to question whether the Corps constituted an effective investment of valuable 
manpower and materiel.  While army and navy officers experimented with innovative 
ways to employ naval forces, Marine leaders stood passively on the sidelines and simply 
reacted to direction from above rather than working to influence conditions to improve 
their organization.   
In the face of this confusing state of affairs, some civilian leaders expressed 
increasing frustration over the actions and antics of the Commandant and many of the 
Corps’ other senior officers.  This further undermined their confidence in the unit.  
However, the roots of this circumstance require further exploration.  And while 
historians have studied the tenures of individual Commandants, none examine in detail 
the issues that arose from the turnovers of command and analyze the resultant changes of 
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direction, policy, and priorities against the military requirements at the time. This 
dissertation scrutinizes the critical periods of turnover that occurred between 
commandants to determine if these seams in command continuity were key in 
perpetuating the institution’s lack of vision and cohesiveness.5  That said, not all of the 
Marine Corps’ leadership problems originated from above.   
The Corps experienced a crisis of leadership during the war, one that originated 
not only from the higher levels of command, but from within the Marine Corps’ junior 
officer ranks as well.  Officers’ dissatisfaction and disappointment with the 
Commandant and his staff is evident in contemporary writings that reached a crescendo 
after the war.  Addressing these issues, Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Metcalf, former chief 
historian for the Marine Corps, concluded that “The Civil War period of the Corps’ 
history was probably the lowest ebb of fighting efficiency that the organization has ever 
reached in time of war.”6  Yet this same dissatisfaction over the unit’s inefficiencies 
prompted an element of the USMC’s officer corps to call vigorously for reforms, with 
one of the most vocal and influential even referring to the service as “a parasite on the 
body of government” and “a barnacle on the hull of the Navy.”7  Historian Jack 
Shulimson concluded that “by the late 1870s the Marine Corps was an organizational 
anomaly and in some disarray.”8  Although not all scholars agree with these views, 
clearly they imply the existence of problems in leadership and organization.  This 
dissertation contends that these leadership deficits exacerbated existing confusion 
regarding the service’s basic function and future direction, and that the growing 
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discontent further inhibited attempts to correct problems.  And yet, that same discontent 
drove the next generation of leaders to work together to achieve needed reforms. 
The issue of the Corps’ value to American military forces became such a 
significant topic that Congress actively debated disbanding the Corps several times 
during the war and pursued that subject for years afterward.  Navy support for Marines 
became dependent largely on the personalities of individual commanders, and during the 
war the Army went so far as to independently create its own marine-styled organization 
to meet its requirements.9  Problems cited with the USMC were legion and ranged from 
the personal failings of senior officers to the identification of organizational and 
structural weaknesses.  Furthermore, critics pointed out various training and educational 
inefficiencies that made the prospects of internal reform difficult.  This dissertation 
analyzes these observations and ascertains the reasons behind the USMC’s apparent 
inability to meet the challenges of the 1860s.   
 This study argues that the Marine Corps of the Civil War period included two 
diametrically opposed factions, each possessing a different vision of where a Marine 
Corps fit within the American military establishment.  The dominant faction consisted of 
the Corps’ ranking officers, men who openly and bitterly bickered amongst themselves 
over sometimes trivial matters while stubbornly clinging to traditional roles and missions 
that became increasingly obsolete or irrelevant.  The second faction, comprising a 
segment of the mid- and lower-ranking officers, embraced new ideas and missions and 
strained to carve out a larger role for the unit by volunteering their services for non-
traditional assignments.  The latter group, despite its intimate familiarity with ongoing 
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operations and current combat requirements, lacked the seniority or forum to implement 
lasting institutional changes.  They did, however, act as a force for change as they gained 
seniority and could institute the reforms they believed needed to be made.  They also 
embraced an effort to increase the professionalism of the officer corps.  These two 
groups worked against each other to the overall detriment of the Corps, further 
undermining national confidence in the service by 1865.   
 Another central feature of this dissertation involves assessing precisely what the 
Marine Corps’ roles and missions were during the Civil War in relation to what the 
military establishment believed it should be doing.  There were almost as many different 
and distinct views of what Marines should be doing as there were naval officers, officials 
of the Navy and War Departments, and members of Congress to espouse them.  This 
study examines salient positions and evaluates them in terms of how they met the needs 
of the Navy, nation, and the military establishment.   
Under the commandancy of Archibald Henderson (1820-1859), the Marine 
Corps began to move from traditional roles to ones that recognized the changes taking 
place in modern navies.  Traditional roles involved the maintenance of order and 
discipline aboard ship and guarding navy yards and bases ashore.  In combat afloat, 
Marines positioned themselves high in the ship’s rigging and other locations that 
allowed them to snipe at enemy officers and gunners.  Marines were also posted at ships’ 
hatchways to prevent sailors from abandoning their battle stations to seek safety below 
decks.  Henderson realized that naval reforms reduced the threats of mutiny and 
desertion, while technological changes from the adoption of more powerful (and longer 
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range) naval guns, armor protection and steam propulsion rendered many of the Corps’ 
old functions obsolescent.  Facing these changes head-on, he argued to have Marines 
assigned to ships’ main batteries and proposed ways to enhance their capabilities when 
fighting ashore as part of a landing party or operating with army forces.10  The Corps’ 
notable performance in the Mexican War, against the Chinese barrier forts in 1856, and 
in smashing John Brown’s raiders in 1859 seemed to validate his concepts.   
Many of Henderson’s initiatives were well underway when John Harris replaced 
Henderson as commandant in 1859.  However, for several reasons, to be explored in 
greater detail, Harris soon retreated from Henderson’s initiatives and fell back on the 
time-honored, but increasingly irrelevant, tasks that Marines had performed since their 
inception in the Age of Sail.   
Taking these changes into account, did the Corps perform well enough to be 
worth the national investment of men and money?  If not, did the Marine Corps pursue 
changes and attempt to transform itself into a more valuable military organization?  This 
dissertation posits the notion that the Corps as an institution actively resisted change 
during the 1860s, and that its intransigence led to the deterioration of its relationship 
with senior naval, military and civilian leaders.  Because of this, the Marine Corps 
rapidly squandered the hard-earned reputation it had gained prior to the war.  However, 
these shortcomings also helped to fertilize the seeds of reform and to nurture within a 
new generation of Marine leaders the desire to pursue institutional changes that would 
improve the Corps’ status and relevance as a service. 
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Marine Corps Historiography and the Civil War 
 Perhaps because of the inconsistency of its performance, a definitive history of 
the U.S. Marine Corps during the Civil War had not been written.  Furthermore, when 
one examines general histories of the USMC, the service’s activities from 1861-65 seem 
curiously downplayed.  Take, for example, a series of carefully focused historical 
publications prepared by the Corps itself.  One concludes “the Marine Corps played an 
important, if minor role, in the Union victory,”11 yet it provides few specifics on why 
that was the case.  Another pamphlet in the series, The United States Marines at Harpers 
Ferry, 1859, convincingly argues that the Corps’ response to John Brown’s raid 
constituted a significant achievement, an observation shared by many historians.  Indeed, 
in yet a third pamphlet that spans the entire period from 1859 until the end of the war, 
the Harpers Ferry action dominates the narrative and overshadows the Corps’ subsequent 
four years of wartime service.12  Apparently, at least when these works were produced in 
the 1960s, the Marine Corps believed it had little to relate about its own activities in the 
Civil War.  Actually, there is much worth analyzing about the Corps’ activities in the 
war, particularly at the organizational level. 
 Scholars are divided over the issue of the Marine Corps’ performance during the 
war.  Generally, two schools of thought have developed, one that centers principally on 
the often-courageous actions of individuals and small units, and another that discusses 
the service’s performance as part of the larger conflict.  A good example of the former 
group appears in two of the earliest histories of the Marine Corps, wherein M. Almy 
Aldrich and Richard S. Collum provide battle narratives drawn from a combination of 
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official documents and after-action reports.  However, critical examinations of these 
actions are absent:  Marine participation in failed undertakings such as the First Battle of 
Bull Run and the night attack on Fort Sumter, the costly assault on Fort Fisher, the 
wholesale surrender of a battalion of Marines on the steamship Ariel, to name a few, are 
retold from the perspective of the individual participants without mention of the 
contemporary controversy that these reverses generated or analysis of lessons learned 
from the actions.13  
For example, Collum recounts that Major John G. Reynolds’ battalion at Bull 
Run “broke line several times, but [its members] were as frequently formed and urged 
back to their position . . .,”14 accenting the positive while diminishing the negative 
aspects of the Marines’ behavior under fire in this first major combat action.  Yet he 
omits Colonel Commandant John Harris’ often cited biting observation that the incident 
represented the “first instance in [the USMC’s] history where any portion of its members 
turned their backs to the enemy,” an act that so affected his judgment that it prompted 
him to officially request that Marines be excused from serving with the army in the 
future so that they could return to what he perceived as more traditional assignments.15  
Basically, these early works avoid discussing controversies altogether.   
 Upbeat, largely uncritical examinations of the Marine Corps’ actions in the Civil 
War continued into the late twentieth century.  Colonel Robert Heinl’s Soldiers of the 
Sea, and journalist J. Robert Moskin’s massive The U.S. Marine Corps Story both 
provide narrative descriptions of the Corps’ Civil War operations, yet neither author 
seeks to analyze larger issues or discuss in detail weaknesses in leadership, training, 
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doctrine or structure.  Although Heinl curtly states that new Commandant John Harris 
“was no Archibald Henderson,” and that “the officers of the Corps were divided by 
rivalry,” he does not elaborate on those observations, bypassing an opportunity to 
analyze why the Corps’ leaders acted as they did and how their bickering affected the 
unit’s overall performance.16  As for Moskin, other than remarking that the USMC, 
“under Harris’ tired leadership,” was not capable of meeting the challenges posed by the 
war, he also stops short of real analysis and leaves obvious questions unasked.17  Were 
Commandant Harris and his squabbling senior officers the only roadblocks to the 
creation of a more valuable and successful Marine Corps?  What, if anything, did 
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles do about the situation?  And neither author 
attempts to address key issues such as the state of the USMC’s relationship with its sister 
services, or to analyze the value and appropriateness of the Corps’ roles and missions.   
Heinl’s key contribution is his central theme outlining the Marine Corps’ 
development of the amphibious assault and its assumption of that mission as a core 
function of the organization.  Accordingly, he briefly mentions Marine Corps 
participation in certain amphibious operations, but especially focuses on Admiral David 
Dixon Porter’s charges that the Marines were primarily responsible for the near-
disastrous Naval Brigade assault on Fort Fisher in 1865.  Heinl astutely recognizes that 
“no amount of bravery can compensate for lack of training, practice, and correct 
organization on the part of all forces in an amphibious assault, especially, as in this case, 
when the plan [Porter’s] was unsound.”18  Unfortunately, Heinl does not provide deeper 
analysis of whether Marine leaders should share in the responsibility for planning 
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shortfalls, or if they contributed suggestions but were ignored or disregarded by Porter or 
his staff.  Moreover, Heinl confuses the definition of “amphibious operation” with 
“amphibious assault” and thereby weakens his tracing of the Marine Corps’ development 
of the former to the few Civil War landings made by Marines, particularly since the 
army conducted far more amphibious operations than Marines did during the war.19  
These matters merit further examination that will facilitate a rigorous analysis of Marine 
participation in the development of amphibious operations during the war. 
In his revised edition, Moskin provides negligible coverage of the Civil War, 
devoting only nine of the book’s 727 pages to relate the highlights of Marine 
participation in that four-year long war.20  Basing his work mostly on secondary sources, 
he presents rousing tales of heroic individual Marine actions but neglects the more 
controversial aspects of the USMC’s employment.  For example, Moskin believes that 
the Marines’ “most ambitious attempt in this war,” their attempt to retake Fort Sumter in 
1863, “was a chaotic failure,” yet he provides no analysis of why it was ambitious, why 
it did not succeed, or what (if anything) was done to prevent the same problems from 
resurfacing in later operations.21   
Allan Millett’s Semper Fidelis applies the elements of the “new” military history 
and focuses on the organization as an extension of the society that produced it.22  Millett 
produces a penetrating study, but declines to give the same intensity of examination to 
the Civil War period that he does to other periods of Marine Corps history.  To Millett, 
“the Civil War brought the United States Navy and Marine Corps their greatest 
challenge since their formation,”23 yet he buries that experience within a chapter subtly 
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entitled “The Marine Corps Survives its Doldrums.”  He devotes far more pages to 
discussing the effects of the Marines’ performance on its continued survival than he does 
answering the question of why the service performed so poorly to begin with.24   
Despite his abbreviated coverage, Millett’s observations on the Civil War Marine 
Corps are thought-provoking.  Citing problems such as the overall poor quality of the 
Corps’ officers, the debilitating effect of the service’s loss of experienced leaders to the 
Confederacy, and the unit’s chronic inability to recruit sufficient numbers of high-
quality enlisted men, he correctly argues that the service “began the Civil War on the 
defensive both tactically and institutionally, and it never recovered.”25  Bluntly 
describing its performance at the First Battle of Bull Run as “a disaster,” Millett asserts 
that “the Marine battalion had suffered as severe a defeat as any of the Army’s amateur 
regiments,” and consequently gained a reputation that would prove hard to shake in the 
following years.26  The “debacle” of a disastrous attack on Fort Sumter, the surrender of 
Marines at sea in the Ariel episode, the Army’s forming of its own “Marine Brigade” on 
the Mississippi, and Admiral David Dixon Porter’s charges of poor performance by his 
Marines rounds out Millett’s picture of an organization in crisis.27  In Millett’s eyes, 
individual acts of heroism and courage in battle could not make up for perceived 
deficiencies at the organizational level:  critics declared that many Navy vessels 
performed well without Marines on board and that few ships dissolved into disorder, 
much less into mutiny, in their absence.28   
However, where Millett narrowly concentrates on the internal struggles of the 
Marine Corps, some issues were larger than that.  A significant portion of the problems 
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faced by the Corps’ leaders either originated were perpetuated by actions, policies and 
procedures within the Navy and War Departments, and also from political leaders.  
Although the Marine Corps certainly possessed its share of leadership failings and 
institutional flaws, many of those problems were exacerbated by a distinct lack of 
structural and strategic guidance from above that might have clarified institutional 
expectations, command relationships, and personnel policies.  This dissertation argues 
that civilian leaders and the military establishment itself should have issued clear 
guidance and direction on what was expected from its Corps of Marines, and that leaders 
from both naval services share some degree of responsibility for the uneven performance 
of the Marine Corps.  The study asserts that the Civil War Marine Corps lacked a 
strategic focus, and that its senior leaders failed to develop and pursue a course of action 
that might have resulted in its carving out a defined niche for itself.  Ironically, under 
former Commandant Archibald Henderson the Corps had previously moved toward 
enhancing its capabilities and structure to assume a greater role in landing party 
operations, missions that became more important as the war progressed.  In distancing 
itself from similar initiatives, the wartime Corps was passed over for several missions 
that it had previously sought to fill.   
 In his Ph.D. dissertation, Jeffrey Ryan largely concurs with Millett’s assertions 
and dwells on what he believes is the key to many of the Corps’ problems:  a surfeit of 
leadership among the Corps’ senior officers, “whose limitations were a cause for 
concern even before the war.”29  Specifically, Ryan contends that many senior Marine 
officers, from Commandant Harris down, neglected to grasp the fact that many of the 
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core roles and mission of the Marines were being rapidly made obsolete by new naval 
technologies, tactics, and personnel practices.     
In essence, the Corps’ senior leaders lived in the past, married to old ideas and 
concepts that made their adherence to traditional roles more irrelevant as time passed.  
To Harris, the Corps’ Bull Run experience reinforced his notion of what happened when 
Marines worked outside their traditional roles and “he became determined not to let such 
a thing happen twice.”30   To Ryan, Harris and other officers actively held the Marine 
Corps back in its development of new roles and failed to initiate reforms in the areas of 
training and professional development that might have created a better, more modern 
Corps of Marines.  While absolutely correct, he does not address why they did this, nor 
does he explain why senior naval or military leaders did not intervene to correct the 
situation.   
 Like Millett, Ryan concentrates too tightly on problems internal to the USMC.  
He ignores the fact that the Marine Corps never operated in isolation, but was a 
component of the national armed forces.  He devotes little attention to exploring the 
same issues at the Navy Department and congressional levels, and therefore neglects to 
paint a clear picture of the Marine Corps as part of the larger naval structure.  While 
Ryan correctly observes that some naval operational commanders “displayed a 
startlingly weak grasp of the realities and difficulties of organizing and carrying out a 
successful sea-based land assault,”31 he does not connect that point to the larger matter 
of what actions, if any, were taken by naval leaders to correct these deficiencies and to 
gain a better understanding of those principles.  This dissertation fills that void and 
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examines the expectations of the chain of command above that of the Corps itself, 
particularly since those leaders also were accountable for shaping the Marine Corps to 
meet their demands. 
 Historian David Sullivan’s multi-volume description of the Marine Corps’ 
actions during the Civil War turns away from the organization itself and dwells instead 
largely on the activities of individual Marines.  Within the framework of his 
meticulously detailed research effort, Sullivan places the Marine squarely in the center 
of action and argues (like Collum, Heinl, Moskin, and others before him) that the 
individual heroism and courage of the Marines at the small unit level should somehow 
mitigate the criticisms of the Marine Corps’ general performance during the war.  The 
majority of his work consists of battle narratives.  In the last chapter of his final volume 
Sullivan steps back and provides his analysis of the Corps’ overall performance in the 
war.  He directly attacks the idea that the Marine Corps’ performance in battles such as 
Bull Run or Fort Fisher was less than expected from a regular national military 
organization, instead arguing that the Marine battalion at Bull Run in 1861 fought 
valiantly and “performed as well as, if not better than, any other [Union] military 
organization thrown into the battle….”32  Valor aside, Sullivan forgets that men can fight 
bravely and still lose in battle, and it is that taint of failure, whether accurate or not, that 
can influence how commanders employ that unit from that point on.  This dissertation, 
while acknowledging the courageous individual contributions of Marines, re-centers the 
debate on the organization and on decisions made at higher levels.  It argues that the 
Marine Corps, at the organizational level, could not discern important flaws in its own 
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organization.  If it had, it might have resolved those issues and made changes to enable 
the Corps to better serve the requirements of the military establishment.   
The Corps experienced a crisis of leadership during the war, one that originated 
not only from the higher levels of command, but from outside the Marine Corps as well.  
These problems were compounded by the fact that the Navy Department lacked a clear 
expectation of its own roles, and therefore had little understanding of how the Marine 
Corps should fit within the organization.  Yet these problems were true also of the 
Federal government itself at that same time; in many ways it lacked the administrative 
capacity to achieve its goals.  But whereas the government eventually overcame those 
shortcomings, the Marine Corps continued to flounder.  Fortunately for the Corps, many 
of its junior officers filled the leadership void, providing valued direction and guidance 
that helped to ensure that, at least at the smaller organizational level, Marines were well 
trained and provided with the concerned leadership that allowed them to succeed in roles 
and missions not foreseen or sometimes neglected by senior Marine leaders.  One 
purpose of this study is to shed light into the factors that contributed to that situation.   
Furthermore, the emergence of revolutionary technologies, tactics and weaponry 
that saw implementation during this particular period of time changed the conduct of 
naval warfare and exacerbated the problems inherent in developing a naval strategy that 
went beyond blockading enemy ports.  The Navy’s role in how it identified, 
conceptualized, absorbed and placed these new technologies into service is scrutinized 
along with a critical examination of the process whereby new capabilities are taken into 
account to develop cohesive naval strategies.  Furthermore, the Marine Corps’ role in 
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ascertaining where it fit within these new strategies is analyzed, and the Corps’ 
successes and failures to meet the challenges posed by technological change is 
measured.   
 A number of other questions are examined as well.  Foremost among them is 
assessing exactly what the Navy’s, Marine Corps’ and the nation’s expectations were 
from the Corps in terms of the organization’s roles and missions.  It looks at the factors 
that determined what roles and missions the Corps should be conducting and measures 
its success in meeting those requirements.  The study scrutinizes how the Marine Corps 
responded to stimuli for institutional change and provides analysis of factors that made it 
resistant to acceptance of new ideas of how the unit should function.  The performance 
of its leaders, at all levels, to better prepare the Marine Corps for war and to improve the 
training of its men serve as a yardstick to measure its success.   
Importantly, the Marine Corps could not clearly articulate its personnel 
requirements for officers and enlisted men, in part due to a lack of commitment to make 
necessary reforms and also because of structural weaknesses.  Where other services 
sought new answers to problems of gaining sufficient numbers of qualified persons, the 
Corps instead continued traditional practices that had long proven inefficient.  
Furthermore, senior civilian and naval leaders, themselves confused as to what Marines 
should be doing and relying on perceptions hardened during the first battles of the war, 
relegated their responsibility for oversight of the service to others, thereby aggravating 
the situation. 
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 Finally, the actions of the Marines during the war deserve to be evaluated in 
terms of their performance relative to that of other regular forces.  I contend that the true 
legacy of the Corps during the war lay in its faithful service performed to the best of its 
abilities - despite being handicapped by deep professional, functional, and institutional 
problems.  At the individual and small unit level, Marines served effectively, but the 
uneven performance of its senior leaders exposed serious flaws that, if uncorrected, 
threatened the Corps with absorption into another service or outright dissolution.  
Fortunately for the Marine Corps, its junior leaders became acutely aware of the 
institutional hurdles they needed to overcome and developed among themselves a strong 
desire to advocate needed reforms.  As such, the Civil War Marine Corps, with all of its 
defects, served as the catalyst for changes that would take place later, sowing seeds that 
would flourish in the more fertile grounds of future conflicts.  The Civil War therefore 
served as a sort of crucible that forged strong drives for reform among the Corps' more 
junior leaders, and their actions eventually brought about changes needed for the overall 
professional growth of the institution.   
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CHAPTER II 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF NAVAL WARFARE, 1815-1861 
 
In the early afternoon hours of 8 March 1862, a massive iron monster of a ship 
chugged slowly out of the Elizabeth River in Hampton Roads and set a course for the 
Union warships on blockade duty near Fortress Monroe, Virginia (see Figure 2-1).  The 
strange-looking armored vessel, the reconstructed CSS Virginia (formerly the wooden 
steam frigate USS Merrimack)1 bore ominously down on the Federal ships, belching 
huge plumes of black smoke from its single smokestack.  Aboard the waiting Union 
warships, sailors and Marines manned their weapons and sighted in on the Virginia as it 
closed on them.  On signal, the Union gunners opened fire.  The Virginia’s own 
batteries, one-fourth of them directed and manned by Confederate Marines, followed 
suit.  A one-sided battle soon ensued.  As Union shells bounced harmlessly off the 
Virginia‟s sloping casemate armor plating, the Confederate guns wreaked havoc aboard 
her first intended victim, the USS Cumberland.  At its full speed of five knots, the 
Virginia struck the Cumberland, burying an iron ram deep into the wooden timbers of its 
prey.  Mortally wounded, Cumberland filled with tons of water while the Virginia‟s 
crew frantically disengaged from the wreck, then turned and made for its next target, the 
frigate USS Congress.2  
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Figure 2-1.  Contemporary Map of Hampton Roads Action, 8-9 March 1862.3 
 
 
Having witnessed the ease with which the Virginia dispatched the Cumberland, 
the captain of the Congress (Lieutenant Joseph Smith, Jr.) made way and headed for 
shallow water, hoping that the Virginia‟s deeper draft would prevent it from following.  
The Congress soon ran aground, safe from the Virginia‟s ram, but still within range of 
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the ironclad‟s guns.  Both ships fired at one another at long range, yet the contest was 
grossly uneven:  shots from the Congress merely “glanced harmlessly” off the Virginia‟s 
casemate, yet the Confederate guns wreaked carnage on the wooden Union frigate.  The 
Congress struck its colors, but was soon set ablaze by hot shot fired from the Virginia‟s 
guns.  Seemingly unstoppable, Virginia moved on to its next victim, the steam frigate 
USS Minnesota, also grounded in a forlorn attempt to keep away from the Confederate 
warship.  Expecting to repeat its success against the Congress, the Virginia raked the 
Minnesota with long range fires, but soon tired of the one-sided fight.  With the tide 
changing and light fading, and knowing that the Minnesota would most likely still be 
aground in the morning, the Virginia withdrew slowly up the Elizabeth River to rest its 
crew and to replenish ammunition for the morrow, the path illuminated by the light 
thrown off by the blazing wreck of the Congress.4  In only one afternoon of fighting, a 
single Confederate ironclad had completely destroyed two Union frigates, seriously 
damaged a third, and a fourth (the steam frigate USS Roanoke) also lay helplessly 
aground and vulnerable to destruction by the Virginia.  The Federal blockading squadron 
in Hampton Roads had suddenly ceased to exist as an effective force. 
However, when the Virginia returned the next morning to finish off the 
Minnesota, the Confederates observed what one officer described as “an immense 
shingle floating on the water, with a gigantic cheese box rising from its center.”5  That 
“cheese box on a shingle” turned out to be the USS Monitor, the Union Navy‟s own 
uniquely designed ironclad that had arrived in Hampton Roads only the previous 
afternoon, too late to have joined in that day‟s fight (see Figure 2-2).  With Monitor now 
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on scene, Federal sailors hoped it might stem the carnage that the Virginia had inflicted 
on the Union blockaders the previous day.   The Monitor‟s captain (Lieutenant John L. 
Worden) positioned his ship near the grounded Minnesota, hoping to protect the crippled 
ship from fires from the Virginia.  The two ironclads began an artillery duel that lasted 
for hours, and several times the slower, less maneuverable Virginia tried unsuccessfully 
to ram the Monitor.  The Monitor experienced problems rotating its novel gun turret and 
eventually settled for using the vessel‟s maneuvering power to bring the immobile guns 
to bear on the Virginia.  Neither ship‟s weapons could penetrate the other, although the 
Virginia scored a direct hit on the Monitor‟s pilot-house, blinding its captain and forcing 
a change of command.  As the Union ship withdrew to assess the situation, the Virginia 
also tired of the battle and steamed back up the Elizabeth River.6   
 
 
Figure 2-2.  Side and Top Views of the USS Monitor. 
 
 
Although this first battle between ironclad warships appeared to possess all the 
trappings of signaling the dawn of a revolutionary new age in naval warfare, it instead 
reflected the culmination of a long chain of developments that navies had pursued for 
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almost a half a century.  Britain and France were engaged in an ironclad naval arms race, 
and American developments as a result of the Civil War were but the latest in a long line 
of advances.  Yet the fight at Hampton Roads captured the attention of naval leaders 
around the world, revealing in dramatic fashion the clear superiorities of iron over wood 
in ship construction.  The ironclad duel also showcased both the advantages and 
disadvantages of steam propulsion and spurred the pursuit of more powerful and 
accurate naval artillery and projectiles.  Accounts of the battles at Hampton Roads 
reverberated throughout the naval communities and both accelerated and expanded the 
naval arms race.7  Literally overnight, construction of wooden-hulled warships ceased 
and ironclad alternatives became the new standard.  Furthermore, the fight also exposed 
how much the missions of shipboard Marines were affected by these changes and 
provided two quite different approaches to that problem within Federal and Confederate 
military organizations.   
Yet as historian Craig Symonds explains, perhaps the greatest change brought by 
the fight of 8-9 March 1862 was how it “significantly redefine[d] the character of naval 
combat.”  Gone were the glorious days of epic battles won at sea by men fighting in the 
elements from open decks at close ranges, in clashes often decided by desperate hand-to-
hand combat.  Instead, naval warfare entered the industrial age, wherein officers and 
sailors were but cogs in a great machine, small parts of a mechanical whole, existing 
only to maintain, repair, feed, and operate the great machines of destruction.  In this new 
form of modern warfare most participants had only the vaguest of ideas of what was 
transpiring outside their limited areas of observation.  Even at this early stage, the 
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engineers and mechanics of the ironclads toiled in the dark compartments of the ship, 
covered with soot and grime, often unaware of events occurring above decks.8  These 
new conditions reflected the adoption of a new system of operations and organization, 
wherein specialization of tasks and responsibilities became more important and issues of 
how to command and control ships and crewmembers under such conditions became 
more complex and problematic. 
This chapter examines the American experience in transitioning its naval forces 
from sail to steam, from wood to iron, and in replacing its short-range cannons with 
more powerful and longer-ranged smoothbores and rifled artillery.  It also investigates 
the consequent development of tactics, techniques, and operational procedures to 
maximize on the different capabilities afforded by these new technologies.  In particular, 
it explores the implications that these innovations had for the Marine Corps‟ role in 
modern naval warfare, with special attention paid to the degree that such problems were 
realized and addressed by civilian and military leaders.   
This first battle of ironclads hinted at possible changes in the future roles and 
missions of Marines aboard ship.  The Monitor carried no Marine detachment.  The 
novel ship had no superstructure that might support sharpshooters, a limited number of 
guns, and, with its deck space tightly enclosed, needed no coercive force to keep the 
crew at their battle stations.  In short, the Monitor had no room for Marines in their 
traditional roles.  Conversely, the Confederates adopted a different approach aboard the 
Virginia, where several of the great guns were ably manned by Confederate Marines, 
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who also served as a boarding party for capturing a ship‟s crew once the victim had been 
disabled by the main batteries.9  Both approaches had merit for their respective units. 
The American pursuit of modern warships and ordnance in the decades prior to 
the Civil War era proved uneven and sporadic.  At any given time between 1815 and 
1861, cliques of senior civilian and uniformed naval leaders could be found that either 
solidly opposed or actively advocated experimenting with new propulsion, armor or 
weaponry systems, making the development of modern naval warships an erratic 
process, at best.  All too often new initiatives would be begun, only to be abandoned or 
modified by the next group of leaders, bringing any progress made to a halt.  Ideas 
deemed worthwhile in one administration might be considered foolhardy under the next, 
resulting in discontinuity and inconsistency in long-range planning.  This situation made 
it difficult for the Navy‟s leaders to see beyond the equipment issues and develop the 
tactical concepts needed to implement new naval technologies.  As a result, leaders often 
focused on providing near-term solutions rather than on producing integrated service 
capabilities, practically guaranteeing the Navy and Marine Corps would continue to be 
ill-prepared for new challenges. 
Any visualizing of the Navy‟s path to modernization during this period produces 
a picture similar to the track of a roller coaster.  Although the effort grew more 
consistent in the years immediately preceding the war, overall one would observe spikes 
reflecting sudden bursts of rapid technical improvements and experimentation 
interspersed with valleys depicting years of inactivity, regression, and neglect.  Some 
historians have ascribed this erratic progress as the result of decades of generally myopic 
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or poor leadership.  Critics point to the many starts, stops, delays, changes and 
cancellations of projects that haunted the navy‟s shipbuilding program from 1815 
through early 1861, and lay much of the blame for the uneven progress at the feet of the 
secretaries of the navy.  Others fault the excessive conservativism of the Board of 
Commissioners and the Bureau Chiefs that replaced it.  Each bears some responsibility 
for failing to define long-range goals and implement plans to achieve them.10 
Reexamining the naval shipbuilding program in the decades before the American 
Civil War reveals shortfalls and gaps in the Navy‟s ability to plan for its requirements in 
terms of ships and equipment.  More important to this study is whether the Navy pursued 
in an efficient manner efforts to modernize the fleet and to increase combat capabilities 
by deliberately incorporating new technologies in both ship and weapon design, as 
foreign navies were doing at that same time.  And although there has been some 
disagreement over whether the legislative or executive branch of government proved 
more dominant in formulating and shaping naval policy prior to 1861, historian 
Christopher McKee persuasively concludes that “the initiative and impetus for the 
development and nurturing of the navy have almost always come from the executive 
branch,” and by extension, the appointed secretaries of the navy.11   
One of the most important duties of the senior administrator of the Navy is to 
ensure that his organization is adequately equipped with ships of sufficient quality and 
quantity to execute the missions assigned to it.  By analyzing a particular secretary‟s 
performance in accomplishing that task, that assessment can serve as the basis for 
comparison with the effectiveness of other secretaries.  Such assessments reveal just how 
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conflicted naval policy was between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, a situation 
exacerbated by having some nineteen different secretaries and several interim or acting 
appointees during those years.  On the average, a new administrator assumed control of 
the Navy every two years, a circumstance not conducive to establishing or implementing 
of any long-range plans.  Aggravating that problem is the fact that some secretaries 
opposed previous plans for modernizing the force or pursuing new technologies, further 
degrading the ability of any one secretary to effectively plan beyond his own tenure.12 
For example, toward the end of the War of 1812, the U.S. Navy seemed to be 
foremost among the major navies in the adopting of steam power.  It launched the 
world‟s first steam warship, the USS Fulton I (formerly Demologos), an achievement 
that attracted the interest of even the more powerful British Navy (see Figure 2-3).  The 
unique, catamaran style frigate powered by a steam-driven centrally mounted wheel 
between the hulls was described as being “far in advance of her time,” yet the end of the 
war and a change in naval leadership helped bring the bold experiment to an 
ignominious end.  When the Fulton‟s chief proponent, Navy Secretary William Jones, 
resigned in late 1814, his successor, Benjamin W. Crowninshield suspended work on a 
sister ship and quickly relegated the Fulton to mundane duty as a receiving ship.13  
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Figure 2-3.  Contemporary Drawing of the USS Fulton I.14 
 
 
The next major experimentation with steam involved the Navy‟s purchase of the 
riverboat steamer Enterprise in December 1822.  Faced with an urgent need for a 
shallow draft steamer to help intercept pirates off the coast of Cuba, the Navy purchased 
the vessel, rechristened it the USS Sea Gull, and employed it in the West Indies for three 
years, becoming the first steam warship to engage in combat operations.15  Despite its 
success, steam power continued to be viewed by some as highly experimental. 
Certain secretaries stand out from their peers as either being great proponents for 
progress and efficiency or as negative forces that made the Navy less capable under their 
tutelage.  For example, historian Edwin M. Hall argues that “the war-readiness of the 
U.S. Navy after the War of 1812 reached bottom under [Navy Secretary Smith] 
Thompson.”  Thompson, who favored austere budgets, “showed no interest in 
technological developments,” and the few ships contracted under him were mostly still 
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under construction decades later.  One of Thompson‟s ships, the New York, “proceeded 
so slowly that she was still on the stocks at Norfolk when the Civil War began and was 
burned when the Norfolk Yard was destroyed” four decades later.16   
Thompson‟s successor, Samuel L. Southard, reversed that downward trend.  
Southard “welcomed technological change” and seemed supportive of efforts to 
modernize the fleet while still understanding the need to reduce numbers of ships.  
Importantly, Southard successfully communicated those desires to Congress, gaining 
funding for new shipbuilding.  However, that achievement was mitigated somewhat by 
the actions of the Board of Navy Commissioners, which convinced Southard to instead 
allow it to reallocate some construction funding toward repairs of outmoded ships, thus 
diluting his original intentions.17  This example reinforces the observation that the Board 
served at times as an anchor delaying the forces for change.   
Although the next two secretaries paid little attention to shipbuilding and 
modernizing, in 1834 Secretary Mahlon Dickerson convinced the frugal Andrew Jackson 
administration to build steam warships.  Dickerson argued in his first annual report that 
steam warships enhanced “the . . . strength and respectability” of the Navy, and he 
declared that “the power of steam is soon to produce as great a revolution in the defense 
of rivers, bays, coasts, and harbors, as it has already done in commerce, intercourse, and 
business.”  In response, the navy began constructing a new steam-powered battery, the 
Fulton II, and two years later Congress authorized two similar vessels.18   
The same inconsistent approach to modernizing could be found even at the 
highest levels of government.  President Andrew Jackson, a former army general, argued 
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in his first Message to Congress in 1829 that the Navy represented “the best standing 
security of this country against foreign aggression,” yet believed the service needed 
reorganization and had too many obsolescent warships.  Six years later, Jackson reversed 
his opinion, arguing instead for “its gradual enlargement,” and the following year, 1836, 
the Navy needed “a speedy increase of the force that has been heretofore employed 
abroad and at home,” even if it were costly.  Those expenses, he asserted, “are small 
compared with the benefits which they will secure to the country.”19  Jackson‟s reversal 
reflected two points of analysis: he had not provided adequate support to the service in 
his first term, and by the time of his second term had gained a new sense of appreciation 
for the role the Navy played in protecting the expansion of American maritime 
commercial interests.  In all, Jackson learned to better manage the costs of maintaining 
the Navy‟s capabilities.  The same points applied to Jackson‟s thoughts concerning the 
Marine Corps, which will be covered in due course in the next chapter.  
Meanwhile, Commodore John Rodgers, the President of the Board of Naval 
Commissioners under Dickerson, reversed a longstanding position of the board when in 
1836 he concluded that steam power did have a valid place in the future of the U.S. 
Navy.  Authoring a document that provided the closest semblance to anything of a naval 
policy at the time, Rodgers acknowledged not only the need for steam warships in the 
Navy; he recommended that twenty-five of the vessels be built.  Yet the vague roles he 
identified for the ships revealed his limited understanding of the existing capabilities of 
steam warships already being realized in other modern navies.  He argued for steam 
vessels “to defend our great estuaries, to aid the operations of our other naval force, and 
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in the concentration or movements of the military force,” all auxiliary or support 
missions.20  Rodgers, though changing his mind about the value of steam in the Navy, 
still could not foresee that it would eventually replace sail on naval vessels. 
But others were working toward that goal.  In 1837, the Navy launched the steam 
vessel Fulton II, a ship that became in some ways the forerunner of a new steam Navy.  
Although generally unseaworthy, the Fulton II did provide naval engineers with a test 
platform for experimenting with the concepts of steam propulsion and armor plating on 
warships (see Figure 2-4).  To get the most out of the tests, Dickerson assigned a long-
time critic of the navy‟s sluggish support of innovative ideas, Captain Matthew C. Perry, 
to command the Fulton II.  Perry took an active role in the ship‟s trials, in the process 
becoming one of the first advocates for what eventually became the Navy‟s engineering 
branch and earning him the title “father of the steam navy.”  From the Marine Corps‟ 
perspective, although it assigned a detachment to the vessel, it did not give any 
consideration to how Marines should be employed on modern warships:  the duties 
assigned its members were traditional ones identical to those on other Navy ships at the 
time.  The ship spent the next twenty-four years on active service until seized by Florida 
and Alabama militiamen at the Navy Yard in Pensacola, Florida in 1861.21 
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Figure 2-4.  USS Fulton II.22 
 
 
In another example of how changes in administration caused abrupt adjustments 
in naval policy, in 1837 Martin Van Buren succeeded Andrew Jackson as president.  
Van Buren brought with him a different view of the value of the Navy.  Despite having 
been Jackson‟s vice-president, he contended that “this country required no navy at all, 
much less a steam navy.”23  Van Buren replaced Dickerson with James Kirke Paulding, 
who historian W. Patrick Strauss characterizes as a man that “planted himself across the 
path of progress toward „dirty and noisy steamers.‟”24   
In 1837, the navy lost the influence of Commodore John Rodgers as well.  Late 
that year the man who had headed the Board of Naval Commissioners off and on for 
almost thirty years retired, and that conservative body fell back into its familiar groove 
39 
 
 
of generally opposing new ideas.  According to Strauss, “While major navies abroad 
adopted iron ships, steam power, and more powerful shells for their guns, the board still 
believed that the wooden sailing ship of the line was the embodiment of sea power, 
smoothbore cannon and solid shot the epitome of firepower; and proficiency in 
seamanship the great quality sought in officers.”  The financial impact of the Panic of 
1837 worsened the situation, as it brought increased pressure to reduce government 
expenditures, particularly expensive experiments with new technologies.  For all these 
reasons, steam power and other modernizing efforts generally languished during 
Secretary Paulding‟s tenure.25 
The next period of growth in naval ship construction took place during the tenure 
of Secretary Abel Upshur, widely considered to be a reformer genuinely interested in 
making the navy a more capable and efficient force for the nation.  Upshur was a 
forward thinking leader who presciently believed that “the application of steam-power to 
vessels of war, and the improvements which have recently been made in artillery, are 
destined to change the whole system of maritime war.”  In his first annual report he 
advised that “a very large part of [the fleet] ought to consist of steamships.”  Of interest 
is his advocacy for all-iron steam warships, and he urged Congress to authorize the 
constructing of “at least one vessel of medium size, sufficiently large to afford a fair test, 
without exposing too much to the hazard of failure.”26   
When Upshur assumed office in 1841, two of the three steamers authorized by 
Congress in 1839, the Missouri and Mississippi, were still being built along the same 
general design as Fulton II; as side-wheel steamers whose 650 horsepower engines 
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would propel them at about 9 ½ knots.  However, since the exposed engines and drive 
wheels were vulnerable to enemy fire, few naval officers believed the ships were useful 
for anything other than peacetime missions or as test platforms for steam technology.27   
One Navy officer believed he could solve the vulnerability issues, if he were only 
given the chance.  Captain Robert R. Stockton proposed building a steam sloop 
propelled by a submerged screw, thereby using the ship‟s own hull to protect the boilers 
and machinery.  Upshur supported Stockton and gave him command of the warship, later 
christened as the Princeton, to serve as a floating laboratory for the Navy (see Figure 2-
5).  Further innovations, such as a six-bladed screw, increased the performance and 
versatility of the vessel, and Stockton also had several notions concerning ordnance that 
will be discussed later.  In 1843, Princeton became the first screw-driven steam warship 
in the world and also the first naval vessel to burn the more efficient (and cleaner) 
anthracite coal, a significant development in itself.  Anthracite not only provided more 
energy per ton, but it produced less smoke when burned, thereby also reducing the 
characteristic signature plume that normally gave away a steam-powered vessel's 
location for many miles.28   
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Figure 2-5.  The USS Princeton.29 
 
 
In addition to supporting Stockton‟s work, Upshur also pushed for the building of 
four more experimental iron steamers:  the Michigan, Union, Water Witch, and 
Alleghany.  Two of the ships, Union and Allegheny, unfortunately proved wholly 
unreliable, but served to provide valuable data to naval construction engineers 
nonetheless.  Of the others, after a major redesigning of Water Witch‟s propulsion 
system, that ship on to spend about a decade in active naval service around the world.  
And the Michigan, the Navy's first all iron-hulled vessel, served for decades in the Great 
Lakes.  Upshur also pursued another initiative that initially appeared to great promise.  
In 1842, he requested funding to build a “shot and shell proof” armored steam battery 
along the lines of the original Fulton I steam battery.  However, contractual and 
technological problems plagued the project for almost two decades, during which several 
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models were discarded.  Finally, a smaller, all iron-hulled battery clad in 4-inch armor 
plate with a twin screw-drive was launched in 1860.  By then, the Stevens’ Battery (later 
Naugatuck) was outdated and consequently saw little operational use even during the 
Civil War (see Figure 2-6).  In 1862, it provided disappointing service at Drewry‟s Bluff 
in the James River.30  The combining of cost overruns, serious design limitations and 
overly long construction period ensured it had little positive influence on the navy‟s 
ship-building program.    
 
 
Figure 2-6.  The USS Naugatuck (Stevens’ Battery), 1862.31 
 
 
Secretary Upshur paid a terrible personal price for his support of new 
technologies.  Just seven months after relinquishing the naval portfolio to become 
Secretary of State, Upshur, President John Tyler, and other dignitaries boarded the 
Princeton to observe a test-firing of the ship‟s unique naval gun system.  On 28 February 
1844, with the crowd pressing close to its novel twin 12-inch guns, the breech of one 
piece exploded and shot shrapnel into the group.  President Tyler, who had lingered 
behind the crowd, narrowly escaped injury, but Secretary Upshur, Secretary of the Navy 
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Thomas Gilmer, and four others were killed outright, and scores of other guests 
wounded.  Although a court of inquiry absolved Captain Stockton of any blame in the 
accident, the incident cast a pall over his experiments for several years afterward.32  
For the next two years, naval requirements were heavily influenced by worsening 
relations with Mexico over the annexation of Texas that culminated in the Mexican War.  
As the diplomatic situation deteriorated, Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft queried 
the commander of the Home Squadron, Commodore David Conner, about assets he 
might need should the nation be forced to blockade Mexico‟s Gulf coast or seize coastal 
ports.  Conner quickly replied that he would require a sea-going steamer and ships with 
drafts of eight to ten feet to operate in the sandbar-clogged Mexican Gulf port cities.  
These communications hinted of the possibility of future landing party operations, yet 
there is no evidence that they were shared with Marine Commandant Archibald 
Henderson, who might have made special preparations for such an eventuality.33 
The outbreak of hostilities near the Rio Grande and congressional declaration of 
war against Mexico on 13 May 1846 added a sense of urgency to the navy‟s 
requirements.  Bancroft quickly gained authority to fill Conner‟s earlier request, 
purchasing outright several small, shallow-draft vessels that proved ideally suited for the 
Gulf environment.  Furthermore, Conner added to his squadron by capturing and arming 
several small Mexican steamers, giving his force greater capability to cross sandbars and 
move up shallow rivers.  As a result, Conner‟s forces soon captured Tabasco, Frontera 
and Tampico, his steamers towing gunboats over the sandbars and providing the means 
of moving up rivers against the current, regardless of wind conditions.  The smaller 
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steamers also granted greater mobility in transporting troops ashore.34  Tellingly, 
squadron commanders routinely stationed themselves on steamers, whenever available, 
proving the value and versatility of steam power. 
The increased dependability and flexibility of steam warships in the Mexican 
War convinced the new Secretary of the Navy, John Mason, to request “four war 
steamers of the first class.”  In 1848, Congress authorized the building of four vessels 
that became the Powhatan, Saranac, Susquehanna, and San Jacinto.  A unique contract 
system entailed their being built under the supervision of naval constructors at New 
York, but employed as contract mail steamers until required in wartime.  The agreement 
also stipulated that each mail steamer be capable of easy conversion to a warship in 
event of need, and that active naval officers be assigned to each ship at all times.35 
Even as it entered the 1850s, the navy institutionally still seemed reluctant to 
commit to steam technology despite improvements in the durability and efficiency of 
steam engines.  For example, in a report detailing the advantages of steam over sail, 
Secretary William Graham confusingly urged that “authority be given to build every 
year two new vessels, one sail and the other steam.”  In asking for half the ships to be 
sail, he contradicted his own argument that it was “vain to rest content with the old 
models and armaments and appliances of vessels, which, however excellent in their day, 
may have been superseded by more recent inventions.”36  These conflicting statements 
indicated that there was no long-term, coherent shipbuilding policy.   
The next year, a new secretary, John P. Kennedy, again changed direction, this 
time advocating the construction of even more steam vessels.  Reporting “the principal 
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maritime nations are now diligently intent upon the effort to build up powerful navies,” 
he asked for “three first-class screw-propeller frigates, and the same number of propeller 
sloops-of-war [and] . . . a few smaller steamers.”  Kennedy essentially proposed an all 
steam navy and also boldly urged that Congress authorize “the establishment of one or 
more factories for the construction of all the machinery necessary to the complete 
requirements of the largest class of steamers.”37  However, Kennedy served only seven 
months, leaving office with President Millard Fillmore‟s administration.   
The incoming Democratic President, Franklin Pierce, selected Southerner James 
C. Dobbin for his Secretary of the Navy.  Dobbin sought to build a navy that could 
protect American maritime interests around the world and assert neutral rights for 
commerce.  Consequently he urged building “at least six first-class steam-frigate 
propellers” since he believed those ships had distinct advantages over side or stern-
wheel steamers.  The screw-propeller arrangement, he asserted, by not “being exposed to 
the shot of the enemy,” combined “two elements of progress – the sail and the steam-
engine.”  In other words, Dobbin believed the screw-propeller arrangement to be the 
most versatile and less vulnerable of the options: it freed more deck space for cannon 
that would otherwise be masked by side-wheels and moved the vulnerable machinery 
below decks where it was better protected by the hull.38 
After some debate, Congress appropriated funds for Dobbin‟s six steam frigates 
and the last of those vessels was launched by the end of 1856.  Dobbin also 
recommended much-needed changes in the contracting process that Congress soon 
adopted; withholding half of a ship‟s construction funding until the vessel was launched, 
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tested, and met expectations.  Those rules were implemented, in part, as a response to the 
loss of control experienced on the Navy‟s albatross project, the Stevens’ Battery.  That 
venture, begun over a decade before, continued to limp along without producing any 
significant progress, serving as an expensive and highly visible example of the need for 
reform of the Navy‟s contracting process.39   
During Dobbin‟s tenure, the Navy also passed up a great opportunity to witness 
first-hand the successes (and failures) of European naval forces in integrating new 
technologies in ship design.  Multinational conflicts such as the Crimean War provided a 
laboratory of sorts wherein new ideas and concepts in naval technologies could be tested 
and improved upon in actual combat conditions.  Although not a participant in the 
Crimean War, the United States nonetheless sought to benefit from the experiences of 
European combatants by dispatching military observers to glean nuggets of information 
on “The Art of War in Europe” that might improve its own military forces.  To this end, 
Secretary of War Jefferson Davis dispatched three Army officers under Major Richard 
Delafield to Europe, who visited the military forces of several combatants on both sides 
of the conflict.  Returning a year later, the team presented their observations in a richly 
detailed report that circulated widely throughout the American military.40  And although 
the army officers provided a wealth of information on select naval subjects, such as 
modern naval rifles, floating batteries, hospital ships, ship-fort engagements and the like, 
their report could have benefitted from the inclusion of a naval officer.  By not 
dispatching its own observers, the Navy missed an invaluable opportunity to better 
prepare its forces for future conflicts. 
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Nonetheless, Dobbin did not hesitate to use European examples to support his 
goal of enhancing American naval power.  In his 1854 report, Dobbin alluded to the 
utility of screw-driven steam sloops in the Crimean War to back his request to construct 
some for his navy.  With a draft of only eighteen feet, he pointed out that such ships 
could enter any major American port, where larger frigates could not.  Dobbin strongly 
asserted that, given ten screw-driven steam sloops outfitted with fifteen to twenty guns 
each, the Navy “could annoy the enemy at sea, and penetrate and defend our harbors 
along the coast inaccessible to the larger class of heavier draught.”41   
Several influential contemporary naval officers later considered Dobbin‟s tenure, 
the first full four-year term served by a Navy Secretary in two decades, as “a time of 
naval awakening and naval expansion.”  Historian Harold Langley concurs, observing 
that Alfred T. Mahan and George Dewey, both midshipmen during Dobbin‟s term, 
considered it the “last great period of [development] before the Civil War.”42 
With the inauguration of Democrat James Buchanan in 1857, Isaac Toucey 
replaced Dobbin.  Fortunately for the naval services, the new secretary pursued many of 
the same initiatives of his predecessor.  Though rising sectional difficulties and the 
economic distress caused by the Panic of 1857 made it difficult to gain significant 
funding increases, Toucey managed to take advantage of tensions between Britain and 
America over the African slave trade to convince the Southern-dominated Naval 
Committee to build seven shallow-draft steam sloops similar to those proposed earlier by 
Dobbin.  Interestingly, part of his argument centered on his observation that the Navy 
had few vessels “that can enter most of the harbors south of Norfolk,” and that the 
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sloops, if built, could fill that need.  By 1860, seven had been built and placed in service, 
just in time to perform that mission during the Civil War.  And in his last report in 1860, 
Toucey cogently recommended that all newly-constructed Navy vessels be propelled by 
steam, and that some older warships be refitted as steamers.43   
Although not considered a particularly strong secretary, Toucey attempted to 
make the Navy as efficient and functional as circumstances would permit.  Concerning 
operations, Toucey‟s introduction of steam power, along with the coaling stations to 
support it, helped make the African Squadron effective in its role for the first time in its 
four decades of existence.  In addition, his purchase of commercial steamers as auxiliary 
naval vessels enabled the Punitive Expedition to Paraguay in 1859-1860 to succeed as 
the largest overseas deployment of combat power since the Mexican War.  Toucey also 
proved supportive of other technology initiatives in the area of ordnance.  And, Toucey 
provided the Marine Corps with excellent support, authorizing the transfer of artillery 
and ammunition to the Corps and allowing some of its officers to attend the artillery 
course at West Point.  Each of those initiatives helped create a more capable Navy and 
Marine Corps.  However, as a southern sympathizer and an avid devotee of his president 
(James Buchanan), Toucey did little to ready the Navy or its personnel for combating a 
Southern rebellion, even when that threat loomed prominently.44 
Looking at the period between 1815 and 1861, the pursuit of American naval 
steam vessels proved a discontinuous and fragmented process.  Responsibility for this 
properly rests on the shoulders of the naval leaders for failing to articulate a clear 
position on new technologies and ideas.  The dizzying succession of different 
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administrators, each changing their minds abruptly and frequently regarding the types of 
ships that the service required, made it extremely difficult to plan for long-range 
requirements.  Not until late in the period did the combination of having full-term navy 
secretaries and the creation of advisory boards coupled with service-led construction and 
inspection efforts produce some level of consistency in the process.  Although they 
gained some limited success by adopting commercial steam propulsion systems to 
military use, the efforts failed to produce a modern, serviceable ironclad warship in the 
years before the Civil War.   
The developing of more powerful, safer, and more versatile naval weapons 
followed a different path.  During the same period of time, great leaps were made in the 
area of naval armament:  what Spencer Tucker refers to as a “Revolution in Naval 
Ordnance.”  In the War of 1812, most ships‟ guns were muzzle-loading, smooth-bore 
short cannons that were dependent on tactics designed for close-range, massed broadside 
salvoes to inflict enough damage to the enemy‟s ship and crew to force surrender.  The 
Napoleonic Wars in Europe accelerated the development of more powerful artillery 
pieces and the use of experimental shells, vice shot, as a way of increasing the 
destructive power of projectiles.  In 1824, the development of the French Paixhans shell, 
named for its inventor Henri-Joseph Paixhans, demonstrated that wooden naval ships 
could not withstand the greater explosive and penetrating power of shells and 
consequently sparked a naval arms race.45   
Initially, the American fleet‟s adopting of modern naval artillery faced many of 
the same challenges seen with other new technologies:  the old system had worked fine 
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for the more senior naval leaders, so why change?  Not surprisingly, many of the same 
naval leaders who favored iron construction and steam power also embraced new naval 
artillery designs; conversely, the same men who resisted steam and iron also generally 
opposed shells and high-velocity guns.  One of the early proponents for the new 
Paixhans type shells was Matthew Perry, who enthusiastically tested and evaluated 
several different artillery and shell designs while captain of the Fulton II.  Impressed 
with his findings, in 1840 Secretary Paulding ordered Perry to continue that effort, 
hoping to use Perry‟s data to support the purchase of shells for some of the larger guns in 
the fleet.  Research on naval guns continued until the Princeton accident in 1844, when 
that episode placed a damper on experiments.46 
On 25 June 1844, Secretary Mason dispatched two officers to Europe to learn 
more about France‟s ordnance standardization program.  That same year Mason 
instituted his own board to investigate and recommend a similar standardizing of naval 
ordnance for the American fleet.  His goal was to simplify the logistical nightmare of 
having to supply the many different calibers of shot/shell in use throughout the navy, by 
possibly cutting down on the many types and sizes of guns that could be found even on a 
single warship.  By 1847, the board had succeeded in its task, and soon after almost the 
entire Navy had adopted a new system of deploying only six models of 32-pounder 
cannons and two versions of an 8-inch shell gun.  It also doubled the number of shell 
guns on all ships.  Of course, ships carried lesser guns as well, particularly on the smaller 
vessels, but the move was “beneficial in that it greatly simplified the types of shot and 
charges and eliminated possible costly error in battle.”47  With the nation then at war 
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with Mexico, this single initiative greatly simplified the required resupply and rearming 
of the fleet, saving precious resources.  
During the latter half of the 1840s, Lieutenant John A. Dahlgren became one of 
the premier experts in the field of naval ordnance, and his stabilizing influence added 
structure to the Navy‟s development of ships‟ weapon systems.  He had been one of the 
first Americans to learn of the capabilities of Paixhans‟ shells, and had also served on 
the successful ordnance standardization board.  In 1847, Dahlgren successfully adapted 
the highly experimental Hale rockets for naval service against Mexico.  But his major 
career achievement lay in his research, testing, and developing of new naval guns for the 
fleet.48   
To support his tests, Dahlgren first created a naval test range along the Anacostia 
River in Maryland, applying the same principles he learned in the coast survey to 
accurately survey the range.  Once established, Dahlgren used the range extensively to 
experiment with various guns, and eventually designing his own series of weapons.  The 
Dahlgren gun, as it was called, took into account the common metallurgical flaws all too 
often encountered by ships‟ gunners with sometimes fatal results.  He added more metal 
around the vital breech area, and cast less metal around the lower-stressed muzzle area.  
The result was a lighter, yet safer gun, thus solving two problems at once.  Furthermore, 
his detailed testing of guns with various bore sizes and shell combinations led him to 
recommend that the navy move away from 32-pounders and instead adopt more accurate 
and longer-range combinations.49   
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Dahlgren also designed versatile small boat howitzers that proved especially 
valuable to Marines in several landing force operations, in particular the assault against 
the Barrier Forts in China in 1856.  Despite occasional conflicts with his immediate 
supervisors, some of whom “disapproved [of] Dahlgren‟s ideas and methods,” 
Dahlgren‟s work bore fruit.  In 1854, the Navy adopted the 9-inch Dahlgren gun as the 
standard armament for the USS Merrimack, the first of a new class of screw frigates.  
The success of that trial helped Dahlgren convince Secretary Toucey in 1857 to use the 
sloop Plymouth as a test platform for an 11-inch Dahlgren pivot gun – the pivot being 
yet another ordnance innovation (see Figure 2-7).  That same year (1857), Dahlgren‟s 
crew fired 121 11-inch and 230 9-inch shells from the decks of the Plymouth “without 
experiencing any of the difficulties usually supposed to render such heavy ordnance 
nearly unavailable on shipboard,” dispelling “all remaining doubt” about the weapons.50  
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Figure 2-7.  11-inch Dahlgren Pivot Gun on the USS Kearsarge (1864).51 
 
 
Understanding that a warship‟s main purpose is to place naval guns where they 
could best engage the enemy, Secretary Toucey could confidently report in 1858 that “In 
the Dahlgren gun we have found what we want, and it is believed there is no gun in any 
service that surpasses it.”  Meanwhile, the Navy‟s own foundries, machine shops, and 
gun-carriage manufacturers, all established under Dahlgren‟s watchful eye, freed the 
service from having to deal with sometimes unreliable outside contractors and helped 
ensure a level of quality that enhanced the Dahlgren gun‟s standing.  Flush with success, 
Dahlgren turned to the developing of even larger guns and conducting experiments with 
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rifled cannon.52  And by 1861, Dahlgren‟s guns could be found throughout the nation, 
where they were thereafter used with great effectiveness by both sides. 
Surveying American naval ship construction and weapons development supports 
two major points of analysis.  First, particularly with regard to the transitioning from 
wind to steam power, the Navy‟s harnessing of modern technology into its vessels was 
sporadic and overly dependent on the influence of certain key personalities rather than 
any deliberate plan.  When a particular leader did manage to gain authority to 
experiment with a particular new concept, the effort was all too frequently cancelled or 
changed by the next, further frustrating the efforts of reformers to modernize the 
American Navy.  The development of naval ordnance was less sporadic, due to the 
prominence of certain dominant persons whose expertise in that field outweighed the 
voices of critics and opponents to change.   
Second, even when the Navy gained an improved capability, it lacked a system to 
develop the new tactics, techniques and procedures to maximize the advantages of the 
technology.  Such a system would have helped the Navy as an institution benefit from 
the new potential by properly matching tactics to capability.  It would also help to 
identify shortfalls in either, that could then be properly addressed by leaders.  Shortfalls 
in either capabilities or tactics represent combat requirements.  Once identified, plans 
can then be developed to fulfill those requirements.  This type of process can also add 
structure to a defined research and development effort to produce a more fully integrated 
capability.  But without having a process or system to integrate new equipment with 
proper tactics, the full potential of the weapon may go unrealized.  For example, when 
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Dahlgren‟s efforts bore fruit by producing safer, more powerful, and increasingly 
accurate naval guns, the Navy at first simply used the new guns to replace old ones, and 
continued to use the same tactics employed with the older weapons.  A more effective 
approach might have been to replace all older ordnance on a vessel with the new 
weapons, and then develop new tactics to advantageously engage enemies at greater 
distances.  The latter approach would have allowed ships equipped with Dahlgren‟s guns 
to hit enemy targets from ranges beyond that which the enemy could hit with inferior 
guns.  Similarly, if that range advantage were coupled with new tactics to maximize on 
the use of steam power that freed vessels from the vagaries of wind, one can see the 
extra benefits that might be gained in combat over enemy forces as compared to older, 
close engagements to deliver massed, broadside fires as done in the War of 1812.   
The problem, however, went beyond the absence of a system to develop tactics to 
fit capability.  Even if new tactics were developed to fit the increased capabilities 
derived from the integrating of new technologies in modern ships, the Navy Department 
did not have the means to capture and disseminate standard lessons learned until the 
creation of the Naval Academy in 1845.  Before then, the Navy relied on individual ship 
captains for that purpose, an inefficient and fragmentary effort at best.  Furthermore, 
many of those same captains constituted the largest body of resistance to new ideas and 
many were wholly unfamiliar with emerging concepts, technologies or tactics to begin 
with.  And even with the Academy, decades passed before it found itself in a position to 
teach new officers about the latest technological or scientific advances.  For example, 
according to historian Harold Langley, steamers were not regularly assigned to it for 
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practice ships until after the Civil War, making that institution of little value in teaching 
new officers practical information they might need about steam propulsion.53   
Since no formal mechanism existed within the Navy Department to develop the 
new tactics or procedures to match the increased capabilities, many warships engaged 
enemies using essentially the same methods employed in the War of 1812.  In truth, the 
problem went even deeper.  Not only was there no single system to develop new tactics, 
in the critical field of naval gunnery there were few gunnery procedures or drills that 
were standardized at a level beyond that of an individual ship.  Gunnery procedures, 
even commands, varied widely from ship to ship and sometimes even gun to gun, 
making it more difficult to develop cohesive and efficient gun crews.  Even seasoned 
sailors required some amount of additional training to gain proficiency with a particular 
gun captain‟s methods and commands.  Historian Spencer Tucker cites the excellent 
example of one gunner in 1850:  “when he first entered the service, there were twenty-
seven separate [commands] for exercising the guns in his division, whereas another 
officer on the same ship received only three commands – fire, load, and run out.”54  In 
the area of gunnery, at least, Marine gun crews had a distinct advantage over their Navy 
brethren by the simple virtue of having all been trained in one system by Marine officers 
who, in turn received all their instruction from one focal point:  the Corps‟ Adjutant and 
Inspector‟s training cadre.  With their standardized procedures, Marines could more 
easily increase gun crew proficiency, a factor not wasted on ships' captains eager to eke 
out greater combat efficiencies from their crews.     
57 
 
 
This examination illustrates that the Navy Department adopted new concepts and 
technologies in a haphazard manner in the decades before the Civil War.  Furthermore, it 
had no defined system of integrating capabilities with tactics.  Of greater relevance to 
this study is that no consideration was given to the ways that the naval modernization 
effort might affect the overall mission of the Marine Corps in naval warfare.  Part of the 
reason lies in the fact that the Navy had no clear visualization of how the adopting of 
faster, more versatile steam vessels, greater armor and longer range, more accurate and 
deadly armament might change its own methods of fighting.  And, if the Navy could not 
systematize its own adapting to the changing face of naval warfare and create new 
tactics, techniques and procedures to fully realize the technological gains, who could 
expect it to understand how those same changes might affect the Marine Corps?   
Another factor is that the Navy Department, since its earliest years, typically 
administered the Marine Corps with a paternalistic sense of benign neglect, paying little 
attention to the service unless a problem surfaced.  Until it was dissolved in 1842, the 
Board of Navy Commissioners did not include Marine representation and that body 
consequently only addressed specific Marine Corps issues that threatened to impact the 
Navy at large; issues such as manning, regulations, pay and allowances, and the like.55  
When the old Board of Navy Commissioners system made way for the forming of 
separate functional bureaus, again Marines were excluded.  Although it would have been 
quite easy (and more effective) to detail a Marine officer to the Bureau of Ordnance and 
Hydrography to represent the Corps‟ interests in weapons or ordnance issues, that step 
was not even considered.  A similar situation existed at the highest levels of the Navy 
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Department.  In general, the various secretaries of the navy and their staffs remained 
interested mainly in ensuring that adequate numbers of Marines were assigned to ships 
and shore stations, and little attention was paid to how they were employed except when 
problems arose.56   
In the decades before the Civil War, the Navy Department paid little attention to 
the Marine Corps unless a problem arose.  As an institution, it invested little time or 
effort considering how new technologies and capabilities might affect the roles and 
missions of the Marine Corps in naval warfare; there were enough problems determining 
how those factors would affect the Navy.  Marine problems were left to the Corps‟ own 
leaders to solve, unless the problem had some direct bearing on the Navy.  And with the 
changing nature of naval warfare gradually making traditional roles and missions of 
Marines on ship less relevant and even obsolescent, the future of the Marine Corps was 
therefore left by default largely in the hands of Marine leaders.  Some of those leaders 
would prove more effective than others in dealing with those issues.  
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CHAPTER III 
ARCHIBALD HENDERSON’S MARINE CORPS 
 
Taking advantage of the cooler temperatures in the late Florida afternoon on 4 
May 1837, Brevet Brigadier General Archibald Henderson, Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, sat down to pen a letter to his wife, Anne.  With his long campaign against Creek 
and Seminole Indians drawing to a close, he wanted to tell Anne that he would soon be 
home.  Even within such an intimate communication, Henderson‟s pride in his 
achievements during what was known as the Second Seminole War found its way into 
the letter.  And he had a lot to be proud of.  Then fifty-four years old, an age when many 
persons were content to follow a more sedentary lifestyle, Henderson instead did 
something that no other military service chief had done since the Revolution:  he 
personally led his troops into combat.  With a touch of self-satisfaction, he informed 
Anne that he “never sleep[s] out of the camp and have now been near eleven months 
continuously in tents in the field.”  However, petty rivalries also crept in and he could 
not resist contrasting his dedication to duty with that of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel 
Miller, his next senior Marine officer, who “has never left Tampa for the field and has 
[even] gone to Havannah [sic] in one of the cutters for a visit.”1    
Internal discord aside, Henderson returned to his favorite subject, the Marines, 
and boasted of how their aggressive patrolling had succeeded in depriving hostile Indians 
of a refuge and forcing many of the enemy to sue for peace.  In the field, surrounded by 
the camp tents of his fellow Marines, he took comfort that his men had worked alongside 
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army troops in a new role and mission; to help restore order and federal control over a 
rugged and often violent frontier.  And, to his personal credit, Henderson‟s performance 
in the field earned him new, ground-breaking commands; first of an army artillery 
regiment and then the command of a full brigade comprised of regular army, Marine, 
militia and volunteer troops.  In the end, his “distinguished services in the Creek and 
Seminole campaigns” earned him his brevet promotion to brigadier general; the highest 
rank ever bestowed on a Marine officer at that time.2  Now, sitting on the banks of the 
Hillsborough River in central Florida, his mission nearly over, he had time to both reflect 
on his accomplishments to that point, and also to look forward to the next challenges for 
his beloved Corps.  Having served as Commandant for sixteen years, Henderson already 
had achieved more than all previous Commandants combined, yet he had even higher 
goals in mind.   
This chapter explores the influence and actions of Archibald Henderson in first 
saving the Marine Corps as a service, then forging it into a more efficient and important 
element of the national military establishment.  It examines his role in modernizing the 
unit in terms of both its roles and missions as well as in acquiring and employing newer, 
more efficient technologies and equipment.  It also appraises Henderson‟s efforts to 
institutionalize practices intended to increase the professionalization of the officer corps 
and enhance the general proficiency of individual Marines.  Henderson‟s goals and 
visions for the organization are scrutinized to ascertain the level of progress that he made 
toward reaching his objectives and institutionalizing his initiatives.  The analysis of that 
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evolution will provide a baseline for comparative assessment of his performance with 
that of others.    
This study argues that Henderson proved to be the right man to lead the Marine 
Corps at the right time.  But who was he?  Several historians have assessed Henderson‟s 
strengths and weaknesses.  According to Allan Millett, “Henderson was politically 
astute, stubborn, intelligent, and a polished gentleman of considerable charm.”  He 
describes Henderson as a complicated man, yet “also a bit of a martinet” who was “no 
slouch as a bureaucratic infighter and schemer.”  Nonetheless, Henderson tempered his 
“burning ambition” with genuine “moral probity, devotion to his Corps, and love of 
soldiering.”3  Joseph Dawson characterizes Henderson as “an exemplary American 
military leader” whose leadership by personal example guided the Marine Corps through 
one of the most challenging periods in its history.  An intelligent, articulate, and 
meticulous man, his dedicated and determined effort to improve the Corps allowed him 
to put “his stamp on future generations of Marines.”4  A similar picture, by Joseph 
Alexander, paints Henderson as “an unofficial, outspoken crusader for professionalism 
and accountability within his own officer corps” who “inherited a tiny Marine Corps in 
disarray, a marginal naval auxiliary” that, “in less-capable hands . . . would surely have 
failed to survive another decade.”5  Henderson was the right man, with the precise skills, 
to lead his organization through its most challenging period.  
Archibald Henderson was born on 21 January 1783 near the town of Dumfries, 
Virginia, coincidentally only a few miles from the main gate of the modern Marine 
Corps base at Quantico.  From all accounts, “Archie” enjoyed a good childhood growing 
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up as the fourth son of Alexander and Sarah Henderson.  Alexander, a Scottish 
immigrant who arrived in Virginia in 1756, proved himself a successful merchant with a 
concurrent appreciation for public service:  he served two terms as a delegate in the 
Virginia General Assembly, as a justice of the peace, and also as a colonel serving under 
his neighbor (and fellow church-member) George Washington in the Revolutionary War.  
Following the war, Alexander attended the Mount Vernon Convention of March 1785, a 
preliminary session that helped lay the groundwork for the Constitutional Convention of 
1787.6  In any event, Alexander‟s reputation as a patriot, politician, and respected 
businessman extended throughout the region.  
Alexander‟s success allowed him to provide his sons with excellent educations 
and as an adolescent Archibald attended two private academies in Maryland and learned 
French with the assistance of a tutor.  Typical of well-to-do adolescents of the time, 
Archibald worked for his family‟s business interests and also sampled a job at an iron 
foundry near Antietam, but he seemed not to find a niche.  He returned to his Dumfries 
home and, perhaps with some prodding by his parents and siblings, sought out other 
opportunities.  Military service was one option.  In his early twenties he applied for 
military commissions and, on 4 June 1806 his efforts were rewarded with the offer of an 
appointment as a second lieutenant of Marines.  That seemingly inauspicious start led to 
a career that spanned over fifty years.7   
Henderson advanced steadily, benefitting from modest expansions of the naval 
services.  Within nine months he received a promotion to first lieutenant and within a 
year gained command of a detachment of twenty-three Marines aboard the new sloop-of-
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war USS Wasp.  In December 1807, barely eighteen months after he entered the service, 
Henderson advanced to command a fifty-four man detachment aboard the frigate USS 
Constitution.  Afterward, Henderson then served ashore from 1808 to 1811 at several of 
the Marine barracks that guarded essential naval shore facilities and property.  During 
that time, he also functioned for four months as the adjutant to the Marine Commandant 
in Washington, D.C.  That position provided him with valuable professional experiences, 
exposure to the bureaucratic system in the capital, and introduced him to the 
administrative challenges facing the fledgling corps.  On 1 April 1811, Henderson gained 
promotion to the rank of captain and received orders to command the Marine detachment 
aboard the newly commissioned frigate USS President.  However, to his chagrin the 
assignment was short-lived.  When the War of 1812 broke out, Archibald found himself 
far from the action as the commander of the Marine Barracks in Boston, Massachusetts, 
a post he held until September 1813.8   
For a time, he thought he might miss the war against Britain altogether.  
Henderson even toyed with the idea of seeking a transfer to the army to get into the fight.  
However, on 9 September 1813, Henderson received orders to command his old 
detachment aboard “Old Ironsides,” the nickname the USS Constitution had since earned 
for its seemingly shot-proof performances in combat.  On 20 February 1815, while 
patrolling off Madeira near the coast of North Africa the Constitution (Captain Charles 
Stewart, USN, commanding) encountered two British warships, the frigate HMS Cyane 
(34 guns) and the sloop HMS Levant (21 guns).  To deprive the British of their combined 
advantage, Captain Stewart decided to fight each ship separately.  In an impressive 
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display of seamanship, Stewart opened the attack with a broadside from the 
Constitution‟s main batteries and then deftly maneuvered to keep the two enemy ships 
from combining their fires.  Stewart‟s bold tactics worked:  the Constitution fought first 
one enemy warship and then the other, alternating her broadside batteries and avoiding 
the guns of the enemy ships.  For his part, Henderson deployed his Marines “in the tops 
and from the gangways” to fire on British officers and gunners with their muskets to 
disrupt the enemy‟s actions.  Within an hour the Cyane struck her colors, and the Levant 
followed soon afterward.  Henderson‟s men then provided protection for the prize crews 
and guarded the captured sailors.  At home the details of the Constitution‟s late triumph 
at sea captured the attention of the American public and spread rapidly through the 
popular press.9  Importantly, the action provided a victory to a war-weary public that had 
not seen many successes during the conflict. 
For his part in the fight, Captain Henderson received recognition that elevated his 
reputation in Virginia and the nation‟s capital.  To begin with, Captain Stewart 
mentioned Henderson personally in his report on the action, stating he “owes his grateful 
thanks for the lively and well directed fire kept up by the detachment under 
[Henderson‟s] command.”10  Among additional accolades, Congress awarded a gold 
medal to Captain Stewart and silver medals to several junior officers, including both 
Henderson and another Marine.   On 26 April 1816, Congress also awarded Henderson 
about $400 in prize money for the capture of the Cyane, converted to a U.S. Navy 
warship.11   
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After 1815, Henderson held a number of assignments.  One post stands out:  from 
16 September 1818 to 3 March 1819, he served as the acting Commandant of the Marine 
Corps following the death of Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Wharton.  In what appeared to 
be a dress rehearsal for his later holding of that post, Henderson took over the day-to-day 
administration of the Corps and consequently learned how to navigate the halls of 
government to get things accomplished.  That experience served him well when, 
eighteen months later, the new Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Gale, was 
court-martialed and relieved from that office.  Almost immediately, on 19 December 
1820, President James Madison nominated Archibald Henderson, as the next senior 
Marine officer, “to be Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of Marines, to take rank from 
the 17th day of October, 1820,” the official date of Gale‟s dismissal.12  At age thirty-
seven, with fourteen years in service, Henderson‟s time had arrived.  
That is not to say that Henderson‟s assumption of the commandancy was 
guaranteed.  Henderson certainly did not believe that to be the case and he, like his peers, 
spent a considerable amount of time lobbying for his own selection as Commandant.  An 
examination of the process of selecting a Commandant yields insight into the level of 
unprofessional conduct inherent in the intra-service politics that all senior Marine 
officers, Henderson included, engaged in, wherein they often shamelessly endorsed 
themselves at the expense of their rivals.  While still serving as acting Commandant after 
Wharton‟s death, Henderson wrote President James Monroe directly, offering to 
personally fill the permanent post should Monroe determine that the “present senior 
officer [Gale] is incompetent to discharge the duties of the Commandant.”13  When 
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Monroe nonetheless selected Gale for the job on the traditional basis of his seniority, 
Henderson, from his new post in New Orleans, continued to poison Gale‟s reputation by 
forwarding third-party reports alleging a naval officer had “seen Major Gale intoxicated 
in New Orleans.”14  The Gale-Henderson interaction could best be described as coldly 
hostile or even borderline insubordinate, as evidenced when, after being banished by 
Gale to New Orleans (at that time the most distant shore post in the Corps) and ordered 
to proceed there “by the nearest and most expeditious route,” Henderson instead chose a 
leisurely and circuitous route that took him ten weeks to complete.15  These, and similar 
episodes show that Henderson personally partook of the same pattern of bickering and 
backstabbing that he publicly disdained and later unsuccessfully tried to eradicate from 
the Corps.    
The situation seemed much the same on the question of Gale‟s successor.  
Despite being the next senior officer in line and believing himself to be the most 
qualified, Henderson still worried about being passed over.  Of the next four officers in 
line, all were, like Henderson, captains holding brevet promotions to major:  Richard 
Smith, Robert D. Wainwright, William Anderson, and Samuel Miller, in order of 
seniority.  During Gale‟s trial, Miller, a hero of the controversial Battle of Bladensburg 
during the War of 1812, served as the Corps‟ Adjutant and Inspector and acting 
Commandant, nominally Gale‟s second-in-command and the most likely alternative to 
Henderson.  In the end, although we may never know with certainty what factors swayed 
President Monroe to select Henderson, the facts that he was most senior, a war hero in 
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his own right and the product of an influential Virginia family may all have entered into 
the equation in his favor.16   
In becoming Commandant, Henderson inherited a Marine Corps in a state of 
disarray and threatened with either outright dissolution or with being absorbed into the 
army or navy.  Systemic problems were widespread, and the roots of those troubles 
originated both in and outside the Corps.  Each problem needed to be resolved if 
Henderson hoped to make any progress in saving and reforming the institution.  
Internally, the organization had functioned for some years under the central direction or 
guidance predominantly of the secretary of the navy, who personally made most of the 
executive decisions for the Marine Corps.  The role of the Commandant was at the time 
more of an administrator than a service chief, but Henderson would soon gain some of 
the reins for himself.17  As for the small and widely scattered Marine detachments, the 
men remained largely in the hands of officers who spent much of their energies looking 
after their individual interests, either jockeying for assignment to comfortable shore posts 
or engaging in public bickering with rival officers over actual or perceived slights to 
their character.  Also, in contrast to the other services, little to no initial screening took 
place either in the officer commissioning process or in recruitment of enlisted Marines; 
officer accession relied heavily upon political patronage and, located in only a few cities, 
recruiters looked more for quantity than quality.  Furthermore, the highly publicized 
institutional embarrassment of having its Commandant court-martialed for public 
drunkenness and misconduct did not improve the Marine Corps‟ image in the eyes of the 
public.   
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Moreover, Gale‟s trial was only one example of public spectacles wherein some 
senior officers hoped to knock a rival down a notch.  In fact, Major Miller became the 
next one in the public arena and that event provides insight into the mindset of the 
Corps‟ senior officers regarding one other.  Following Henderson‟s selection as 
Commandant several officers, led by Major Richard Smith, alleged improprieties and 
illegal activities on the part of Miller while he had been acting as Commandant during 
Gale‟s trial.  With a sense of the dramatic, Smith, along with Captains Robert 
Wainwright, John Gamble, Samuel Watson, and future Commandant Lieutenant John 
Harris, published a manifesto entitled “Justice” in a local newspaper that outlined 
specific grievances against Miller, prompting Henderson to convene a formal court of 
inquiry to resolve the charges.  Smith and his fellow officers claimed that Miller had 
“fomented a spirit of discord and contention among the officers at Headquarters,” 
appropriated mess funds, had been “carrying on a petty traffic with subordinate officers,” 
and “has, at times, employed Marines to work on his private property.”  After hearing all 
the evidence, Miller was acquitted of all charges except one:  that he had hired Marines 
to work on his property.  However, since “it has been customary, for officers 
commanding, to employ marines occasionally as gardeners and otherwise,” the court of 
inquiry could not hold Miller solely accountable for an impropriety commonly practiced 
by all barracks commanders.18   The incident leaves the reader with a sense of the 
ingrained attitudes and unprofessional practices openly displayed by the Corps‟ seniors 
against each other.  These events were distractions that did little to improve the Marine 
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Corps‟ public reputation, yet to Henderson‟s credit, open spectacles such as these 
generally declined both in number and visibility during his tenure.   
Externally, the small organization became an easy target in times of increased 
public pressure for military cost reductions.  Ambiguities over the roles and missions of 
Marines and questions regarding the operational command of both shipboard 
detachments and shore-based barracks further aggravated the situation and added to the 
Corps‟ vulnerability.  Within the navy, the authority of a ship‟s captain was absolute, and 
by extension that authority also included the Marines assigned to his ship.  However, 
with no central, binding guidance or regulations that detailed appropriate tasks for 
Marines or formal agreements regarding command responsibilities, problems were 
usually resolved in an arbitrary fashion.  The opinions of ships‟ captains varied widely 
over the subject of what constituted appropriate tasks for Marines.  In the absence of 
clear guidance, some commanders assigned their Marines to duties totally unrelated to 
those normally associated with the service, such as tasks associated with unskilled 
laborers, a practice harmful not only to the morale, but also to the individual proficiency 
of the men.  A similar problem existed at shore posts, wherein the senior navy officer 
sometimes applied the same degree of authority as if at sea, although for years 
Henderson successfully argued his men fell under different rules while stationed on 
shore.19  In an era wherein complex command and control relationships were largely 
undefined, the Marines often suffered. 
Henderson had a full plate of problems to solve if he intended to reform and 
improve the organization.  The first priority, on which all other initiatives rested, was to 
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strengthen the Commandant‟s authority over all of his Marines.  That authority, always 
ephemeral by the very nature of assigning Marines to work for navy officers, had been 
further eroded over the years through institutional neglect combined with inconsistent or 
weak Marine leadership.  Historically, the Navy Department expressed little interest in 
the Marine Corps, except where its performance impacted the navy.  Furthermore, past 
Commandants had been reluctant to “rock the boat” by seeking to better define the limits 
of the Commandant‟s (or any other Marine officers‟) authority.  Absent any incentive to 
do otherwise, most Marine officers simply avoided dealing with challenging issues 
altogether.  Henderson, though, took a different tack and wasted no time in letting the 
Marine Corps know he was now at the helm.  In quick succession, he issued orders to the 
Marine commanders of both the shipboard detachments and the shore-based barracks to 
report regularly (and directly) to Marine Corps Headquarters and not, as had previously 
been the case, through their local ship or yard commanders or to the secretary of the 
navy.  In addition, he issued orders and guidance designed to tighten the accountability 
of equipment, supplies and contracts among the commanders of Marine barracks and 
also shipboard detachments.  That effort encouraged frugality and efficiency within the 
organization.  To supervise the implementation of his directives, Henderson scheduled 
regular inspection trips to the various Navy Yards and ships.20  These measures served 
two goals:  they tightened the chain of command and consequently reinforced his 
authority and control over the organization, and they also created a means of influencing 
and supervising subordinates who were often scattered to various posts around the world. 
79 
To increase his control over the organization, Henderson personally appointed 
officers to the key headquarters billets of Adjutant and Inspector, Quartermaster, and 
Paymaster.  Henderson understood the importance of having supportive officers in those 
important posts and consequently took immediate steps to place trusted men in those 
billets.  Although the issue of who could nominate persons to these staff positions later 
resulted in friction between the Commandant and the Navy Department, Henderson 
nonetheless placed new officers in each of the billets soon after becoming Commandant, 
giving him the means of directing and supervising the implementation of his policies 
throughout the Corps.21 
However, Henderson‟s authority was not absolute; some of the “old guard” 
senior officers resented his imposition of authority over them, particularly where their 
duty assignments were concerned.  When Henderson replaced Miller, it ignited a new 
challenge to the limits of the Commandant‟s authority and exposed the degree that 
politics influenced officer assignments.  After replacing Miller, Henderson assigned him 
to sea duty in the West Indies, causing Miller to muster his political pull to countermand 
the orders and gain instead a shore assignment at one of the barracks.  The issue of who 
could make Marine officer assignments quickly worked up the chain of command and 
landed on the desk of President Monroe himself, a long-time supporter of Miller.  To 
Henderson‟s chagrin, the commander-in-chief sided with Miller and cancelled the sea 
duty orders.  Believing his command prerogatives were being undermined, the 
Commandant tactfully, yet firmly wrote the president and convincingly argued that his 
failure to back the decisions of the Commandant would negatively impact on the good 
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order and discipline within the Corps.  To drive the point home Henderson politely 
offered his resignation should the president lack confidence in his abilities.  Although 
Monroe agreed in principle that Henderson had the authority to assign subordinates, 
Miller remained ashore in Norfolk – a visible symbol of the limits to the Commandant‟s 
authority where senior officers were concerned.  Henderson afterwards sought to avoid 
similar confrontations by assigning more junior captains to sea duty and allowing the 
more senior ones to stay ashore.22  It seemed that he considered those types of battles not 
worth expending his political capital on. 
One can almost understand why the senior officers of the Marine Corps shunned 
sea duty as they did.  Historian Allan Millet notes that “there were substantial reasons for 
Marine officers to find sea service disagreeable.  Although death in action was not much 
of a threat, the mortality rate of Marine officers from disease, suicide, drowning, 
accidents, and duels was substantial.”23  Factored over the 44 years in question, it 
appears that a total of seventy-one company grade officers either died or were discharged 
from their duties, a rate of about two per year.  And, if officer resignations are factored 
in, the officer attrition rate more than doubles.  Spread out evenly over the years, it 
appears that about five officers a year either died, resigned, or were dismissed, making a 
rough annual attrition rate of about 20 percent each year, representing a high degree of 
loss for such a small organization.24 
Henderson fully understood the scope of the officer attrition problem and sought 
ways to reduce the incessant drain of manpower.  Perhaps based on his own career 
experiences, he believed that one of the contributing factors involved the traditional 
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practice of sending new lieutenants to command shipboard detachments with no 
preparation or training, essentially throwing them out to sea to learn through trial and 
error.  Henderson sought to make that transition from civilian to officer more efficient by 
providing new officers with instruction regarding their duties and responsibilities before 
going to sea.  Immediately after becoming Commandant, he directed that “all officers 
appointed in the corps are ordered here [to Headquarters] in order to receive instruction, 
that they may be capable of performing the duties assigned them.”  To supervise the 
effort, he formally tasked the Adjutant and Inspector with the responsibility for 
instructing “all officers who join the corps in the manual [of arms] and battalion 
exercise.”25  Explaining his rationale to Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson, 
Henderson argued that “nothing is so well calculated to give character to a Corps, as a 
uniformity of a system, and the initiation of your officers into the duties of their 
profession . . . under the immediate notice and auspices of its Commanding Officer.”  
Therefore, he directed that “a young officer should never be permitted to leave Head 
Quarters before he is perfectly competent to [direct] the drill of a Battalion -- so that 
should he succeed by accident, or other causes, to command, he might be able to do 
justice to the situation.”26  With this goal in mind, Henderson sought to better prepare 
new officers for the challenges he knew they would soon face. 
Often, this period of instruction represented the only formal training an officer 
might receive, and the last chance to evaluate the fitness of new officers before sending 
them out to the fleet for duty at sea.  The latter point is important because at that time 
little or no physical or mental screening took place in the commissioning process itself.  
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Although Henderson tried throughout his tenure to gain approval for a proper screening 
of prospective candidates for medical, moral or mental problems before accepting them, 
that reform was not adopted until the Civil War.  In the interim, Henderson‟s 
“internship” program filled that void, granting experienced officers an opportunity to 
infuse in the new officer, through the personal examples of the instructors and 
Commandant, a common framework of customs and traditions that built esprit de corps.  
The initial training period also helped weed out weaker officers at an early stage, thereby 
increasing overall efficiency.   This last point is borne out by evidence that suggests 
some of the new officers resigned their commissions or were dismissed during their entry 
level training period.27  In those instances, the marginal officers were identified early, 
before being dispatched to command detachments around the world, thereby avoiding 
not only the costs involved in transfers, but also the problems associated with short, 
often tumultuous officer turnovers at overseas commands.  Lastly, the instructors also 
benefitted from the experiences gained in training men. 
Until a proper pre-commissioning screening program came about, Henderson‟s 
new officer training bridged the gap and provided a common baseline of knowledge and 
proficiency in the service.  Eventually, Henderson‟s new officer training initiative 
became institutionalized within the Marine Corps, and is the precedent for today‟s 
Officer Basic Course at Quantico, Virginia.28  Although modern Marine officers undergo 
an extensive screening process before commissioning, the Corps‟ leaders nonetheless 
believe that the benefits derived from having every new officer undergo a six-month 
period of training and evaluation outweigh the costs involved in administering the 
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program.  In his time, Henderson also believed the effort worth the expense and 
subsequent Commandants continued the practice, making it one of several of 
Henderson‟s reforms that shaped the modern Marine Corps. 
Henderson also consistently sought ways to increase opportunities for officer 
education, either at the entry level or later in one‟s career.  One of Commandant 
Henderson‟s top manpower priorities involved gaining access to service academy 
graduates who might wish to serve as Marine officers.  As early as 1823, Henderson 
argued for the opportunity to fill vacant officer positions by offering commissions to 
graduates of the Army‟s Military Academy at West Point, particularly since some of its 
attendees did not enter army service on graduation.  To Henderson, the academy 
represented an excellent and underutilized source of qualified men who could help fill 
the Corps‟ needs more efficiently than the existent political patronage system did.  
Although Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard agreed in his report to Congress in 
1825 that “an arrangement will be made with the War Department, by which the officers 
of this [Marine] [C]orps will be taken hereafter from the graduates at West Point,” the 
initiative was not implemented until 1882.29  Nonetheless, as historian Joseph Dawson 
observes, it “disturbed Henderson to note that about half of the lieutenants [were] asked 
to resign because they were deficient in skills or leadership,” and he viewed the 
academies as a possible solution to these problems.30  For all of these reasons, 
Henderson continued to press the point throughout his tenure, stating in 1858 that “I 
cannot close this report without again calling the attention of the [Navy] department to 
the urgent necessity of having a standard of education for officers of the corps.”  His 
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proffered “remedy could be found by commissioning the officers from the cadets at West 
Point, a certain number of whom could be appointed with the especial view of entering 
the corps.”31  Although he never gained permission to allocate some commissions to 
academy graduates, he did not shrink from making his opinion known on the issue and 
his stance helped later commandants press the point with successive departmental and 
congressional leaders. 
Concurrent with his push for increased officer education, Henderson also pursued 
reforms to improve the quality of life, quarters and morale of his enlisted Marines.  He 
lobbied vigorously for better pay and living conditions, sought to increase the numbers 
of Marines so that smaller detachments could better spread out workloads, struggled to 
eliminate or reduce extraneous and arbitrary duties, and banned the practice of flogging 
as a means of punishment at shore commands.  Henderson proved to be a tireless 
advocate to gain fair pay, equitable enlistment bounties, and increases in allowances and 
entitlements to make compensation for Marines comparable with that received by men in 
other services.  Henderson also lobbied hard to acquire modern, more accurate rifles to 
replace the Corps‟ older musket-type shoulder weapons.  He emphasized marksmanship 
training, resulting in an increase in the range, accuracy and capability of Marines.  
Furthermore, he enhanced the overall quality of the training of enlisted Marines by 
adopting and adhering to standardized training programs.  He also solicited the support 
of Congress to gain better clothing and equipment, and expanded the use of the 
Headquarters element and Marine Band in the many ceremonial opportunities that 
presented themselves in the capital district.  In addition, Henderson designated Sunday as 
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a day off for personnel not on watch, and also pushed for a limitation in the liquor ration 
to minimize the problems caused by alcohol abuse in the barracks.  And to both ensure 
that his reforms were being implemented while better assessing problem areas within the 
Corps, Henderson began the tradition of scheduling and conducting regular inspections 
of all shore posts and selective ships‟ detachments.  As Joseph Alexander explains, “one 
of his most admirable practices as commandant was his willingness to leave his 
Headquarters each year and inspect each barracks command.  Each tour took weeks, but 
these visits brought him in intimate contact with every shore-based officer and non-
commissioned officer, gave him firsthand knowledge of the conditions in which his 
Marines had to live and work, and reaffirmed his role as commandant to most of the 
Corps.”32   
Importantly, Henderson began to employ the results of his inspections as a 
vehicle to keep Navy Department officials notified of both problems encountered and his 
recommendations for resolving them.  By securing the authority to insert his own 
correspondence regarding the Marine Corps within the secretary‟s Annual Report to 
Congress, a major administrative coup that began in 1824, Henderson gained a useful 
means to inform officials about issues related to the Corps and to argue for increasing 
manpower and expanding the Corps‟ roles.  Although initially a small and relatively 
minor portion of the secretary‟s overall report, once the precedent was established, 
Henderson used the medium as a way to advance his proposals for the Marine Corps.33  
His reporting on the conditions at various posts and his eloquent commentary regarding 
proposed solutions often led to more funding for barracks improvements and new 
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recruits.  His correspondence, although small when compared to the volume of the 
secretary‟s report, nonetheless provided a visibility to Congress that was nonexistent 
before. 
One of Henderson‟s most important proposals involved expanding the roles and 
missions of the organization within the military establishment.  Although Henderson 
firmly believed that Marines “are essentially required on board the vessels of war under 
all circumstances, but more particularly in action . . . for the protection of our widely 
scattered commerce,” he also envisioned a Marine Corps that did more than just provide 
“guards, at the various navy yards in the United States, and on board the different armed 
vessels.”  He believed that the Marine Corps constituted the “Military Arm of the Navy.”  
With this view in mind, he sought out ways to strengthen the Corps‟ capabilities to 
perform that role, particularly in the area of landing party operations.  Although Marines 
had long been a part in such operations, Henderson sought ways to improve the 
firepower and capacity of Marines when they were committed to fight ashore.  Perhaps 
not coincidentally, landing party operations were being conducted with greater frequency 
and on successively larger scale by the Navy and Marine Corps, with more than fifty 
such operations undertaken during Henderson‟s tenure alone, a notably higher number in 
contrast to similar missions undertaken before 1820.34      
In addition to naval forces making more armed landings on foreign shores, an 
often ignored naval mission boosted the likelihood of American warships making armed 
boardings, searches and seizures of ships at sea.  In 1819, Congress directed the 
establishment of an African Squadron to suppress the foreign slave trade, outlawed in the 
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United States since 1807.  And, although historian George M. Brooke, Jr. characterizes 
the Navy‟s efforts to suppress slavers between 1820 and 1839 as “spasmodic and 
ineffective,” ships of the squadron still conducted scores of searches of hostile vessels, 
and sometimes seized half a dozen ships per year.  From the 1840s up to 1861 the 
seizures became more frequent and occurred within the operating areas of the Home and 
West Indies Squadrons as well.  By 1858 and 1859, naval vessels seized about a dozen 
vessels per year, and annually rescued thousands of slaves from their captors and deadly 
conditions.  In each of these boardings, the Marines played a key role from start to finish.  
Armed with either their muskets or manning ships‟ guns (or both), Marines covered the 
initial hailing and stopping of suspect ships.  Once the ships were stopped, Marines often 
served in the boarding party, and if the naval officer decided to seize the vessel, they 
both guarded the captive crewmen and performed as the security element for the prize 
crew.  The increasing frequency of such operations contributed to a raising of relative 
importance of Marines on ships, so much so that a special report by the previously 
hostile Committee on Naval Affairs not only recommended boosting the size of the 
Corps, it stated that “if the services of a marine force are necessary at our navy yards, on 
board ship they are absolutely indispensible.”35  Although the sharp decline in the slave 
trade after 1861 made this function less important, because of these operations an entire 
generation of junior navy officers observed firsthand the utility of having a Marine 
detachment aboard ship for operational reasons other than serving with a landing party.  
At the same time, hundreds of Marines gained valuable experiences in boarding and 
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seizing hostile vessels, and many soon put that familiarity to the test on blockade duty 
off Southern ports.   
Since becoming Commandant, Henderson had promoted the concept of forming 
Marine battalions that could be landed from the sea and fight enemies ashore with 
enhanced combat capabilities.  In one of his first official communications with the 
secretary of the navy and Congress, he explained how he “deemed it important to keep 
up the skeleton of a battalion” at headquarters to serve several functions.  First, it 
provided the previously mentioned training cadre with a means to instruct “all officers 
who join the corps in the manual and battalion exercise.”  In other words, the skeleton 
battalion served as a training platform to teach new officers basic infantry tactics and 
procedures.  Second, when needed the battalion structure could quickly be fleshed out 
with sufficient officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.  Although the skeleton 
battalion fulfilled its primary function for the majority of the “Henderson Era,” by the 
late 1830s the Commandant began forming and employing battalions in response to 
national military requirements.  This early “force-in-readiness” concept represented 
another departure from the Marine Corps‟ traditional means of employment as loose 
collections of shipboard detachments.  From the outset, the performance of the Marines 
in these expanded roles such as the Second Seminole War, the Mexican War, and John 
Brown‟s Raid caught the eye of the public and enhanced the positive reputation of the 
Corps, thus setting the stage for future battalion operations.36   
Using his official correspondence, Henderson distributed ideas to improve 
Marine battalion composition and purpose, and he modified his overall concept 
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accordingly.  With keen foresight, he looked for ways to enhance the capabilities of 
Marines fighting ashore, regardless of the size of the committed unit.  Exhibiting a clear 
awareness of the changes taking place in naval warfare, as noted in the previous chapter, 
Henderson looked for ways to enhance the firepower and lethality of landing parties 
through the addition of an organic artillery capability.  To help sell the idea to his 
superiors, Henderson encouraged Marines afloat to serve in the ships‟ batteries and he 
argued for organic artillery pieces and ammunition to better train the men in gunnery 
drills.  From the Navy‟s perspective, ships‟ captains gained qualified gun crews for their 
vessels, always a problem at sea.  Navy commanders also benefited by having the 
Marines perform a more relevant combat function than their traditional firing of muskets 
from the rigging, a task made increasingly obsolete due to the changing face of naval 
warfare.  For Henderson, Marines performing gunnery duties afloat also justified his oft-
repeated requests for ordnance, ammunition and qualified instructors.  By 1842, after 
nearly two decades of experience with Marines manning ships‟ guns, the Committee on 
Naval Affairs reported that “Naval men unite in the opinion that one marine to each gun 
is the smallest number required, of efficiency, on board a man of war.”37  Slowly, yet 
steadily, Henderson‟s Marines became a more valued element aboard warships, 
sometimes winning over former opponents of the Corps in the process.   
Henderson had long advocated the building of an artillery capability in the Corps.  
Correspondence dating from 1823 establishes his early thoughts to “introduce a 
knowledge of artillery duty” among his Marines.  Following the Mexican War, he asked 
the Navy Department for “four light artillery pieces for training purposes,” but to no 
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avail.  However, in the 1850s, strengthened by the successes of his men in several high-
profile landing operations that pitted sailors and Marines fighting more determined (and 
better equipped) enemies ashore in Argentina and Nicaragua, he began to argue with 
greater conviction the necessity of strengthening the firepower projected ashore by 
creating an organic artillery capability in the Marine Corps.  Basing his requests in part 
on recent operations in China and the Far East, he relentlessly pushed his message home 
with the many successive secretaries, patiently explaining his plan to each.  Seeing 
greater challenges in future landings, Henderson observed in 1853 that “the present drill 
of the corps on shore is exclusively that of the infantry,” but he contended that “artillery 
drill, especially that of light artillery, would be highly beneficial in case of landing a 
force in a foreign country.”  This statement is important for several reasons.  First, 
Henderson correctly recognized that future enemies might prove more powerful than 
those that naval landing forces had encountered in the past.  Although Marine infantry 
had fared well when pitted against threats such as those faced by the landing party that 
rowed ashore at Quallah Battoo in 1832, the same force might find itself outmatched if 
committed against a modern, well-disciplined force.  Henderson advocated adding 
artillery to the battalion located at his headquarters, so as to unite “the artillery with the 
infantry drill” already conducted there, “and thus adding greatly to the efficiency of the 
soldiers of the corps.”38  
Second, the statement clearly illustrates Henderson‟s concept for an amphibious 
force, one that combines infantry and artillery capabilities in an integrated unit to be 
employed from ships to fight ashore.  His idea reflects both a prescient understanding of 
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the modern theory of combined arms warfare, wherein different combat arms are merged 
to gain a synergistic effect that can be employed to great advantage over an enemy, and a 
perceptive appreciation of the potential inherent in amphibious warfare.39  In this manner 
Henderson became the first Commandant to embrace, albeit on a limited scale, the 
amphibious mission that would come to define the Marine Corps a century later.  
Third, Henderson hoped to make use of the Marine Corps‟ respected skills as 
gunners aboard ship to gain a similar capability that would add to the firepower of 
Marines deployed ashore.  By taking on the task of training Marines to man the heavy 
naval artillery on ships, he achieved two important goals:  he made the Marine 
detachments more relevant aboard ships in light of rapid changes in naval warfare; and 
the training in naval artillery served the primary purpose of preparing Marines to employ 
light artillery pieces that could be used to great effect on shore.  Furthermore, if the navy 
agreed that training Marines for gun crews on ship would be beneficial (and evidence 
shows that it did), Henderson could then use that requirement to justify the purchase of 
light artillery pieces and ammunition to train them properly.40   
Fourth, understanding the importance of officers in the training effort, Henderson 
employed the issue of training to again call for opportunities for educate his officers on a 
par with that found in the other services.   Pointing out in 1853 that both the Army and 
the Navy now had academies that provided each with educated, trained and screened 
officers, “the marine corps . . . cannot long maintain a comparative efficiency with either 
the navy or army . . . and consequently [are] wholly unprepared for any service requiring 
an application of science.”   He properly pointed out that “graduates from West Point 
92 
would supply this deficiency, and place the corps on a just and equal footing with the 
other arms of the service.”  He also argued for the creation of a retired list, to weed out 
officers too infirm or aged to perform their duties in a satisfactory manner.  
Unfortunately for the Marine Corps, neither of these initiatives reached fruition under 
Henderson‟s commandancy, yet the seeds he planted would bear fruit in the future.41   
Although he failed to gain academy graduates during his tenure, Henderson did 
succeed in gaining permission to have some of his officers attend a course at West Point 
on both light and heavy artillery.  Leveraging in part off the recent success of a landing 
party operation in which Marines successfully employed field artillery against heavily 
fortified Chinese positions, Henderson argued for the necessity of having qualified 
instructors at his headquarters to gain “knowledge of Artillery for the purpose of 
introducing it into the Marine Corps.”  In the summer of 1857, Lieutenant Israel Greene 
became the first of several Marine officers to attend the West Point course.  On 
completion, Greene became the Corps‟ first Instructor of Artillery, an achievement that 
Henderson believed represented “an important step forward” for the organization.  In his 
1858 report, Henderson proudly announced that he had “established at headquarters a 
school for drill both in the use of the musket and of light and heavy artillery,” and that 
the school had been in operation for about a year.42   
Also in 1857, the Marine Corps gained the final piece needed to achieve its 
organic artillery capability, the acquiring of actual ordnance to support its artillery 
training program.  The Navy Department delivered a complement of heavy and light 
artillery pieces and an allocation of ammunition to the Corps‟ Headquarters battalion.  
93 
The Marines now had everything they needed to adequately train recruits and new 
officers in artillery skills.  Henderson‟s vision became a reality and, in customary 
fashion, he confidently reported in 1858 that the ordnance “authorized with the sanction 
of the [Navy] department” had already proven itself useful in his training of an ad hoc 
battalion for service with the upcoming Paraguay Expedition.  That operation, a punitive 
mission then still in transport to the objective area, represented the largest employment 
of military muscle outside the United States since the Mexican War, and Henderson‟s 
Marines would play a part in it.43    Typically, though, he used the situation to justify an 
increase in manpower, obviously hoping to fill his battalion on a full-time basis, to 
provide military authorities with a permanent force-in-readiness to employ in 
contingencies.      
 Moreover, as asserted by historian Joseph Dawson, Henderson continued to 
expand his concept of the Marine battalion, hoping to add other capabilities to make it an 
even more nimble force.  In his 1857 report to Secretary Toucey, Henderson reminded 
him of the progress made in training infantry and artillery skills to Marines, yet boldly 
stated that the effort “is not enough.”  The Marine officer, he contended, “should be not 
only an infantry and artillery officer, but an engineer” as well.  He argued that “When 
bodies of men are landed from vessels-of-war their numbers are rarely large; but they 
may be made very formidable by properly constructed field works, or by more permanent 
works.”  With clear logic, Henderson pointed out that “there is no officer aboard the ship 
that would be expected to do this but the marine officer, and it would not be fair to 
expect it of him without military education.”  And, as before, he suggested that this 
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deficiency could be easily resolved through the appointment of some West Point 
graduates to the Marine Corps.44   
In addition to improving the Corps‟ capabilities in landing party operations with 
the navy, Henderson also looked for opportunities to serve with the army in land 
operations, something that no previous commandant had envisioned or desired.  
Henderson‟s intent was threefold:  to prove the ability of Marines as a professional 
fighting organization to its critics; to make the Corps more valuable as a force in 
readiness for the military establishment; and to increase opportunities for both training 
and employing Marines outside of traditional naval operations.  Although Henderson 
achieved some success in reaching these goals and helped blunt some of the arguments 
of those who still wished to see the Marine Corps reduced or disbanded, he first had to 
face one of the most formidable threats to the institution, from no less a personage than 
the President of the United States himself. 
When Andrew Jackson became president in 1829, one of his goals involved 
trimming excess in the government structure, and he believed the military constituted 
part of that surplus.  In an address to Congress, Jackson outlined his concern:  “Neither 
our situation nor our institutions require or permit the maintenance of a large regular 
[military] force.”  He contended that “if . . . war should come upon us, our regular force 
should be increased to an extent proportioned to the emergency, and our present small 
army is a nucleous [sic] around which such force could be formed and embodied.”  
Jackson‟s military concept envisioned a small standing army that could be expanded in 
time of need with militia and volunteers.45    
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The Marine Corps drew special attention in Jackson‟s quest to reduce excess, 
particularly the size of its headquarters element and the staff.  In his first annual message 
to Congress, Jackson stated caustically that “marine service could well be made from the 
[Army‟s] artillery or infantry – there being no particular training requisite for it.”  He 
also asserted that the unit had too many senior officers for its size, making that service 
more costly than an army regiment of the same approximate size “without rendering 
proportionate service.”  As Dawson concludes, Jackson “used a political ploy” by raising 
the subject of brevet promotions, implying that the Marine Corps currently paid for five 
more lieutenant colonels than it rated by law.  “Therefore,” Dawson argues, “Jackson 
struck personally at Henderson‟s claim to operate the most financially efficient branch of 
the military.”  After airing his allegations, Jackson recommended that “the Marine Corps 
be merged in the [Army‟s] artillery or infantry, as the best mode of curing the many 
defects in its organization.”46  In reality, in light of the decentralized nature of its 
employment and extended service at sea, Jackson‟s comparison of the Corps‟ 
organization and training requirements with that of standard Army infantry or artillery 
regiments was akin to comparing apples with oranges.  Nonetheless, his comments and 
the resultant response from Congress revealed just how politically vulnerable the Marine 
Corps was.  As a result of Jackson‟s comments, despite having made a decade of 
progress against various critics of the Corps, Henderson found himself facing one of the 
most significant challenges of his career, one that required all of his resourcefulness.   
The president‟s criticism ignited a flurry of activity in Congress and within the 
Navy Department.  Congress‟s Committee on Naval Affairs initiated several inquiries 
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into “The Expediency of Dispensing with the Marine Corps as Part of the Armed 
Equipment of a Vessel-of-War.”  In response, Navy Secretary John Branch, a Jackson 
appointee, ordered the fitting out of the sloop-of-war Erie “without the usual allotment 
of marines, expressly with a view to test” that idea.  Branch also solicited the opinions of 
sixteen of the most senior navy officers, asking them to respond to four questions 
constructed to gauge the value of Marines aboard navy vessels, and whether some of 
their tasks might not be performed by sailors.  As one might expect, the responses were 
mixed, with some navy officers stating that Marines could be dispensed with, while 
others declared they could not.  Overall, seven officers believed Marines were not 
needed, and nine argued that the Corps was a necessary element aboard warships and 
within the Navy Department.  Branch himself admitted that “there appears to be much 
diversity of opinion” over the subject, although he interestingly arranged the reports so 
that the opinions of supporters of doing away with Marines appeared first in his 
communication to the Committee on Naval Affairs.47  Also conspicuously absent from 
Branch‟s document was any rebuttal or remarks from the Commandant‟s office, 
indicating that Henderson was not included in the staffing process.    
Henderson counter-attacked by corresponding directly with many of the Navy‟s 
ship captains and yard commandants, asking them to forward to him their opinions as to 
the value of Marines within their commands.  This grass-roots approach yielded many 
testimonials to the usefulness of the Marine detachments both afloat and ashore that he 
wielded like a club in his frequent correspondence with departmental officials, as well as 
with various members of the House Committee on Naval Affairs.  In the letters, 
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Henderson addressed not only the day-to-day performance of his men at sea, but also 
mentioned how Marines were often used to restore order in civil disturbances, riots or 
slave rebellions.  Additionally, he focused the attention of legislative leaders on several 
discrepancies in existing law that resulted in Marines being paid less than soldiers or 
sailors.  Appealing to their sense of justice and fairness, he began to make headway and 
won several decisions in the favor of the Marine Corps.48   
Because of the scope of issues raised, Congress took on the task of reorganizing 
the Marine Corps, and Commandant Henderson helped shape those plans.  With some 
vigorous lobbying and selective sharing of the fruits of his naval correspondence 
campaign, he gained more than he lost when Jackson signed the resulting bill into law.  
The “Act for the Better Organization of the Marine Corps,” the first major legislative 
work since the Corps‟ inception, permanently settled the question of whether the Corps 
should exist as a separate service under the Navy Department:  it would.  It also 
continued the posts of Commandant and the three staff officers (Adjutant and Inspector, 
Quartermaster, and Paymaster), and even promoted the Commandant to the rank of 
colonel (see Figure 3-1).  The Act also authorized a significant increase in manpower as 
well as placing the officers of the Marine Corps on an equal footing with the Army as 
regards to rank equivalency, pay, allowance, and emoluments.  For the first time, the law 
contained a clause that left the Marine Corps open to being “detached for service with 
the army by order of the President of the United States.”  It also recognized previous 
awards of brevet promotions made under earlier acts and specified a minimum term of 
four years for enlistments, vice the previous five, a measure that would help the 
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recruiting effort.  Through this act Henderson won approval for many of the issues that 
he had been fighting to achieve since 1821.  Most importantly, Congress‟s Act meant the 
Marine Corps would continue as a separate service, headed now by a Colonel 
Commandant of Marines, and assisted by a staff selected from officers of that Corps.49  
Because Congress specified that Marines could be detached for service with the army, 
Henderson was able to argue that he had an implied mission on his part to prepare his 
men for that eventuality.  And, within two years, he would seize an opportunity to fulfill 
that clause by volunteering his unit for army service, thereby changing forever the 
dynamics of where the Marine Corps fit within the military establishment. 
 
 
Figure 3-1.  The Marine Corps' Organization after the 1834 Act.50 
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However, Henderson did not like everything in the 1834 Act.  He lost one 
element of the fight:  henceforth, Marines assigned to shore installations such as navy 
yards were placed under the rules and regulations of the Navy, and that required the 
Marine Barracks commander to report to the Yard Commandant in the same way that 
officers of detachments at sea fell under the command of the ship‟s captain.  Although 
several commanders of Marine Barracks “fought” this provision, it remained intact, 
providing a source of festering discontent to some Marine officers.51  Nonetheless, the 
Marine Corps as an institution gained far more than it lost in this legislation. 
In 1836, the War Department found itself in a quandary.  The United States 
became engaged in a growing insurgency in Georgia, Alabama and Florida as a mixed 
group of Native American tribes and runaway slaves resisted government attempts to 
resettle Indians in the West.  The Army, much reduced in size, proved ineffective at 
regaining control and Jackson faced pressures from constituents to resolve the problem.  
Seizing on this opportunity, Henderson volunteered to lead a Marine Battalion to fight 
alongside the Army.  Jackson accepted the offer and Henderson quickly formed a 
battalion through the expedient method of reducing guards at Navy Yards to a bare 
minimum and by pulling some men back from sea duty.  By June, Henderson had raised 
a battalion of thirty-six officers and about four hundred enlisted men.  Arriving in 
southern Georgia on 23 June by steamboat and road march, Henderson found he had 
missed the fight against the Creek Indians.52   
There were, however, still Seminoles to fight in Florida.  By September, the 
Marines arrived at Fort Brooke, near Tampa Bay, and began conducting patrols and 
100 
larger operations to gain control of the area.  At the same time, Marines serving aboard 
naval warships within the theater also engaged the Seminoles, patrolling aggressively up 
and down the many waterways in search of the elusive enemy.  Henderson and his men 
began the difficult task of rooting out the enemy from some of the most challenging 
terrain imaginable.  In one of the few meaningful engagements of the war, the Marines 
managed to penetrate the “Great Cypress Swamp” and conducted an operation that 
deprived the Seminole warriors of a base camp, capturing supplies and several support 
persons.  The results of the engagement forced some Seminole warriors to negotiate a 
settlement.  Moreover, Henderson found himself commanding several Army units in 
succession, and by mid-1837, controlled “the most active zone of combat-the southern 
part of the [Florida] peninsula.” In June, Henderson received orders to return to his 
Washington, D.C., duties, and by 1838, many of his Marines had followed him, with the 
exception of the ships‟ detachment serving with the “Mosquito Squadron,” that 
continued to patrol Florida‟s waterways until 1842.53    
The Marine Corps was probably the only organization that benefited from its 
service during the Creek and Second Seminole Wars.  Its performance as a regular 
combat unit established the precedent for subsequent deployments with the army.  
Marine officers also forged close personal and professional relations with army officers 
that lasted a lifetime.  Moreover, the Marine Corps‟ service with the Army of the South 
yielded another reward.  Because of the Army‟s acute shortage of regular officers in the 
theater of operations, many Marine officers gained the rare opportunity to command 
regular army units in combat or to serve in critical staff positions.  Henderson himself 
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served alternately as the commander of the Army‟s 4th Artillery Regiment, and later as a 
brigade commander, when he earned his brevet rank of brigadier general.54  These 
operations also yielded an important second bonus:  they formed the foundation for a 
rich and colorful shared history that helped promote a sense of esprit de corps in the 
ranks while elevating the reputation of the unit in the eyes of the public. 
Thus, the Marine Corps‟ timely and successful service in the Second Seminole 
War opened the door for similar operations in the future.  It also justified Henderson‟s 
long-standing (yet frequently criticized) practice of maintaining several officers and 
enlisted men in Washington, D.C., to serve as a cadre staff for forming a battalion in 
contingencies.  The training cadre also produced other important gains by helping to 
educate and evaluate all new Marine officers in the military arts before shipping them off 
to their distant posts.  That practice served two functions; it trained officers for the rigors 
of duty at sea and also afforded Henderson and his trusted officers the opportunity to get 
to know each and every officer in the Marine Corps despite the decentralized nature of 
its employment scheme.55  Through this common training the headquarters staff 
managed to instill common Marine Corps customs and traditions into new officers who 
only months before had been civilians with little knowledge of military life. 
At the onset of the Mexican War, Henderson, in a move reminiscent of his 
actions in 1836, gained presidential permission for both a significant increase in the 
manpower of the Corps and to form a battalion for service with the army in the invasion 
of Mexico.  Playing off the absence of any significant threat from the small Mexican 
navy, he reallocated Marines from shipboard service to fill the new battalion and had 
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them transported to New York to await embarkation.  Unfortunately, the battalion did 
not arrive in Mexico until three months after the army‟s amphibious landing at Veracruz, 
but Marines aboard ships of the Gulf Squadron participated in the landings and the 
subsequent operation to seize the city and the fortress that guarded it.  The ships‟ 
detachments had also assisted in the prior seizures of several port cities up and down 
Mexico‟s Gulf coast, conducting landing operations that placed much of the area under 
American control, thereby facilitating the Vera Cruz landing.  The battalion did arrive in 
time to join General Winfield Scott‟s forces as it fought into “the Halls of Montezuma” 
in Mexico City.  There, according to Navy Secretary John Mason, the Marines 
“performed their duties with the highest honor, and displayed the qualities of veteran 
troops.”56       
Meanwhile, Marines played a larger role on the Pacific, filling the void caused by 
the relative absence of regular army units.  Ships‟ detachments provided the fighting 
nucleus for landing parties that seized most major cities and ports up and down the coast, 
helping to gain control of California for the United States and defeat Mexican forces in 
Lower California and the Sea of Cortez.  Significantly, Marines from ships stationed off 
San Diego participated in a rescue of Brigadier General Stephen Kearny‟s overland force 
and later formed an ad hoc battalion under Lieutenant Jacob Zeilen (the future seventh 
Commandant) that seized Los Angeles.  Henderson‟s Marines were proving themselves 
adept at operating amphibiously and, according to Secretary Branch, their “most 
important service with the squadrons of the gulf and Pacific . . . entitled [them] to the 
most favorable consideration of Congress.”57  Its Mexican War service added to the 
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battle honors of the Marine Corps and proved just how versatile the organization had 
become:  it served not only in its traditional role of fielding small shipboard 
detachments, but also nimbly reformed into larger landing parties and as separate 
battalions capable of fighting for extended periods on land.   
Following the Mexican War, Henderson continued to seize every opportunity to 
commit the Marines for service either afloat or ashore.  He consistently volunteered his 
Corps for assignments outside of their normal mission areas to prove its value as a 
flexible and expeditionary force.  Marines successfully handled domestic crises at home 
that ranged from quelling prison riots to restoring order on the streets of Washington and 
New York, and also participated in naval actions and interventions abroad.  Through 
these actions the Corps honed its public reputation and demonstrated its versatility to the 
nation in the years before the Civil War.   
As evidence of that trust and confidence, in June of 1857 President James 
Buchanan directed that Henderson‟s Marines restore order to the capital in the wake of 
several days of violent riots that overwhelmed city police forces.  In his last action in the 
field, General Henderson called out his Headquarters and Washington Barracks Marines 
and addressed them personally.  Under the command of his Adjutant and Inspector, 
Captain Henry B. Tyler, Sr., the Marines marched on the mob of about a thousand that 
had gathered near the City Hall, fixed bayonets, and backed up the mayor‟s calls to 
disperse.  With the rioters threatening both the crowd and the Marines with violence, 
Henderson, dressed in civilian clothes, placed his body against the muzzle of a cannon 
brought by the demonstrators and warned them, “Man, you had best think twice before 
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you fire this piece against the Marines.”  Several in the crowd brandished weapons and 
even fired at the Marines, who quickly overwhelmed them, seized the cannon, and 
dispersed the mob.  After restoring order to the area, the Marines marched back to their 
barracks, having accomplished their mission in dramatic, yet effective fashion.58       
To senior leaders such as President Buchanan, General Winfield Scott, and 
Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey, the Marines were proving their value in times of 
crisis.  Yet just when it seemed that the Corps was advancing as a trusted military 
institution, the architect of its success, Commandant Archibald Henderson, died in office 
in January 1859.  Under his tutelage the Marine Corps had made considerable progress, 
and yet much work remained unfinished.  Since his assumption of command, the 
Marines had fought in over fifty landings “under conditions short of war.”  Members of 
the Corps had also participated, both with the Army and Navy, in two wars that taxed the 
resources of the nation, and had acquitted themselves with honor.  The unit also supplied 
men to deal with domestic riots, disturbances, and violent demonstrations, resolving each 
situation with professionalism.  Henderson had also trained his Corps as an 
expeditionary force-in-readiness, and gained weapons, instructors and resources to 
continue that effort.  The Marines of 1859 were better trained, clothed, equipped, paid 
and fed than their predecessors.  They also benefitted from being led by officers and non-
commissioned officers who had been trained, and to some extent screened, under the 
watchful eye of the Commandant and his staff.  The size of the Corps had also doubled, 
and the duties of its members were better defined and regulated.  In short, contrary to 
Millett‟s observations that “the Marine Corps that Archibald Henderson left behind was 
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little different than the force that he had commanded for the first time in 1820,” a lot had 
changed, and Henderson was personally responsible for making it happen.  For all that 
work, as Joseph Dawson points out, Secretary Toucey‟s remarks in his 1859 report that 
“the Marine Corps is an indispensable branch of the Naval Service [and] a gallant little 
band upon which rests the most widely extended duties at home and in every sea and 
clime, without sufficient numbers to perform them,” prove a fitting epitaph indeed.59   
It must be acknowledged that Henderson did fail in at least three general areas.  
The first of these, as will be explained in the following chapter, is that he failed to fully 
institutionalize some of his initiatives within the Marine Corps.  Although many of his 
training and education programs would continue beyond his tenure, they survived 
through institutional inertia, and not through an ingrained adoption of the measures by all 
senior Marine officers.  The Marine Corps‟ performance at Harpers Ferry in October 
1859 might more properly be regarded as the last action of the Henderson Era than as the 
first action of John Harris, his successor.60  Second, Henderson failed to identify, train 
and prepare a successor to keep the Marine Corps on the trajectory he established.  As a 
result, some of his initiatives and reforms fell by the wayside as the next Commandant 
assumed command and established different priorities.  Third, although Henderson had 
always kept his superiors advised of his reforms and ideas, the initiative remained on his 
shoulders and died with him.  Through sheer force of personality coupled with longevity, 
Henderson remained the single driving force for modernizing the Corps.  Although he 
continuously pushed from below, seldom did his superiors in the Navy Department get 
behind the initiatives and make them truly their own.  In the next chapter, these three 
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failings combine with dramatic effect on the Marine Corps, and changed how that 
organization was employed in the next war.   
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CHAPTER IV 
CHANGE OF COMMAND, CHANGE OF DIRECTION 
 
On 6 January 1859, Brevet Brigadier General Archibald Henderson, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, lay down on his sofa for his customary afternoon nap.   
Sometime about 4:15 P.M., the “Grand Old Man of the Marine Corps” died in his sleep, 
officially ending an era wherein efficiency, zeal, service, and innovation were among its 
highest qualities.  For almost thirty-nine years, Henderson had exerted his influence over 
the officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps, and instilled in them a sense of 
personal and institutional pride in their varied accomplishments.  Through his concerned 
leadership, Henderson had worked to set as priorities certain training and education 
initiatives to make the Marine Corps a more relevant and valued service to America‟s 
military establishment.  Fortunately for the Corps that Henderson so loved and nurtured, 
his programs and procedures had become so ingrained as to continue for a time in his 
absence.1  However, the function of continuing to improve the institution now rested in 
the hands of the man who replaced him as Commandant. 
In that regard, it does not appear that Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey 
expended much time or energy deliberating on the task of identifying who should 
succeed Henderson.  Instead, Toucey reflexively resorted to the traditional practice of 
finding the next senior officer and nominating him for the post.  Apparently, the issue of 
Henderson‟s successor had not been anticipated.  Henderson‟s death caught his closest 
staff officers somewhat by surprise; after all, the man had been Commandant longer than 
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most of his Marines had been alive.  It had been a remarkable thirty-nine years since the 
subject of filling the post of Commandant had last surfaced.  If Henderson himself 
contemplated who should succeed him, he never committed it to paper.  In that regard, 
he missed the opportunity to identify and groom a successor who would keep the Corps 
on the path he had paved.  As a result, on his being informed on 7 January of 
Henderson‟s sudden death, Secretary Toucey ordered the next senior officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel John Harris, to proceed to Washington, D.C., to assume the duties of 
Commandant.  Toucey also forwarded Harris‟ nomination to President James Buchanan, 
who endorsed that recommendation without comment.  By 8 January, less than forty-
eight hours after Henderson‟s death, Harris had arrived at Headquarters, received a 
promotion to Colonel, and assumed duties as the sixth Commandant of the Marine 
Corps.  
This chapter examines the leadership Colonel Harris exhibited, from the moment 
he assumed duties as Commandant to the opening shots of the Civil War.  It focuses 
specifically on Harris‟ views of where, operationally, the Corps fit within the military 
establishment.  It does this by scrutinizing his correspondence and also reviewing and 
analyzing his actions to ascertain his perceptions, policies and intentions for how he 
believed the Marine Corps, as an institution, should be employed.  That vision is then 
compared and contrasted with that of his predecessor, Henderson, and against the 
requirements of the naval services as described by senior political and military leaders.  
Particular attention is given to the nature of the relationships established by Harris with 
superiors and subordinates, and the effect those interactions had on the Corps as an 
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institution.  Harris‟ priorities revealed much about his concept for what he believed 
constituted the proper employment of Marines.   
Colonel Harris left behind few documents that give a clear picture of his youth or 
background.  Other than the fact that he was born on 20 May 1793 in East Whiteland 
Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania, little else is known.  Although it is not evident 
where he received his education, his correspondence indicates that Harris was a literate 
man who could read and write effectively.  In any event, the record shows that on 10 
November 1813, Harris accepted a commission as a second lieutenant of Marines and 
soon after fought British forces threatening the nation‟s capital in Washington, D.C.  
Because of the wartime shortage of officers, Harris gained promotion to first lieutenant 
in only eight months, and on 14 August 1814 received orders to sea duty on board the 
frigate USS Guerriere in Baltimore.  There, according to historian Joseph Alexander, 
Harris probably “fought with Marines at Sparrow‟s Point and Fort McHenry from 11 to 
13 September [1814],” but his performance seems to have been “unremarkable,” or at 
least not mentioned in reports.2  
  After the War of 1812, Harris spent almost twenty years afloat, serving on board 
a variety of warships.  His extensive sea service imparted in him two things:  a keen 
appreciation of the role of Marines aboard naval vessels; and a habit of following the 
operational command of naval officers.  While on sea duty he was awarded a brevet 
promotion to captain in 1825.  In 1837, Harris, and many of his detachment joined 
Henderson in Florida, where he earned another brevet promotion to major for his “good 
service” in command of a unit of mounted Marines during the Battle of Hatchee-Lustee.  
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Alexander insightfully considers that period of time to be “the peak of his career as a 
fighting marine,” a sober assessment that hints at Harris‟ subsequent dearth of 
accomplishments.  Following the Florida campaign, Harris left sea duty for good and 
spent the rest of his pre-Commandant career at a succession of barracks commands at 
various Navy Yards, a sequence of non-descript assignments that, Alexander concludes, 
“seemed to take much of the fire out of [him].”3   
When the Mexican War broke out less than a decade after the Florida campaign, 
opportunities for Marine officers to serve in the conflict abounded and most of the 
Corps‟ officers expressed eagerness to participate in the war effort.  But Harris desired 
instead to remain in his barracks command in Gosport, Virginia (later known as 
Norfolk).  Specifically, when Commandant Henderson queried Harris about his 
preferences for joining a battalion being formed for service with the army in Mexico, 
Harris replied that he did not wish to be assigned to the Mexican force unless he could 
command the battalion; that he “would rather stay at home than go second to an officer 
of his own grade.”  He further added that “I have no desire to go, but if you [Henderson] 
think the good of the service requires it, I shall not hesitate to do so.”4  Having other field 
grade officers more anxious to go, Henderson passed Harris by, yet one cannot help but 
wonder what the energetic Commandant must have felt about Harris‟ reluctance to seize 
such an opportunity.   
John Harris showed none of that hesitation, however, in assuming the job of 
Commandant.  In little more than a day after Henderson‟s death Harris began tackling 
the various administrative duties of the post with competence and confidence.  At first 
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blush, he seemed to continue unabated the various initiatives of his predecessor and, as 
Alexander notes, his initial correspondence indicated that he “was determined to run a 
taut ship.”  In reality, the day-to-day responsibilities of the Commandant were not too 
challenging at that time:  the actual assigning of officers, approving of leaves and 
promotions, convening of courts-martials, etc., were all tasks performed by the navy 
secretary and his office.  Harris‟ job was merely to advise on those matters.  The 
Commandant could not even directly appoint his own staff officers, although Henderson 
had long wielded his influence to gain officers supportive of his initiatives.5  Harris 
would never reach that same level of influence with his superiors that his predecessor 
enjoyed, so he had to be content to work with staff officers who were often supportive of 
Henderson‟s goals and, as we shall see, some of those relationships grew strained over 
time for several reasons. 
The main issue with Harris‟ tenure as Commandant was not his administrative 
competence, but rather his limited vision for the Corps‟ place within the military 
structure and his restricted outlook regarding the types of roles the unit should pursue as 
a service.  In contrast to Henderson‟s actions, it is questionable that Harris worked to 
ensure that the Marine Corps was meeting the needs of the naval services and nation in 
the most efficient and best manner.  Although Harris did not directly commit his 
thoughts to paper regarding his ideas on what constituted valid roles and missions for his 
unit, his concepts for employing Marines nonetheless can be inferred from a careful 
examination of his actions in office.  Gradually, and somewhat subtly, Harris developed 
his own set of conservative priorities for the organization.       
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It was notable that, when Harris took over as Commandant, Marines were in the 
midst of one of the largest peacetime military deployments since the Mexican War.  
Working in concert with the navy, Henderson had organized, trained and deployed an ad 
hoc battalion of about 200 Marines, with its own organic artillery, to provide a 
formidable landing party for the navy‟s Punitive Expedition to Paraguay.  That battalion 
epitomized the vision Henderson foresaw of Marine units with their own artillery 
capability serving as the core of naval landing parties, essentially constituting “the 
military arm of the navy”6 in projecting power ashore.  Importantly, Henderson also 
made good use of such deployments as a means of advertising the capabilities of the 
Corps and lobbying Congress for support.  For instance, writing to Secretary Toucey, he 
invoked the example of the Paraguay battalion to emphasize the “propriety of having 
established at headquarters a school for drill in both the use of the musket and of light 
and heavy artillery.”  Henderson argued that “every practicable facility should be 
afforded to instruct them on all the duties of their profession,” and noted that 
“comfortable and healthy barracks with sufficient space for drill” were needed, hoping 
that “provision will be made for their erection” as soon as practicable.  After all, the old 
Commandant continued, “the same drill should be imparted to every soldier, whether of 
the army or of the marine corps; the marines having more than once taken the field with 
the army as in Florida and Mexico.”7  Just as he had done for decades, Henderson cited 
examples of actual deployments as a rationale for gaining the support that he wanted to 
enhance his various programs. 
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Henderson also had used examples of operational employment of Marines to 
justify increases in the authorized numbers of officers and men within the Corps, and 
Secretary Toucey endorsed his requests.  Arguing that the utility of having a battalion of 
trained Marines ready for operations such as the Paraguay Expedition outweighed the 
costs, Henderson hoped to gain the manpower to officially flesh out his Headquarters 
training cadre so he would not have to keep diverting resources from the ships‟ 
detachments.  Interestingly, in his annual report the Commandant also compared the 
individual proficiency levels of the two groups of Marines that accompanied the 
Paraguay Expedition, those with the battalion and those with the separate ships‟ 
detachments, and concluded that the battalion‟s men were better trained.  Again 
highlighting the merits of having a centralized training center, he remarked that the 
ships‟ detachments, not having benefited by the battalion‟s training program might, “by 
being properly distributed among drilled [battalion Marines] . . . soon acquire the 
steadiness of their immediate associates in the ranks on the right and left.”  In short, the 
process of training and employing the Marines as a battalion organization helped 
increase the overall proficiency of all of the Marines of the fleet, whether they belonged 
to the battalion or not.  Providing him with personnel to permanently maintain that 
training cadre would ensure future support at the same level of quality.8  Similar appeals 
by Henderson had generated mixed success rates in the past, but under Henderson‟s 
experienced and skilled tutelage Secretary Toucey generally seemed to be a supporter of 
the Commandant‟s initiatives.  Henderson‟s consistent descriptions of the Corps‟ 
accomplishments in his correspondence with Navy Department and congressional 
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leaders served two functions:  reminding senior political leaders of the unit‟s successes 
and soliciting continued support.     
An analysis of Harris‟ correspondence and actions as Commandant reveals that 
he may have had quite different opinions as to the utility of Henderson‟s non-traditional 
operations.  While to a casual observer Harris may have seemed to be continuing to 
support some of Henderson‟s improvements, a closer study uncovers a quite different 
situation:  Harris may not have been as ardent a supporter of Headquarters‟ involvement 
in the planning, training and directing of Marines as Henderson intended.  Where 
Henderson had long publicized the accomplishments of Marines in his official letters, 
Harris mentioned very little about them, and much of what he did say focused on 
negatives.  For example, with regard to the aforementioned Paraguay Expedition, both 
Secretary Toucey and Henderson devoted a sizeable portion of their 1858 report on the 
subject.  Toucey also took time to note that “at no period when we were not actually 
engaged in war has the navy been more actively employed than during the past year.”  By 
extension, that also included the Marine Corps, a fact that Henderson highlighted.  In his 
1859 report, Toucey led off his narrative of the Navy‟s accomplishments for the year 
with a recap of the expedition‟s achievements, assessing the operation as a success.  In 
contrast, Harris made no mention at all of the part his men played in the largest 
deployment of combat power outside the United States since the Mexican War.  Instead, 
he focused on the state of barracks buildings at the various Navy Yards; important, but 
somewhat routine business.9  Where Henderson focused his attention outward and to the 
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problems of the future, Harris seemed to look inward and concentrate on issues of the 
present. 
Nowhere is this difference in operational focus more evident than during the 
Marine Corps‟ most visible military accomplishment of the prewar years:  its successful 
handling of John Brown‟s Raid at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in October of 1859.  Harris‟ 
part in the Marine Corps‟ response to the raid and what he had to say (or not say) about 
the Marines‟ role is quite revealing, and appears in stark contrast with that of his 
predecessor.  Close scrutiny leads to better understanding of John Harris‟ notions for 
what he believed constituted valid roles and missions for the Marine Corps.   
On 17 October 1859, Secretary of War John B. Floyd received a series of frantic 
telegrams from Baltimore and Ohio Railroad officials reporting that an abolitionist force 
of “one hundred and fifty strong” had seized the Federal Arsenal at Harpers Ferry and 
blocked the rail line that ran through the area.  Subsequent reports of “a formidable negro 
insurrection” raised the specter of another Nat Turner‟s Rebellion and fanned the flames 
of apprehension throughout the slaveholding Virginia and Maryland countryside, 
prompting a wide-ranging activation of militia units to combat the threat of insurrection.  
In nearby Washington, D.C., Floyd and President James Buchanan conferred on the state 
of affairs and decided it required the immediate presence of regular military troops to 
stabilize the situation.  The problem was, the nearest army regulars were located at Fort 
Monroe, a two-day journey, at a minimum.  Deciding that a quicker response was 
necessary, Floyd met with Secretary Toucey to request that Marines from the 
Washington Barracks be deployed immediately to quell the crisis.10  The fact that both 
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Floyd and Buchanan entrusted the Marines with such a politically sensitive mission is 
indicative of the high degree of trust and confidence that they had in the abilities of the 
Marine Corps. 
In this instance, the driving force for the employing of Marines in time of crisis 
would not be the unit‟s Commandant, but rather the Navy Secretary and politicians 
outside the Navy Department.  This situation is the direct opposite from that posed when 
Henderson was still alive, wherein navy secretaries more often than not tried to rein in 
Henderson‟s drive to commit Marines to action.  In the Harpers Ferry operation, decision 
makers outside the Corps pushed for it to take action, and Commandant Harris passively 
implemented orders as he received them.  Toucey, on being briefed by Floyd on the state 
of affairs at Harpers Ferry, concurred with the need for immediate military action and 
directed his Chief Clerk to personally deliver an order to Harris.  In a concise, yet 
detailed written directive, Toucey instructed Harris to “Send all available marines at 
Head Quarters, under charge of suitable officers, by this evening‟s train of cars to 
Harpers Ferry, to protect the public property at that place, which is endangered by riotous 
outbreak.”  Furthermore, Toucey specified that “the men will be furnished with a proper 
number of ball cartridges, ammunition and rations, and will take two howitzers and 
schrapnel [sic],” the last items being an indicator of the degree of uncertainty as to the 
scope of the threat the Marines might face.  The order also specified instructions 
regarding the command and control of the operation, placing the Marine detachment 
under the operational control of the “Senior Army Officer” at the site.11  Toucey‟s 
directive contained all the elements of a modern mission order, clearly addressing the 
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specifics of who, what, where, when, and why of the task to be accomplished, leaving 
Harris with little to add except to assign personnel and work out minor details.   
Harris assigned the only officer available at that time, First Lieutenant Israel 
Greene, to command the detachment, and he provided eighty-six Marines to fill out the 
unit.  Greene quickly formed the men and put them to work gathering the weapons and 
equipment that they would need for the job.  While that was going on, it appears that 
Secretary Toucey was growing concerned that Harris was not doing everything necessary 
to brief the Marines or to provide the degree of supervision necessary for success.  To 
assuage his fears, the navy secretary took several steps that he never felt compelled to do 
when Henderson was Commandant.  First, Toucey forwarded Greene a copy of his order 
to Harris, as if insinuating that the Commandant might not have provided that 
information already.  Second, apparently concerned that only one Marine officer, Greene, 
was available at the time to lead the force, Toucey took it upon himself to order another 
Marine officer, Paymaster Major William W. Russell, to accompany Greene‟s command, 
ostensibly to provide the junior officer with support or assistance.  Harris apparently 
agreed with this arrangement, or at least he did not oppose it.  In any event, the inclusion 
of Russell may have proved, in the end, more of a distraction than an asset to Greene.12      
On arrival near Harpers Ferry, Greene met the overall commander of the force, 
Army Brevet Colonel Robert E. Lee, and helped plan and coordinate the actions of his 
Marines.  When it became evident that the Marines would lead the assault against 
Brown‟s raiders and free the hostages taken early in the raid, Greene organized his men 
into specific elements, provided each with detailed instructions, and supervised 
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rehearsals of their tasks.  His level of planning is comparable with that of modern 
military units, and the discipline of his men was superb.  As evidence of the last point, 
Greene ordered his lead Marines to assault John Brown‟s position with unloaded, 
bayonet-tipped weapons to prevent possibly wounding of the hostages within, despite 
having to brave enemy fire in the process.  On order, Greene‟s men executed their plan 
with precision, adapting rapidly to the changing situation with little loss of momentum, 
and quickly killed or captured all of Brown‟s men and freed all the hostages without 
injury.  Greene himself led the charge into the fire of the raiders and personally captured 
Brown.  From start to finish, Greene‟s assault lasted less than three minutes, ending an 
ordeal of terror that had captured the attention of the entire nation.  Lee, as overall 
commander, seemed entirely pleased with the performance of Greene and his men, 
inserting his “commendation of the conduct” of the Marines to his report on the action, 
and adding that they “were at all times ready and prompt in the execution of any duty.”13 
Greene‟s men had been at the heart of an action that transfixed the nation and 
polarized its people regarding the issue of slavery in America.  Not surprisingly, many 
leaders were quick to praise Greene and his men for their performance.  Colonel Lee, in 
addition to “express[ing his] thanks to . . . Major Russell, and Lieutenant Green[e] for 
the aid they afforded me,” also wrote Harris a personal note, stating “Your Corps has 
captivated so many hearts in Virginia, that you must not be surprised at the desire of its 
sons to enter its ranks.”  As proof, Lee included a letter from a “young & hearty” 
prospect who, along with several friends, soon enlisted into the Corps.14 
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Secretary Toucey also congratulated the Harpers Ferry Marines.  He forwarded 
copies of Lee‟s official report to both Greene and Russell, adding his appreciation for the 
“gallant part taken by the Marines under your command” in the action.  With a sense of 
pride, he congratulated the officers and proclaimed that the “conduct of yourself and 
your command on that occasion meets with the highest commendation of the 
Department.”15  
  Newspapers and magazines covered the action in detail for months afterward, 
telling and retelling the events to a national audience that hung on every word.  
Everyone, it seemed, had some words of thanks or praise for the role the Marines played 
at Harpers Ferry.  Everyone, that is, except the one person who commanded the Marines, 
Commandant John Harris, who remained strangely silent on the action.  If, as Sullivan 
asserts, “Harris was well-pleased with the performance of his Corps during the trouble at 
Harpers Ferry,” he missed many opportunities to say so in his official correspondence.  
Somewhat surprisingly, in Harris‟ contribution to Secretary Toucey‟s annual report to 
Congress, written only four weeks after his men‟s successful handling of the Harpers 
Ferry incident, Harris says not one word about the part his men played in that action.  
This omission is particularly unusual since in that report Harris asks Congress to 
consider a request for adding almost one thousand more officers and men “to meet the 
wants of the service,” yet neglecting to cite the one example still fresh in the minds of 
the nation that clearly illustrated the tangible benefits that could be reaped for the country 
if such a request were granted.16  The failure to even mention the noteworthy 
performance of his men at Harpers Ferry in the report, certainly the most important 
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contribution to national defense made that year, is a curious omission that suggests that 
Harris might not have been fully supportive of the practice of employing Marines in such 
a non-traditional fashion.   
There are other examples that suggest Harris may not have welcomed the use of 
Marines outside the traditional missions of ships‟ detachments or guarding naval 
property.  In early 1861, the Marine Corps again found itself thrust into the center of a 
growing national crisis.  As smoldering sectional disagreements over the “peculiar 
institution” of slavery were fanned aflame by rhetoric surrounding the upcoming 
presidential election, some military officers and men from all services began to waver in 
their loyalties to the Federal government, prompting many to resign or even desert their 
posts.  The outcome of the election further aggravated the situation and the trickle of 
resignations and desertions became a deluge, particularly in the South.  The Washington, 
D.C., area, sandwiched as it was between two slaveholding states, proved especially hard 
hit with manpower losses that left many of the capital‟s defenses with inadequate men to 
man the posts.  Historian B. Franklin Cooling, III, bluntly described the situation in the 
Spring of 1861:  “Prior to the fall of Fort Sumter, Washington‟s military defense was 
much more an illusion than a reality [and] could boast of little more than the usual 
number of dottery old bureau chiefs, and a sprinkling of gold-laced officers from the 
Navy Yard.”17   
According to Cooling, the city‟s new Inspector General, army Colonel Charles P. 
Stone, reported that “The only regular troops near the capital of the country were three or 
four hundred marines at the Marine barracks, and three officers and fifty-three men of 
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ordnance at the Washington Arsenal.”  Stone also noted that the District‟s “old militia 
system had been abandoned (without being legally abolished), and Congress had passed 
no law establishing a new one.”18  Furthermore, Cooling asserts that “Volunteers in the 
District of Columbia formed but four innocuous organizations whose loyalty was open to 
question.”19  With the nation teetering on the cusp of war and the capital left with few 
defenses, the Marine Corps seemed ideally positioned to step into the vacuum as the 
protector of Washington, an opportunity that seemed too good to pass up even for a hard-
pressed organization with so many critical needs.   
However, Harris seemed not to relish the role of being the most likely defender of 
the capital.  In fact, his correspondence illustrates a reluctance to expand his security 
obligations outside traditional responsibilities.  Yet the realities of the deteriorating 
national political situation dictated that the Marine Corps must operate outside its norm 
and assume a greater role in the capital‟s defense.  On 5 January 1861, Secretary Toucey 
ordered Harris to “send a detachment of 40 Marines, under the charge of proper officers 
and properly manned and equipped, to occupy Fort Washington for about fifteen days 
and to protect public property.”  That position, located a few miles south of the District 
of Columbia on the Maryland side of the Potomac, controlled the river approaches into 
Washington and was considered to be one of two critical defensive positions for the 
capital region, the second being Fort McHenry, near Baltimore.  The threatened loss of 
such important forts spurred even the lethargic Buchanan administration to take action to 
ensure they remained in Federal control.  To give Harris a hint of the urgency of the 
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request, Toucey also advised him that “a conveyance will be furnished by the Navy 
Department which, will receive them at the Navy Yard wharf.”20  Speed was paramount. 
Harris quickly organized and dispatched a force of forty-eight Marines under the 
command of Brevet Major George Terrett, to garrison Fort Washington.  Terrett, then 
commander of the Marine Barracks in Washington, was a seasoned and quite capable 
officer who had earned a brevet promotion during the Mexican War.  Terrett also took 
with him two second lieutenants to assist him in commanding the detachment.  With a 
sense of urgency that reflected the circumstances, Terrett rapidly mustered and equipped 
his men, marched them to the wharf, embarked aboard their transport, and proceeded to 
Fort Washington.  On their arrival, the men stored their gear and excess equipment, and 
then commenced their duties as a garrison force.21    
Three days later, Harris received another order to “provide a detachment of thirty 
Marines” to Fort McHenry to “garrison the fort until relieved by army troops.”  Again, 
Toucey requested that Harris act fast, giving him until “tomorrow morning” to have the 
detachment in place.  With almost fifty men at Fort Washington, and with no reduction 
in his requirement to protect both his headquarters and the Navy Yard, Harris looked 
elsewhere for forces to meet this new commitment.  He telegraphed his commanders at 
the Brooklyn and Philadelphia barracks to determine which post could best handle this 
new assignment.   After receiving personnel reports from both barracks, Harris directed 
First Lieutenant Andrew Hays to lead a detachment of thirty-nine Marines and to proceed 
with them for Baltimore aboard the next morning‟s 4:00 A.M. train.  With no time to 
waste, Hays quickly organized, equipped and prepared his men for the task.  The 
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detachment embarked on the specified train and Hays soon after reported their safe 
arrival at Fort McHenry.  By that same afternoon the detachment was already conducting 
patrols of the area outside the fort, seeking to “guard against arson” or any other 
threats.22   
Harris now had Marines occupying key positions around the capital:  the Navy 
Yard, his Headquarters Barracks, and both Fort Washington and Fort McHenry.  His 
rapid actions in filling the military vacuum around the District would seem to leave him 
well-positioned to argue convincingly for the authorization to increase his organization‟s 
overall personnel strength, should he push the issue (see Figure 4-1).  Certainly, 
Congress would have found it a hard request to turn down.  Instead, Harris looked for 
reasons to withdraw Marines from the fort garrisons, arguing that such missions were not 
technically Marine responsibilities.  Citing the same Act of 1834 that Commandant 
Henderson had used to gain permission for Marines to fight with the army in Florida, 
Harris now argued that the situation at Fort McHenry had raised the question of who, by 
law, could control Marines in the field.23  Harris‟ own words and actions speak volumes 
of what he thought about having his Marines detailed to postings with the army. 
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Figure 4-1.  Capital Area Defenses Occupied by Marines, January 1861.24 
 
 
One would think, as some indeed must have, that national military requirements 
would trump individual service parochialism.  The issue of who could exercise control 
over Marines in the field, while a germane and valid concern, hinged on technicalities 
that could have been worked out to the benefit of all parties, and yet Harris stubbornly 
dug in his heels.  On 10 January, the day after he arrived at Fort McHenry, Lieutenant 
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Hays forwarded Harris a copy of a general order from army Lieutenant General Winfield 
Scott that ordered one of his officers, Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Brown, to assume 
command of the garrison, including the Marine detachment.  Incensed, Harris wrote 
Toucey to protest what he perceived as an illegal and improper encroachment of his 
command authority.  Marines, he argued, could only be ordered to serve under army 
control in the field by the president.  Without presidential authority, Scott‟s order was, by 
law, invalid.  Harris went on to point out that the secretary should protest Scott‟s actions, 
facetiously commenting that Scott “might, with the same propriety, order an [Army] 
officer to assume command of the Head Quarters of the Corps,” if Toucey did not 
challenge that authority.25  The tone of Harris‟ letter reflects righteous indignation, and it 
was apparent that he wrote it in the passion of the moment.   
Technically, Harris was entirely correct in his assertion: absent a presidential 
order to provide Marines to serve with the army, Scott did not have authority to issue an 
order placing the Marine detachment under command of an army officer.  However, 
instead of offering up a solution that might have satisfied all parties while still 
accomplishing the mission of defending critical government installations, Harris 
polarized the issue and made Marine participation seem to be an all or nothing 
proposition:  either the president should order Marines to serve with the army, or the 
Marines would not participate.  Alternatives wherein the Marines might have still 
supported those missions while also maintaining their chain of command were not 
addressed.  An easy solution, although uncommon at that time, might have been that the 
Marines coordinate their operational activities with the local commander, while still 
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maintaining a Navy/Marine command structure.  With the army in dire need of 
manpower, such an arrangement might have been acceptable, but Harris‟ preference 
seemed to be not to work with the army under any circumstance. 
In the end, despite siding with Harris‟ point regarding the issue of command of 
Marines, Toucey still kept the detachment in place until the army could relieve it.  Rather 
than make a hard decision or policy for how to handle this and similar situations in the 
future, Toucey tried to tread the middle ground, acknowledging Harris‟ point, yet not 
rescinding his order to deploy the Marines.  Perhaps the secretary acted out of a broader 
knowledge of events transpiring throughout the nation:  on 10 January, Florida joined 
South Carolina in seceding from the Union, and on 11 January Alabama passed its own 
secession ordinance.  On 12 January, in a direct, precise missive, the secretary ordered 
Hays to return to the Washington, D.C., area immediately “on arrival of Army troops at 
Fort McHenry,” fulfilling the intent of the original assignment.  Three days later, a 
smugly satisfied Harris notified Toucey that Hays and his men had returned, ignoring the 
fact that their deployment to Fort McHenry might have helped forestall drastic action by 
some of Maryland‟s more ardent Southern sympathizers.  Uncharacteristically, Harris 
also noted that Hays “reports [his] detachment as behaving remarkably well, obeying all 
orders promptly and cheerfully.”26  For Hays‟ unit‟s short six-day deployment, Harris 
heaped on it more praise than for any other unit since he had become Commandant.  
To make matters worse for him, the very next day, 16 January, Harris received a 
letter from Captain Algernon S. Taylor of the Fort Washington garrison.  Taylor, who 
had several days earlier replaced Major Terrett as commander of that Marine 
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detachment, wished to inform Harris fully of the situation at his post.  Believing that the 
fort was in a “defenseless and pregnable condition,” he felt that the garrison needed 
reinforcing.  As proof, Taylor relayed the blunt observation of First Lieutenant George 
W. C. Lee, an army engineer assigned to the fort, that “150 tolerably organized men 
could enter this place against the force now here.”  To remedy the problem, “Lieutenant 
Lee is now preparing some of the embrasures to mount howitzers in, but, when mounted, 
I have not men sufficient to work them and at the same time protect other assailable 
portions of the fort.”  Since “I do not wish to be placed in a position to detract from the 
high character of my Corps, I feel myself bound to make this report.”27  Taylor looked to 
Harris to provide him with additional assets to properly carry out the mission. 
Instead, Harris seemed to want to withdraw his men from Fort Washington 
altogether.  On 18 January, Harris forwarded Taylor‟s report to Secretary Toucey, asking 
“that such action may be taken as the case requires.”  However, as a hint of the course of 
action Harris would prefer, he reminded the secretary that “the fifteen days for which the 
Marines were sent to Fort Washington expire tomorrow,” the 19th.  Although Toucey‟s 
reply to Harris has not been found among the records, it is known that Harris sent a small 
force to augment Taylor‟s unit, despite his earlier reluctance to do so.  Also, despite 
Harris‟ reminder of the end of the fifteen-day commitment, Taylor‟s men remained at 
Fort Washington for another week past that deadline, staying until another army unit 
formally relieved the detachment.28  Harris‟ comments and the two-day delay in 
forwarding Taylor‟s report suggests reluctance on his part to send more men to the fort, 
and a desire to conclude Marine participation in its defense as soon as possible. 
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Harris‟ earlier protestations to Secretary Toucey about Lieutenant General Scott 
ordering Marines without authority of the president did not stop Scott from including the 
Marine Corps from his contingency planning for capital defense.  Perhaps Scott was 
reminded of the last war, wherein a Marine battalion was assigned to his command in 
Mexico.  In any event, within a confidential general order dated 12 February 1861, Scott 
reasonably assigned the Marines to a prominent role in the event of an attack or threat in 
the District of Columbia.  “In case of alarm, outrage, or mob violence, at or near any of 
the public buildings or in the streets or squares of this city,” the order specified that 
“Colonel Harris, chief of the Marine Corps, will please put in rapid march to Capitol 
Square, there to await for further orders, as many of his marines as he can spare from 
other duties.”29  Although the need to dispatch Marines as a reaction force in case of civil 
disobedience never materialized, the plan to do so quite sensibly remained in effect 
despite the protestations of Harris.30  Scott‟s order clearly indicates that senior army 
officials believed that it was entirely within their authority to include Marines within 
their military plans, particularly where national security was concerned.  Unfortunately, 
Scott's personal observations regarding Harris' protests against that authority are missing 
from the historical record.  
Concurrent with his taskings to help man Washington defenses, Harris found 
himself also dealing with problems at his most remote barracks, the Warrington Navy 
Yard near Pensacola, Florida.  Rumors and indicators of Florida‟s possible secession had 
been surfacing since the presidential election in November 1860.  For example, in 
December, the commander of the Pensacola Marine Barracks, Captain Josiah Watson, 
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forwarded to the Corps‟ Quartermaster, Major William Slack, a copy of a letter he had 
received from the civilian contractor who provided the Marines with their rations.  In it, 
the contractor advised Watson that he would continue to “furnish rations under my 
contract [for] 1861 till I give you notice,” adding as a postscript “that if Florida goes out 
of the Union I will not furnish [rations] afterwards.”  On being notified of the ominous 
development, Toucey took minimal action:  he authorized Watson to draw rations from 
the Navy Yard if the Marines were cut off, and a concerned Harris closely monitored the 
situation.31    
The threat of being deprived of their rations was not the only problem the 
Marines (and navy) faced in Pensacola.  On 6 January, news reached the Navy Yard that 
the Federal installations of Fort Morgan and Mount Vernon Arsenal in nearby Alabama 
had surrendered to forces loyal to that state‟s governor.  Rumors began to circulate about 
large military formations moving on the Pensacola area.  Workers at the Navy Yard 
stopped coming to work, and stories of deliberate sabotage and talk of sympathy with 
secessionists abounded.  Despite this, the Commandant of the Navy Yard, Captain James 
Armstrong, did little to prepare his installation against an attack, even after Florida 
passed a secession ordinance of its own on 10 January.  Evidence suggests that several of 
the senior members of his staff, including his executive officer, Captain Ebenezer 
Farrand, USN, sympathized with rebel forces and may even have collaborated with them 
to hand over the installation to the South.  To the beleaguered Armstrong, the only 
trustworthy forces he felt he could muster were the thirty-seven Marines of Captain 
Watson‟s detachment and perhaps thirty workmen.32  
140 
Captain Watson‟s men faced several obstacles to providing a good defense of the 
Navy Yard.  First, they had few men to effectively cover such a large area.  Second, the 
yard had two main entrances and three pedestrian gates to guard, and part of the 
perimeter wall was in disrepair.  To make matters worse, at low tide intruders could 
simply walk around the wall.  Third, the Marines‟ own barracks was physically located 
outside the yard compound, making it necessary to defend both positions, thus further 
dissipating the strength of the detachment.  Fourth, the post‟s artillery pieces were either 
unserviceable, improperly mounted, or had some components missing, rendering them 
all useless.  Fifth, many of Watson‟s initiatives to bolster security were undermined by 
several of Armstrong‟s subordinates, probably purposefully done so that a takeover could 
be more easily accomplished.  As an example of this last point, when Captain Farrand 
discovered that Watson had taken it upon himself to equip his sentries with live 
ammunition, he “gave [Watson] an order for the guard not to fire at any person, but . . . 
to call [Farrand],” so that Farrand could personally take charge of the situation.33   
Not surprisingly, that is precisely what happened.  According to witnesses to the 
day‟s events, at about 9:00 A.M. on 12 January, a messenger from the guard sought out 
Captain Farrand to inform him that a party was waiting for him at the main gate.  Farrand 
went and met with the men, later identified as commissioners from the state of Florida, 
and shook hands with them.  Witnesses later testified that it was as if he had been 
expecting them.  As Farrand greeted the commissioners, several companies of armed 
men appeared, and the guards were ordered not to interfere.  Farrand then escorted the 
two commissioners to Captain Armstrong‟s office.  Soon afterward, another of 
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Armstrong‟s officers, identified as Navy Lieutenant Francis Renshaw, came out of the 
office, crossed the courtyard, and issued orders to haul down the American flag, stating 
that Armstrong had surrendered the post.  At that point, the armed state forces were 
allowed to enter the Navy Yard, where they soon occupied the post‟s magazine and 
assembled in the courtyard.  On discovering these developments, Captain Watson went 
to Armstrong‟s office to see what was transpiring, and the yard commandant advised him 
that he had, in fact, surrendered.34  There would be no fight.   
Watson was further ordered by Armstrong to have his men stack arms, confine 
themselves to two rooms on the upper level of the Marine Barracks, and to turn the 
remainder of the facility over to the state troops that had already occupied the Navy 
Yard.  To the chagrin of his Marines, Watson made them lay down their arms and 
allowed the Florida troops to occupy his barracks.  The first direct confrontation between 
U.S. Marines and Southern rebel forces had ended without a shot being fired.  Watson 
and his men were paroled a couple of days later and allowed to embark on the navy store 
ship Supply for passage back to the North.35  Although critics attributed the loss of the 
Pensacola post to timid leadership by the yard commandant and treasonous actions by 
some of his former officers, the Marines were nonetheless tarred with the same brush of 
that embarrassment because of the high expectations many had for their capabilities.    
The events in Pensacola were mirrored at many other Federal properties 
throughout the South.  As the United States divided itself and war loomed on the 
horizon, John Harris and his Marines would find themselves faced with many challenges.  
From the time of his assumption of the commandancy to the days just before the start if 
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the Civil War, John Harris believed that his major responsibility lay in providing 
administrative oversight for a decentralized organization, and to manage the personnel 
and equipment in a competent manner.  Where Henderson had sought to increasingly 
centralize certain functions, such as organization, command, and the training of officers 
and men, Harris remained content to decentralize and push those same functions back to 
the various detachments and barracks officers.  His actions demonstrated that Harris saw 
his duty as predominantly being a provider of personnel and resources to those units. 
Prior to 1859, Henderson perceived his headquarters as being the central core of 
the Marine Corps, providing the guidance, direction and training for all Marines, who 
could then be assigned to other units as needed.  He also understood the strengths and 
advantages of operating in larger, battalion-sized formations.  The larger units benefitted 
from a centralized approach to training, and could always form smaller detachments as 
needed with little loss in proficiency or cohesion.  The same could not be said for the 
reverse:  a battalion formed from many smaller, disparate units needed additional 
training and exercising to be able to effectively operate as a unit.  It is for precisely this 
reason that Henderson habitually maintained a training cadre at his Headquarters even 
when field units were short on manpower.  He believed that the central training effort 
was so important to the overall organization that it was worth the relatively minor 
inconvenience of some units having to function shorthanded. 
After becoming Commandant, Harris indicated that the opposite approach was 
more important:  although he understood the importance of schools of practice, he felt 
compelled to report that “from want of accommodations and of numbers we find it 
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impossible to instruct the men as infantry and as light and heavy artillery.”36  By granting 
a higher priority for the assigning of Marines to barracks and detachments rather than 
maintaining appropriate levels at the centralized training cadre and schools, Harris 
reversed Henderson‟s long-standing effort to centrally control the training and evaluation 
of new Marines.    
Another sharp difference between Harris and his predecessor lay in their 
divergent concepts of employing Marines, as well as in their ideas of what constituted 
valid roles and missions for the Corps.  Henderson sought out service with the army and 
rarely turned down a mission, seemingly understanding that the unit owed its existence 
to the fact that it could be depended on to competently serve in any number of roles, and 
not just in its traditional ones.  Henderson also understood that those long-established 
roles were dated and some were in danger of becoming irrelevant as society and 
technology effected changes on naval warfare and practices.  For all of these reasons, 
Henderson experimented with new roles and sought out opportunities to undertake 
missions outside of the norm, as a way of enhancing the value of the Corps to the Navy 
and the nation. 
Conversely, Harris seemed to take comfort in traditional assignments and felt 
uneasy when ordered to do anything outside the normal routine.  Harris also repeatedly 
issued arguments that his men should not serve under army control, even when such 
assignments would have benefitted the Corps in the long-term, as it had in the past.  In 
resisting such service, army leaders may have begun to find dealing with the sensitivities 
of Marines too difficult and not worth the effort expended.  Certainly, Winfield Scott and 
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others were finding that working with Harris was proving itself a complex proposition.  
Harris, in expending so much energy to extricate Marines from army command in early 
1861, may have closed some doors that might have led to more harmonious and mutually 
beneficial relationships in the future. 
As the secession crisis deepened, Harris seemed not to actively support several 
important initiatives that Henderson had worked towards for decades.  Harris appeared 
more interested in the formalities of command than on the realities of dealing with the 
situation the nation faced.  Furthermore, Harris lacked the practiced skills and diplomacy 
of his predecessor, but that is perhaps expected when comparing Harris‟ abilities to a 
leader with the longevity and experience of Henderson.  In such a comparison, Harris 
appears ill-prepared for the job, although, as both Millett and Alexander point out, it 
would be hard to see which of the most likely candidates would have been better 
prepared to fill Henderson‟s shoes.37  Furthermore, the duty of preparing junior leaders 
for increased responsibility is a function of the senior officer, and neither Henderson nor 
any of the many navy secretaries seemed to expend much time or effort towards training 
subordinates to take over their jobs.  As a consequence, the Marine Corps entered 
America‟s Civil War with John Harris at the helm, largely unprepared for the challenges 
to come.  
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CHAPTER V 
CRACKING IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FIRE:   
FROM THE SECESSION CRISIS TO BULL RUN 
 
Reacting to the election of Republican Abraham Lincoln to the U.S. presidency, 
several southern states pursued a path to withdrawal from the Union, precipitating the 
Secession Crisis, a crisis of loyalty to the Federal government.  Within a brief period of 
time about nine hundred former Federal government officials and military officers 
resigned or abandoned their positions and “went South” to accept posts within the rebel 
government rapidly taking shape in Montgomery, Alabama, the provisional Confederate 
government‟s capital city.  There, a Confederate government coalesced and made plans 
for its own defense.1   
The Secession Crisis led to filling the ranks of the new Confederacy‟s armed 
forces with experienced leaders, as former Federal soldiers, sailors and Marines sought 
military appointments in the South.  That crisis affected the U.S. Marine Corps in several 
important ways; exposing leadership failings and personnel problems, creating 
additional pressures on its officers, and disclosing shortcomings in the way the Corps 
recruited new prospects and how it employed them in the fight.  Most importantly, it 
revealed Commandant John Harris‟ vision of where he believed the Corps fit within the 
Union military structure, and events soon demonstrated the shortcomings of that 
concept.  Finally, Harris‟ early actions in the war had far-reaching consequences as they 
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established the pattern for how the Corps would be employed, a pattern that proved 
difficult to break even as the requirements of the war changed and grew.   
These flaws in the leadership of John Harris were quickly exposed during the 
Secession Crisis.  Immediately following Lincoln‟s inauguration and the standard 
change in Navy Secretaries, Harris performed his duties in a routine manner despite the 
indicators that war was looming on the horizon.  Like other service chiefs, Harris 
behaved as though oblivious to the slow depleting of his officers and men.  Likewise, 
Harris had not only failed to anticipate security issues when performing emergency 
duties around the capital, he had seemed to find all manner of reasons to resist 
performing those same duties.  But unlike other service leaders, Harris‟ timidity of 
action and recalcitrance to change affected his service more profoundly.   
Beginning with South Carolina‟s unanimous passing of an Ordinance of 
Secession on 20 December 1860, all of the Union‟s military services experienced 
alarming numbers of officers resigning their commissions, and the Marine Corps was no 
exception.  As other states joined South Carolina in seceding and subsequently entering 
the new Confederate States of America, the tempo of defections increased.  Yet early in 
the crisis some civilian leaders observed that Marine officers seemed to be resigning in 
higher percentages than did Navy officers.  To make matters worse, neither Secretary of 
the Navy Isaac Toucey nor Commandant Harris took any steps to stop the exodus until 
they were forced to by the incoming Lincoln administration.  Harris actually 
recommended approval of many of the early resignations, making it easier for some 
officers to leave the service honorably, instead of punishing them with a swift and harsh 
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dismissal.  That policy may have exacerbated the problem within the Corps, and account 
for why it was affected to a greater extent by the losses of its leaders.  Even more 
amazing, Harris wrote glowing letters of introduction for resigning officers, apparently 
without any thought that his remaining men might soon be facing them across the field 
of battle.   
The first U.S. Marine officer to tender his resignation in the Secession Crisis was 
Second Lieutenant Calvin L. Sayre, of Alabama, who returned from a shipboard 
deployment the day after his home state seceded on 11 January 1861.  Sayre desired 
“desperately to return home and discuss his future with family and friends,” so he 
petitioned for and received a leave of absence.  Nonetheless, he soon changed his mind 
about continuing his Federal service and instead submitted his resignation.  Harris 
favorably endorsed Sayre‟s request and Secretary Toucey approved it on 14 February 
1861.  That same day, while clearing his affairs with Headquarters prior to departing the 
Washington, D.C. area, Sayre received separate letters from the Corps‟ most senior staff 
officers.  The Marine Corps‟ Paymaster, Major William W. Russell, remarked that 
Sayre‟s “resignation from the Marine Corps for the purposes of following the fortunes of 
your state, will be a source of regret to your fellow officers.”  The Corps‟ Adjutant and 
Inspector, Major Henry B. Tyler, Sr., added that “should your lot be cast in military life 
that you will rise to eminence in the estimation of your Countrymen.”2 
In Harris‟ letter, he summed up Sayre‟s two and a half years of service, 
observing that “all of [that] time his bearing as an officer and a gentleman has met my 
entire approbation.”  Furthermore, Harris expressed regret “that the unsettled state of the 
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Country makes it, in [Sayre‟s] opinion, necessary that he should resign.”3  Therefore in 
this, the first of several important resignations of its kind, Harris established the model 
for how he would handle succeeding defections.  He and his senior staff officers not only 
made the process simple and straightforward, but they also provided the departing 
officer with documents that eased their transition.  These actions could hardly dissuade 
other like-minded officers of attempting the same thing.  Furthermore, the letters imply 
that the writers knew Sayre might seek some form of military service in the South, and 
he did.  These actions could hardly dissuade other like-minded officers of following their 
colleagues “South.”   
On his arrival a week later in Montgomery, Sayre presented copies of those same 
letters and earned a position in the Confederate government.  Days later, Sayre was 
delivering official dispatches to Texas for the Confederacy‟s new Secretary of War and 
soon after that received a commission as a first lieutenant of the newly formed 
Confederate States Marine Corps.  Within three months of leaving the U.S. Marines, 
Sayre faced his former comrades over the muzzle of a cannon aimed at the Union Fort 
Pickens across the waters of Pensacola Harbor.4  
Slowly at first, then with greater rapidity, other officers followed Sayre‟s 
example.  On 27 February, First Lieutenant Jacob Read of Georgia forwarded his letter 
of resignation.  Months before, on 1 November 1860, Read had been involved in an 
incident at the Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, wherein he allegedly prevented enlisted 
Marines from leaving the post to vote in the presidential election if they expressed an 
interest in voting for Lincoln.  According to an account of the incident, Read was officer 
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of the day and posted at the gate of the Marine Barracks at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.  
Marines would come to Read to request permission to depart the yard to vote, and a 
witness overheard Read exclaim to one “If you are going to vote for Lincoln, by G-d, 
you should not stir a step” out of the gate.  The story quickly found its way into the New 
York Times, and soon after landed on the desk of Secretary Toucey.5           
The commanding officer of the Marine Barracks, Captain Abraham N. Brevoort, 
realized the gravity of the situation and arranged to publish his “disapproval of the 
conduct of Lieut. Jacob Read,” adding that Read‟s “conduct has been by me reported to 
the commandant of the corps.”  Brevoort forwarded copies of the newspaper clippings 
and a detailed report of the circumstances to Colonel Harris, who shared them with 
Secretary Toucey.  Brevoort recommended that Read be charged for disobeying orders 
prohibiting Marine recruits on drill from leaving the Navy Yard, and also for actions 
“calculated to bring discredit on the service.”  In turn, Read justified his allowing of 
some Marines off-post by stating that they were actually in the custody of non-
commissioned officers who returned them to the yard after voting.  While admitting his 
own actions were careless and not well thought-out, Read nonetheless blamed the 
incident on “a reporter permitted to hang around the Barracks and pick up for use the 
unguarded words which sometimes very naturally and excusably escape the lips, even of 
older and more habitually discreet persons than myself.” 6  In essence, Read faulted the 
reporter for revealing his indiscretion, instead of accepting responsibility for 
precipitating the incident through his own actions. 
155 
 
The embarrassing episode provided Secretary Toucey and Colonel Harris with an 
ideal opportunity to address the open political partisanship that had precipitated the 
event.  Instead, Toucey weakly replied that he did “not deem the offense of Lieut. Read 
of sufficient importance to demand a Court-Martial.”  Telling Harris to “reprimand him 
for disobedience of orders,” he also directed Harris to “inform Captain Brevoort that the 
Department disapproves of his course in the matter in giving publicity [to the incident] 
through the newspapers.”  Read did not receive a reprimand and Brevoort, guilty only of 
trying to defuse the episode after the fact and rightfully report the incident to superiors, 
instead found himself being unfairly chastised for an offense committed by one of his 
officers.7  In this case, the senior Navy and Marine Corps leaders failed to support a 
subordinate commander who only wanted to maintain good order and discipline in his 
unit.  To add insult to injury, the lesson learned by Brevoort and others was to not get 
involved in such matters.   
In any event, Read resigned on 27 February, and the following week accepted a 
commission as a captain in Company D, 1st Georgia Regulars.  Although the USMC did 
not know it at the time, Read had apparently already been selected for induction into the 
Regular Army of the State of Georgia at least two weeks prior to his actual resigning.  
Read also received a commission as a captain in the CSMC.  Captain Brevoort was 
undoubtedly pleased to see him depart and probably would have been doubly gratified to 
know that Read faced a southern court-martial less than two years later for, among other 
charges, conduct highly prejudicial to good order and military discipline, a finding that 
Brevoort might have seconded.8 
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The next officer to resign was also not a surprise to his fellow Marines.  Second 
Lieutenant Becket K. Howell, brother-in-law to Jefferson Davis, resigned on 27 
February, and Toucey approved his request on 1 May.  Howell had communicated with 
Davis by wire the day he resigned, and Davis encouraged his young relative to join him 
in the South.  Howell‟s family ties to the former secretary of war and sitting senator were 
well known in Washington, and Harris provided Howell with a parting letter that 
included “my sincere wishes for his prosperity in whatever walks of life his future may 
lead him.”  By 29 March, that walk had taken him to Montgomery, where Howell gained 
a commission as a first lieutenant in the Confederate Marines.9     
Three other officers resigned at the same time as Howell:  First Lieutenant 
George Holmes, Second Lieutenant Henry L. Ingraham, and First Lieutenant Andrew J. 
Hays.  Holmes had long military experience, having served as a company commander in 
the Florida Volunteer Rifles in the Mexican War before entering the Marine Corps.  
Harris wrote a favorable letter for him as well, stating that “his deportment [during his 
twelve-year service in the USMC] has been that of a high-toned gentleman.”  
Furthermore, he added that “Should he decide to enter any other Military Corps, I take 
pleasure in recommending him as a gentlemen, to be relied upon at all times.”  Less than 
one month later, Holmes received a commission as a captain in the CSMC and began 
raising his own company for war service.10   
Harris was, incredibly, behaving almost as a referral agent for the South as the 
Confederacy scrambled to build up its military capability.  Even the most casual 
observer of the news on the streets of Washington at that time was alarmed at what was 
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transpiring in the South.  To bring the situation into focus, Harris had already painfully 
experienced having one of his posts, the Marine Barracks in Pensacola, Florida, forcibly 
seized by state militia only two months earlier.  Nonetheless, Harris set aside the 
implications of that event and instead wrote letters of recommendation for subordinate 
officers who were essentially abandoning their posts in time of need.  The most 
charitable explanation for his action is that he put the parochial interests of the Marine 
Corps, i.e. maintaining its autonomy from the army, above the security needs of the 
nation.   
One aspect of Hays‟ departure was even more disturbing and raised serious 
questions about Harris‟ actions during the crisis.  Hays, from Alabama, had gained a 
commission from the Marine Corps in 1847, and served on several ships and stations.  In 
1860-61, Hays had been assigned to the Marine Barracks in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.    
Significantly, when Harris was ordered in mid-January to provide garrisons at key 
defensive positions around the nation‟s capital, he assigned Hays to lead a detachment of 
Marines at Fort McHenry in Baltimore, after mass desertions from the army garrison left 
that position vulnerable.  Soon after, Harris became concerned when Hays intimated that 
he did not like the command relationship being proposed by Army reinforcements.  
Harris then supported Hays‟ request to withdraw the Marines, a move that certainly left 
the garrison weaker in their absence.11  The Commandant seemed not to consider the 
tactical consequences of the move at the time, and in light of Hays‟ defection shortly 
afterward, Harris‟ support of Hays raises questions regarding his judgment in the event. 
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Whatever Hays‟ motivation at Ft. McHenry, it did not stop Harris from providing 
him with a laudatory letter of recommendation similar to that given to Holmes.  Harris 
even took “great pleasure in recommending him as a gentleman to be relied upon at all 
times,” a referral that helped gain Hays a commission as a captain in the CSMC.  But 
Hays‟ story does not end there.  In mid-April, USMC Sergeant James Thompson walked 
into the office of the Corps‟ assistant quartermaster in Philadelphia and was surprised to 
see Hays in the office in civilian attire.  Thompson, who knew Hays personally from 
having served with him in the past, said that Hays got up, greeted Thompson with a 
warm shake of his hand and asked him if he knew of any non-commissioned officers or 
other men who might be interested in joining him in the South.  Unknown to Thompson 
at the time, only two weeks earlier Hays had become a captain in the Confederate 
Marine Corps.  Hays was therefore an enemy officer in mufti.  Hays talked with 
Thompson for a while, recommending the Confederate Marine Corps as an opportunity 
for some U.S. Marines to better themselves, particularly since he could guarantee them 
“good positions.”12   
When Thompson finished his business and returned to his post on the USS 
Princeton, he immediately reported the incident to the ship‟s commander, Captain Henry 
K. Hoff.  Hoff in turn relayed the information directly to Gideon Welles, who had just 
taken over as the new secretary of the Navy.  Welles in turn fired a copy of Hoff‟s report 
to Harris, along with several pointed questions as: Why was this happening?  Did Harris 
know of it?  Why did the assistant quartermaster (Captain William A.T. Maddox, 
USMC) not report it himself?  A furious Welles directed Harris to immediately 
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investigate the situation and to question Maddox regarding Hays‟ business with him on 
that day.  Harris, doubly embarrassed by the incident occurring in his Corps and 
involving a man he had earlier proclaimed to be “very sincerely his friend,” said he 
would look into the matter.  Although Maddox claimed to know nothing of Hays‟ 
conversations with Thompson, Welles regarded him with some suspicion after the 
incident, particularly when Maddox came up for promotion in later years.  Maddox 
originated from Maryland, a hotbed of secessionist activity, and that probably did not 
help his standing with Welles or other administration officials in general.13  In the 
meantime, Hays had retreated safely back to the South, and it is not known if his 
recruiting trip to the North bore fruit since relatively few enlisted Marines left the Corps 
to become Confederate Marines. 
In the case of Second Lieutenant Henry L. Ingraham, of South Carolina, his 
resignation also surprised no one.  A relative newcomer to the Corps with only two-and-
a-half years of service, his father was Captain Duncan N. Ingraham, USN, a senior 
officer who also resigned to accept a position in the Confederate States Navy.  Like 
Hays, Holmes and Howell, in less than a month after resigning, Henry Ingraham had 
received a commission as a first lieutenant in the CSMC, and soon after reported for 
duty with the Confederate Marine battalion in Pensacola, Florida.14 
In only two weeks the Marine Corps had lost six officers representing fifteen 
percent of its active lieutenants, more than would normally resign in a three or four-year 
period of time.  Furthermore, each was allowed to resign rather than be dismissed, and 
most carried with them letters of recommendations from Harris and his staff.  At that 
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same time the Navy was also experiencing the same phenomenon of large numbers of 
officers resigning their commissions, and some in Congress grew alarmed.  In response, 
the House formed a select committee of five representatives whose Chairman, Henry L. 
Dawes, soon proposed a resolution censuring Toucey for “accepting, without delay or 
inquiry” the resignations, a practice “prejudicial to the discipline of the service, and 
injurious to the honor and efficiency of the navy.”  The House passed the resolution of 
censure on 2 March 1861 by a vote of 95 for to 62 against.15  Strangely, Harris was not 
personally censured for his part in the routine approval and forwarding of Marine officer 
resignations.  Although Harris‟ actions were in part responsible for Toucey‟s censure, he 
was not punished in any direct fashion, despite Congress‟ realization that the Marine 
Corps‟ response to the officer resignations was part of the problem.  But the damage by 
then was done.  Officers continued to resign, but instead of gaining automatic approval 
as the earlier ones had, most were instead quickly and summarily dismissed.   
Not all of the officers who left the USMC during the Secession Crisis were 
predestined to do so.  Many agonized over their decision and circumstances other than 
birthplace may have helped influence their choice.  With one exception, none of those 
who resigned in 1861 were slaveholders in their own right, and several had participated 
in suppressing the foreign slave trade.  And the one slaveholding exception, Major 
Henry B. Tyler, Sr., continued to deliberate his future for more than two weeks 
following his home state‟s departure from the Union.  Tyler, a Virginian who owned 
twelve slaves, was one of the last from his state to depart the Marine Corps and seemed 
to have weighed several other factors before deciding to leave.  Furthermore, Tyler had a 
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significant financial incentive to stay:  years earlier he had posted a surety bond as 
security for the Corps‟ Paymaster, Major William W. Russell.  Any dismissal from 
service would cause him to forfeit that bond.16 
Slave ownership and financial incentives aside, Tyler‟s personal relationships 
with Commandant Harris had long been rocky, and on several occasions the Corps‟ 
Adjutant and Inspector corresponded with Secretary Toucey directly to try and resolve 
some of their professional differences.  In a series of lengthy and technical exchanges, 
Tyler argued that Harris frequently overstepped his bounds and would not let him 
perform his duties as Inspector as Tyler comprehended them.  Having held that position 
since June 1857, Tyler laid out a case that Harris consistently undermined Tyler‟s efforts 
to teach proper tactics and to enforce existing regulations at the several Marine Barracks.  
He argued that Harris prevented him from training the new men in accordance with new 
Army tactics and procedures.  For his part Toucey listened patiently to Tyler‟s 
arguments, but consistently backed Harris‟ prerogatives.  An extensive correspondence 
issued back and forth between Tyler and Toucey regarding Harris, as the level of 
frustration built in Tyler. 17    
To make matters worse, in April 1860 Major Tyler and his son, Lieutenant Henry 
B. Tyler, Jr., had placed Commandant Harris on report for alleged improprieties in 
assignments, and won their case.  Both Tylers then continued to work directly under 
Harris in Washington for the next year.  In the interim, their daily relations with Harris 
were most likely strained.  It seems likely that the elder Tyler‟s uneasy relationship with 
Harris and his concerns over what he believed were dilutions of initiatives begun under 
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Archibald Henderson played a role in his eventual decision to leave.  Tyler‟s concerns 
about Harris‟ leadership may even have been the deciding factor.  In any event, the 
abrasive relationship he had with the Commandant undoubtedly made it easier for Tyler, 
Sr., to walk away from an otherwise successful thirty-eight year career.18      
State loyalty may have been another contributing factor.  Major Tyler had earlier 
hinted that he might not be able to fight against his fellow Virginians.  Miss Emily 
Thorn, a guest of Tyler‟s in April 1861, suggested that might be the case, but similar 
allegations against other Marine officers are difficult to substantiate.  Yet one fact 
remains clear:  Harris did nothing to dissuade Tyler or any other officer from departing.  
In fact, the only regret Harris seemed to have regarding the loss of Tyler was that the 
officer Welles selected to replace him as Adjutant and Inspector was not one of Harris‟ 
choosing.19 
Virginia‟s secession prompted a new wave of officer resignations, with the 
Marine Corps losing seven of its twelve officers from that state, or just over 50 percent.  
Tyler and his son accounted for two of them.  The younger Tyler went out with a bang, 
having been placed under arrest in June for being drunk, disorderly, and vocally abusive 
toward anything or anyone associated with President Lincoln, the Federal government, 
or its policies.  After making his appearance in a colorful article in the New York Times 
and spending about a week in jail, Lieutenant Tyler was “stricken from the rolls” of the 
USMC and soon afterward joined the CSMC.20   
Other Virginians resigning included Brevet Major George H. Terrett, hero of the 
Marine battalion‟s exploits in Mexico City during the Mexican War, senior captains and 
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veterans Robert Tansill and Algernon S. Taylor, Brevet Captain John Simms of T‟ai 
Ping Rebellion fame, and First Lieutenants George P. Turner and Alexander W. Stark.  
With the exception of Lieutenant Stark, who returned from an overseas naval 
deployment too late to secure a posting in the CSMC, all the other Virginians gained 
Confederate Marine commissions.  Stark instead joined the Confederate army as a major 
of artillery and advanced to the rank of lieutenant colonel while commanding an artillery 
battalion.21   
Other Marine officers with indirect or even no direct ties to the South also 
resigned, and some of them joined their southern comrades in the CSMC.  On 20 April 
1861, Captain Jabez C. Rich of Maine and First Lieutenant Adam N. Baker of New 
Hampshire left their posts in the Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard, the same night that 
Secretary Welles ordered the destruction of that station to keep it from falling into the 
hands of Virginia state military forces.  The sudden absence of two of Gosport‟s most 
senior Marine commanders from their posts added to the confusion of the day, creating 
even more gaps in the already difficult task of supervising Union sailors and Marines 
detailed to destroy the ships and munitions in the yard.   Therefore, much useful 
equipment and stores came into the possession of Virginia, and subsequently the 
Confederate military.22   
On top of losing two more of its officers, the fact that Gosport was given up so 
soon after the surrender of the Navy Yard in Pensacola, Florida, did not improve the 
reputation of the Marine Corps.  To complicate matters, neither Captain Rich nor 
Lieutenant Baker were southerners, hinting that factors other than sectional loyalties 
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might have existed to influence them to resign.  Although Rich had a long, but spotty 
career, Baker‟s prospects seemed promising, and his sudden departure from the Marine 
Corps came as a complete surprise to his fellow officers.  Neither officer fit well in the 
Confederate military establishment; each soon left the South, further strengthening the 
supposition that the command climate in the USMC may have pushed some officers to 
believe that better opportunities lay elsewhere. 23  Unfortunately for them, these two 
officers‟ experiences soon proved otherwise, but by then it was too late to reverse their 
decision.  
All told, in 1861 the USMC lost a total of twenty-eight officers.  The majority of 
them were company grade officers, and several of those possessed decades of experience 
leading Marines.  Some, such as First Lieutenant Israel Greene of Wisconsin, the 
commander of the Marines who captured John Brown‟s raiders and restored order 
following that incident in late 1859, had proven themselves in difficult combat 
assignments with sensitive political overtones.  Similarly, Captain John Simms of 
Virginia had served in the Marine battalion during the Mexican War and in 1856 
commanded the almost 300-man landing force that attacked and reduced the Barrier 
Forts in Canton, China, during the T‟ai P‟ing Rebellion.24   
The leadership of these officers, representing slightly more than half of the  
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critical company-grade ranks, would be sorely missed in the USMC and heartily 
welcomed in the CSMC (see Table 5-1).  Historian Allan Millett astutely observes that 
“the [rate of] defections did little for the Marine Corps‟ status with the Lincoln 
administration or with social Washington.”25  With these officers also went an unknown 
number of non-commissioned officers and enlisted Marines, some possibly influenced 
by the same departing officers.  In addition to losing a majority of the critical source of 
mid-level leadership for the many detachments, the Corps also lost (and the South 
consequently gained) two important field grade officers:  Major Henry Tyler, Sr., the 
units‟ Adjutant-Inspector; and Major George Terrett, commander of the Marine Barracks 
in Washington, D.C.  These two officers, both intimately involved with the training of 
new personnel, resigned just as the USMC began its wartime expansion.  To cap it all 
off, one of the respected former commandant‟s youngest sons, Richard Henderson, 
decided to accept a commission as a lieutenant in the CSMC rather than enter his 
father‟s U.S. Marine Corps.26   
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Table 5-1.  Listing of U.S. Marine Officers Who Resigned or Were Dismissed 
Between December 1860 and December 1863.27 
 
 
Name Rank 
Separation 
Type 
Later Service 
Terrett, George H. Major Dismissed CSMC, CSA 
Tyler, Henry B. Sr. Major Dismissed CSMC 
Rich, Jabez C. Capt Dismissed Va. MC 
Simms, John D. Capt Dismissed CSMC 
Tansill, Robert Capt Dismissed CSMC, CSA 
Taylor, Algernon S. Capt Dismissed CSMC 
Baker, Adam N. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Greene, Israel 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Hays, Andrew J. 1st Lt Resigned CSMC 
Henderson, Charles A. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Holmes, George 1st Lt Resigned CSMC 
Kidd, Robert 1st Lt Dismissed Unknown 
Matthews, S. H. 1st Lt Dismissed Unknown 
Meier, Julius E. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Read, Jacob 1st Lt Resigned CSMC 
Stark, Alexander W. 1st Lt Dismissed CSA 
Tattnall, John R. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Turner, George P. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Tyler, Henry B. Jr. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Wilson, Thomas S. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Cummins, George W. 2nd Lt Dismissed Unknown 
Grant, Oscar B. 2nd Lt Resigned Remained In North (Civilian) 
Howell, Becket K. 2nd Lt Resigned CSMC 
Ingraham, Henry L. 2nd Lt Resigned CSMC 
Rathbone, J. H. 2nd Lt Resigned Remained In North (Civilian) 
Reber, J. M. 2nd Lt Dismissed Remained In North (Civilian) 
Sayre, Calvin L. 2nd Lt Resigned CSMC 
Sells, D. M. 2nd Lt Resigned Remained In North (Civilian) 
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To compound the damage done to the U.S. Marine Corps through the loss of 
several valued leaders, the Confederate Marine Corps benefited greatly from the transfer 
in experience.  Through some of the more gifted leaders the CSMC came to be infused 
with the spirit of former Commandant Henderson‟s reforms and imagination.  A 
significant number of the new CSMC officers had previously been intimately involved 
in implementing Henderson‟s initiatives, and many continued that work in their new 
Corps.  Major Tyler, Adjutant and Inspector for both Henderson and Harris, went on to 
command a Confederate Marine battalion for a critical period of time in the unit‟s 
infancy and then afterward served in the CSMC headquarters.  Major Israel Greene, 
former artillery instructor to the USMC and the leader of the Marines who captured John 
Brown in 1859, became the CSMC‟s Adjutant and Inspector.  Major George Terrett, 
previously the commander of the Washington, D.C., Marine Barracks during the time 
when that post served as Henderson‟s main training ground for new recruits, later 
commanded a Confederate Marine battalion at Drewry‟s Bluff, successfully integrating 
Marine infantry and artillery gunners into a force that helped defeat the Union Navy‟s 
drive toward Richmond.  Drewry‟s Bluff eventually served also as the training center for 
the CSMC, a location at which most new officers and many enlisted received their initial 
screening and training.  This centralization of training served to standardize techniques, 
procedures and traditions throughout the new Corps, under the watchful eyes of former 
Henderson disciples.  Other examples exist as well that support the contention that 
Henderson‟s influence permeated the new Corps through these men.28 
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The departing Federal Marine officers constituted a valuable nucleus of 
leadership at a time the Corps most needed them.  Their leaving created an experience 
and leadership vacuum in the USMC, a hole that contributed to the Corps‟ sometimes 
poor or uneven performance, particularly in the critical first engagements in the war.  As 
Millett correctly points out, the defections stripped the USMC of much of its company 
level leadership, leaving the large numbers of raw recruits who entered the Marines 
without effective instruction, leadership or supervision, particularly during their crucial 
first weeks in uniform.29  
There is no evidence that Commandant Harris took any measures whatsoever to 
prevent or even minimize the extent of the defections of his officers and men.  Rather, 
Harris‟ actions from the beginning encouraged or aggravated the situation by making it 
easy to leave under honorable conditions.  Harris‟ actions were irresponsible and 
inexcusable.  Furthermore, considering the high percentages of Marine officers that 
resigned (higher than either the Army or Navy), and taking into account the aberrant 
defecting of some officers with no direct ties to the South, Harris‟ performance should 
have elicited greater scrutiny by superiors.  And as a service chief, he should probably 
have been included in the House‟s censure of Secretary Toucey or even replaced when 
Welles became secretary.   
Even without an official censure, Harris suffered administratively when Gideon 
Welles replaced Isaac Toucey as Secretary of the Navy on 5 March 1861.  Tellingly, one 
of Welles‟ first official functions was his approval of a request from Harris to be absent 
from Washington until 9 March.  From that point on Welles‟ correspondence with Harris 
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is curt, concise, detailed and direct.  The secretary critically examined all of Harris‟ work 
and did not hesitate to take corrective action when needed.  Welles advised Harris and 
other senior Marine officers to cease their practice of having officers linger around in 
Washington, D.C., for days or weeks waiting to provide brief testimony in courts-martial 
proceedings.  Instead he directed Harris to send them back to their commands until 
specifically needed in court.  And soon afterward, Welles admonished Harris for 
botching a court-martial of Lieutenant Edward McD. Reynolds.  He scolded Harris for 
routinely forwarding the court‟s finding of Reynolds being found guilty of “disobeying a 
lawful order of his superior officer,” yet given a sentence “to be restored to duty.”  
Welles pointed out the inconsistency of the court‟s actions, stating that the court failed in 
its duty and Harris neglected his since “under the circumstances [the court members] 
attach no criminality to the offense proven.”  In summary, if the party is guilty, sentence 
him accordingly; if not guilty, he need not be sentenced.  Welles then formally 
disapproved of Harris‟ and the court‟s findings of guilt.  The secretary wanted to hold 
Harris accountable and to coax him to critically examine his correspondence before 
forwarding it to the department.30  Furthermore, Welles seemed impatient with what he 
believed were excessive legal and administrative details that consumed resources and 
distracted officers from the larger issues of fighting the war.  
Welles began to assume more control over the administration and employment of 
Marines and rarely solicited advice or recommendations from Harris.  From the start, 
Welles‟ exerted great influence over the day-to-day running of the Marine Corps.  
Harris, for his part, seemed to accept his reduced role and simply implemented Welles‟ 
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orders as he received them.  Other than routine requests for more officers and men, 
Harris forwarded few new ideas of his own.  Conversely, the secretary‟s directives to 
Harris were specific -- requests to add or remove Marines to/from certain ships or 
stations, to transfer Marines from one post to another, or even to reposition them from 
Harris‟ own headquarters.  As an example of the latter, on 27 April 1861, Welles 
notified Harris that he was advised by the commander of the Washington Navy Yard that 
there were insufficient Marines to guard it.  Welles then directed the Commandant to 
dispatch thirty more Marines immediately, a move that could just as easily have been 
done by the yard commander talking directly with his subordinate Marine Barracks, 
Washington, commander, who was located on his same post.31  In any event, Welles left 
no doubt who was administratively running the Marine Corps, and that person certainly 
was not Harris.  Harris merely executed the orders received from the Navy Department. 
These same unsettled conditions and leadership problems negatively affected 
Marine Corps field operations during the first six months of the war.  For at least two 
decades before the war, Marines were called upon to perform a wide variety of 
assignments with little advance warning, and the Corps effectively carried out those 
tasks.  Yet the Marine Corps, when called upon in 1861, generally failed to perform as 
well as before.  Marines displayed difficulties deploying in the defense of Washington, 
D.C, protecting the Navy Yard at Pensacola, and destroying war materiel at Gosport.  
How to account for these failures and strings of problems? 
In early April, 1861, Union forces held only two positions in the South:  Fort 
Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, and Fort Pickens, guarding the mouth to 
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the harbor at Pensacola, Florida.  President Lincoln and Secretary Welles grew 
concerned that if Fort Pickens were lost to the Union, the Navy would have no secure 
base within the entire Gulf Coast from which later operations could be supported.  
Accordingly, on the night of 12 April, the same day that Confederate forces began 
bombarding Fort Sumter, Welles ordered the Marines to land and reinforce Fort Pickens.  
Operating at night, one hundred and sixteen Marines from four separate warships under 
the overall command of First Lieutenant George R. Graham rowed ashore and ran across 
the 600 yards of exposed beach to the safety of the fort‟s ramparts.  The bold move 
caught the besieging Rebel troops by surprise and gave the Union garrison enough 
manpower to adequately guard the approaches against Confederate attack.  The 
reinforcement most likely forestalled an attempt by Southern forces to emulate the 
success achieved at Fort Sumter.  After additional Union Army troops and artillery 
landed on 17 April, the Marines rejoined their ships.  A correspondent from the New 
York Times who witnessed the operation had nothing but praise for the Marines, calling 
them the “one bright spot on the Navy.”  The new garrison commander of Fort Pickens, 
Colonel Harvey Brown, must have agreed with that assessment, for less than a week 
later he recalled the Marines back to shore from their ships and incorporated them into 
his garrison to serve as a reaction force for the next month.32  Yet unaccountably, Harris 
made no mention of these creditable actions in his official correspondence. 
Following the fall of Ft. Sumter, the military situation began to heat up around 
the nation‟s capital and Marines were again involved in the action.  On 1-2 June 1861, 
Marines aboard the USS Pawnee participated in an exchange of cannon fire between 
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ships of a Union flotilla under Navy Commander James H. Ward and Confederate 
batteries at the mouth of Aquia Creek.  Hundreds of rounds were exchanged between the 
ships and the shore batteries as the Union Navy sought to maintain control over the 
Potomac River and the approach to the nation‟s capital.  For the next several weeks, 
Ward‟s small unit engaged other Confederate batteries and landed Marines and sailors at 
several points to conduct reconnaissance and to destroy enemy gun positions.33  These 
actions, too, went generally unmentioned by the Corps‟ leader. 
Up to this point in the war, all of the Marine Corps‟ direct participation had been 
at a modest scale, involving primarily small ships‟ detachments.  Unaccountably, the 
Marine Corps had not yet taken the significant step it had done in both the Second 
Seminole War and the Mexican War:  it had not yet formed a standing battalion-sized 
unit to serve in larger-scale operations.  In that regard Harris' Corps was way behind its 
own competition, the Confederate States Marine Corps, which had by 24 April already 
successfully formed and deployed a Marine battalion for service in the Pensacola area.34   
Harris' landing force that reinforced Fort Pickens consisted of an ad hoc grouping 
of detachments from four separate warships; the Brooklyn, Sabine, Wyandotte and St. 
Louis.  In that instance, as with the subsequent relief force dispatched to destroy the 
federal property at Gosport, the senior Marine officer took charge of the makeshift unit 
and relied heavily on his junior leaders to execute his orders.  Although each Marine had 
received some level of military training beforehand, the system was certainly less 
efficient and less capable than if a unit had been formed that had the opportunity to train 
together as a team, even if only for a short while.  In purposely-formed units, the defined 
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chain of command promoted command and control and also leaders at all levels could 
better know the individual strengths and weaknesses of their men and resolve identified 
deficiencies prior to actual combat.  All of these measures enhance the chances of a 
unit‟s success in combat.  The Army also entered the war with similar disadvantages due 
to its wide pre-war scattering of units, yet it quickly realized the advantages of 
organizing and training in larger formations.  The Marine Corps seemed not to have 
learned that lesson and instead operated mostly as small units throughout the war. 
The next major combat operation the Marines participated in brought all of these 
problems to the surface, with disappointing results.  On 12 July 1861, Secretary of War 
Simon Cameron, with the concurrence of Gideon Welles, requested a battalion of 
Marines be formed “and held in readiness to march on field service.”  In apparent 
confirmation of the strains between Harris and Welles, the Commandant was not 
consulted about the committing of a battalion of his Marines until after the decision was 
made.  Perhaps his exclusion was deliberate.  And while historian David Sullivan 
speculates that Harris was likely “outraged and humiliated at being kept in the dark 
while plans for his Corps were being made,” and that “Welles was similarly proud and 
equally jealous of his prerogatives,” he does not address the key issue of why Harris was 
not included in such an important decision.  As further evidence of the degree that Harris 
was excluded, Welles had already selected leaders for the battalion.  The secretary had 
already issued orders to Major John G. Reynolds and Captain Jacob Zeilen to depart 
their respective posts and report to Washington, D.C., for duty with the battalion.35        
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In addition to deciding to field a Marine battalion and personally selecting its 
leaders, Welles also dictated its organization.  He notified Harris that “you will be 
pleased to detail from the barracks four companies of eighty men each, the whole under 
the command of Major Reynolds, with the necessary officers, non-commissioned 
officers and musicians, for temporary field service under Brig. Genl [Irvin] McDowell.”  
Command relationships and logistics were also specified; Reynolds would report to 
McDowell, and the army would provide necessary “camp equipage, provisions, etc.” for 
the unit.36  Harris was left with little to do except execute the orders as received.   
Welles‟ approach to the forming of the Marine battalion is telling and confirms 
that Harris held little influence in operational decision-making.  Welles continued to 
issue direct and specific instructions to Harris regarding the battalion, perhaps reacting to 
Harris‟ own unaccountable inactivity in this area.  Welles probably knew that what he 
was doing went against normal protocol, yet he may have felt that such measures were 
needed to gain results.  The nation had already been at war for three months, little 
seemed to be getting done, and Lincoln‟s administration was beginning to feel the 
pressure to take action against the rebels.37   
As directed, Harris provided the unit with the officers and non-commissioned 
officers he had at hand.  But when it came to filling the ranks, Harris departed from the 
precedent established by his predecessor, Archibald Henderson, and simply assigned 
new recruits to Reynolds‟ battalion instead of experienced Marines.  Harris‟ decision 
produced dire consequences.  In past instances when Henderson had formed battalions 
he had filled the ranks with qualified Marines pulled from the various ships‟ 
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detachments and shore stations, later backfilling the ships and barracks with new recruits 
once they had been trained.  Harris took the opposite approach, leaving his experienced 
men scattered throughout the fleet while men fresh from civilian pursuits topped off the 
battalion.38   
This last point was not lost on Major Reynolds and his subordinate leaders.  One 
of the officers, Second Lieutenant Robert E. Hitchcock, himself a new addition to the 
Corps, summed up the situation as he saw it in a sober letter home: “. . . tomorrow 
morning will see me and five other Lieut[enant]s with 300 Marines (raw recruits in 
every sense of the term) on our way to Fairfax Court House to take part in a bloody 
battle.”  Hitchcock observed further:  “This is unexpected to us, and the Marines are not 
fit to go into the field, for every one of them is as raw as you please, not more than a 
hundred of them have been here over three weeks.”  Of the 324 Marine privates in the 
battalion, only 2 percent (or seven total Marines) had served for more than three months.  
Many had been in uniform less than a week before departing for Manassas.  The senior 
leaders were not in much better shape:  although half of Reynolds‟ twelve officers were 
combat veterans, only one of the twelve non-commissioned officers had seen combat.  
Historian Allan Millett describes the battalion best when he states that while it “looked 
disciplined and smart, it was a pitiable group of raw recruits.”  Furthermore, “some had 
just been issued weapons,” probably for the first time in their lives.39   Certainly only a 
few, if any, were proficient with the weapons they now carried into battle.  
Meanwhile, Marine privates stationed aboard ships in various ports heard rumors 
of the battalion being formed and some volunteered to take the place of the recruits.  One 
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collectively authored letter from the detachment on the USS Richmond, then in New 
York, advised Harris they had seen battle before and ventured that “There are a number 
of recruits in the Barracks who would willingly take our place on board ship and do ship 
duty equally well.”40  Some of those writing, themselves veterans of the Marine 
battalions that served in the Indian and Mexican Wars, probably also wondered why 
their Commandant did not think of that on his own, or accept their logical suggestion 
after they made it.   
Untrained and green as his men were, Reynolds mustered them in the early 
afternoon of 16 July and marched them across the Long Bridge over the Potomac into 
Virginia to take its place with McDowell‟s forces.  McDowell assigned the Marines to 
his First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Andrew Porter.  Porter in turn assigned the 
Marines to protect Captain Charles Griffin‟s mounted “flying artillery” battery.  The 
horse-drawn artillery set a murderous pace for the foot-mobile Marines, and Reynolds‟ 
subordinates were challenged to maintain order and discipline during the blisteringly hot 
movement south.41      
On the evening of 20 July, Reynolds‟ battalion made camp near Centerville, 
Virginia, and prepared for a movement the next day against Confederate forces believed 
to be occupying defensive positions along Bull Run, near the town of Manassas.  Before 
dawn on the 21st, Reynolds‟ Marines joined the long column of troops jamming the road 
into the Warrenton Turnpike, inching forward at an excruciatingly slow pace.  With 
Federal plans now behind schedule, the Marines struggled to maintain their support for 
Griffin‟s battery as it repositioned to the far right of the Union lines.  In the early 
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afternoon heat, Griffin‟s battery sprang forward from the lines to establish firing 
positions oriented toward Henry House Hill to bring enfilade fire down the Confederate 
ranks.  Another battery commanded by Captain James B. Ricketts also moved up, 
reinforcing Griffin‟s guns.  Reynolds‟ Marines “followed promptly,” and as they moved 
in trace of the Union artillery and left the concealment of woods behind them they 
became the target of Confederate fire that inflicted the first Marine casualties (see Figure 
5-1).42  The Marines found themselves at what many later identified as a critical juncture 
in the battle.   
 
 
Figure 5-1.  Situation at Bull Run, 12:00-2:00 P.M., 21 July 1861.43 
 
 
The battle intensified and the Confederate forces counterattacked against the 
Union artillery.  According to Reynolds, “the battalion was exposed to a galling fire,” 
and McDowell sent orders for the Marines to move up so as to protect the batteries, now 
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dangerously exposed to Confederate infantry.  In Reynolds‟ own words, “The battalion, 
in consequence, took the position indicated by the general [McDowell], but was unable 
to hold it, owing to the heavy fire which was opened upon them.”  Griffin‟s position was 
swept by rebel artillery and an assault by the 33rd Virginia Regiment.  Along with two 
New York regiments also ordered to protect the artillery units, Reynolds struggled to 
push his men forward so as to better protect the batteries from the fires of the enemy 
infantry.  However, like the other Union units on that flank, the battalion “broke three 
[sic] several times, but as frequently formed and urged back into position, when finally a 
general rout took place, in which the marines participated.”44   
Rout accurately describes the retreat of McDowell‟s army from the field of 
battle.  Set in motion by a hysterical withdrawal of the 11th New York “Fire” Zouaves 
located at the right of the Marines, many of Reynolds‟ men followed suit and the 
rearward movement quickly escalated into a complete disintegration of the Union lines.   
Reynolds confirmed this collapse; “No effort on the part of their officers could induce 
them to rally.”  Yet the Marines were hardly alone in the panicked frenzy of retreat 
toward the perceived safety of the capital.  Roads became almost impassably clogged as 
individual Union soldiers threw away equipment and supplies, joining frightened civilian 
observers jockeying for position in the sea of humanity flowing back towards 
Washington.  Nothing could halt the retreat and a witnessing congressman exclaimed 
that “the further they ran, the more frightened they grew.”  The Marines commingled 
with this mob, and it took several days after the battle for exhausted officers to sort out 
exactly who died, who was wounded, and who had been captured or deserted.  In his 
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official accounting to Harris several days later, Reynolds reported one officer and eight 
men killed, nineteen men seriously wounded and sixteen men still missing and 
unaccounted for.  Slowly, word would come back over the next few weeks that some of 
the men listed as missing were in fact prisoners of the Confederates.45  
In the aftermath of the Union‟s humiliating defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run, 
one fact was certain; there was no shortage of people to blame for the loss.  The Marine 
battalion made a convenient target of criticism.  As a regular military unit and not a 
volunteer outfit, many observers had expected more out of the battalion than the green 
Marines could provide.  Some of the Marine officers marching out to war thought as 
well, with one remarking about the battalion‟s presence that:  “I ought perhaps to say 
that the Corps will have the post of honor [in the formation], which  of course is the post 
of danger.”  Analysts then and since have disagreed as to the extent to which Reynolds‟ 
men should be held accountable for their part in the loss, but the fact of their retreat was 
a hard blow to recover from.  Millett labels their participation “a disaster, an omen for 
most of [the Corps‟] battalion-size operations for the rest of the war.”  Furthermore, “the 
Marine battalion suffered as severe a defeat as any of the Army‟s amateur regiments.”  
Sullivan is a little more forgiving, reminding readers that “the Marines were no different 
than other troops” in the battle.  Jeffrey Ryan somberly remarks that “The performance 
in battle . . . left little impression on either their foes or comrades,” observing also that 
“even the battalion‟s own commander seemed to think that the unit‟s greatest 
accomplishment was in staying intact for as long as it did, before joining in the general 
rout.”  These are hardly the epitaph any warrior would wish.  The Marine Corps‟ official 
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histories mention the event, but provide little analysis of the performance.46  In truth, the 
Marine battalion failed to live up to expectations at Bull Run, and its defeat had a long-
term, negative effect on the forming of similar units during the war, particularly 
regarding service with the Army.        
Commandant Harris‟ own perceptions of the outcome are telling and reveal much 
about his thoughts on having Marines serve with the Army.  On 24 July 1861, in his 
forwarding of Major Reynolds‟ report on the action at Bull Run, Harris recommended 
that Reynolds‟ Marines “again be assigned, as they are wanted, to their more legitimate 
duties in the Corps” (emphasis added).47  Those “more legitimate duties,” in Harris‟ 
mind, involved reassignment to the ships‟ detachments and shore installations, 
traditional duties that Marines had long filled, and presumably would always fill.  And, 
at the time, Harris still had lots of vacancies to fill on ships.   
In immediately taking that stance, Harris distanced himself from Henderson‟s 
established practice of having Marines formed into battalions for detached service with 
the Army.  In Harris‟ annual report for 1861, he felt compelled to mention that “In July 
last, under orders from the department, I prepared a battalion [. . .] for duty with the 
army under General McDowell” (emphasis added).  He evidently needed to mention that 
the Bull Run battalion was not something that he did on his own initiative, but rather was 
undertaken on an order from Welles.  Furthermore, he asserted he had misgivings from 
the onset:  “I could not but feel great anxiety lest the battalion should fail.”  If he had 
genuine concerns about the success of the Marines, those misgivings were never 
communicated or shared with his superiors beforehand, as one might expect.  Harris 
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went on to blame the failure of the unit primarily on the fact that “the battalion was 
necessarily composed almost entirely of recruits, many of whom received their arms 
only a day or two before leaving the barracks, and probably some of them had never had 
arms in their hands before,” a point of emphasis shared with Reynolds.  Furthermore, 
Harris lamented that the experiment resulted in “the first instance in [the Corps‟] 
recorded history where any portion of its members turned their backs to the enemy,” 
harsh criticism, indeed.48  What Harris failed to mention was the critical role he himself 
played in deciding to fill the battalion with raw recruits rather than provide it with 
experienced men from his various barracks and ships‟ detachments, as his predecessor 
always did.  By not manning the battalion with seasoned men, Harris essentially doomed 
it to failure. 
Harris exhibited equal reluctance for supporting similar efforts in the future.  
Later in his report, he reminded the reader that “In September last, under orders from the 
department, I organized another battalion” of Marines (emphasis added).  Again, Harris 
felt compelled to mention that the forming of that second unit was not undertaken on his 
own initiative, but instead done as the result of an order from Welles that another 
battalion be raised.  Nonetheless, despite the protestation, he added that “I have every 
confidence that if brought into action they will acquit themselves with credit and 
honor.”49  And importantly, on that second iteration the battalion went out with officers 
and men specially selected and trained for the task, making it the first purposely 
organized Marine battalion of the war.  Still, a close reading of his report supports the 
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contention that Harris was not fully behind the concept of fielding separate battalions for 
operations, even one that would operate under Navy command. 
The Marine Corps had been badly mauled in its first major engagement of the 
war.  It had started off out of step with the administration and senior military leaders and 
never regained the same confidence and respect that it had enjoyed before the war.   
Institutionally, it appeared sluggish and hesitant in reacting to the demands of the 
conflict.  Its senior leaders moved lethargically, even reluctantly in response to urgent 
calls for action on their part.  Harris‟ own behavior was at times matter-of-fact and 
routine, with no real sense of urgency or of being adaptive to the changing national 
situation.  His leadership during the Secession Crisis was anemic and substandard.  
When the Corps most needed an assertive, even aggressive hand at the helm, Harris 
failed to provide it. 
Harris had relinquished the operational command of the Marine Corps to Welles.  
In fact, he seemed to prefer that approach.  Every time something original was 
demanded of the organization, he resisted it.  He grudgingly formed a battalion to serve 
with the Army at Bull Run only when ordered to, and manned the unit with the least 
capable individuals he had.  A second battalion was created soon afterward, but one gets 
the impression from his correspondence that Harris was unconvinced, or at least 
ignorant, of the inherent and potential advantages that those units afforded the 
organization.  Instead, he consistently and predictably dissipated the Corps‟ manpower 
and resources by fielding small, mostly independent detachments for scattered service 
throughout the fleet rather than seeking alternatives that would have allowed the Marine 
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Corps to maximize on its strengths and potentially carve out a distinct niche for itself in 
the war. 
By August of 1861, Harris had failed as a Commandant and the Corps 
desperately needed a new leader.  But several factors in the relationship between Welles 
and Harris combined to ensure that Welles would keep Harris in place, not the least of 
which is the fact that Harris had generally conceded total control of the Corps to the 
more forceful secretary.  Under Harris‟ tired and unimaginative leadership the Corps 
would continue to limp on as an institution, ignoring any internal impetus for change and 
relying instead on outside influences to provide it with direction.  This state of affairs 
appeared in sharp contrast with the organization that had exhibited such imagination and 
resourcefulness in the Mexican War only thirteen years before, and had quite recently 
been a force the government had earlier relied on in challenging circumstances.   
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CORPS STAGGERS OFF TO WAR:   
ORGANIZING, RECRUITING AND EMPLOYING MARINES 
 
On the afternoon of 26 August 1861, the Federal military commenced its first 
major amphibious operation of the war.  A naval force composed of five warships, the 
Revenue steamer Harriet Lane and three transport ships carrying about 860 Army troops 
departed Fort Monroe, Virginia, for their target, two fortified artillery batteries that 
guarded the sea approaches of the barrier islands near Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.  
Since the idea for the “expedition originated in the Navy Department,” the respective 
service secretaries agreed on Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham, U.S. Navy, as overall 
commander of the mission, and Major General Benjamin F. Butler, as the commander of 
the attached Army troops that made up the landing force.  To form his own landing 
element, Stringham providentially decided to combine the four separate Marine 
detachments aboard the warships of his squadron into one unit of about 100 men 
commanded by Captain William L. Shuttleworth.  Facing the Union squadron were 700-
800 Confederate sailors and volunteer soldiers under the overall command of former 
U.S. Navy Commodore James Barron.1  
At about 4:00 PM on the 27th, the flotilla arrived off Hatteras Inlet and made 
ready to disembark the landing party.  Complications surfaced from the onset but 
Stringham did his best to deal with each problem as it arose.  The weather had begun to 
deteriorate, making any seaward landing impossible.  Stringham directed his ships to 
193 
 
pass over the bar and into the inlet, and made preparations to land troops the next 
morning.  At daybreak on the 28th several Union warships began firing on the 
Confederate forts while Marines and soldiers loaded into flatboats and made for their 
landing point on shore (see Figure 6-1).  The weather, however, refused to cooperate and 
worsening surf conditions swamped some of the boats, forcing a halt to the landing after 
only 315 men were ashore.  Of that number, about sixty Marines were in the first boats 
landed and consequently made up about one-fifth of the total Union force ashore.  Aided 
by innovative fire support provided by the Federal warships, the small element advanced 
against the Confederate positions with “the Marines in front” and soon occupied Fort 
Clark after its garrison had been driven out by the bombardment.  The Marines then 
“hoisted the American colors on the battery,” signaling to the gunners afloat that the 
position was in friendly hands.  With the weather continuing to deteriorate and night fast 
approaching, the Union landing force then established defensive positions at both the 
original landing site and at the captured fort, preparing for a counterattack that never 
materialized.2   
 
 
Figure 6-1.  Hatteras Forts and the Union Scheme of Maneuver.3 
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Stringham‟s squadron resumed its bombardment of the last remaining 
Confederate stronghold at Fort Hatteras at about 7:40 the following morning.  The naval 
guns were joined by a land-based rifled 6-pounder battery that the Union forces had 
brought ashore the previous day.  For several hours the Federals continued their barrage 
until the Confederate garrison ran up a white flag, signifying their surrender.  The Union 
landing force then moved on the fort (with Marines again in the lead), took possession of 
it, and rounded up over 700 Confederate prisoners.  Despite numbering less than half the 
strength of the enemy, the Federal landing force had sustained no serious casualties.  
Stringham‟s ships now controlled the entire inlet and the mouths of several prominent 
rivers and waterways.4 
To better understand the circumstances of Marines and their officers early in the 
war a number of factors must be addressed.  These include how the Federal military 
establishment employed Marines in the war‟s early amphibious operations and the ways 
service leaders and expedition commanders interacted.  Furthermore, Marine recruiting 
limitations, organizational restructuring, and administrative problems shaped Marine 
corps capabilities well into 1862.  And Marine leadership, especially that exhibited by 
Commandant Harris, remained a limiting factor even beyond Harris‟ death.  Finally, 
Navy officer initiatives also influenced precisely how the Corps contributed to Federal 
actions.   
Although relatively small in scale when compared to the size of later landing 
operations, the Federal victory at Hatteras Inlet was important for several reasons.  First, 
it represented the only significant Union victory among the several disappointing losses 
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of 1861.  Admiral David Dixon Porter called it “our first victory of any kind, and . . . the 
moral effect of this affair was very great.”  Second, it gave the U.S. Navy control of a 
shore base to facilitate the expanding of its nascent blockade effort.  Third, it established 
a model for the conduct of other amphibious operations along the coastal areas of the 
South, and underscored the importance of allowing the naval commander great latitude 
in forming his plans.  Fourth, the Navy gained valuable experience in the techniques of 
providing naval gunfire against fixed shore fortifications while still underway, a 
procedure that helped to negate the previous advantages of land-based forts against 
stationary ships firing from anchor.  Naval officers refined and applied this technique in 
subsequent actions, with great success.5     
However, the seizing of the Hatteras forts also revealed some problems that 
would continue to plague the Federal military for several years.  First, the issue of 
placing these early joint operations under the unified command of one officer continued 
to be a source of friction.  Basically, the concept of designating a single officer to have 
command authority over senior officers from other services was still a controversial idea 
at that time; indeed it remained one until late in the twentieth century, despite its obvious 
merits.  By failing to invest absolute command in one officer, the success of future joint 
operations were greatly dependent upon the degree of cooperation offered by the various 
other commanders associated with that action.  Basically, by not designating one unified 
commander during multiservice operations, Union leaders violated the long-recognized 
military principle of unity of command.  Without unity of command, the separate Army 
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and Navy commanders could (and sometimes did) pursue different courses of action 
simultaneously.6  
It was here that the Marine Corps presented the Navy with a solution to this 
problem.  Although technically separate and distinct services, the Navy and the Marine 
Corps both reported to a single source, the Navy Department, for orders, direction and 
guidance.  The naval services shared a long tradition of joint action under unified 
command.  This quality greatly simplified naval operations, providing a clear, single 
command and control structure that subordinated all of the actions of the separate 
elements toward achieving a common goal.  Historically, that feature had proved 
successful in many instances, most recently in the seizing of the Barrier Forts in Canton, 
China, in 1856.  It made great military sense to simply increase the scale of the Marine 
Corps‟ participation in these larger landing party operations to meet the greater 
requirement of the significantly enlarged naval force.  Unity of command would be 
easily achieved, and the longstanding level of commonality and familiarity of each 
service‟s procedures would also enhance the chances of achieving a successful outcome.  
However obvious as it seems in hindsight, the Marine Corps did not offer up any such 
recommendation at the time of the Hatteras expedition and the Army consequently filled 
the void.  And early problems with recruiting and organization compounded the 
difficulty of the Corps assuming a greater role in amphibious operations.  In the process, 
the Army formed its own specialized “Marine-like” units organized to perform missions 
obviously best suited for Marines.  In frustration, several Navy commanders attempted 
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to form their own Marine units as a way to work around problems with the Army, trying 
to create a ground combat element that was responsive to the needs of the Navy.7 
Second, as commanders, both Stringham and Butler displayed the same timidity 
and lack of initiative that would continue to plague Lincoln‟s upper military ranks for 
years to come.  Despite decisively defeating Confederate forces at the objective, 
Stringham and Butler failed to exploit their success by moving on to nearby exposed and 
weakened enemy positions.  Instead, both commanders quickly disengaged their forces 
and departed, leaving behind only a token force to occupy the captured forts.  As a 
result, the initiative passed to the enemy, who scrambled to reorganize their defenses and 
strengthen their fortified positions in the area.  And when Secretary Welles criticized 
Stringham for not pressing the attack and enlarging the Union‟s foothold in North 
Carolina, the naval commander resigned in protest.  Welles did, however, use 
Stringham‟s parting as an opportunity to split the Atlantic Blockading Squadron into two 
zones, each commanded by younger, more aggressive officers.8  
As concerns the Marine Corps, Stringham‟s departure as commander of the 
expedition meant that key lessons regarding the employment of Marines in similar 
operations would go unlearned.  Early in his planning, Stringham had decided he wanted 
Marines in his landing party.  He also understood the value of having them organized in 
larger combat formations than that of the normal ship‟s complement of about twenty.  
However, when the Corps offered up no unit of its own for the mission, Stringham 
instead created his own by combining his four Marine detachments to form an ad hoc 
unit.  He then planned to land it early in the operation, thereby ensuring the landing party 
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contained a regular military unit with its own organic artillery support, a pair of boat-
howitzers.  That unit subsequently performed well in the potentially disastrous 
circumstances that followed.  Stringham obviously valued the capabilities and qualities 
his Marines provided to the landing party, yet when he left that information departed 
with him, forcing successors to relearn similar lessons on their own.9 
Third, the assignment of political general Benjamin Butler to duties as the 
amphibious landing force commander proved unfortunate for the Union in the long run.  
Butler was a mediocre military leader at best, and sometimes his actions bordered on 
incompetency.  Even at this early stage in the war there were signs of this.  Several 
officers involved in the Hatteras operation commented on Butler‟s many deficiencies in 
the battle, the greatest probably being his complete lack of a cohesive plan for landing 
and supporting his troops.  Marine Lieutenant William Cartter bluntly observed that, 
despite the glowing newspaper accounts praising Butler‟s role in the victory, “he had 
nothing to do with it.  He did not even land with the landing parties.”  But Cartter did, 
and he believed that Butler‟s failure to do so made him “not fit to command a company 
of school children.”10  
Navy Lieutenant John S. Barnes levied an equally harsh assessment, also 
including Stringham in his criticism.  While admitting that the expedition had been a 
success, Barnes stingingly wrote that “the enemy never had more faithful allies than they 
had in the brutal folly, supreme ignorance and want of ordinary military and naval 
perception” as the two leaders, Stringham and Butler.  Butler‟s botched landing plan 
placed a loose collection of under-strength elements from five separate commands in 
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harm‟s way ashore, essentially marooning the small group without food, water, supplies 
or equipment in the face of a numerically superior, well-entrenched enemy force.  Had 
the landing party faced a more determined foe, the outcome might easily have proved 
disastrous.  Nonetheless, Army commanders continued to serve in similar expeditions 
and make some of the same mistakes, culminating in December 1864 with Butler‟s 
failed attempt to seize Fort Fisher, North Carolina, in the largest amphibious operation of 
the war.11  
All of these points were of particular concern to the Marine Corps.  For decades 
the Corps had been central in the forming of almost every landing party that the Navy 
conducted.  The Marines had been fully integrated into the Navy‟s command structure, 
and were well familiar with shipboard procedures and small boat operations.  For 
decades, Marines had worked side-by-side with the Navy in landings all over the world, 
and had gained great experience in these small-scale amphibious operations.  During 
Henderson‟s tenure, the Commandant had taken great pains to enhance the capability of 
Marines to perform that role, to the extent that in the late 1850s, Marines were even 
entrusted with command of landing parties in combat ashore.  To increase their combat 
power ashore, the Navy Department provided artillery pieces for the training of Marines 
and sponsored the attendance of some officers to West Point‟s artillery course.  And 
from time to time, the Corps created Marine battalions and employed them in 
increasingly larger naval expeditions.  The battalion units provided enhanced command 
and control capability as well as a greater combat potential than could be achieved 
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through the less efficient method of simply combining several small detachments 
together right before a landing.12   
Thus, Marines were, during the early stages of the war more experienced and 
qualified at conducting amphibious operations than any Army unit of that time.  It would 
seem a logical step to continue to assign Marines to those operations once the war began, 
particularly since Welles‟ Blockade Strategy Board and his developing naval strategy 
emphasized the seizure of advanced naval bases in the South and the forcible closing of 
port cities. 
Yet when the time came to plan for the Hatteras operation, the Marine Corps 
volunteered no battalion.  Major John R. Reynolds‟ previous battalion had been quickly 
dismantled after the First Battle of Bull Run and its personnel sent to fill shortages at 
various barracks and ships‟ detachments.  Therefore, lacking a dedicated battalion for 
the task, Stringham resorted to the traditional, yet less efficient method of creating his 
own from his own Marines.  For his part, Commandant Harris seemed quite content to 
leave those decisions to local commanders, passing up another opportunity to make 
improvements to the Marine Corps‟ structure that could enhance their overall 
capabilities to conduct landing party operations on the scale required by the accepted 
naval strategy of the North.   
The only major difficulty the Marine Corps faced lay in the scale of operations to 
be conducted, an obstacle that the Army also needed to overcome as it transitioned from 
small collections of peacetime units to forming large-scale military units.  Yet Secretary 
Welles and others turned to the Army to fill the mission.  No Marine leader stepped 
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forward to volunteer the unit for the job, despite having had recent experiences as a 
landing party.  And the war would not wait for the Corps to catch up.  The Hatteras 
expedition therefore served as the baseline model for future operations of its type, 
establishing a precedent that left the Marines, arguably the best qualified for the 
amphibious task at the time, to instead fill a marginal role in those operations.  Indeed, 
even after the successful conclusion of the Hatteras battle, Harris made no mention in 
any of his correspondence of the key part his men played in making the victory 
possible.13    
Furthermore, the assigning of Butler as the landing force commander signaled 
the Union military establishment‟s departure from the pre-war traditional landing party 
arrangement.  From that point on, it became accepted practice to assign an Army officer 
to that role, essentially pre-empting any serious discussion to having Marines fill that 
position.   And by placing men of the caliber of Butler in charge of many of these 
expeditions, the Army intimated that it considered these actions to be secondary to the 
larger fight on land.    
In the last half of 1861 the Marine Corps, like other services, grew substantially 
in structure as a result of the national realization that an unprecedented military effort 
would be needed to win the war.  The Marines also underwent fundamental changes 
within its officer corps as a result of several administrative reforms long considered, but 
not implemented until forced to by the pressures of war.  Each of these factors is 
examined to determine how the initiatives shaped the unit during the critical early stages 
of the war. 
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Congress had always been slow to respond to requests to increase the structure of 
the Marine Corps, but the prospects of a large-scale, long war soon muted any resistance 
to expanding the service.  In July 1861, Congress passed “An Act for the Better 
Organization of the Marine Corps,” adding almost one thousand more Marine privates; 
several dozen non-commissioned officers and about thirty more officers to the unit (see 
Figure 6-2).  The Corps also benefitted from two separate 610-man discretionary 
increases to the organization authorized by President Lincoln to meet critical shortfalls 
on ships and shore stations.  Although the presidential increases did not add permanent 
structure, they did authorize the commandant to recruit, feed, house, equip and cloth 
Marines in excess of Congress‟ limit.  On paper, Harris should have commanded a unit 
of about 4,500 Marines and officers.  Yet by the end of October, 1861, there were only 
2,354 on the rolls, slightly more than half the men authorized.14 
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Figure 6-2.  Marine Corps Organization after Congress’ Act of 24 July 1861.15 
 
 
The Corps‟ recruiting effort proved to be a weak link in its drive to fulfill its 
expectations.  Despite being allowed to induct more officers and Marines as a result of 
the war, the service consistently failed to meet its manpower needs and could not even 
fill its authorized ranks.  At the end of 1862, Harris dejectedly reported that “The corps 
is now six hundred men short of our complement.”  Furthermore, “I fear our numbers 
will rather diminish than increase.”   Among the three services, the Marine Corps drew a 
distant last place in terms of meeting its manpower requirements.16 
Several factors accounted for the Marine Corps‟ disappointing performance in 
recruiting.  First, Harris and the service responded slowly to the increased need for 
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recruits.  They reacted rather than acted, and conducted recruiting in the same 
unimaginative manner that the Corps had before 1861.  The Corps failed as an institution 
to adapt its recruiting practices to meet the greater demand for men, and therefore 
realized only partial gains from the patriotic response of the people who enlisted in large 
numbers after Fort Sumter and the First Battle of Bull Run.  Instead of surging its 
recruiting effort at that time as did the Army, the Marines routinely established 
rendezvous in their traditional enlistment locations of New York City and Philadelphia.  
In addition, where the Army established full-time recruiters, Harris and other senior 
officers treated recruiting as an additional duty instead of assigning the task to certain 
officers on a permanent basis, and then holding those recruiters personally accountable 
for their success or failure.  To make matters worse, the Corps had no successful 
tradition or model to emulate since it had never, in its eight decades of existence, 
conducted its recruiting in an efficient manner.  It had always achieved marginal success 
at enlisting quality persons in the amounts needed to fill its structure, and that spotty past 
performance made it doubly hard to fill even greater needs.17   
Second, for far too long after the commencement of hostilities the Marine Corps 
concentrated on enlisting the same type of individual that it did before the war, 
deliberately excluding a large segment of the population that could have yielded good 
Marines.  Since 1857, in part due to pressure from political leaders, Marine recruiters 
had been instructed to seek out only native-born U.S. citizens.  Many of those prospects 
were thirty or more years in age and most hailed from the Atlantic seaboard, putting the 
Marine recruiters in constant competition with those of the Navy.  The few recruits who 
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signed on represented the disadvantaged of the urban areas, with a few inexperienced 
farm boys thrown in for good measure.  In all, the enlistees “had few skills, little 
education, and no political ties of benefit to the Marine Corps.”  In November 1861, a 
frustrated Harris instructed his recruiters to seek out younger, unmarried men, and as a 
result they achieved better success in not only recruiting, but gained ground by 
increasing the retention rate of those who did sign up.  However, by not expanding the 
recruiting effort into sizeable non-traditional population groups typified in immigrant 
centers and pursuing prospects in other large cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, and 
Detroit, as well as rural towns, the Marine Corps missed out on many men that soon 
filled Army regiments in great numbers.  Tellingly, when the Navy expanded its 
recruiting effort into the Great Lakes and elsewhere along the Atlantic coast it doubled 
its number of seamen in only three months.  Meanwhile, Marine recruiting sputtered 
along producing its usual substandard results.18 
The Marine Corps also failed to seek enlistments among another important 
segment of the population:  African Americans.  Significantly, the Navy began soliciting 
recruits from the rapidly blossoming numbers of unemployed emancipated slaves along 
the Mississippi River Valley in late 1862 as a solution to the Mississippi Squadron‟s 
critical shortage of sailors.  The squadron commander, Admiral David Dixon Porter, 
signed on as many as were qualified for the task, even replacing some of the substandard 
white sailors with so-called “contrabands.”  Writing to the pro-emancipation Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus Vasa Fox, Porter seemed very pleased with the 
performance of these former slaves on his squadron‟s ships.  “What injustice to these 
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poor people, to say they are only fit for slaves.  They are better than the white people 
here, who I look upon as brutes, and half savages.  I have shipped about four hundred 
able bodied contrabands and owing to the shortness of my crews, have to work them at 
my guns.”  The Army also began recruiting African Americans in earnest, soon fielding 
entire regiments with black soldiers eager to fight their former masters and prove their 
worth.  Meanwhile, the Marine Corps never even considered a similar move that might 
have solved all of its manpower woes at once.  With that decision, the Corps became the 
only American service to not recruit African Americans, a policy that remained in place 
until 1942.19   
Third, the Marine Corps shared with the Navy several serious obstacles to 
recruiting that proved hard to overcome.  One involved the fact that the naval services 
were regular services, with fixed four-year enlistments and no provisions for volunteer, 
militia or reserve-type service that otherwise gave prospects the choice of being able to 
sign on for shorter periods of time.   The Army offered all those appealing options.  The 
Navy tried to make some concessions by reducing their service obligation to one year, 
but the Marine Corps‟ remained unchanged. The Corps‟ longer service obligations 
dissuaded many potential recruits from signing on when they knew they could invest 
shorter times in militia or volunteer Army units.  Volunteer and militia units also 
presented the young recruit with the popular incentive of serving with family and friends 
under generally lax discipline standards, enticements that the Marines definitely did not 
offer.20   
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Another factor that worked against Navy and Marine recruiters involved 
enlistment bounties.  In general, Marine bounties were always considerably less than 
those offered by the Army.  Congress established the Marine bounty at two dollars, far 
below the one hundred dollars paid to Army prospects.  To make matters worse, in some 
cases Army enlistees could gain additional bounties from their home state, city, and 
other sources, a significant financial incentive to some that the Corps could not hope to 
match.  Therefore, in some areas the disparity in bounty money proved an 
insurmountable hurdle for recruiters.  When the naval services opened a yard at Cairo, 
Illinois, Admiral David Dixon Porter wrote to Harris that “The recruiting here did not 
amount to much, there was no bounty, and our people are all so patriotic they cannot 
fight without it.”21  In all, the inconsequential two dollar bounty offered by the Marines 
for signing up for four years of strict discipline and sea service proved practically 
worthless as an enlistment tool.  It is no wonder that the Marine Corps‟ recruiting effort 
fell far behind that of even the Navy, with which it shared some of the same obstacles. 
Predictably, some Marine recruiters resorted to creative, extreme, or even illegal 
methods to fill the ranks.  One creative method involved some recruiters offering to pay 
the bounty to third parties who provided enlistees.  This essentially harnessed the 
civilian population behind the task and several relatives cashed in when they enlisted 
their son, a method one historian referred to as a “finder‟s fee.”  Records also reveal that 
some civilians took advantage of that program, in essence becoming unofficial 
recruiters.  A few were fairly successful, with one enterprising individual signing on 
forty-three enlistees and another thirty.  Of course, recruiters also placed advertisements 
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in newspapers and periodicals, often highlighting in dramatic fashion the prospects of 
gaining prize money through the capture of enemy ships, a claim that grew increasingly 
remote as the war progressed.  And in June, 1862, Harris himself made the remarkable 
and wholly erroneous interpretation that the Army‟s enlistment bounty of $100 applied 
to his Marines as well.  Not surprisingly, Harris‟ higher bounty offer proved attractive 
and was accepted by many recruits.  Unfortunately for Harris, his ingenious solution to 
the recruiting problem came to a sudden end in mid-1863 when it was determined that 
the Army bounty money did not extend to Marine enlistments.  The realization caused 
anger and consternation throughout the ranks and acute embarrassment for the 
Commandant.  But one thing was certain among the recruiters:  however wrong he might 
have been, Harris had, in a roundabout fashion, temporarily provided the Corps with a 
recruiting tool that actually worked.22  
In late 1862, Harris became so concerned about his recruiting shortfalls that he 
consented to a desperate new tactic.  He authorized his recruiters in Cairo, Illinois, to 
seek out Confederate prisoners of war as prospects.  The following year, in the aftermath 
of the Battle of Gettysburg, Harris expanded that policy to the recruiters in Philadelphia, 
provided that the prisoners agreed to take an oath of loyalty to the Union.  He also 
recommended that any former Confederates who were enlisted be distributed so that 
“they could do no mischief.”  One Philadelphia recruiter, Captain James Lewis, 
expended considerable effort among the prison camps in search of prospects, and 
produced fairly successful results.  One selling point was that former Confederates 
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serving with the Marines could take some comfort in knowing that such duty “made it 
highly unlikely [they] would be called upon to fight their old comrades in the field.”23 
The net effect of this recruiting shortfall was that it kept the Corps in a permanent 
state of manpower crisis.  The deficit of Marines forced Harris to deal with many 
competing demands for the few available men.  This state of affairs caused him to focus 
almost exclusively on fulfilling the most immediate priority requirements that lay before 
him, leaving him with no excess to expend on anything outside of those needs.  Faced 
with a continual scarcity of Marines, he could not afford the luxury of entertaining 
notions of creating new units, such as the various special battalions, unless ordered to do 
so by higher authority.  In short, Harris felt he could not support plans to divert already 
scarce manpower toward projects not specifically called for in his understanding of the 
roles and missions of Marines that would only increase his already desperate need for 
men.    
Although the Marine Corps would struggle for years with enlisted recruiting, it 
quickly and easily filled the vacancies in its officer corps opened by the Secession Crisis 
and the increase in structure.  Letters from prospects seeking commissions flooded the 
offices of both Secretary Welles and Commandant Harris.  So many requests came in 
that the Marine Corps found itself in the position of having to formalize a process to 
select the most qualified of the applicants.  For the first time, it could be selective of who 
gained a commission.  And with backing from Welles, a screening process was devised 
and included as a provision of the July 1861 “Act for the Better Organization of the 
Marine Corps.” The Act fixed many of the problems associated with the previous 
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method of gaining officers:  it specified age requirements for Marine officer candidates 
(twenty to twenty-five years of age); it mandated medical screening to ensure the 
candidates could meet the rigors of the duty; and it empowered the Navy Department to 
form a board to ascertain the candidate‟s fitness for the job.  Accordingly, the secretary 
soon designated “a competent Board of Officers . . . for the examination of such 
candidates for admission into the Marine Corps.”  He charged the members to “examine 
each candidate to ascertain if his mental and moral qualifications are such as fit him for 
the duties of a Second Lieutenant.”  Welles mandated that the candidates would first be 
screened by a medical board that would certify their fitness, and then subjected to a 
battery of written and practical tests.  Board members posed questions to gauge the level 
of education and mental capacity of prospective officers.  This initiative represented a 
great step forward by thoroughly screening candidates before granting commissions, a 
reform only made possible by the requirements of the war.  It also helped ensure that the 
positions vacated by the officers who “went South” were filled with competent junior 
leaders, although it was recognized that it would take some time for them to reach the 
same level of experience as the men they replaced.24   
Of equal importance, the Corps benefitted materially from a clearing of the log-
jam of over-age and physically incapable officers that had long clogged the upper level 
of the organization and inhibited promoting of more capable officers.  On 3 August 
1861, Congress passed an “Act providing for the Better Organization of the Military 
Establishment” that mandated that all military officers with more than forty years active 
service or those incapable of active service by reason of poor health be placed on a 
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retired list.  Officers not willing to retire under their own volition were to appear before a 
formal Retiring Board consisting of between five and nine officers, and including two 
medical officers.  Within the Marine Corps, six officers had served for more than forty 
years and five of them were ordered to appear before the board: Lieutenant Colonels 
James Edelin and William Dulany, Majors Thomas English and Ward Marston, and 
Captain Abraham Brevoort.  Although the number six might seem a small number, it 
represented every line major or above in the Marine Corps with the exception of Major 
Reynolds, who had only recently been promoted as a result of the death of Major 
Benjamin Macomber, then in his late sixties.  Once these senior officers were identified, 
Welles then ordered the sixth Marine officer with over forty years service, Colonel 
Harris, to preside over their Retiring Board.25 
Harris‟ board convened on 7 November 1861 to examine the case of its first 
officer, Captain Brevoort.  Brevoort had first entered the Marine Corps in 1820 and had 
held the rank of captain since 1833, almost thirty years.  After a week of probing 
questions and thorough physical examinations, all conducted with the same icy 
procedural formality as a court martial, Brevoort decided to spare himself further 
embarrassment and instead to voluntarily retire, a request that was approved on 22 
November.  In the interim, having observed the fate in store for them, Edelin and 
English also submitted requests for transfer to the retired list.  However, in the case of 
Dulany, despite his forty-four years of active service the medical officers pronounced 
him remarkably fit for his age and his excellent military record helped tip the scales in 
his favor.  The board members decided to retain him on active duty.26  
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The final candidate, Ward Marston, also proved successful, despite having a year 
earlier been relieved from his command at the Marine Barracks in Philadelphia by Harris 
himself.  Marston, like Dulany, had passed the physical portion of the examination.  He 
decided to defend himself during the competency phase and prepared exceedingly well 
for that task.  In an ironic twist, when Harris testified against Marston, the embattled 
officer grilled Harris so thoroughly and efficiently that he confused and flustered the 
Commandant, leaving some who witnessed it wondering if Marston was not the more 
competent of the two.  To Harris‟ dismay, the board pronounced Marston fit for active 
service by a narrow margin and ordered him to Marine Barracks, Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire.  The board also examined the physical competency of two other officers and 
added one of them, First Lieutenant Charles Henderson, suffering at the time from 
terminal heart disease, to the retired list, creating a total of four officer vacancies.27  
Those four vacancies translated to the opportunity to bring in four new second 
lieutenants, and promote ten other officers accordingly. 
In the flurry of promotions that followed, the Retiring Board helped to clear out 
some of the Corps‟ ossified upper ranks, providing younger, more physically capable 
officers with opportunities to hold positions of increased responsibility.  These newer 
officers brought with them fresher ideas, increased knowledge of newer weapons, 
technology and tactics, and the physical ability to endure the hardships of field service.  
Concerning the latter point, some of the officers retired by the board had not served 
outside of the relatively sedentary environment of naval shore facilities for decades, and 
had little inclination to do field service in the future.  Even Dulany, despite his being 
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certified as fit for active service, stubbornly resisted any attempt by Harris to send him to 
sea or any field assignment.  In any event, because of the actions of the Retirement 
Board, several senior positions were filled with officers who could better endure the 
rigors of combat and lead their Marines by personal example.  As a result, the Marine 
officer corps was to some extent revitalized. 
However, a serious question remained:  why did Secretary Welles exempt Harris 
from also appearing before the Retiring Board?  By law Harris should also have been 
subjected to the same proceeding and inquiry as the other senior Marine officers were, 
and it would have given Welles the opportunity to select a new Commandant, possibly 
opening up all sorts of new approaches for deploying Marines.  Yet Harris was not 
evaluated.  Part of the answer may be that such a decision would have required Welles to 
arrange for senior officers from outside the Corps to preside over the board.28  Arranging 
for officers from another service to sit in judgment of Marines and decide on questions 
of individual competence would probably have been an unpleasant and sensitive 
development for all concerned.  Certainly, Welles had other pressing issues at the time.  
Furthermore, among the senior officers of the Corps, no single candidate to fill Harris‟ 
shoes was evident (as will be addressed in due course in the next chapter).  In the end, 
Welles probably just decided that it was safer and easier to stick with Harris since at 
least he was a known quantity, despite his weaknesses.29   
Concerning Welles‟ relationship with Harris, it seems clear that Welles did not 
hold Harris‟ performance as Commandant in any high regard.  In Welles‟ personal diary, 
he recorded his most open and intimate thoughts.  Despite having daily contact with the 
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secretary, Harris appears in the diary only three times, and each of the occasions dealt 
with unpleasant circumstances.  In the first instance, on 20 August 1862, Welles 
recorded that he had just “Sent a letter of reproof to Colonel Harris” and Lieutenant 
Colonel Reynolds, “between whom there is a bitter feud.”  His frustration became 
apparent when Welles frankly remarked that “Almost all the elder officers are at 
loggerheads and should be retired.”  On that day, Welles was highly dissatisfied with 
how Harris had handled a court-martial of Reynolds that split the loyalties of the Corps‟ 
officers at a time when they should have been concentrating on fighting the war.  
Instead, on the same day that a Marine earned the service‟s first Medal of Honor, one-
third of the Corps‟ officers were participating in the two-week public spectacle in 
Washington, D.C., that Reynolds‟ trial had become.  The farcical trial disgusted Welles, 
and his belief that “partisanship, not merit, governed the decision” of guilt, led the 
secretary to decide to refuse to approve the court‟s decision.  His great fear was that if he 
did nothing to stop similar actions, the Corps‟ officers might “plunge into a series of 
courts martial for a year to come.”30  The trial showcased to a public audience all the 
petty weaknesses of the upper ranks of the Corps, and Welles hoped his letters censuring 
the actions of the two protagonists might dissuade future outbreaks of unprofessional 
conduct. 
Harris appeared in Welles‟ diary a second time on 14 May 1864, when the 
secretary commented on having attending Harris‟ funeral.  Welles somberly observed 
that Harris‟ “death gives embarrassment as to a successor.  The higher class of marine 
officers are not the men who can elevate or give efficiency to the corps.”  Based on his 
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experiences with the Corps‟ senior officers, he believed that “Every man who is over-
slaughed [passed-over for promotion] and all his friends will be offended with me.”  Yet 
he also realized that “there is a duty to perform” in deciding who should replace Harris 
as Commandant.  However, since Welles had essentially been directing the 
administration of the Corps for several years, he did not feel any need to rush the 
decision.31 
Welles mentioned Harris in the diary for only a third time -- five months after the 
Commandant‟s death.  On 10 October 1864, Welles described a meeting with President 
Lincoln concerning Harris‟ earlier mistaken authorization to pay recruits the same $100 
bounty as the Army.  The secretary recalled his earlier disapproval of Harris‟ action, but 
admitted he wholly underestimated the scope of Harris‟ error.  In July 1863 Welles had 
asked Harris when he had begun authorizing the $100 bounty payments.  “He said in 
June, and I supposed it was the preceding June and therefore covered but one month.”  
However, he later learned “it commenced in June, 1862, and consequently covers 
thirteen, instead of one month, and that there are over eleven hundred or so enlisted” 
under the error.  The grand scale of the mistake changed the situation entirely, since it 
covered about one-third of the total number of Marines in the Corps at that time!  After 
discussing the ramifications of the situation with Lincoln, Welles curtly concluded: “He 
concurs with me and decides it is best to pay the bounty.”  Harris disappointed Welles 
even in death.32 
Concurrent with the Corps‟ manpower, leadership and administrative issues, the 
unit faced several significant logistical problems that also threatened to degrade its 
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overall performance in the war.  At the outset of the war, the Marines possessed no 
single standard rifle.  Instead, the unit held a wide variety of weapons, ranging from .69 
caliber smoothbore and rifled bore muskets left over from the Mexican War to top-of-
the-line .58 caliber Springfield rifles.  The Marine Corps also owned a number of older 
converted muskets fitted with the Maynard priming system, wherein a roll of paper 
primers, vice metal percussion caps, was used to ignite the powder charge.  Muskets 
equipped with this system, susceptible as it was to damp conditions that rendered the 
paper primer unusable, were useless to Marines stationed aboard ship.33   
Without a standard shoulder weapon, the task of logistically supporting (let alone 
training men to operate) such a wide variety of weapons was inefficient and 
burdensome.  On more than one occasion the various commanders of Marine units had 
to be reminded to specify numbers, calibers and types of weapons when requisitioning 
supplies.  With only a few thousand Marines, it should have been a simple task to 
provide the Corps with one standard weapon, yet that goal eluded Harris.  To make 
matters worse, the Navy‟s Ordnance and Hydrography Bureau, also frustrated with the 
confusing number of weapons and types, threatened to cease providing ammunition for 
the Corps.  The inability of the service to gain one standard shoulder weapon, preferably 
of a type that was accurate, dependable, and well-suited for duty at sea, indicates the low 
priority level the organization possessed within the Navy Department and the Ordnance 
and Hydrography Bureau.  It also hinted of the service‟s status within the national 
military establishment, that at the same time when tens of thousands of new soldiers 
were being armed, some system to arm a service of less than 4000 total men could not be 
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devised.  Some of the failure to gain better weapons support must be levied on Harris, 
since he failed to elevate the problem to a level of attention that might have resolved it.  
Evidently, bad as the situation was, Harris did not feel compelled to mention it in any of 
his wartime annual reports.34  However, each of these problems might have been more 
easily resolved, and both the Corps‟ and the Navy Department‟s interests better served, 
by the simple expedient of having Marine representation within the Bureau of Ordnance.  
Such an arrangement could have been easily brought about within the department as a 
way of solving the many problems related to support for the Marine Corps. 
Harris‟ solution to the ordnance issue provides yet another example of his 
priorities for the Corps.  To Harris, the various ships‟ detachments came first.  
Therefore, he ensured that the ships‟ detachments were provided with the best weapons 
and equipment, and then filled orders for other units.  When forced to decide among 
ships, those serving in active war zones were taken care of first before those with the 
Pacific or Africa Squadrons.  This made good sense, yet when the various battalions 
were formed, also having a high expectation of combat service, those units were not 
accorded the same priority but were instead provided with whatever was left, often only 
days before embarking for their operations.35  Although this problem was partly resolved 
in 1862, it showed for a time that the battalions did not have the same priority in the 
mind of Harris that the individual ships‟ detachments did.      
Even before the Union‟s successful expedition to Cape Hatteras, developments 
were underway that might have had a profound impact on how the Marine Corps would 
be employed in the war.  On 3 August 1861, Secretary Welles met with Captain Samuel 
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DuPont, then President of the Blockade Strategy Board, to discuss DuPont‟s selection to 
command a proposed naval expedition to seize a coastal area along the shores of South 
Carolina.  Welles desired to use that area as a base to support the new South Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron being formed to prevent the South from gaining foreign goods, 
equipment, weapons and supplies.  Welles granted DuPont the “full authority necessary” 
over the operation “to insure success.”  DuPont had given that type of mission much 
thought and believed that a battalion of Marines under his direct control was necessary 
to ensure success.  He asked Welles to provide him with one.36    
Welles agreed to DuPont‟s condition and on 8 August ordered Harris to form a 
battalion of 300 Marines “for important operations on our coast.”  Welles also advised 
Harris that DuPont had asked specifically for Major Jacob Zeilen, recently the second in 
command of the battalion that served at Bull Run, to lead the unit.  To that end, Harris 
notified Zeilen of the mission and requested that he begin planning for a tentative 
embarkation date of 1 October.  In the interim, Harris, in a departure from the manner in 
which he fielded the previous Marine battalion, ordered his barracks commanders to 
provide their “best drilled men” for the job.  He also used the occasion to push for 
arming the battalion with new .58 caliber Springfield rifled muskets, one of the finest 
shoulder weapons available at the time.  And, in a move displaying the level of support 
the Marines had from the Navy Department, Secretary Welles provided the unit with its 
own surgeon, a significant move with surgeons in such demand at that time.37  Unlike 
the rushed Bull Run unit, Harris and the Navy Department invested the time and 
resources to see that this unit possessed everything it needed to succeed.   
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However, things did not proceed as smoothly as Harris desired.  Zeilen, still 
recovering from wounds received at Bull Run, was not yet fit enough to command the 
battalion.  Harris then assigned Reynolds, as his only available and capable field grade 
officer, to that duty.  And, concerned that so many of the junior officers lacked 
experience, Harris also decided to assign his Adjutant and Inspector, Major Augustus 
Nicholson, as Reynolds‟ second in command, a move that again revealed the fragility of 
relations between the Corps‟ senior officers.  Nicholson took the assignment as an 
affront to his perceived seniority as a staff officer and a personal “injury which I feel has 
been unintentionally put on me.”  Incredibly, Nicholson, who had previously served 
under Reynolds at Bull Run without incident, now argued that he received his promotion 
to major twenty four days before Reynolds and should therefore not fall under a more 
junior officer.  Tellingly, he did not offer to replace Reynolds as the commander of the 
battalion: he just did not want to go.  Nicholson went straight to Welles in protest, 
further aggravating Harris.  In return, Harris felt compelled to advise Welles that 
Reynolds had held a brevet major‟s rank when “Nicholson held that of a second 
lieutenant but six months.”  Harris fully expected Welles to back him and issue 
Nicholson “due reprimand,” yet the exasperated Welles, no doubt irked from having to 
deal with the incessant bickering that continued to issue from the Corps‟ senior officers, 
instead simply ordered Nicholson‟s transfer rescinded.38  The incident provided Welles 
with just one more example of the nonstop squabbling among the senior Marine officers.    
On the morning of 15 October 1861, Reynolds embarked his battalion on board 
the USS Pawnee, part of a fleet of more than fifty warships, transports and support 
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vessels.  Also joining the expedition were 12,000 soldiers under the command of 
Brigadier General Thomas W. Sherman, a volunteer officer.  Each commander‟s orders 
reminded them of the president‟s expectation of “the most cordial and effective 
cooperation” between them.  Strangely, the orders also reminded each commander that 
“no officer of the Army or Navy, whatever may be his rank, can assume any direct 
command, independent of consent, over an officer of the other service, excepting only 
when land forces are expressly embarked in vessels of war to do the duty of marines.”  
This had the effect of telling them to play well together, but that they were not bound to 
comply with what the other wanted.  The arrangement would prove a far cry from 
having unity of command in a joint environment.39   
Presciently, as early as 26 July 1861, before he had even been selected to lead the 
naval force, DuPont had already expressed concern over Sherman as the Army‟s choice 
for commander of the landing force.  In a letter to his wife, DuPont observed that “I hear 
[Sherman] is a very superior military man,” but added that “I learn he is ugly-tempered 
and morose – bad, this, for a naval cooperation where the two branches are apt to come 
in collision.”  Nonetheless, DuPont hoped to make the relationship work.40 
The Marine battalion experienced bad luck from the start.  No sooner had the 
Marines embarked on the Pawnee at the Washington Navy Yard than Welles ordered 
them to disembark and load instead on a lighter draft steamboat, the Mount Vernon, over 
concerns that the deeper draft Pawnee might be forced to navigate too close to 
Confederate batteries while transiting down the Potomac River.  Once at Fort Monroe, 
the Marines moved back onto the Pawnee, but concern soon grew that the ship was 
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overcrowded.  It seemed that little real preparation had been made for accommodating 
the Marines, who were simply grouped in the open on the main deck, exposed to the 
elements with no provision for sleep or mess.  At that late stage in the operation, just 
prior to movement to the objective area, there were but two choices:  redistribute the 
battalion throughout the fleet, with consequent loss of cohesion and control; or keep it 
intact aboard one ship that could accommodate them.  After some debate, DuPont 
decided to keep the battalion together and chartered a civilian steamer, the Governor, 
which had just discharged its cargo at Fort Monroe.  Reynolds‟ men and equipment were 
soon transferred to it.  The Governor would prove a fateful choice.41  
On 29 October the fleet departed Hampton Roads for the open seas.  On the 
morning of 1 November, the ships were buffeted by a sudden gale that scattered the fleet 
before it.  For several hours the Governor, its captain drunk and insensible, rode out the 
ever-increasing swells that began to cause damage to the ship.  With no one in authority, 
John Weidman, a passenger on the ship, assumed command from the intoxicated captain 
and attempted to restore order among the crew, who he described as “very, very 
worthless.”  At about 4:00 PM, having suddenly been struck hard by a series of large 
waves, the port side hog brace broke in two places, followed quickly by the failure of the 
other port braces.  The ship shuddered and groaned, and soon afterward lost its 
smokestack.  Then a steam pipe broke, forcing the ship to reduce speed.  Things did not 
look good.  Throughout the rough night the Marines fired off the ship‟s signal rockets, 
hoping to attract assistance, then fired musket volleys when the rockets ran out.  At 
about 3:00 AM, the belabored engine quit altogether and the Governor was kept afloat 
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only through the herculean efforts of about one hundred Marines manning the pumps 
and buckets in shifts.  With the situation growing grim, the USS Sabine came to the aid 
of the sinking ship and began taking on personnel.  Heavy seas aggravated the transfer of 
men, but the Sabine was able to rescue most of the crew and embarked Marines, along 
with the majority of their weapons and equipment before the Governor sank.  All told, 
seven Marines lost their lives in the mishap and the battalion missed its opportunity to 
participate in DuPont‟s invasion of South Carolina.42       
However, other Marines played an important role in DuPont‟s seizing of Port 
Royal.  In the wake of the storm, DuPont mustered as many of his ships as he could 
contact, and converged his fleet off Charleston harbor.  By the morning of 4 November 
DuPont counted twenty-five vessels at anchor, and viewed several others inbound.  That 
afternoon DuPont dispatched his shallower draft vessels toward Port Royal, and just 
before dark some of his gunboats opened fire on several Confederate steamers, driving 
them back to the safety of their shore batteries.  The following morning, 5 November, 
several of DuPont‟s warships conducted a reconnaissance in force to draw fire from the 
enemy batteries, so that those locations could be accurately plotted by the invasion fleet.  
And in the absence of his Marine battalion, DuPont fashioned a reserve force from the 
Wabash‟s Marine detachment and some sailors, to employ as might be needed.  His 
preparations complete, DuPont nonetheless decided to postpone his assault until the 
morning of 7 November because of impending signs of bad weather.43 
The attack commenced at 9:23 AM with a four-hour bombardment of the 
Confederate batteries located at Forts Walker and Beauregard by Union warships firing 
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from ranges of 800 to 600 yards (see Figure 6-3).  The ships fired on the move as they 
maneuvered through an elliptical course, further refining the gunnery tactics first 
practiced at Cape Hatteras just two months before.  The moving bombardment of the 
forts worked: from the deck of the Wabash, Lieutenant Barnes recorded that “The air 
over the fort was filled with clouds of sand, splinters, and fragments of gun carriages and 
timbers, caused by the bursting of the ten-, nine-, eight-, and eleven-inch shells, poured 
in at a rate of about 60 a minute.  Human nature could not bear up under such a fire.”  By 
about 2:00 PM, observers reported that Fort Walker appeared deserted, and DuPont 
immediately ordered his reserve landing party to occupy the position.  Quickly rowing 
ashore, the sailors and Marines moved into the fort and rapidly established a defense to 
repel any Confederate attempts to retake it.  Meanwhile, DuPont ordered up one of the 
Army transports, and by 5:45 PM transferred responsibility for the defense of Fort 
Walker to one of Sherman‟s brigade commanders, Brigadier General Horatio G. Wright.  
The Wabash‟s Marines remained at the fort until the Army was fully established, then 
returned to their ship.  Part of South Carolina had been restored to Union control.44   
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Figure 6-3.  DuPont’s Seizure of Port Royal, South Carolina.45 
 
 
Before sunset of that same day, a Union vessel made a close pass by Fort 
Beauregard on Bay Point, seeing that it too might be abandoned.  At dawn the next 
morning, Navy Lieutenant Daniel Ammen, commander of the gunboat Seneca, took a 
party ashore and verified that defenders had evacuated the post.  Ammen then hoisted 
the Stars and Stripes on the fort‟s flagpole and DuPont called in another Army transport.  
By noon, DuPont had transferred the responsibility for the fort to Brigadier General 
Isaac I. Stevens.  Later that afternoon, Reynolds‟ Marine battalion arrived off Port Royal 
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and was also landed at Bay Point, where it assisted in the occupation duties of that area 
for several months.46   
The combined effects of the gale, the delay in getting to Port Royal, and the 
complete evacuation of the Confederate forts by their defenders relegated the 
contribution of Reynolds‟ battalion to a minor support role.  Thus for the Marine Corps, 
the potential of having a specially trained Marine battalion employed in an amphibious 
operation remained unrealized.  DuPont also felt that frustration, writing only that “The 
Sabine has brought the marines; they have been nothing but trouble to me.”  He later 
softened that stance, even praising the Marines for the moral courage they showed when 
their ship sank, yet his disappointment at not being able to commit them as planned 
remained.  But to Reynolds‟ credit, he drilled his unit repeatedly and prepared them for 
whatever future challenges DuPont might have for them.  That fact was not lost on his 
men, and one memorialized their stay in Bay Point in verse:  “Our commander‟s name 
was Reynolds; On that you may depend; And out of eleven hours; It‟s he will drill you 
ten.”47 
Reynolds‟ battalion remained in Bay Point for more than three-and-a-half 
months, training, drilling, and assisting Sherman‟s men in occupation duties.  In the 
meantime, DuPont made plans to seize another area further south.  To the great joy of 
the Marines, the unit embarked on 23 February 1862 aboard the steam transport ship 
McClellan for movement to DuPont‟s next objective, a series of Confederate 
fortifications and the former Federal Fort Clinch, located on Amelia and Cumberland 
Islands, near the Georgia and Florida border.  On the morning of 2 March, Reynolds‟ 
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Marines landed at the southern tip of Cumberland Island and quickly occupied the 
deserted fortifications.  The day before DuPont‟s force landed the Confederates had 
abandoned most of their positions in the area, so the Marines faced little resistance as 
they moved from one objective to another.  As DuPont described it, “We captured Port 
Royal, but Fernandina and Fort Clinch have been given to us.”  Again, the Corps missed 
an opportunity to showcase the battalion‟s capabilities, due to no fault of its own.48 
Not wanting to tie his Marines down with occupation duties he thought were best 
suited for the Army, Admiral DuPont arranged for Reynolds‟ Marines to be sent back to 
Bay Point on 8 March.  But a week later he recalled the battalion to St. Augustine, 
Florida, when that city appeared to be threatened by the appearance of about 400 
Confederate guerrillas.  DuPont wanted the Marines to occupy and guard St. Augustine 
(and possibly Jacksonville) from the threat, but Brigadier General Sherman had different 
ideas.  On 19 March, Sherman visited DuPont on the Wabash, and the admiral knew that 
the general was disturbed when he uttered his first comment: “Well, Commodore, you 
have taken the whole coast.”  According to DuPont, “I saw further he was particularly 
disappointed at our having captured St. Augustine, and at my sending for the marines to 
hold it.”  DuPont believed Sherman had little interest in fighting, yet wanted to share in 
the glory of the success.  His correspondence expressed little confidence in the fighting 
abilities of Sherman or his men.  “Poor General, he flies about like a shuttlecock, 
imagining great things about Savannah or Charleston, and if he attempts either with his 
present force he will be whipped so thoroughly that I doubt if there will be a man of 
them to pick up by the gunboats.”  DuPont began to be concerned that Sherman would 
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protest every attempt to employ the Marine battalion out of some belief that it might 
overshadow the actions of his own soldiers.  If that proved to be the case and continued, 
Dupont declared “I will send the battalion home; they are too well-trained men to be lost 
out here any longer.”  The cooperation between the commanders seemed at an end.  In 
particular, the naval element of the expedition easily controlled all of the area‟s 
considerable waterways, but the Army did not adequately control the shore.  Frustrated, 
DuPont knew that his Marine battalion gave him the capability of controlling events both 
afloat and ashore, and he angrily predicted “I could not only take St. Augustine – of 
course, without asking him if I please – but hold it too.”49   
Two days before the Marines were to land in St. Augustine, DuPont discovered 
that Sherman had already ordered a lieutenant colonel and two companies of soldiers 
there.  Sherman knew that the presence of the higher ranking officer would preempt 
DuPont‟s desire to employ the Marines because it would give Sherman superior 
authority over Reynolds and the battalion.  The petty nature of the move caused DuPont 
to remark it was “the most unhandsome thing he has done.”  It signaled to DuPont that 
Sherman would continue to pursue every means of protesting or blocking his every 
effort to use the battalion in support of DuPont‟s own plans.  And if DuPont could not 
employ his Marines as he saw fit, neither would Sherman.  The admiral reluctantly 
decided to “send the battalion home now – it is idle to attempt to fit it in anywhere and 
they are a fine body of well-drilled and disciplined troops and should be employed.”  
Accordingly, Reynolds‟ battalion departed on the 26th for Washington, D.C.  However, 
the tactical situation along the St. Johns River soon changed for the worse, indicating 
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that DuPont‟s decision to send the Marines back was hasty and probably done out of 
spite.  Of course, DuPont probably also assumed that if he sent Reynolds‟ unit back to 
Washington that it would be kept intact and made ready for the next similar task, but that 
did not happen.50  
Reynolds‟ battalion arrived at the Washington Navy Yard on 31 March 1862, and 
promptly landed in a firestorm of controversy.  On Reynolds‟ arrival, Commandant 
Harris relieved him of his command and informed him that he would face formal 
charges of being drunk on duty and insubordination, the latter charge stemming from an 
intemperate letter Reynolds had written to Harris while still stationed at Bay Point, 
South Carolina.  In a fit of anger, Reynolds had corresponded with Harris regarding 
some rumors and allegations that his wife told him were circulating around the 
Headquarters while he was deployed with the battalion.  Harris took some of the 
statements as a personal attack and therefore proffered charges.51 
Meanwhile, true to his outdated priorities, Harris parsed out the rigorously 
trained and now highly disciplined battalion to fill the many open billets in ships‟ 
detachments and barracks throughout the Corps.  With the impending court martial of 
the unit‟s commander absorbing all the attention, little effort was taken to extract and 
capture all of the lessons learned from the months of experience as the Marine Corps‟ 
first specially formed amphibious battalion.  Although many of the participants would, 
from time to time, come together to perform similar tasks, the naval services missed 
another opportunity to build on what had already been accomplished.  Coincidentally, 
two major amphibious expeditions were underway at the same time the battalion was 
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being dissolved:  the seizure of New Orleans and the Peninsula Campaign with its drive 
up the James River.  In addition, the naval services were also establishing a presence at 
Cairo, Illinois, to wrest control of the Mississippi River from the Confederates.  The 
battalion would have benefitted any of those efforts, but that was not to be.  It would be 
more than a year before a similar unit would be formed.52 
Winfield Scott‟s “Anaconda Plan” became the basis for Union strategy in the 
Civil War.  A critical element of that plan involved the imposition of a blockade on 
Southern ports to prevent the export of cotton or import of goods that could support the 
Confederate war effort, and involved the closing of port cities by force.  These tasks 
required an increased amphibious capability within the Union military establishment.53  
Yet from the first application of amphibious force, the Marine Corps missed the 
opportunity to step forward and assume its logical role in that type of operation.  Indeed, 
the Corps‟ leaders made no effort either to advertise their unit's existing capabilities or to 
propose ways that the unit might better support the increased requirements as dictated by 
the national strategy.  By not shaping its own role in the war effort the Marine Corps was 
swept aside by the Army, which simply assumed the role that had been executed by 
Marines for decades. 
Tellingly, the impetus for employing the Marine battalion in the Port Royal 
expedition came not from within the Marine Corps, but from Admiral DuPont.  DuPont 
viewed such a unit as a natural extension of the same role that Marines had served in for 
decades during countless landing parties, where the Marines provided combat power 
ashore in the accomplishment of a primarily naval mission.  The major difference 
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between past landing party operations and those envisioned by DuPont was the scale of 
the mission; greater sized missions would require correspondingly larger landing parties. 
Yet Harris only provided battalions when he was specifically tasked to do so by 
the Navy Secretary.  Evidently he viewed the creation and fielding of battalions not as a 
positive development that highlighted the importance and relevance of Marines in those 
operations.  Instead, he saw it as a distraction that diluted his manpower and strength, 
keeping him from his traditional, but less strategic mission of providing small 
detachments for a large number of vessels.  An imaginative leader would have created 
and volunteered such a specialized battalion as a natural extension of the detachment or 
ad hoc battalion, and then employed any success they achieved as leverage to gain 
greater structure and support.  But Harris was far from being either visionary or bold.  
Marine leaders proved equally unimaginative in adapting to the increased 
demands of the war to ensure that the Corps could fill gaps in its increased structure.  
For decades the Marine recruiting effort had been criticized as producing marginal 
results in terms of both the quantity and quality of persons enlisted.  Yet when the war 
brought the requirement for large numbers of men, little change was made to improve 
how that task was performed.  Although some of the reasons that the Marine Corps was 
not as competitive as the Army in recruiting were outside the service‟s control, it 
nonetheless responded too sluggishly to the challenge in ways that might have produced 
better results.  Instead, it continued to pursue recruits in the same inefficient and 
unimaginative manner that it did before the war, reaping the same, predictably poor 
231 
 
results.  The fact remains that the Marine Corps did not even do half as well at recruiting 
as the Navy, with which it shared many of the same disadvantages.   
Part of the problem with recruiting was systemic and reflected a failure in the 
Corps‟ leadership at the highest level.  From the outset of the war, the Marine Corps had 
participated heroically in several engagements, yet most of those experiences went 
unreported by Harris and were consequently little noticed by the public at large.  Some 
actions, like that of Reynolds‟ battalion at Bull Run, or the Marines‟ role in the loss of 
the Navy Yards at Pensacola and Norfolk, probably went unheralded because they 
resulted in defeats.  But there were many other examples where Marines had fought 
valiantly and performed well yet were largely unknown even within the Marine Corps 
itself.  For his part, the Commandant failed to mention the many achievements of his 
own men, not realizing that by bringing their exploits to the public‟s notice people would 
gain an appreciation for the job they did.54  Perhaps Harris simply did not believe it was 
part of his duty, or his role as Commandant to publicize the service, but if he did not, 
who would?  As a result, Marines remained a small, nearly anonymous group, their few 
numbers operating within a larger group of sailors led by Navy officers, with few outside 
those closely associated with them understanding what they did and how well they did it.  
Yet by not informing the public at large on the roles of Marines and how they 
contributed to the war effort, Harris made it doubly hard for the recruiters to do their job, 
or Congress and the public to appreciate their service. 
232 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 U.S. Navy Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the 
War of the Rebellion, 30 volumes and index (Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office, 1894-1922), Series I, 6:  119-24 (hereafter referred to as ORN, 
and all citations are to Series I, unless otherwise noted); U.S. War Dept., The 
War of the Rebellion:  A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies, 128 vols. and atlas (Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1880-1901), 
Series I, 4:  573-74, 579-86, 592-94 (hereafter cited as OR, and all citations are to 
Series I, unless otherwise noted), quote from 580; Navy Dept., “Report of the 
Secretary of the Navy, 1861,” U.S. Serial Set 1119, Sess. vol. 3, 37th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., Senate Executive Document 1, Pt. 3 (hereafter “SecNav Annual Report, 
1861”), 7, 46-47.    
 
2 OR, 4:  582, 585-86, 589-90; ORN, 6: 121, 125-27, 134-35, 138-40; “SecNav Annual 
Report, 1861,” 7, 46-47; Letter, Daniel O‟Connor to “Dear Timothy,” USS 
Cumberland, 7 September 1861, Daniel O‟Connor Papers, copy in Archives and 
Special Collections, Alfred M. Gray Research Library (hereafter GRC), 
Quantico, Va., quotes from text.    
 
3 Adapted from a sketch in Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, 7 September 1861, 
271. 
 
4 OR, 4:  582, 585-86, 589-90; ORN, 6: 121, 125-27, 134-35, 138-40; “SecNav Annual 
Report, 1861,” 7, 46-47; O‟Connor to “Dear Timothy,” USS Cumberland, 7 
September 1861, copy in Daniel O‟Connor Papers, Archives and Special 
Collections, GRC, Quantico, Va.    
 
5 David Dixon Porter, Naval History of the Civil War ([1886]; reprinted, Minneola, 
N.Y.:  Dover Publications, 1998), 44-47, quote from 46; William R. Trotter, 
Ironclads and Columbiads:  The Civil War in North Carolina, The Coast 
(Winston-Salem, N.C.:  John F. Blair, Publisher, 1989), 38-41.  
 
6 As described in 2010, the principle of unity of command dictates that “all forces 
operate under a single [commander] with the requisite authority to direct all 
forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”  See the discussion of the 
subject in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 2009), I-1-I-5, IV-1, quote from IV-1, available on the 
Internet at:  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0/, last accessed on 20 
May 2010. 
 
7 For details regarding the actions against the Chinese Forts, see Bernard C. Nalty, The 
Barrier Forts:  A Battle, a Monument, and a Mythical Marine (Marine Corps 
233 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Historical Reference Series, No. 6) (Washington:  Historical Branch, G-3 
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962).  In Rowena Reed, Combined 
Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 1978), 15-18, the 
author peripherally addresses the point that at Hatteras, in addition to 
experiencing other significant problems in the planning and executing of the 
action, “the „cooperating‟ troops proved more of a handicap than an asset, except 
for the interdicting fire of the boat howitzers, which could have been managed by 
a handful of Marines” (16).  As a note, Reed employs the term “combined 
operation” in the manner widely used during the Civil War to describe what are 
more properly termed joint operations today in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.  For a discussion of the Army‟s creation of its own amphibious-type 
units, see this and succeeding chapters, and works on the Mississippi Marine 
Brigade as covered in Chester G. Hearn, Ellet’s Brigade:  The Strangest Outfit of 
All (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 2000). 
 
8 See OR, 6:  162-63; Bern Anderson, By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the 
Civil War ([1962], reprinted, New York:  Da Capo Press, 1962), 51-52; Kevin J. 
Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral:  The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont 
(Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press), 126-27. 
 
9 Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham to Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, U.S. Flagship 
Minnesota, New York Harbor, 2 September 1861, reprinted in “SecNav Annual 
Report, 1861,” 46-48, also 51 of same report. 
 
10 For assessments of the military career of Benjamin Butler, see: OR, 34, pt. 3:  332-33; 
Chester G. Hearn, When the Devil Came Down to Dixie:  Ben Butler in New 
Orleans (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press), 1997, 5; James M. 
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: the Civil War Era (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 328-29, 820; David K. Work, Lincoln’s Political 
Generals (Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 2009), 45-46, 230; and other 
characterizations.  William H. Cartter to “Dear Mother,” USS Minnesota, 13 
September 1861, Cartter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.      
 
11 John D. Hayes and Lillian O‟Brien, eds., “The Early Blockade and the Capture of the 
Hatteras Forts, From the Journal of John Sanford Barnes, July 19 to September 1, 
1861,” New York Historical Society Quarterly 46 (January 1962), 78-85, quote 
from 84-85.    
 
12 See the discussion of Marine participation in landing party operations in Chapter 3. 
 
13 Welles to Samuel F. DuPont, A. D. Bache, Charles H. Davis, and John G. Barnard, 27 
June 1861, Record Group (hereafter RG) 45 (Naval Records Collection of the 
234 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Office of Naval Records and Library), Confidential Letter Book of the Secretary 
of the Navy, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 
(hereafter NA); Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral, 106-24; “SecNav Annual 
Report, 1861,” 515-16. 
 
14 Congress, “An Act for the Better Organization of the Marine Corps,” 37th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Statutes at Large, 1789-1875, 12:  275; Welles to Colonel Commandant 
John Harris, Navy Dept., Washington, D.C., 22 April 1861, 30 May and 22 
November 1861, RG 80 (General Records of the Dept. of the Navy, Records of 
the Office of the Secretary of the Navy), Entry 1 (Letters to the Commandant and 
Other Officers of the Marine Corps) (hereafter “Letters Sent”), NA; Welles to 
“President of the United States,” Navy Dept., Washington, D.C., 20 November 
1861, RG 127 (Field Organization Records, Records of the United States Marine 
Corps), “Letters Received – HD,” NA; Harris to Welles, Headquarters, Marine 
Corps (HQMC), Washington, D.C., 18 November 1861, RG 80, Entry 14 
(Letters From the Commandant and Other Officers of the Marine Corps, January 
1828 - December 1886) (hereafter “Letters Received”), NA; “SecNav Annual 
Report, 1861,” 519.  
 
15 Compiled from:  Congress, “An Act for the Better Organization of the Marine Corps,” 
37th Cong., 1st Sess., Statutes at Large, 12:  275. 
 
16 Navy Dept., “Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1862,” 1 December 1862, Serial Set 
1158, Sess. vol. 3, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., H. Exec. Doc. 1, Pt. 3 (hereafter 
“SecNav Annual Report, 1862”), quote from 902. 
 
17 Jeffery T. Ryan, “On Land and Sea” (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1997), 
141-42. 
 
18 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis:  The History of the United States Marine Corps, 
([1980]; rev. and exp. ed., New York:  Free Press, 1991), 88, 92-93; Navy Dept., 
“Secretary of the Navy Annual Report, 1857,” 8 December 1857, Serial Set 944, 
Sess. vol. 2, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., H. Exec. Doc. 2, Pt. 3 (hereafter “SecNav 
Annual Report, 1857”), 584; Harris to L. V. Pierce, Esq., HQMC, Washington, 
D.C., 14 September 1861, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent,” NA; Charles Oscar 
Paullin, Paullin’s History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911 (Annapolis:  
Naval Institute, 1968), 303. 
 
19 Admiral David Dixon Porter to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox, 
Arkansas River, 16 January 1863, reprinted in Gustavus Vasa Fox, Confidential 
Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox:  Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861-
1865, Robert Means Thompson and Richard Wainwright, eds.,  2 vols. (New 
York:  Naval History Society, 1918-19), 2: 151-55, quotes from text; Ari 
235 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Hogenboom, Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008), 199; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 374-75.  
 
20 Ryan, “On Land and Sea,” 143-48; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 93, Paullin, Naval 
Administration, 303. 
 
21 Ryan, “On Land and Sea,” 143-48; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 93; Porter to Harris, Cairo, 
Illinois, 14 November 1863, RG 127, Entry  42 (Letters Received, 1818 – 1915) 
(hereafter “Letters Received”), NA, quote from text. 
 
22 Ryan, “On Land and Sea,” 143-48, quote from 144; Philadelphia [Pa.] Inquirer, 3 
October 1863, 6; [Philadelphia, Pa.] Press, 1 April 1864, 3; Daily Evening 
Bulletin [Philadelphia, Pa.], 23 April 1864, 5; RG 127, "Correspondence Files," 
"Records of the Quartermaster‟s Dept.," “Letters Sent, October 1857-April 1860, 
August 1860-January 1863,” and “Letters Received, 1861-1872,” NA; Harris to 
Captain Matthew R. Kintzing, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 7 June 1862 and 21 
July 1863, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Harris to Major 
Ward Marston, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 19 June 1862, RG 127, Entry 4:  
“Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Colonel Jacob Zeilen to Kintzing, HQMC, 
Washington, D.C., 24 August 1864, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-
1884,” NA; Zeilen to Orderly Sergeant E. A. Clark, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 
17 October 1864, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Gideon 
Welles, “Diary of Gideon Welles,” Entry for 10 October 1864, reprinted in Diary 
of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols., 
Welles, Edgar Thaddeus, ed. (Boston, Ma.: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1911) 
(hereafter Welles, Diary [1911]), 2:  174. 
 
23 Harris to Kintzing, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 3 November 1862, RG 127, Entry 4:  
“Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Harris to Captain Lucien L. Dawson, HQMC, 
Washington, D.C., 15 July 1863, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” 
NA, first quote from text; Harris to Captain James Lewis, HQMC, Washington, 
D.C., 1 December 1863, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; 
Lewis to Harris, Philadelphia, Pa., 21 December 1863, RG 127, Entry  42:  
“Letters Received, 1818-1915”  (hereafter “Letters Received”), NA; Kintzing to 
Harris, Cairo, Ill., 27 January 1864, RG 127, Entry 42:  “Letters Received,” NA; 
Ryan, “On Land and Sea,” 148-51, second quote from 150. 
 
24 Congress, “An Act for the Better Organization of the Marine Corps,” Statutes at 
Large, 12:  275; Welles to Harris, Navy Dept., Washington, D.C., 15 August 
1861, RG 80, Entry 1:  “Letters Sent,” NA, quotes from text.  For a detailed 
summary of the selection process, see David M. Sullivan, The United States 
Marine Corps in the Civil War – The First Year (Shippensburg, Pa.:  White 
Mane Publishing Company, 1997), 157-63. 
236 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
25 Congress, “An Act providing for the Better Organization of the Military 
Establishment,” 37th Cong., 1st Sess., Statutes at Large, 12:  287-91; Welles to 
Harris, Navy Dept., Washington, D.C.:  2 November 1861, RG 80, Entry 1:  
“Letters Sent,” NA; Edward William Callahan, ed., List of Officers of the Navy of 
the United States and of the Marine Corps from 1775 to 1900, Compiled from 
the Official Records of the Navy Dept. (New York:  Haskell House Publishers, 
1969), (hereafter List of Officers of Navy and Marine Corps), 691. 
 
26 See the Case Files of Abraham N. Brevoort, William Dulany, Ward Marston, Charles 
Henderson, and John L. Broome, RG 125 (Records of the Office of the Judge 
Advocate General [Navy]), Entry 57 (Records of the Proceedings of Marine 
Retiring Boards) (hereafter "Marine Retiring Boards"), Volume 1, NA; Callahan, 
List of Officers of Navy and Marine Corps, 681.   
 
27 Case File of Ward Marston, RG 125, Entry 57:  "Records of the Proceedings of 
Marine Retiring Boards," vol.1, NA; Welles to Marston, Navy Dept., 
Washington, D.C., 6 December 1861, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798 - 
1884,” NA; Case Files of Charles Henderson, and John L. Broome, RG 125, 
Entry 57:  " Records of the Proceedings of Marine Retiring Boards," vol.1, NA; 
John L. Broome Papers, GRC, Quantico, Va.  Marston had long been a thorn in 
the sides of Welles and Harris, having launched an almost weekly letter writing 
campaign protesting his relief from command.  Marston even included President 
Lincoln in his correspondence, and the secretary‟s files are filled with samples of 
Marston‟s letters and Welles‟ responses.  Harris would likely have felt vindicated 
in his judgment of Marston had he known that the officer would be court-
martialed and dismissed in disgrace in 1865 for the charges of swindling over 
$8000 dollars of his Marines‟ bounty money that had been entrusted to his care 
in the intervening years.  See Ryan, “On Sea and Land,” 153-54, for a complete 
description of Marston‟s troubles.   
 
28 Section 15 of Congress, “An Act providing for the Better Organization of the Military 
Establishment,” Statutes at Large, 12:  287-91, states “that any commissioned 
officer of the army, or of the marine corps, who shall have served as such for 
forty consecutive years, may . . . be placed upon the list of retired officers.”  
Those officers over forty years in service who did not voluntarily retire were to 
appear before a board as described in section 17 of the law, “to determine the 
facts as to the nature and occasion of the disability.”  And if the board found an 
officer “incapacitated for active service, will report whether, in its judgment, the 
said incapacity result[ed]” from age or infirmity. 
 
29 No contemporary source, not even Welles‟ detailed Diary, revealed why the secretary 
did not put Harris before the Retiring Board. 
237 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
30 Welles, Diary [1911], 1:  89, quotes from same; Joseph Alexander, “John Harris,” in 
Commandants of the Marine Corps, Allan Millett and Jack Shulimson, eds. 
(Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 2004), 81-82. 
 
31 Welles, Diary [1911], 2:  31, 47, quotes from 31. 
 
32 Welles, Diary [1911], 2:  174, quotes from text. 
 
33 Harris to Colonel Henry Knox Craig, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 20 April 1859 and 7 
April 1860, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Harris to Navy 
Secretary Isaac Toucey, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 26 April 1861, RG 127, 
Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA.  As an aside, these were the rifles 
issued to Reynolds‟ Marines for use at Bull Run. 
 
34 Harris to various Marine commanders, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 19 July 1861, RG 
127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Captain Duncan N. Ingraham to 
Harris, Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, 2 May 1860, RG 127, Entry 42:  
“Letters Received,” NA; “SecNav Annual Report, 1861,” 515-16; “SecNav 
Annual Report, 1862,” 902; Ryan, “On Land and Sea,” 59-61.  
 
35 Harris to Lieutenant Colonel James Edelin, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 4 September 
1861, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Major William B. Slack 
to Major John Reynolds, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 16 May 1861, RG 127, 
“Letters From the Quartermaster of the Corps,” NA; Reynolds to Harris, Marine 
Barracks, Washington, D.C., 24 July 1861, RG 80, Entry 14:  “Letters 
Received,” NA; “SecNav Annual Report, 1861,” 37, 515. 
 
36 ORN, 12:  201-209, quote from 207; Harris to Major Jacob Zeilen, HQMC, 
Washington, D.C., 9 August 1861, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” 
NA; Harris to Reynolds, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 15 February 1862, RG 127, 
Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA.   
 
37 ORN, 12:  209; Harris to Zeilen, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 9 August 1861, RG 127, 
Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA, first quote from text; Welles to Harris, 
Navy Dept., Washington, D.C., 19 September 1861, RG 80, Entry 1, NA; Harris 
to Welles, HQMC, Washington, D.C.: 23 September 1861, RG 80, Entry 14:  
“Letters Received,” NA; Harris to Edelin, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 24 
September 1861, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA, second quote 
from text; Harris to Reynolds, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 15 February 1862, RG 
127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1798-1884,” NA; Welles to War Secretary Simon 
Cameron, Navy Dept., Washington, D.C., reprinted in ORN, 12:  210; Assistant 
238 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Surgeon David F. Ricketts to Reynolds, Marine Battalion, Bay Point [S.C.], 20 
November 1861, RG 127, “Letters Received by the Adjutant and Inspector,” NA. 
 
38 Nicholson to Welles, Adjutant and Inspector, Washington, D.C., 3 October 1861, RG 
80, Entry 14:  “Letters Received,” NA, first quote from text; Harris to Welles, 
HQMC, Washington, D.C., 3 October 1861, RG 80, Entry 14:  “Letters 
Received,” NA, second and third quotes from text; Harris to Nicholson, HQMC, 
Washington, D.C., 7 October 1861, RG 127, Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1789-1884,” 
NA.  
 
39 Telegram, Welles to Harris, Navy Dept., Washington, D.C., 8:42 AM, 15 October 
1861, RG 127, “Letters Received – HD,” NA, also reprinted in ORN, 12:  217; 
ORN, 12:  214-15, quotes from 215; Sherman‟s orders may be found at ORN, 12:  
220.  See also President Abraham Lincoln‟s guidance at ORN, 6:  293.  Thomas 
W. Sherman should not be confused with his more famous namesake, William T. 
Sherman; although many contemporaries referred to Thomas as “the other 
Sherman.” 
 
40 Samuel F. DuPont to “My Dear Sophie,” Navy Dept., Washington, D.C., 26 July 
1861, reprinted in Samuel DuPont, Samuel Francis DuPont:  A Selection From 
his Civil War Letters, 3 vols., John D. Hayes, ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.:  Cornell 
University Press, 1969), 1:  112-15, quotes from 113. 
 
41 DuPont to “My Dearest Sophie,” [USS] Wabash, [off Hampton Roads, Va.,] 19 
October 1861, reprinted in Civil War Letters, 1:  174-78, ORN, 12:  223. 
 
42 ORN, 12:  232-47, quotes from 237; “SecNav Annual Report, 1861,” 82-84. 
 
43 “SecNav Annual Report, 1861,” 82-84; ORN, 12: 255- 61, John D. Hayes, ed., “The 
Battle of Port Royal, S.C., From the Journal of John Sanford Barnes, October 8 
to November 9, 1861,” New York Historical Society Quarterly 45 (October 
1961), 84. 
 
44 ORN, 12:  261-63, “SecNav Annual Report, 1861,” 86-88, 90; Hayes, ed., “Barnes‟ 
Journal,” quote from 391.  
 
45 ORN, 12:  262A. 
 
46 “SecNav Annual Report, 1861,” 88-92, 97-98; ORN, 12: 264- 70. 
 
47 DuPont to “My Dear Mr. [Gustavus Vasa] Fox,” Wabash, Port Royal, [South 
Carolina,] 9 November 1861, reprinted in DuPont, Civil War Letters, 230-32, 
quote from 232; DuPont to “My Precious Sophie,” Wabash, Port Royal, 13 
239 
 
                                                                                                                                                
November 1861, reprinted in DuPont, Civil War Letters, 235-42; Major William 
Russell to Reynolds, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 19 November 1861, RG 127, 
Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, 1789-1884,” NA; Private William Gould, “The Wreck of 
the Governor,” Civil War Miscellaneous Collection, U.S. Army Military History 
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., quote from text.  An interesting side note of the 
operation was that the fight for Fort Walker almost precipitated an engagement 
between Federal and Confederate Marines.  When the Union fleet appeared off of 
Port Royal, the commander of the Confederate Navy‟s Savannah Squadron, Flag-
Officer Josiah Tattnall, formerly of the U.S. Navy, mustered all of his forces to 
oppose any landing.  When DuPont‟s ships opened fire on Fort Walker, 
Tattnall‟s small flotilla, made up of a converted river steamboat, the CSS 
Savannah, and several armed tugs, attempted to return fire but its guns could not 
adequately reach the Union ships.  Soon after, perceiving that the fires from Fort 
Walker were slacking off, Tattnall landed a group of sailors and his company of 
Confederate Marines, led by former twelve-year veteran of the USMC Captain 
George Holmes, at nearby Skull Creek to reinforce the garrison of the fort.  
However, as the relief force moved toward the fort it collided with the soldiers 
abandoning that post.  And around that same time Dupont‟s Marines and sailors 
were already entering Fort Walker.  Believing his mission impractical with the 
fort to already in the hands of the Union forces, the senior Confederate officer 
ashore gave the order to fall back to Tattnall‟s ships, and the rebel relief group 
was withdrawn.  Their retreat left the Federal Marines and sailors free to 
consolidate their defense of Fort Walker without interference.  See Ralph 
Donnelly, Biographical Sketches of the Commissioned Officers of the 
Confederate States Marine Corps, David M. Sullivan, ed. (Shippensburg, Pa.: 
White Mane Books, 2001), 101-03; Savannah, [Ga.] Republican, 12 November 
1861, 1, reprinted in ORN, 12: 295-98; ORN, 12:  300-314. 
 
48 ORN, 12: 566-68, 572-75, quote from 575. 
 
49 ORN, 12: 603-04, DuPont to “My Precious Sophie,” Wabash, Off St. Johns, [Fla.], 19 
March 1862, reprinted in DuPont, Civil War Letters, 367-76, all quotes from text. 
 
50 DuPont to “My Precious Sophie,” Wabash, Off Mosquito Inlet, Coast of Florida, 23 
March 1862, reprinted in DuPont, Civil War Letters, 376-86, all quotes from text; 
DuPont to Major John Reynolds, Wabash, Off St. Augustine, [Fla.], 25 March 
1862, reprinted in DuPont, Civil War Letters, 386-87; ORN, 12: 657-58. 
 
51 Reynolds to Harris, HQ, Marine Battalion, Bay Point, Port Royal, S.C., 22 February 
1862, RG 80, Entry 14:  “Letters Received,” NA; John G. Reynolds, Proceedings 
of a Marine General Court Martial, Convened at Washington City, May 7, 1862, 
for the Trial of Lieut. Col. John Geo. Reynolds, U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, 
D.C.: Henry Polkinhorn, Printer, 1862), 5-6; Court Martial of Lieutenant Colonel 
240 
 
                                                                                                                                                
John G. Reynolds, RG 45, Naval General Courts-Martial and Courts of Inquiry, 
NA; Welles, Diary [1911], 1:  89.  See also the narrative on the incident in 
Sullivan, The First Year, 1:  238-42. 
 
52 Muster Rolls for the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. for the Months of April and 
May 1862, RG 24 (Bureau of Naval Personnel, Deck Logs), Muster Rolls of the 
United States Marine Corps, NA. 
 
53 For an overview of Union naval strategy in the Civil War, and its implications for 
amphibious warfare, see Clark G. Reynolds, Navies in History (Annapolis:  
Naval Institute Press, 1998), 121-130; and Anderson, By Sea and by River, 33-
40. 
 
54 See Harris‟ annual reports at “SecNav Annual Report, 1861,” 515-16; and “SecNav 
Annual Report, 1862,” 902. 
241 
 
CHAPTER VII 
EMPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS:  
BLOCKADES, RAIDS AND LANDINGS 
 
Most Marines were employed during the Civil War in one of four ways:  as 
guards posted to garrison units (Marine Barracks) located on naval facilities; as separate 
Marine detachments assigned to warships; as ad hoc groupings of ships‟ detachments 
that served as part of larger combat formations; and as battalion units specially formed 
for specific purposes.   
 
Marine Barracks 
Marine Barracks are garrison units located at Navy Yards or other shore 
facilities.  The Marines assigned to the various barracks performed routine non-tactical 
security duties involving the protection of the public property in those yards.  The 
barracks commander, in coordination with the Commandant of the Navy Yard, posted 
Marines as guards and sentries about the facility, controlling access to specific areas and 
responding to any emergency or threat that might arise.  The nature of the work does not 
normally require duty in the field, yet on a few occasions barracks Marines were directed 
to assist local authorities in restoring or maintaining order.  In those cases, the men did 
perform tactical missions under field conditions.  For example, during the Draft riots in 
New York City in July 1863, the Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard performed well 
in helping to quell civil unrest by patrolling the streets to put down mob action, by 
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guarding federal gold at the Sub-Treasury on Wall Street, and by forcibly recapturing 
stolen weapons that rioters had earlier seized from a militia armory.  In the process the 
Marines helped save lives and protect property.1  
Of particular concern to this study, efforts by the military establishment to 
expand the Marine Corps‟ mission to include the garrisoning of several large 
fortifications at the outset of the Civil War were rebuffed by the Commandant himself.  
As described in Chapter IV, in early 1861 the War Department, with full concurrence 
from the Navy Department, directed the Corps to man several strongpoints around the 
national capital to fill a security vacuum created by large-scale Army resignations and 
desertions during the Secession Crisis.  The Marine Corps was assigned a central role in 
contingency plans for the defense of the capital and key government locations.  These 
assignments presented the Marine Corps with a fleeting opportunity to provide a 
valuable service to the nation during a time of vulnerability.  Performing those tasks 
would have tangibly supported any requests the Commandant might have made for 
additional Marines to continue the assignments, particularly since the Corps was 
protecting the political establishment.  Instead, Commandant Harris resisted using 
Marines for such missions, and in the process squandered valuable political capital that 
might have benefitted the Corps.2 
That said, some of the Marines assigned to the barracks units found ways to 
actively participate in the war by conducting tactical missions.  In late 1864, when parts 
of Kentucky continued to be plagued by guerrilla attacks, Admiral David Dixon Porter 
authorized the Marines from the Mound City, Illinois, Marine Barracks to conduct 
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“expeditions” into threatened areas.  Marine Lieutenant Henry Clay Cochrane led two 
such patrols.  “In the first detail, I had 75 men, and in the second, about 45 men and a 4 
gun steamer.”  His men “Scouted many miles into Kentucky, captured a boat and lot of 
contraband goods (books, dry goods, coffee, &c., &c.) and returned to the barracks 
without losing a man.”3  Though these operations were as close as the barracks 
commands came to actual combat, they afforded junior officers and Marines an excellent 
opportunity to hone their fighting skills. 
Following the losses of the Pensacola and Norfolk yards in the opening months 
of the war, all of the remaining naval facilities guarded by Marines were located safely 
within the confines of Union-held ground.  In late 1861 the USMC had Marine Barracks 
at five Navy Yards:  Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Brooklyn, New 
York; Boston, Massachusetts; and Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  By the end of 1862 it 
had also established new barracks at Cairo, Illinois, and Mare Island, California (see 
Table 7-1).  The Cairo barracks moved to nearby Mound City, Illinois, in May 1864.  
During the war, with the exception of the previously mentioned Pensacola and Norfolk 
Navy Yards, none of those posts were directly threatened by enemy action, making the 
duties routine.   
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Table 7-1.  Location and Approximate Size of Marine Barracks, November 1862.4 
 
Location of Barracks Approximate Number of Marines 
Washington, D.C. 10-13 officers, 300-400 Marines 
Brooklyn, New York 1-2 officers, 130-150 Marines 
Boston, Massachusetts 1-2 officers, 80-100 Marines 
Cairo, Illinois (later Mound City, 
Illinois) 
2-3 officers, 150-170 Marines 
Mare Island, California 2-3 officers, 150-170 Marines 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 3-4 officers, 100-150 Marines 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire 1 officer, 60-70 Marines 
 
 
 
The manning of these barracks had both advantages and disadvantages for the 
Marine Corps.  The most obvious disadvantage was that these facilities required 
personnel who could otherwise be assigned to detachments or battalions.  The size of the 
garrison at each post varied, but in total equaled more than 20 percent of the Corps‟ total 
manpower.  The barracks commands did, however, have advantages in that they 
provided the Corps with shore-based facilities where vital tasks like recruiting, receiving 
and the initial training of recruits could take place in relative safety.  The several 
barracks also provided the service with a manpower pool from which personnel needed 
for higher priority tasks might be drawn.  In addition, the posts were duty locations 
wherein Marines finishing combat assignments might be rotated to for necessary rest, 
retraining, and reorganizing.5  
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Marine Detachments 
On any given day the majority of Marines were assigned to small units that 
served on board individual Navy warships.  The size of a particular ship‟s Marine 
detachment depended in part on the size of the vessel and ranged in numbers from large 
forty to eighty-man units commanded by one or two company-grade officers to smaller, 
ten or twenty-man detachments led by a senior non-commissioned officer (see Table 7-
2).  As the Navy expanded the number of ships in service to meet its war requirements, 
the requirement for Marines to serve on those new warships also increased.  And since 
this form of employment constituted the primary priority for the Corps‟ manpower 
during the war, the dramatic growth in the Navy‟s number of warships led to increased 
pressures on the Marine Corps to provide trained men to fill the need.  Although certain 
sized detachments were traditionally paired with specific classes of ships, the actual size 
was not written in stone, and exceptions to any standard were plentiful and often the 
subject of some debate among ships‟ captains and the Navy Department.6   
 
Table 7-2.  Representative Sizes of Marine Detachments on Board  
Warships, 1861.7 
 
 
Type of Ship and Example Officers NCOs Privates Total 
Frigate (Potomac) 1 7 42 49 
Steam Frigate (Niagara) 2 7 51 60 
Receiving Ship (North 
Carolina) 
 6 45 51 
Screw Frigate (San Jacinto) 1 5 34 40 
Screw Sloop (Hartford) 2 5 36 43 
Steam Sloop (Mohican)  3 10 13 
Sloop of War (Cumberland) 1 7 42 50 
Sloop (Cyane)  3 22 25 
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Tactically, these detachments performed duties little changed from those of their 
predecessors who served on ships from the time of the Revolutionary War.  Marine 
detachments aboard ship were responsible to the ship‟s captain for the enforcement of 
good order and discipline.  During combat in the days of the frigate Navy, Marine 
sharpshooters typically positioned themselves in the ship‟s rigging to fire on enemy 
officers and gunners.  Elsewhere, they also ensured that their own ship‟s gunners and 
sailors remained at their assigned posts in the heat of battle.  In addition, Marines served 
as the vital core for boarding parties, landing parties, and as guards for prisoners of war 
captured as a result of an engagement.   
However, changes in the character of naval warfare threatened to make obsolete 
some of the combat tasks of Marines in ships.  With the advent of steam propulsion, 
higher-powered, longer-ranged naval artillery, armor plating and the consequent 
increased ranges of combat, Marine marksmen were no longer needed in the rigging of 
ships and boarding parties were rarely employed.  In addition, the implementing of new 
naval reforms in recruiting and discipline undertaken in the 1850s minimized the 
incidence of disciplinary problems of sailors.8     
In response, for several decades Marine leaders broadened their shipboard roles 
in an effort to increase their detachment‟s importance on naval vessels.  One way they 
did this was through training their men to man one or more of the ship‟s naval artillery 
batteries, thereby keeping the Marines intact as teams, yet fully integrated within the 
ship‟s combat firepower.  Many times the leaders at the lowest level of command 
recognized and implemented such actions without prompting by the Navy.  To most, it 
247 
 
seemed like a natural extension of the Marines‟ purpose aboard ship.  For example, as 
the Gulf Squadron prepared for Admiral Farragut‟s fight past Forts Jackson and St. 
Philip guarding the approach to New Orleans on the night of 23-24 April 1862, 
Lieutenant James Forney, commander of the Marines aboard the USS Brooklyn, 
recognized the situation clearly and exercised initiative.  “There not being any use for 
my Marines with their muskets, I volunteered to Mr. Lowry, the executive officer of the 
ship, to allow me two guns for the action.  I had abundance of time to drill them so that 
when the engagement came off on the morning of the 24th, they behaved themselves like 
men.”9   
It was in their role as shipboard gunners that historian Allan Millett convincingly 
argues that Marines made their greatest contribution in the war, asserting that “Marine 
gun crews participated in some of the Navy‟s finest hours in the Civil War.”  As 
evidence, he reveals that “of the seventeen Marines awarded the new Medal of Honor . . 
. thirteen were sergeants and corporals serving as gun captains and gun division 
commanders.”  The actions described in the citations are representative of the highlights 
of the U.S. Navy‟s fiercest battles of the war.  Seven Marines earned the award manning 
great guns when Farragut damned the torpedoes and steamed his fleet into Mobile Bay 
on 5 August 1864.  Two Marines distinguished themselves as gunners by reducing 
enemy artillery positions at Fort Fisher, North Carolina, supporting the ground attacks 
on that position in December 1864 and January 1865.  Corporal John F. Mackie earned 
his award (the Corps‟ first) for suppressing sharpshooters along the banks of the James 
River at the First Battle of Drewry‟s Bluff on 15 May 1862, and for manning a great gun 
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“with skill and courage” when the original gunners were killed or injured.  His example 
particularly illustrates the degree of flexibility and versatility that Marines provided 
ships‟ captains in the heat of combat.  Similarly, during the Union Navy‟s desperate 
fight for Port Hudson on the Mississippi River on 14 March 1863, Sergeant Pinkerton 
Vaughn operated one of his ship‟s guns until the vessel, the USS Mississippi, literally 
began to sink beneath him.  He then bent to the task of calmly assisting survivors in 
evacuating the ship while still under enemy fire, setting a positive example to others and 
saving many lives in the process.10    
Initiatives to enhance a detachment‟s firepower and capabilities when operating 
in landing parties have been discussed in detail in previous chapters.  The expansion of 
Marine shipboard duties to include their manning and directing of gun batteries achieved 
the same effect on board ship that their improved combat capabilities in landing parties 
did on land:  it made Marines more versatile, it better integrated them within warship 
crews, and it consequently made them more relevant and valuable to naval commanders.  
As one might expect, ships‟ captains generally welcomed such developments and many 
later vigorously defended continuing the Marine Corps as a separate service because of 
their favorable experiences with Marines on board ships.  Perennially short-handed, 
warship captains were, for the most part, quite pleased to add the discipline, esprit, 
teamwork and courage of Marine gun teams to supplement their combat capabilities.11   
In what might be one of the most famous of such examples, Marines manned and 
directed several of the great guns aboard the USS Kearsarge in its famous duel with the 
Confederate commerce raider CSS Alabama.  In its sensational history, the Alabama had 
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managed to sink or seize 64 Union merchant ships, striking fear into the maritime 
community and even forcing large numbers of American ships to reflag with other 
nations as a way to avoid the carnage.  The Alabama and its captain, Rafael Semmes, 
formerly of the U.S. Navy, had roamed the oceans and seas of the world in search of 
victims for about twenty-two months, until the battle with the USS Kearsarge off 
Cherbourg, France, on 19 June 1864.12   
Furthermore, the Alabama had a special significance for the Federal Marines, 
since that vessel had earlier dealt the Corps a great embarrassment in late 1862.  In 
November of that year, Commandant Harris organized a detachment of 137 Marines for 
duty at the newly established Mare Island Navy Yard located in San Francisco Bay, in 
California.  Harris assigned Major Addison Garland to command the detachment and 
made arrangements for Garland and his men to book passage to Panama aboard the mail 
steamer Ariel, scheduled to depart on 1 December 1862.  On 7 December, the Alabama 
intercepted the Ariel off Cuba and demanded its surrender.  Calling his Marines to 
prepare to repel boarders, Garland‟s actions provoked a panic from the 700 civilian 
passengers, who pleaded with the mail ship‟s captain to capitulate.  Meanwhile, two 
well-placed shots from the Alabama quickly convinced everyone on the Ariel of the 
futility of the relatively unarmed mail steamer fighting Semmes‟ well-armed raider.  The 
Ariel‟s captain surrendered his vessel, including the Marines, whom Semmes‟ 
lieutenants unsuccessfully tried to recruit for the Southern cause.  Semmes‟ men 
confiscated 200 new Enfield rifles and 2000 rounds of ammunition from the Marines, 
who signed paroles not to take up arms against the Confederates.  After posting a bond 
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of $261,000, the Ariel and the Marines continued on to Panama, where the detachment 
boarded the USS Constitution for further transport to San Francisco.  Secretary Welles, 
on receipt of a report on the action, prophetically remarked that “Abuse of the Navy 
Department will follow.”13  Although Garland had little alternative to ordering the 
surrender of his Marines, the incident resulted in yet another embarrassment for the 
Corps and another feather in the cap of Semmes and the Alabama.   
Eighteen months later, Marines helped even the score.  At about 9:00 A.M. on 19 
June 1864, a smugly confident Semmes steamed out to meet the Kearsarge, determined 
to fight his way back out to the open seas to continue his commerce raiding.  The crew 
of the Kearsarge, including the twelve-man Marine detachment that manned the ship‟s 
forecastle pivot gun, proved equally determined to put an end to the Alabama‟s 
escapades.  Interestingly, the Alabama was the only Confederate raider to not have its 
own Marine detachment, having instead only one Marine officer to train its sailors to 
perform Marine tasks.  The Kearsarge, though, had expended great effort and time 
practicing gun drills and honing the skills of its crew to a fine edge.  As the Alabama 
approached, the Kearsarge‟s crew manned their stations and readied their guns for 
action.  At a distance of about 1000 yards, the Alabama loosed a broadside and 
continued to close, both combatants steaming in ever-shrinking circles.  When the 
warships were within 700 yards of each other, the Kearsarge‟s captain, John A. 
Winslow, ordered his men to return fire and his Marines fired the first round.  For more 
than an hour the two combatants traded shots, the Confederates firing rapidly and with 
less effect, and the Federals “firing as though we were at target firing,” averaging about 
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one shot to every two of the Alabama‟s.  Finally, the Alabama raised a white flag and 
began sinking rapidly.  Captain Winslow ordered his guns to cease firing and began 
recovering survivors.  The Alabama‟s raiding days were over at last.  In the wake of the 
action the Marines received commendations for their “great coolness and efficiency” at 
their gun while “openly exposed to the fire of the Alabama.”14   
Marines also played an important role in the seizure of another Confederate 
raider, the CSS Florida, in Brazilian waters after midnight on 7 October 1864.  The USS 
Wachusett (Commander Napoleon Collins, USN) had confirmed the presence of the 
Florida three days earlier in the harbor of Bahia, where the raider had taken refuge under 
the friendly Brazilian flag to refit and resupply.  Collins decided to move offshore and 
ambush the Florida when it attempted to depart the harbor to resume commerce raiding.  
At about 3:15 A.M. on the 7th, the Wachusett bore down on the Florida, surprising the 
raider, and striking the Confederate ship on its starboard side.  The Wachusett‟s Marines 
manned the rails with their muskets and let loose a volley of fire before boarding the 
Florida.  After a short fight at close quarters, Union sailors fastened a tow cable to the 
Florida and the Wachusett pulled its prize out into international waters and away from a 
Brazilian cruiser attempting to intervene on the raider‟s behalf.  After a run of two years 
during which it captured or sank forty-two American merchant vessels, the Florida‟s 
raiding days were over.15 
Detachment Marines made valuable and material contributions to their ship even 
when they did not operate their ship‟s guns.  For example, when the Confederate 
ironclad rams CSS Palmetto State and CSS Chicora made a surprise attack on the Union 
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ships blockading Charleston, South Carolina, in the pre-dawn hours of 31 January 1863, 
the situation looked grim for the Federal forces.  In the first two minutes of the 
engagement, the Palmetto State‟s forward rifled gun pierced the hull of the USS 
Mercedita, leaving it to sink into the shallow water.  The Chicora similarly surprised the 
USS Keystone State, inflicting heavy damage on the Union warship and forcing it to 
flee.  The Keystone State‟s Marines tended to the growing number of wounded and 
assisted in evacuating them to the ship‟s surgeon, placing themselves in danger.  In the 
short engagement, the Keystone State suffered almost one-fourth of its crew dead or 
wounded, and by the time the two Confederate rams withdrew back towards Charleston, 
only five of the ship‟s twenty Marines were left untouched.16  
When resistance did appear to the notion of Marines manning shipboard 
batteries, it originated from a small minority of Marine officers and not from the Navy, 
since few ship captains would object to any initiative that enhanced the effectiveness of 
his crew or increased the combat capabilities of his ship.  On a very few occasions, it 
came to Harris‟ attention that some of his subordinates concluded that Marines need not 
serve as gunners aboard ship.  Moreover, one of his Marine Barracks commanders went 
so far as to insinuate that Marines should have as little to do with the Navy as possible.  
To Harris‟ credit, when he uncovered such behavior he took immediate action and 
expressed his displeasure in a forceful fashion.  After all, Harris had served the majority 
of his career with the Navy and had already demonstrated reluctance to provide forces 
for duty with the Army.  Harris rightly understood that the Navy and Marine Corps were 
symbiotic, and that each service depended on the other to accomplish their missions.  
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And the shipboard Marine detachments were an excellent demonstration of that 
relationship.17  
Although assigning Marines to small detachments on individual warships was 
not the most efficient means of employing them, their presence gave ships‟ captains 
great flexibility in dealing with a wide array of military situations.  Marines provided 
warship commanders with an enhanced capability to conduct small-scale raids ashore, 
helping to keep the enemy off balance and improving Union tactical positions.  There 
were many examples of this during the war, ranging from Commander William Macomb 
dispatching the Marine detachments from the USS Shamrock and USS Chicopee ashore 
at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, the morning of 10 September 1864 to search for 
Confederates who had been harassing the shipping lanes, to those same Marines 
(reinforced by the detachment off the USS Otsego) landing and capturing enemy 
positions near Plymouth, North Carolina, on 31 October 1864.  The latter operation, 
described as “a gallant affair,” allowed Admiral David Dixon Porter to control Plymouth 
and most of the Roanoke River.  On 4 December, with Marines first scouting out a route 
up the Chowan River in a small boat, the USS Chicopee swooped down on a 
Confederate logistics base at Pitch Landing, where a raiding party captured weapons, 
money, valuable stores, and almost 100 bales of cotton.18  The expansion of Union 
control up the Roanoke allowed Porter to then proceed to his larger goal, the capture of 
Fort Fisher, guarding the last major port still in Southern hands. 
For another example, when Confederate troops operating in and around Murrell‟s 
Inlet near Charleston, South Carolina, persisted in attacking groups of sailors from the 
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several Union blockaders in the region, Admiral John A. Dahlgren resolved to 
“administer some corrective to the small parties of rebels that infest that vicinity.”  He 
ordered a landing party of 100 Marines, equipped with four howitzers and adequate boat 
support to eliminate the threat.  On the night of 1 January 1864, an element of 
Dahlgren‟s Marines landed, and with one of the boat howitzers fired on a Confederate 
schooner that had been readying to run the blockade.  The schooner, loaded with resin 
and turpentine, caught fire and soon after exploded in a ball of pyrotechnic violence, 
putting a damper on enemy activity in that area for some time afterwards.19 
Marine detachments performed similar duty during Admiral David Porter‟s near-
disastrous Red River Campaign of March-May 1864.  Since Porter realized his squadron 
would be moving into territory solidly in the hands of Confederate forces, he tasked his 
Marines early on to provide close-in surveillance and security of the nearby riverbanks 
as the joint Army and Navy force moved upriver toward Shreveport, Louisiana.  Even 
prior to leaving the Mississippi River to push up the Red River, Marine skirmishers 
protected working parties ashore, a duty that often placed them in contact with the 
enemy and gave them a taste of things to come.  By mid-April, when the squadron 
moved up the Red River to Grand Bayou, Louisiana, the Union ships were being fired on 
daily by guerrillas hidden along the river banks.  In response, Marines posted 
sharpshooters on deck to help provide protection to exposed sailors and officers, as well 
as guarding them on shore.20 
At Grappe‟s Bluff on 13 April 1864, a group of about one hundred guerrillas 
suddenly opened fire on Porter‟s flagship, driving the sailors below decks.  The Marines 
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quickly returned fire with their Spencer rifles, and even brought a twenty-four pound 
howitzer into action to drive the larger enemy off.  The tactics worked, but the constant 
watches began to take their toll on the relatively small number of available Marines.  
And by the end of April, the Confederates had also changed their tactics and were 
incorporating artillery batteries into their boat ambushes, resulting in greater loss of life 
aboard the gunships.  The gauntlet appeared to be tightening around Porter‟s besieged 
vessels.  On 26 April the situation took a turn for the worse as Porter‟s new flagship, the 
“tinclad” USS Cricket, sustained a terrible beating from rebel batteries arrayed along the 
shore.  The hostile fires killed or wounded half the Cricket‟s crew and caused significant 
damage to the ship‟s engine that threatened to immobilize the ship under the enemy 
guns.  In that same action, the Confederates also disabled and subsequently captured one 
of the Army transports, killing over 180 soldiers in the process.  That desperate fight 
represented the height of the enemy action on the squadron, since Porter had already 
decided to retreat back down the Red River to safety.  Although the Confederates 
continued to harass the boats on their withdrawal, their effort was less intense or 
coordinated.  Nonetheless, Porter‟s sailors and Marines breathed a heavy sigh of relief 
when they steamed back into the Mississippi River.21 
Marine detachments performed similar duties on board Union warships stationed 
on the James River in mid-1864.  But those sailors and Marines faced another threat in 
addition to the ever-present enemy sharpshooters and artillery pieces that lurked in the 
brush-lined river banks; they faced the fearsome new weapon called “torpedoes.”  These 
early sea mines, capable of being detonated either by contact with a ship or 
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electronically detonated by an observer on the shore, struck fear into the hearts of 
anyone navigating the waters of the James, having already claimed several victims.  On 
the afternoon of 6 May 1864, a submerged torpedo holding about 1000 pounds of 
powder exploded beneath the hull of the Commodore Jones by remote detonation, 
completely destroying the gunboat and killing forty sailors.  The USS Mackinaw 
(Commander J. C. Beaumont) had been escorting several ships and immediately 
dispatched its Marines in small boats to search for survivors as well as sweep the bank 
for enemy.  One party of Marines discovered and killed a Confederate soldier located in 
a pit along the riverbank, later determined to be the person who set off the charge.  
Enlarging their search, the Marines discovered three other pits, each containing galvanic 
batteries and wires leading into the river to other torpedoes, and captured two 
Confederates who had manned one of the positions.  Several documents captured with 
one of the prisoners allowed the Union Navy to map out probable mine locations (see 
Figure 7-1).  The Marines‟ actions forestalled other mine detonations, potentially saving 
several ships and many lives.22 
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Figure 7-1.  Sketch Map of Confederate Mines in the James River, May 1864.23 
 
 
Marines from ship‟s detachments also reinforced Army units on occasion.  For 
example, when Major General Quincy A. Gillmore, USV, overextended his forces‟ reach 
and underestimated enemy resolve in northern Florida in February 1864, some of his 
subordinates looked to the Navy and Marine Corps for help.  The sudden loss of seven 
artillery pieces to enemy action near Jacksonville, Florida, prompted the Army 
commander to ask the USS Mahaska‟s captain (Commander J. Blakely Creighton) if he 
could provide the Army with naval howitzers and Marines.  Creighton agreed and the 
Marines and their batteries were incorporated into the Army‟s defenses.  As a 
precaution, the USS Pawnee‟s Marines with two more howitzers stood ready to join 
them ashore, if needed.  For more than a month the Mahaska‟s Marines served side-by-
side with the Army fighting off Confederate forces moving on Jacksonville until relieved 
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on 4 April 1864.  For their part, the Marines received the Army‟s “thanks for efficient 
naval cooperation.”24   
These examples of Marine detachments participating in the fighting are but a 
fraction of available examples throughout the war.  Since Marines served on the majority 
of Union warships, they consequently participated in any action the ship engaged in.  
The nature of this type of employment, wherein the detachment was considered as part 
of the ship‟s crew, in some ways masked the overall contribution of Marines by 
ascribing their efforts to ship‟s crew.  In many cases achievements of Marines are 
anonymously included in ship‟s actions, making it difficult to assess their role in various 
battles and engagements.  This is made even more difficult since Marine detachments 
did not routinely generate independent reports on engagements, but were rather 
mentioned (or not) within their ship‟s captain‟s report.  And since Commandant Harris 
rarely commented on the actions or achievements of his men in his own official reports, 
it is easy to understand how many contemporary observers failed to grasp the scope of 
Marine contributions in the war effort.  Furthermore, with many of the enlisted Marines 
being either foreign-born, illiterate, or both, few of them generated the correspondence 
or historical documents that would shed greater light into their service.    
This form of employing Marines in small detachments on board many of the 
Navy‟s ships had both advantages and disadvantages.  On the positive side, the 
detachment provided its ship with a trained and disciplined security force or infantry unit 
to deal with any problems it might encounter.  Ships so equipped could muster their own 
protective element to confront a wide array of threats that required ship-based combat 
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power, the landing of troops ashore, or some combination of these options to resolve the 
situation.  Detachments that integrated themselves into the ship‟s weapons systems as 
gunners were even more versatile and valuable.  And, since the detachment belonged to 
the ship‟s captain, it was wholly responsive to his needs and required minimal external 
coordination when being committed to action.  Furthermore, the ship‟s Marines could 
also be detached for security service with prize crews, shore details, or as guards for 
prisoners, all relatively frequent tasks during the war.   
The greatest disadvantage of an organization featuring wide-scale employment as 
detachments is that it essentially diluted the overall combat power of the Marine Corps 
by spreading it thinly throughout the Navy.  In effect, as far as the Marines were 
concerned, it was the least effective means to employ its limited assets.  The 
decentralized nature of that system made it more difficult to ensure a commonality of 
training for all Marines and complicated the dissemination of common tactics, 
techniques, and procedures throughout the institution.  Maintaining a high level of 
proficiency became dependent on individual leaders at far-flung posts, and otherwise 
simple functions such as supplying and even paying the Marines proved difficult to 
administer.  It also made it difficult for the Marine Corps to concentrate its manpower to 
deal with larger threats, and the lack of a defined, permanent combat command structure 
above the detachment level complicated matters when operating as impromptu 
companies or battalions.  Basically, the detachment system benefitted the Navy on the 
whole while the Marine Corps reaped all the problems associated with it.   
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Ad hoc Units Formed from Detachments 
However, while separate Marine detachments met the needs of individual naval 
commanders, the increased scale of warfare during the Civil War led logically to the 
requirement to create larger Marine units to fulfill the expanded combat tasks of 
squadron commanders.   
As the emphasis in naval warfare shifted from single ship combat at sea to flotilla 
or squadron-sized formations operating in close proximity of land the Navy‟s leaders 
needed larger units of Marines to handle the important tasks of supporting their 
operations or projecting combat power ashore.  To do this, many were guided by 
experiences in past conflicts, such as the Mexican War or expeditionary operations 
overseas, where company and battalion-sized Marine formations had successfully 
performed as elements of larger landing parties.  Their study and experimentation led to 
the third method of employing Marines in the Civil War; the forming of ad hoc units by 
combining several Marine detachments located within particular squadrons into larger 
combat organizations.  The immediate advantage was that the larger unit could focus 
more combat power ashore than could smaller, separate detachments.  And with proper 
preparation time, the companies or battalions created in this fashion could even task-
organize elements to perform other combat tasks, such as artillery or combat support 
missions, granting them even greater potential.   
Essentially, when a naval squadron commander perceived a need for a larger 
group of Marines to deal with some specific enemy threat or to seize an opportunity, he 
would combine several small detachments into a larger company or battalion.  Although 
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not as efficient or cohesive as purpose-built battalions, these ad hoc arrangements had 
the advantage of being quickly formed from the Marine assets at hand, and proved 
effective in many cases.  Despite having the obvious disadvantages of not having a set of 
established and practiced procedures in common to the unit as a whole, the Marines 
made up for this in part by relying heavily on their common entry-level training, as well 
as keeping their movements and formations as simple as practicable.  In these cases, the 
plethora of different weapons and equipment found in the many Marine elements that 
made up these ad hoc battalions often proved a logistical challenge, even for the 
generally short time of these units‟ existence.  These improvised units were also 
typically short-handed on officers, forcing the commander to operate without an 
adequate staff or subordinate leaders to assist him.  In many instances, some of the lower 
units were led by senior non-commissioned officers whose many years of experience 
helped make up for the absent authority of an officer‟s rank. 
The first ad hoc Marine battalion of the war involved the combining of Marines 
from the detachments of several warships sitting off besieged Fort Pickens, Florida, in 
April 1861.  As described briefly in Chapter V, the Marines from four separate warships 
were combined to create a one hundred-twenty man landing force detailed to reinforce 
Fort Pickens to prevent that post from being lost to the Union in the event the 
surrounding Southern military forces attacked it.  On the night of 12 April 1861, Navy 
Secretary Gideon Welles ordered the battalion to land under cover of darkness.  The 
Marines rowed ashore in small boats, ran across the broad, exposed beach to the fort, 
and reinforced the small garrison over the next six weeks.  Although the unit did not 
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engage in combat, their bold landing likely preempted a Confederate attempt to seize 
that base, the only fort in the South still in Federal hands at the time.25  Overall, the 
Marines‟ successful landing helped offset the Union‟s loss of Fort Sumter, South 
Carolina. 
The second instance of forming an impromptu battalion also occurred early in the 
war and again reflected a desire on the part of senior military leaders to attempt to 
salvage a desperate circumstance.  On 19 April 1861, with the Navy Yard at Norfolk, 
Virginia, under siege by Virginia militia, Secretary Welles ordered Commandant Harris 
to form a “battalion” of 100 Marines to reinforce the beleaguered naval personnel then 
attempting to either save or destroy the ships, equipment, and facilities so the material 
could not be used by the Confederate military.  The Marines from the Washington 
Barracks were turned out, organized, equipped, and marched to the Navy Yard to board 
ships for transport to Fortress Monroe, Virginia.  The following day, 20 April, the 
makeshift battalion arrived in time to participate in the abortive destruction of the yard 
before being ordered to withdraw at 3:30 A.M. the next morning.  The battalion then 
reported back to the Washington Marine Barracks where it was dissolved, having been 
in existence only a few hectic days.26   
Remarkably, Harris failed to comment on the obvious utility of having a battalion 
available to react to the various emergency situations that appeared with increasing 
frequency.  And since the impetus for that battalion originated with Welles personally, it 
was possible that the secretary would have supported the concept of creating a more 
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capable, permanent battalion to deal with those types of contingencies.  Unfortunately 
for the Marines, the idea, if considered at all, was not forwarded in any official capacity. 
Another example of this type of unit is the improvised Marine battalion that was 
employed by Flag-Officer Silas Stringham in the Cape Hatteras amphibious operation 
described in Chapter VI.  In that instance, Stringham‟s Marines served as a stabilizing 
force to the conglomeration of several Army units that were landed (and essentially 
abandoned) ashore in the first day of the operation.  As regular military men possessed 
of a keen familiarity of naval procedures and experienced in landings, the Marines 
carried on the fight with great success against a numerically superior foe.27  Their 
proficiency in infantry tactics and artillery gunnery made them a valuable asset and 
represented an effective means of utilizing Marines for larger-scale landing parties. 
Admiral Dahlgren used this same method, to a lesser degree, when he formed his 
reaction force to rid Murrell‟s Inlet near Charleston, South Carolina, of Confederate 
activity on 1 January 1864.  Having lost his purposely formed Marine battalion in 
November 1863, Dahlgren created his own impromptu unit out of the detachments from 
the ships USS Wabash, New Ironsides, Canandaigua, Housatonic, and South Carolina.  
Once formed, he ordered the 100-man group to land and destroy a Confederate ship 
readying to run the blockade.  Dahlgren then fashioned another makeshift battalion on 5 
February 1864, when he anticipated that a planned drive by the Army to take the Florida 
capital might need the additional manpower.  However, on receiving glowing reports 
from the Army as to their progress, Dahlgren then dissolved the battalion and reposted 
the Marines back to their original ships.28 
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One of the last ad hoc Marine battalions raised during the Civil War was that of 
Admiral David Porter in preparation for his second attempt to seize the Confederate 
stronghold of Fort Fisher that guarded the approach to the important Southern port city 
of Wilmington, North Carolina.  The Union‟s first major attempt to seize the fort began 
the month previous on 23 December 1864, with the deliberate exploding of about 250 
tons of gunpowder aboard an aging warship that had been placed approximately a mile 
off the center of the fort and set afire.  The ship exploded soon afterward, creating a 
powerful, yet disappointingly ineffective shockwave that accomplished little except 
confirm to the defenders that the long-anticipated Union attack had commenced.  Any 
remaining doubts were soon dispelled by the loosing of a non-stop barrage by Union 
vessels that lasted from dawn on the 24th until about 5:30 P.M. that afternoon, during 
which time the Federal warships fired almost 10,000 shells against the gun 
emplacements of Fort Fisher.29   
The first attack failed largely as a result of a lack of cooperation between the two 
Union commanders, Admiral Porter and Major General Benjamin Butler.  The plans 
called for Butler‟s Army troops to land under cover of the Navy‟s massive barrage and, 
when the fires were lifted, begin their assault.  Initially, things seemed to developing 
well for the Federal forces.  During that first day of bombardment, one of the most 
intensive of the war to that point, most defenders did little except hunker down in bomb-
proofs to avoid the effects of the fires, leading Union observers to incorrectly conclude 
that the lack of return fire meant the ships had silenced most of the Confederate guns.  
Accordingly, early on 25 December the Federals began the long process of landing their 
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assault troops, covering their movements with a second barrage from the warships.  That 
afternoon, Butler‟s Federal soldiers massed for a concerted attack on the fort.  To stop 
them before they could form, the Confederate commander, Colonel William Lamb, 
ordered a company of Confederate Marines to help reinforce his defense at the 
threatened point.  The Southern Marines quickly double-timed almost a mile from their 
positions and arrived just in time to meet the attackers, repelling them from the ramparts 
with a ferocity that forced the Union soldiers to withdraw.  Meanwhile, Lamb‟s cannon 
began firing into Butler‟s massed forces.  In the face of this unexpectedly stiffened 
defense, the Federals fell back, leaving their dead and wounded on the field.  Butler‟s 
men withdrew to their ships and retreated to the catcalls of the defenders.30   
In the wake of the failed Union attack, Major General Alfred H. Terry, USV, 
replaced Butler as the Army commander, and his force was expanded to about 9,000 
men.  Terry and Porter planned a second attack, but this time Porter wanted to make sure 
that the Navy did not absorb any blame in case the second assault failed.  Together they 
made preparations for what became the largest amphibious assault in history, a massive 
undertaking that would not be surpassed until the assault on Gallipoli, Turkey, during 
World War I.  All told, two separate landing forces of about 11,000 soldiers, sailors and 
Marines were supported by about sixty warships, a considerable concentration of combat 
power.  In addition to making greater provision for supporting the landing of Terry‟s 
forces on the landward side of the fort with the fires of his ships, Porter ordered the 
formation of a Naval Brigade composed of about 2,000 sailors and Marines (see Figure 
7-2).31   
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Figure 7-2.  Sketch of the Plan for the Second Attack on Fort Fisher.32 
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Porter‟s plan for the Naval Brigade was dangerously simplistic:   
     That we may have a share in the assault when it takes place, the boats will be 
kept ready, lowered near the water on the side of the vessels.  The sailors will be 
armed with cutlasses, well sharpened, and with revolvers.  When the signal is 
made to land the boats, the men will get in, but not show themselves.  When a 
signal is made to assault, the boats will pull around the stern of the monitors and 
land right abreast of them, and board the fort in a seaman-like way. 
     The Marines will form in the rear and cover the sailors.  While the soldiers are 
going over the parapets in the front, the sailors will take the sea face of Fort Fisher. 
     We can land 2,000 men from the fleet and not feel it.  Two thousand active men 
from the fleet will carry the day.33 
 
At about 6:40 A.M. on 13 January 1865, Porter‟s warships began bombarding 
Confederate gun positions in the fort as General Terry‟s men began landing.  By early 
that afternoon, most were ashore about four miles to the north of the fort.  The next day, 
Terry‟s men moved into attack positions and the two overall commanders set the time 
for the assault at 3:00 P.M. on 15 January.  On the morning of the 15th, Porter‟s landing 
party of 1,600 sailors and 400 Marines under the command of Lieutenant Commander 
Kidder R. Breese, USN, began landing by small boats about two miles to the north and 
east of Fort Fisher.  The first division of sailors, armed predominantly with shovels, 
moved to about 600 yards from the fort‟s ramparts and began digging furiously, 
preparing shallow trenches for the Marines to occupy.  Breese then ordered some 
Marines forward into the shallow trenches and began making them deeper with hands 
and bayonets.  The Marines then advanced to within 200 yards of the fort, seeking 
occasional cover from the Confederate grapeshot and canister.  Yet once in position, 
Breese deviated from Porter‟s plan and ordered the force to move left towards the beach, 
believing that location offered better cover.  The whole column then moved toward the 
beach, becoming even more congested into a very narrow front.  The Naval Brigade 
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started drawing a preponderance of the defenders‟ attention and fire, since its massed 
and exposed forces presented the Confederates with an abundance of lucrative targets.  
The landing force suffered increasing numbers of casualties as the Marines and sailors 
slowly crawled forward through flying grape, ball and canister.34   
With seemingly infinite slowness to the exposed Marines and sailors before Fort 
Fisher, the clock approached the time for Terry‟s attack, 3:00 P.M., and passed it.  At 
about 3:25, the signal Breese and his men awaited finally appeared.  Breese commanded 
“Charge!” and the sailors sprang up and began moving toward the fort as the Federal 
Navy ceased its bombardment.  But incredibly, there was no movement visible from 
Terry‟s side of the lines.  The Naval Brigade, already dangerously exposed, appeared to 
be moving onto the fort by itself, rather than as part of a coordinated Army-Navy attack.  
With no suppressive fires to keep them under cover, the Confederates lost no time taking 
advantage of the opportunity and redoubled their fire into the sailors and Marines.  The 
Marines, led by Captain Lucien L. Dawson, practically double-timed under fire to try 
and reach the ramparts before the sailors to provide them with covering fire (see Figure 
7-3).  Meanwhile, the first division of sailors moved over the wall only to be repulsed by 
Confederate sharpshooters.  Now in a frenzy, the survivors and succeeding waves of 
sailors and Marines began piling up behind the dubious shelter of a wooden palisade that 
soon became dangerously crowded.  Before long, several men broke and ran, and when 
some shouted out “Retreat!” others picked up that cry and headed to the rear of the 
column.  With most of the Naval Brigade's officers by then located up front by the fort, 
there were few leaders in the rear to maintain order or keep the men from falling back.  
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Nonetheless, Dawson managed to keep some of his Marines in place and for about two 
hours they delivered rifle fire against the Confederates.35   
 
 
Figure 7-3.  Contemporary Drawing of Marines Moving on Fort Fisher, 1865.36 
 
 
The Confederate defenders believed they had won a second time, but their hopes 
were soon dashed when Terry‟s men launched their assault and gained the wall.  With 
most of the Confederate attention focused on fighting the Naval Brigade, Terry‟s men 
had an easier time and they began to pour into the fort in large numbers.  Slowly, but 
deliberately, Terry‟s men forced the Confederates from each succeeding position, until 
the defenders were forced to withdraw to Battery Buchanan to the south of the fort 
proper.  Darkness aided the Confederates and slowed the Federal advance, but did not 
halt it.  Hoping to free up one of his regiments, Terry requested that Breese provide him 
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with the “Marines and sailors who had muskets to occupy the right of his lines.”  In 
response, Captain Dawson and two of his shattered companies, along with a few sailors, 
moved into the designated position.  By dawn the Federals were in control of the fort.37 
For the U.S. Marine Corps in particular, the Second Battle of Fort Fisher proved 
bittersweet.  Many individual Marines garnered considerable praise for their 
performance during the fight, but the Marine Corps as an institution found itself under 
attack from an unexpected source:  Admiral Porter himself.  Porter‟s naval landing party 
suffered fearful casualties in the attack; of the approximately 2000 sailors and Marines 
who participated in the assault, 393 were killed, wounded or missing, fully 20 percent of 
the force.  And although the Marines represented only 20 percent of the brigade‟s men, 
the after-action reports from the Navy officers who participated in the assault 
commended far more Marines than sailors, a further testament to their courage and 
tenacity in the fight.38   
But the large number of casualties and questionable gains of the naval attack on 
the whole demanded that someone be held accountable for the loss.  Never one to suffer 
criticism easily, Porter placed the blame directly on the Marines.  In his official reports 
on the battle, Porter faulted the Marines for not clearing the rebel breastworks of enemy 
infantry for his boarders.  He argued that “the marines could have cleared the parapets 
[of enemy] by keeping up a steady fire, but they failed to do so and the sailors were 
repulsed.”39  In his judgment, “the marines could have made the assault successful,” but 
did not, and therefore the brigade “lost about 200 in killed and wounded.”40  His detailed 
report made a more direct indictment:  “All the arrangements on the part of the sailors 
271 
 
had been well carried out; they had succeeded in getting up to within a short distance of 
the fort and laid securely in their ditches.  We had but very few killed and wounded up to 
this point.  The marines were to have held the rifle pits and cover the boarding party, 
which they failed to do.”  His analysis was that, “Had the marines performed their duty, 
every one of the rebels on the parapets would have been killed.”  Porter vehemently 
insisted that his plan was sound, but that the Marines failed to carry it out as specified.  
Simply put, the attack “would have succeeded without severe loss had the marines 
performed their duty.”41   
The Marine Corps was a conveniently vulnerable scapegoat.  For years 
afterward, the Corps protested and refuted Porter‟s charges, but critics of the Marines 
found them easy to believe regardless of the evidence presented.  The allegations, 
coming near the end of the war as they did, shadowed the Corps for decades afterward.  
Unfortunately for the Marines, Porter‟s claims echoed loudest within the highest levels 
of the Navy Department and within the Naval Affairs committee, where Porter‟s access 
and influence held special sway.  To his close friend Gustavus Vasa Fox, the quite 
capable and influential Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Porter slyly confided of the 
affair that “I expect you were disappointed at our sailors not carrying the works, they 
ought to have done it, and would but for the infernal marines who were running away 
when the sailors were mounting the parapets, and every man fighting like a lion poor 
fellows . . ..”   In Porter‟s eyes the Marines were not only incompetent, but also 
cowardly!42   
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The damage done by such allegations from a high-placed officer is difficult to 
measure, but soon afterward when Fox provided a list of eight things he wanted to 
accomplish after the war if he did not retire, number four on the list was:  “Marines go to 
the Army where they belong.”  Welles may have begun to harbor similar thoughts, 
perhaps assisted by his rocky relations with the Corps‟ senior leaders throughout his 
tenure.  For example, evidence suggests that after the war, Welles arbitrarily removed 
the names of Marine officers from a combined list of Navy and Marine officers to be 
recommended for accelerated promotion for combat bravery, leaving the Navy portion 
intact.  Worse still, Welles did not inform anyone he removed the names, and the 
incident was not uncovered for many years afterward.43    
As to Porter‟s charges that the Marines were responsible for the failure of his 
planned assault, the consensus of historical opinion is that Porter made the accusations to 
avoid his own personal culpability in the events that led up to the debacle.  Porter should 
rightfully absorb responsibility for failing to clearly articulate and coordinate his plan, 
and for not effectively supervising and directing his men.  As their overall commander, 
Porter was directly responsible for all that his men did, or failed to do.  For their part, 
submerged two layers below Porter in the chain of command, the Marine commanders 
were simply trying to do the best they could with a poor plan, a bad situation, and 
conflicting orders.  In the end, the shortcomings of the Naval Brigade certainly 
illustrated the need for better planning, preparing and executing operations as complex 
as that simplistically described by Porter in his brief order.44   
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For their part, the Marine leaders of the bungled attempt to assault the fort‟s sea 
wall should share blame for one aspect of the operation.  The officers of the Naval 
Brigade, both Navy and Marine, had a clear responsibility to air concerns over the plan 
early on and to make sufficient preparations to ensure that their men could properly 
carry it out.  By not raising questions regarding the practicality of the plan early in the 
planning cycle and not conducting the training and rehearsals needed to execute it, the 
officers, Navy and Marine, abrogated their command responsibilities and sent their men 
into battle unprepared.  As a result, “individual gallantry and collective ardor could not 
overcome inept tactical leadership and romantic planning.”  And to add further insult to 
injury, in this one major instance where sizeable elements of the two Marine Corps 
clashed in combat, the Confederate Marines gained accolades for their performance 
under horrific circumstances, and the Federal Marines drew condemnation.45 
One final effect of the Naval Brigade‟s assault on Fort Fisher is that it tamped 
down any discussion of further experimentation with the concept of amphibious assault 
for many years.  It would be over half a decade before a successful large-scale landing 
party operation would begin to reopen discussions of the tactic.  In 1871, a Marine 
“battalion” led by Captain McLane Tilton, composed of two fifty-man companies and 
attached to a naval battalion conducted a punitive landing that destroyed several fortified 
positions near the mouth of the Han River in western Korea.  Although American naval 
commanders considered the mission a success, in reality it set U.S.-Korean diplomatic 
relations back somewhat since the expedition departed Korean soil immediately after the 
attack, allowing the Koreans to believe that they had therefore won by successfully 
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forcing the foreign invaders out of their land.  Nonetheless, from an operational 
standpoint, it reconfirmed the utility of having Marines as part of a landing force.46  
These impromptu units filled a valid combat requirement for naval commanders.  
The ad hoc battalions gave them a vital land combat capability that was responsive to 
their operational needs that could help them extend combat power ashore.  It is notable 
that every squadron commander formed these units at one time or another to influence 
land actions.  Their employment in every theater of the war led logically to the next 
method of employing Marines.   
 
Deliberately Formed Battalions 
The fourth method of employing Marines consisted of creating semi-permanent 
battalions purposely organized, trained, and equipped to operate somewhat 
independently for extended periods of time.  These units were usually formed with some 
overall specific mission in mind.  In addition, they were created from Marine Corps 
assets as a whole, rather than hastily organized from a particular squadron commander‟s 
Marines as a result of pooling the men of his various ships‟ detachments.   
The first example of such a unit was the Marine battalion created in July 1861 
that served with the Army at the First Battle of Bull Run.  That unit was organized into 
four companies of about eighty men each, and included a small headquarters element.  
Soon after forming, the battalion marched off to combat and humiliatingly retreated with 
the rest of the Union Army.47   
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Commandant Harris apparently did not anticipate or believe in the utility of those 
types of units.  When directed to produce the battalion, he hastily filled it with brand 
new recruits, many of whom had never carried a weapon until mere days before 
marching off to battle.  His method of filling the unit proved to be a recipe for disaster, 
as similarly handicapped U.S. Army battalions also found out.  Finally, almost before the 
dust on the battlefield had even settled, the battalion was dissolved and the Marines 
quickly dispersed to what Harris thought were “their more legitimate duties in the 
Corps,” as parts of various ships‟ detachments and garrisons at shore stations.48    
But the requirement for specially formed Marine battalions did not go away.  
Instead, it took a new direction in the hands of the Navy.  On 5 August 1861, Admiral 
DuPont, finding he would be spearheading a naval effort to expand control ashore along 
the South Atlantic coastline, requested as a condition of his assignment that Secretary 
Welles provide him with a Marine battalion for amphibious operations.  DuPont had 
earlier conducted some research on the several amphibious landings of the Mexican War 
that convinced him of the value of that capability.  In fact, he had long been a proponent 
of Marines on landing parties, even writing in 1847 that Marine detachments should be 
doubled as a way to free sailors of that responsibility.  Now he wished to put that belief 
to the test by having his own unit to perform as a large landing party.  Welles agreed, 
and directed Harris to create another battalion for DuPont‟s use.  That second Marine 
battalion, also placed under the command of Major Reynolds, benefited from some of 
the mistakes of the first.  Instead of raw recruits, Harris assured the secretary that “the 
officers and men selected for this important service have been thoroughly instructed in 
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all the duties of the soldier, are armed and equipped in the most efficient manner, and are 
as fine a body of men as can be found in the service.”  The nineteen officers and 330 
Marines were organized into three 100-man companies and a headquarters element with 
sufficient staff officers, even including a battalion surgeon (a first for such a unit).  
Reading Harris‟ report, one gets the impression that he is assuring Welles that if this 
battalion fails, it will not be due to any failure of Harris in not providing the unit what it 
needed to succeed.49  Further details regarding the employing of DuPont‟s battalion can 
be found in Chapter VI. 
For a number of reasons, including rough weather, lack of enemy resistance, and 
poor operational planning by DuPont, Reynolds‟ battalion did not get the opportunity to 
provide the decisive result that DuPont hoped for.  Nonetheless, when DuPont, frustrated 
by his inability to get the Marine battalion into action, decided to send the Marines back 
to Washington, D.C., both he and Reynolds assumed that the unit would remain intact 
for the next commander in need of their capabilities.  However, like the Bull Run 
battalion before it, this unit also was quickly dismantled and its men sent out to a wide 
variety of assignments before having the opportunity to prove what it could do. 
On 6 July 1863, almost two years after DuPont assumed command of the South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron, President Lincoln replaced him with Admiral John A. 
Dahlgren.  Lincoln and Welles had become disappointed at DuPont‟s inability to gain 
control of Charleston, South Carolina.  Nevertheless, Dahlgren, one of the most 
innovative of the Navy‟s officers, entertained some of the same ideas as DuPont on how 
to close Charleston to the Confederates.  One of those schemes required employing a 
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Marine battalion that would be responsive to his combat requirements.  To gain such a 
unit, Dahlgren first resorted to the time-tested means of creating one out of the Marine 
detachments organic to the ships of his squadron.  Beginning on 12 July 1863, Dahlgren 
ordered all of the Marines from the various ships to land on Morris Island to reinforce 
the Army troops of Brigadier General Quincy Gillmore.  Gillmore‟s men had previously 
been unsuccessful in several attempts to seize Fort Wagner, a large earthen position that 
extended across the island.50 
The makeshift battalion, comprised of 280 Marines with only three lieutenants to 
lead them, spent the 16th and 17th of July practicing battalion drill.  Although a small 
force, Gillmore made plans to employ the Marines in front of his right flank, a position 
that would have guaranteed them a great share of the fight.  However, Dahlgren 
reconsidered committing them in light of the small number of officers in the unit, and 
after deliberating the issue recalled the battalion back to their ships.  He also requested 
that Secretary Welles provide him with “about 500 Marines under a good officer,” 
stating that “there will be occasion for them” in his plans.   Meanwhile, on the morning 
of 18 July, Gillmore‟s attack began without the Marines.  Like the previous attempts, 
this one also failed, producing more than 1500 Union casualties in the process.  Both 
Gillmore and Dahlgren believed that the arrival of a Marine unit might be enough to tip 
the balance of power in the Union‟s favor.51 
Back in Washington, Welles worked diligently to provide Dahlgren with his 
requested Marine unit.  After corresponding with Harris, Welles decided that a battalion 
comprised of four, one-hundred man companies could be formed and dispatched to 
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Dahlgren.  Harris proposed Major Jacob Zeilin, one of his most experienced senior 
officers, to lead the battalion and Welles concurred.  Orders were soon issued directing 
Marines to report to the battalion for duty.  However, when several Navy commanders 
protested the loss of their Marines to fill the battalion, the unit began shrinking in size 
until it soon consisted of only three eighty-man companies.  Nonetheless, the unit 
contained enough officers to fill the billets of adjutant and quartermaster, and each 
company was led by a captain assisted by two lieutenants, four sergeants, and four 
corporals.52   
The news of the arrival of the Marine battalion at Port Royal, South Carolina, on 
5 August 1863 excited Dahlgren, and he made plans with his Army counterpart to 
incorporate the new battalion into the overall scheme of maneuver, even directing that 
his organic Marines be added to the unit, creating a 540-man Marine battalion.  He 
issued orders for Zeilin‟s Marines to set up camp on the south portion of Morris Island, 
asking that the unit “be prepared to move on instant notice.”  He also directed that the 
Marines become “accustomed” or trained “to use charges of buckshot when close action 
is expected, particularly in an assault.”  Dahlgren also recommended dying the Marines 
distinctive white belts so they would better blend into the background, and he provided 
“contrabands” to free the Marines of camp duties so as to “leave them free for marching, 
fighting, etc.”  He also arranged for boats for the unit, and provided additional craft 
equipped with boat-howitzers to cover their landing.  The plan, as relayed by one 
lieutenant, was for the Marines to assault Fort Wagner at night from the rear while 
Gillmore‟s soldiers attacked it from the front, each element supported by fires from 
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Dahlgren‟s ironclads.  Both Dahlgren and General Gillmore looked forward to the next 
attempt to seize Fort Wagner, each confidently believing that if they could have earlier 
committed a regiment of Marines “to push ashore in the rear of Wagner, as I wished, we 
would have taken it.”53  
However, Dahlgren soon faced strong resistance to his plan that came from an 
unexpected source – the Marine battalion commander, Major Zeilin.  On 13 August, 
Zeilin reported to Dahlgren that his force was “incompetent to the duty assigned it.”  
Believing that “Sufficient sacrifice of life has already been made during this war, in 
unsuccessful storming parties,” Zeilin felt compelled to inform the admiral that “it is 
absolutely necessary that they should have time to become organized and drilled as a 
battalion and to know their officers and their duties on a larger scale.”  Driving home the 
main weakness of the Corps, Zeilin pointed out that “The Marine Corps is accustomed to 
act in small detachments on board of ship and ashore, and opportunities rarely offer to 
have more than one company together.”  In this he was absolutely correct, and yet he 
ignored the fact that his unit was created specifically to help break that pattern of 
employment.  He had been given the opportunity to move beyond employment by small 
detachments, much as the U.S. Army had learned to do since the war began, but Zeilin 
proved reluctant to do so.  Furthermore, Zeilin confirmed that these weaknesses were 
“well-known to the Commandant of the Marine Corps when he was called upon to 
furnish, as he was, in the most sudden manner, and his opinion was decidedly averse to 
risking so much with such material.”54  Zeilin thus confirmed, albeit indirectly, 
something that naval leaders must have been suspecting for some time:  that Harris was 
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not supportive of these attempts to move the Marine Corps beyond detachment-sized 
operations.  And importantly, Zeilin seemed to be of a like mind. 
In making his case for his unit‟s unpreparedness for battle, Zeilin argued that his 
men were too raw; “men were detailed for this battalion that had not been drilled for one 
week.”  He also asserted that “few opportunities occur here for drill,” a situation that 
doubtless applied equally well to the soldiers of Gillmore‟s command.  Reaching further, 
Zeilin declared that his Marines were “Unaccustomed to living ashore,” and that “the 
various collateral duties of soldiering” made them “out of sorts, sick, and intractable.”  
Yet he appears to have exaggerated his claims to make the point that the unit was 
unprepared.  Historian David Sullivan‟s close examination of the unit‟s muster rolls 
confirm that only ten of Zeilin‟s Marines had been in the Corps for less than a month 
(only 2 percent of the total).  And if one year‟s service can be used as the benchmark for 
describing an “experienced Marine,” fully 60 percent of his unit met that definition.  
Therefore, the facts do not match up with Zeilin‟s assessment.  As to how much time is 
needed to create a cohesive unit, more time is certainly preferred, but the Marines (and 
the U.S. Army) had successfully employed battalions in the past with similar makeup.  
Zeilin‟s unit was certainly more cohesive, experienced, and had a much larger number of 
seasoned leaders than the hastily-formed unit that Major John Reynolds led into combat 
at the first Battle of Bull Run in 1861.55      
Zeilin‟s report came as a disappointing surprise to Dahlgren and forced him to 
alter his plans.  The admiral remarked that “The Commander of Marines reports against 
risking his men in attacking works.”  He added, “Two of his officers had done the same 
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in conversation before,” and he exasperatedly exclaimed:  “Rather hurtful.  What are 
Marines for?”56  It was a pointed and valid question.  Dahlgren, like DuPont and Porter, 
had looked to the Marine Corps‟ experiences in past wars and conflicts as the model for 
how they believed similar units could be utilized in the Civil War.  But unlike past wars, 
the major resistance to their initiatives came from the senior Marines themselves.  
Dahlgren‟s frustration shone through in his recording of the event.   
Furthermore, Zeilin seemed not to be fully committed to the idea of employing 
Marines in battalions from the very beginning.  As early as 4 August, one of his 
lieutenants intimated in a letter that “Old Zeilen [sic]. . . is going to try hard, he says, to 
go back to New York.”  In a vote of no confidence, he added, “I wish he would, and they 
would send [Lieutenant Colonel John] Reynolds down here.”57  That statement may have 
been an isolated opinion, but in conjunction with Zeilin‟s correspondence to Dahlgren 
less than ten days later it casts a new light on Zeilin‟s resistance to serving in a new role 
with the battalion and the Army in South Carolina.   
Part of the battalion‟s readiness problems might be attributed to the continuing 
medical problems suffered by the fifty-seven year old Zeilin.  Wounded at Bull Run and 
convalescing at various shore installations for the intervening two years, Zeilin 
continued to be frequently absent from his duties with the battalion and his condition 
soon worsened as a result of some disease contracted after or following his arrival at 
Morris Island.  The debilitating sickness soon landed him in a sick bed on the USS 
Wabash.  His extended absence from the battalion no doubt negatively affected the 
major‟s attitudes and his unit‟s preparations for combat.  Finally, when Harris heard 
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about Zeilin‟s infirmity from third parties, the Commandant ordered Lt. Col. John G. 
Reynolds to South Carolina to replace Zeilin, who immediately returned to New York to 
take over as commander of the Marine Barracks, Brooklyn.  But Lt. Col. Reynolds 
would arrive too late for the battalion‟s next action.58    
In the interim between Zeilin‟s departure and John Reynolds‟ arrival, Captain 
Edward McD. Reynolds assumed command of the unit and aggressively prepared it for a 
joint assault on Fort Wagner.  At about 4:00 A.M. on 7 September, the battalion formed 
at the front of a long column of Army troops and led the way into Fort Wagner, finding 
that the Confederates had withdrawn from the position earlier that night.  The Marines 
were presented with a good view of the position‟s defensive works and the damage that 
their own heavy guns had inflicted on the garrison.  The Rebels left behind stacks of 
bodies and a crude attempt at a booby trap that was intended to ignite the powder 
magazine.  Fortunately for the Marines, the device was discovered and defused before it 
could be activated.  Fort Wagner was in Union hands at last.59 
Dahlgren immediately turned his attention to Fort Sumter, and began planning 
for an amphibious operation to seize that position from the Confederates.  The Marine 
battalion figured centrally in his plans.  Dahlgren proposed landing a party of sailors and 
Marines by small boats on Fort Sumter at night, believing that the element of surprise 
would work to the attacker‟s advantage.  Unfortunately for the Marines, Dahlgren 
wholly underestimated the size of the enemy forces on Fort Sumter, stating that “there is 
nothing but a corporal‟s guard at the fort,” and that “all we have to do is to go and take 
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possession of it.”  In reality, the Confederates had been intercepting Union signals and 
had accordingly reinforced and alerted the garrison at the fort.60   
On 8 September 1863, Dahlgren requested that the Marine battalion provide 100 
“volunteers” to join with 300 sailors formed into four “divisions” to seize Fort Sumter.  
Accordingly, Captain Charles G. McCawley and approximately 130 Marines grabbed 
their weapons and boarded a tug that took them alongside Dahlgren‟s flagship.  There, 
McCawley was briefed that he and his men would take part in an amphibious attack on 
Fort Sumter that very night.  The plan seemed simple:  the Marines would embark in 
small boats that would be towed in column and then “lay off the Fort, and protect the 
landing of the Divisions ahead by our fire, when we were to land ourselves and assist in 
the assault.”  With little opportunity to rehearse, the Marines boarded small boats with 
the rest of landing force at about 10:00 P.M., and from that point on everything that 
could go wrong did go wrong, with disastrous results.61 
According to veterans‟ accounts, the movement to the objective area quickly 
became disorganized and confused.  Once near the fort, the order came to cast off the 
boats from the tug, but strong tides scattered the force over a wide area, making it 
impossible for the officers to maintain control of their men.  In addition, some boats 
snagged on buoys arrayed around the fort, further splitting the group and adding to the 
confusion.  Some boats with sailors rowed to the fort, and when they were fired on by 
Confederate defenders, the Marines provided covering fires as per the plan.  However, 
when the firing from the fort grew in intensity, the lead boats began to withdraw under 
orders of Commander Thomas H. Stevens, USN, the overall mission commander.  In the 
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confusion, not all of the boats near the fort received the word to withdraw, particularly 
the Marines who had instead been instructed to press on with the attack.  And of the few 
boats that did land, grenades and powder kegs thrown by the defenders quickly wrecked 
the craft and stranded the attackers on the thin stretch of rocky shore between the harbor 
and the ramparts.  With no boats and no place to escape the increasing enemy fire, most 
of the unfortunate individuals ashore were soon forced to surrender.  The attack was a 
total failure.62 
From the Union perspective, the badly planned and poorly executed night 
amphibious attack proved costly.  Among the 400 participants, four were killed in 
action, twenty wounded, and one hundred-six officers and men were captured.  Many of 
the men captured were subsequently imprisoned in the South‟s infamous Andersonville, 
Georgia, prison camp, where some died as a result of the harsh conditions and high rate 
of disease.  The Marine contingent suffered most of all, with forty-four of the one 
hundred twenty-six participants becoming casualties, or about 35 percent of the total 
involved.63  
Ten days after the Fort Sumter fiasco, Lt. Col. Reynolds arrived to assume 
command of the rest of the battalion.  The unit moved from Morris Island to Folly Island 
soon after, but the fighting for Charleston had quieted down considerably and there was 
little for the Marines to do except provide some men as a mobile reaction force on the 
USS Pawnee.  In the meantime, a tug-of-war began for the Marine battalion, or rather 
the men of that unit, once Harris convinced Welles that they might be best employed 
elsewhere.  On 7 October, Welles asked that Dahlgren return the Marines to 
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Washington, unless their “services . . . are absolutely necessary.”  Perhaps he was also 
trying to goad Dahlgren to further action in Charleston.  Dahlgren replied that he wished 
to keep the battalion as a security force, but Welles was not buying it.  On 9 November 
he ordered Dahlgren to fill up the Marine detachments on his ships with Marines from 
the battalion, and to “direct the return of the remainder” to Philadelphia.  The last 
specially-organized Marine battalion of the Civil War was broken up and its members 
ignominiously used as a source of manpower to fill shortages throughout the Corps.64   
Like the battalion raised for the First Battle of Bull Run and others since, this 
battalion also had failed to meet the expectations of senior naval leaders.  And with its 
dissolution, the Navy Department would not again form another battalion of its type in 
this war.  Indeed, it would not do so again until the Spanish - American War in 1899, 
thirty-six years later.  Until that time, the Marine Corps would have to make do with 
small detachments, and the detachment-centered organizational scheme ensured that the 
Marine Corps‟ contributions to the national military establishment remained small in 
scale.  The organizing of the Marine Corps by detachments thus continued to restrict its 
institutional development for decades. 
The detachment-based structure caused other problems as well.  Such a system 
made it nearly impossible to make any long-range personnel plans or projections, since it 
depended wholly on a tallying of Navy ships requiring detachments.  By basing Marine 
numbers entirely on the transient and changing needs of the Navy at some arbitrary point 
in time, with no provision for any excess, the Marine Corps functioned in a perennial 
state of manpower shortage.  And since the type and number of Navy ships changed 
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constantly, the best the Marine Corps could do was to continue to fill the highest priority 
ships as defined by the Navy Department. 
Therefore, it must be emphasized that the primary impetus for forming larger, 
more capable Marine units during the Civil War came not from the leaders of the Marine 
Corps, but from the commanders of Navy squadrons, with general approval and backing 
by the Secretary of the Navy.  In fact, senior Marine leaders only grudgingly supported 
the creating of Marine battalions, and once formed, requested their return on the basis 
that the men might be best used elsewhere.  Despite several excellent opportunities to 
expand Marine Corps missions and structure early in the war, Harris had to be ordered to 
provide a Marine battalion for service with the Army at the First Battle of Bull Run in 
July 1861.  Even then, the Commandant expended little effort in providing the unit with 
the best, most qualified men he could muster, but instead filled the ranks of the unit with 
the newest recruits.  To Harris, the priority for his Marines still resided in filling ships‟ 
detachments.  Creating the best fighting unit for filling valid naval requirements - - 
major landings ashore and cooperating with the Army - - were distant seconds in 
priorities. 
It is no small wonder that the various squadron commanders looked first to their 
own Marines when considering ways to better employ them in support of their particular 
objectives.  Without exception, every squadron commander formed ad hoc Marine 
battalions at one point or another in the war, and many of these units performed very 
well in the missions assigned them despite being thrown together in a hasty fashion.  
Another advantage for the naval squadron commanders was that by forming their own 
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Marine battalions out of their organic assets, they gained a more capable unit that was 
directly responsible to their own command and prerogatives, a decided benefit for those 
commanders experiencing problems with “cooperating” Army counterparts who 
sometimes focused on different objectives.   
However, these impromptu units possessed several shortcomings as a result of 
generally being thrown together right before an action rather than being deliberately 
organized, trained and equipped for their task.  Furthermore, these ad hoc units were 
temporary ones, existing for only a short period of time before being dissolved and the 
members being sent back to their respective ships.  This situation made it difficult to 
realize valuable lessons learned from their experiences and make institutional changes to 
improve performances in the future. 
Some forward-thinking naval squadron commanders understood the 
disadvantages of creating their own temporary units and instead asked for specially 
formed Marine battalions to augment their forces.  In general, Secretary Welles 
supported their requests, but the units created were not made permanent, in part because 
the Corps‟ leaders failed to propose such a solution and instead insisted on the quick 
return of the units so the manpower might be used for “more legitimate duties.”65  
Particularly in the early stages of the war, such a proposal for a permanent battalion 
might have been favorably entertained, and may also have helped jolt the Marine Corps‟ 
own stuttering recruiting effort.  But evidently senior marine leaders did not consider the 
mission of serving in large formations with the Army or as part of a naval expedition to 
be as important as serving in a ship‟s detachment.  On the road to creating a more 
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flexible and capable organization, the Marine Corps had executed an about face and 
insisted on moving backward along its line of march.     
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE WAR’S END, AND THE PATH AHEAD 
 
Marines fought in one of the last major battles of the Eastern Theater, but they 
were gray-clad Confederate Marines, not U.S. Marines.  On 6 April 1865, a Confederate 
Marine battalion participated in what the contemporary chronicler John Scharf called the 
“last of the great battles of the war” as part of a Naval Brigade that guarded the rear of 
General Robert E. Lee’s retreating Army of Northern Virginia.  For several days after 
abandoning the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, Confederate Marines 
skirmished with General Philip Sheridan’s pursuing Federal cavalry forces that were 
increasing pressure on Lee’s army.  Now, on the morning of the 6th, the Naval Brigade 
occupied hasty defensive positions along the trace of Saylor’s Creek, anchoring the right 
side of the Confederate line.  The Confederate Marines were determined to put up a stiff 
resistance and delay Sheridan’s forces long enough for Lee to pull his army across the 
Appomattox River.  The battle soon developed all along the Confederate lines, and as it 
progressed, Confederate infantry brigades around the naval force ceased firing and fell 
back, yet the Naval Brigade held firm.  Soon after, Sheridan’s men captured Confederate 
General Richard Ewell and his command group and Ewell issued orders to surrender to 
the rest of his corps, including the Naval Brigade and Marines.1   
But the Naval Brigade disregarded Ewell’s command to quit, and instead 
continued to fight the Federal forces to delay their advance on Lee’s army.  The 
Confederate Marines engaged two Union regiments with a savage determination.  
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Recalling the ferocity of the fighting, one Union soldier later stated that the battle was 
“one of the fiercest, most hand-to-hand and literally savage encounters of the war, with 
the remnant’s [sic] of Stile’s battalion and that of the Marines….  They clubbed their 
muskets, fired pistols into each other’s faces, and used the bayonet savagely.”2  Another 
Confederate participant described with pride that “Those Marines fought like tigers and 
against odds of at least ten to one.”3  And as the remaining Confederate Army units 
crumbled and surrendered around them, the remnants of the Naval Brigade continued to 
fight on as an isolated pocket of fierce resistance, eventually consolidating their thin 
lines along some dense woods.  Before long, the survivors of the Naval Brigade 
discovered that they were wholly surrounded by Federal troops.  Only when forced to 
confront the realities of how untenable the position was did the Brigade commander, 
Confederate Navy Flag-Officer John R. Tucker, surrender his force.  Yet even then some 
Marines managed to escape the Union encirclement only to end up surrendering with the 
remnants of Lee’s Army at Appomattox three days later.4   
This chapter examines the U.S. Marine Corps’ actions at the end of the war, and 
whether the lessons emerging from the conflict were applied to improve the structure 
and organization to create a unit better attuned to the requirements of the nation.  In 
addition, the actions of Congress and the Navy Department are further explored, 
particularly where opportunities existed to make the changes that might have resulted in 
a more effective and efficient U.S. Marine Corps.  Comparison is also made with other 
Marine organizations to discern differences and similarities between the roles and 
missions fulfilled by those organizations that might have suggested where changes in the 
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U.S. Marine Corps’ structure and missions might have been made to make it a better fit 
within the military establishment.  Finally, the effect that the war’s experience had on 
the officer corps is scrutinized to see what changes were produced that influenced future 
Marines.  
For the U.S. Marine Corps, its last major action of the war had been at the seizure 
of the Confederacy’s Fort Fisher near Wilmington, North Carolina.  But there would be 
one final experiment with Marine battalions.  In late January 1865, Rear-Admiral John 
A. Dahlgren ordered that the Marines of his squadron’s vessels be consolidated into a 
single battalion unit.  The senior Marine officer, First Lieutenant George G. Stoddard, 
received an appointment as acting lieutenant colonel and commanded the battalion.  His 
next senior officer, First Lieutenant Charles F. Williams, became his executive officer 
with an acting rank of major.  In all, 350 Marines were organized into companies led by 
senior enlisted men.  Many of the Marines had seen recent service with the Marine 
battalion that assaulted the sea face of Fort Fisher.  The battalion conducted intensive 
tactical drills for a couple of weeks until it was landed at Bull’s Bay near Charleston, 
South Carolina, on 16 February 1865.5 
The landing put new pressure on the Confederate forces defending Charleston 
and, in combination with the actions of Major General William T. Sherman’s army 
advancing north from Savannah, Georgia, helped convince the rebels to evacuate the 
city.  The following day, 17 February 1865, the Confederate army pulled out of 
Charleston, and Dahlgren wasted no time in ordering his ships to enter the harbor and 
occupy the city whose capture had long eluded him.  The Marines were then ordered to 
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take Battery White near Georgetown, South Carolina, but that position, too, had already 
been abandoned by the Confederates some days before.  For their role in helping to 
unhinge the Confederate defenders Dahlgren commended Stoddard in his report to the 
Navy Department.  Stoddard “did good service in the field with the Marines of the Fleet 
brigade,” again proving that the Corps’ new generation of leaders was capable of 
handling the challenges of employment as larger formations.  Furthermore, Dahlgren 
remarked that Stoddard “now has command of the largest force of Marines that has been 
collected for some time,” and recommended he be awarded a brevet promotion.  These 
types of actions, thought Dahlgren in answering his question of eighteen months 
previous, are what Marines are really for.6      
For its part, Congress paid very little attention to the Marine Corps during the 
war and when it did, those efforts generally fell into one of two categories.  The first 
involved several initiatives to simply abolish the Corps altogether or to transfer all of its 
personnel and assets to the army.  Presumably the Army would then provide personnel to 
fill the roles of Marines in a more efficient manner.  The second category of 
congressional attention involved routine debate concerning the issue of adding personnel 
to the Marine Corps’ structure to meet the needs of filling the expanding number of 
warships requiring Marine detachments.  To put it bluntly, Congress’s efforts to simply 
add personnel to the Corps did not solve the problems that brought about the occasional 
cries to do away with the service.  Instead, Congress simply treated the symptoms 
without curing the illness.  The real issues were: what should the Marines be doing?  
Were the Marines being employed in the best possible manner to meet fleet 
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requirements?  If not, what structural changes should be made to better help the Corps to 
meet its requirements?  Instead, the debate continued to center on the narrow issue of 
whether the increasingly irrelevant mission of providing separate detachments aboard 
ships could be better handled by Marines, the Army, or in some other fashion.       
For instance, as early as 1862 a movement arose in Congress to abolish the 
Marine Corps altogether and send the men to the Army as some separate regiment that 
would then presumably fill ships’ detachments.  Although that idea had appeared from 
time to time in the past, the initiative had previously been defeated by antebellum 
Commandant Archibald Henderson.  The latest iteration may have arisen as a response 
from some in Congress to a remark that Navy Secretary Gideon Welles had made in his 
1862 annual report.  In it, Welles had written that “There has always been a divided 
opinion among naval officers in regard to maintaining a distinct organization of marines 
for service on ships-of-war, even before the great change which the service has 
undergone by the introduction of steamers.”  Explaining the incongruity of having a 
service dictated partly by army regulations and partly by those of the Navy, he 
recommended that “it would be better were the corps to be permanently attached to 
either the naval or army service.”  Unexplained was the fact that in the Navy’s rapid 
expansion, ships were now going to war without Marines.  Furthermore, many of the 
Navy’s officers had already expressed their opinion that Marines did have a valid 
function on their ships.  Perhaps the secretary was voicing his growing frustration with 
the antics of some of the Corps’ senior leaders:  after all, it had only been a few months 
previous that embarrassing incidents like the Reynolds court-martial prompted Welles to 
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exasperatedly intimate in his diary that “Almost all the [Corps’] elder officers are at 
loggerheads and ought to be retired.”7   
Exactly three weeks after Welles’ report was released, the Senate suddenly 
adopted a resolution directing the Committee on Naval Affairs to “inquire into the 
expediency of abolishing the marine corps as a naval organization, and of attaching it to 
the army as the Twentieth Regiment of Infantry.”  The sponsor of the resolution was 
Senator James W. Grimes of Iowa, a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs and a 
colleague of Welles.  Although the secretary’s diary does not record any specific 
meeting with Grimes on the subject, it is probable that Welles asked Grimes to take 
action on the remarks he made in his report.  In any event, Grimes felt compelled to raise 
the issue on the floor of the Senate and formally recommend that it be investigated.  And 
it is highly unlikely that Grimes would do so without coordinating his proposal with 
other members of the Committee on Naval Affairs  beforehand.8   
The Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Senator John P. Hale of New 
Hampshire, may have had ulterior motives that extended beyond simply investigating 
the best means of organizing and employing Marines.  Hale and Welles had a long 
history of colliding with one another on a wide range of issues related to Navy 
departmental matters.  For his part, Welles believed Hale to be far more interested in 
political gain than in increasing naval efficiencies.  In his diary, Welles confided that 
Hale, despite being a Republican, was consistently “censorious to all [the 
Administration,] but especially to the Navy Department, which, instead of supporting, he 
omits no opportunity to assail and embarrass.”  Welles further characterized his relations 
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with the senator as poor.  “In the entire period of my administration of the Navy 
Department, I have never received aid, encouragement, or assistance of any kind 
whatever from the Chairman of the Naval Committee of the Senate, but constant, 
pointed opposition, embarrassment, and petty annoyance.”  Hale “does nothing to assist 
but much to embarrass and counteract the department.”  Hale may have supported 
Grimes’ action out of the hope that some embarrassment might fall on Welles.  And in 
this matter the Marine Corps appeared caught in the middle of a political struggle 
between some members of Congress and the Navy Department.  Therefore, when the 
news of the strike against the Corps’ institutional existence appeared in the New York 
Times, the service again assumed a defensive posture.9   
Some Marine officers took immediate action to defuse the effort before it could 
build.  Borrowing a tactic successfully used by Archibald Henderson in the past during 
similar congressional attempts to disband the Corps, Major William B. Slack wrote to 
Rear Admiral Dixon Porter to seek his opinion on the matter.  Porter answered quickly, 
despite being in the midst of operations against Fort Hindman, on the Arkansas River.  
He penned Slack a forceful defense of the Marine Corps that saw wide circulation in the 
capital.  Calling any attempt to place the Corps in the Army “a great calamity,” Porter 
declared that “a ship without Marines is no ship of war at all.”  Furthermore, “The past 
efficiency of our Marine Corps fills one of the brightest pages in the history of our 
country.”  To Porter, anyone who thought otherwise on the matter “is demented.”  These 
were strong words of support originating from a man who, at that time was one of 
America’s most famous naval leaders.10 
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Porter’s testimonial seemed to have some effect in dampening the enthusiasm for 
eliminating the Marine Corps.  He argued that Marines filled an integral part in naval 
operations and were valued members on warships.  Slack’s effort seems to have worked 
because shortly after the letter’s circulation the Senate backed away from the initiative.  
On 28 February 1863, the Senate voted unanimously to relieve the Naval Affairs 
Committee of any responsibility for further investigating the expediency of abolishing 
the Corps, seemingly putting the matter to rest.  The Congressional Globe recorded no 
debate on the issue, only that the Senate agreed to Grimes’ request.  The matter was 
dropped for the time being.  The Marines had avoided another political hatchet but 
others were being sharpened.11 
The issue of abolishing the Marine Corps continued to simmer.  In December of 
1863 the idea resurfaced in congressional debates and rumors of another attempt reached 
the ears of Marine officers.  Like the previous year’s effort, part of the impetus for 
debating the future of the Corps may have evolved out of remarks that Secretary Welles 
made in his annual report for 1863.  In it, Welles indicated he was not pleased with the 
Marines’ efforts to field larger combat organizations such as battalions.  The secretary 
observed that “On a few important occasions a battalion has been detailed for army duty; 
but the want of equipment and other causes render their employment in a service to 
which they are not drilled, and to which they do not belong, a question of doubtful 
expediency.”  He concluded again that it might be “better in every respect to attach the 
corps permanently to the navy or army, and make it exclusively subject to the control of 
one or the other branches of the service, instead of occupying an equivocal position as 
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regards both.”  This is an unusual conclusion for him to reach, since as Secretary of the 
Navy he already exercised complete control over the Marine Corps whether it was a 
separate service or not.  The Corps still fell under the Department of the Navy and the 
Reorganization Act of 1834 gave Welles close control over the Corps’ administration 
and activities.  Furthermore, the primary impetus for having Marines serve in larger 
combat formations originated predominantly from his own squadron commanders who 
were seeking to fill a valid operational requirement.  Welles’ remarks may have 
originated out of a frustration generated by the Corps’ sub-par performance as battalions.  
Welles rightfully did not fault the individual Marines, or even the performance of the 
junior officers, who he praised as persons “who would do credit to any service.”  Rather, 
his criticism centered on areas that were the clear responsibilities of the Corps’ senior 
officers.  His comments regarding the reasons for the units’ failing to perform to 
expectations hinted at problems of command, yet in the same report he recommended 
that the Commandant be made a general officer.  In any event, Welles’ curt and often 
conflicting comments may have revived the notion that some reorganization of the 
Marine Corps was in order.12 
In Commandant Harris’ portion of that same report he asked for an increase of 
500 men and permission to offer recruits a bounty of fifty dollars to help the service 
compete with the army’s recruiting tactics.  But Harris did not address Welles’ 
comments regarding a reorganizing of the Corps.  Strangely, Harris admitted that his 
service’s practice of being “broken up into so many small detachments” adversely 
affected its ability “to concentrate even a full company for purposes of military 
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instruction, drill, &c.”  That criticism is unusual because it directly contradicted Harris’ 
long-established priorities and undermined the Commandant’s own concept for 
employing Marines.  On one hand he blamed the poor performances of the battalions on 
the fact that his men were not regularly assigned to such units and could therefore spend 
little time training in larger formations.  But on the other hand, Harris failed to mention 
that he was the principle advocate for employing his men in such a manner.  Harris also 
neglected to offer any recommendations to resolve the problem, such as forming a 
permanent battalion.13    
Despite ignoring Welles’ criticisms in his own annual report, Harris nonetheless 
took positive action on the side to forestall any new congressional attempt to abolish or 
reorganize the USMC.  “Hearing that the effort was to be repeated,” Commandant Harris 
personally penned a series of letters to leading Navy officers.  Using much the same 
verbiage as that successfully employed by Commandant Henderson thirty years before, 
Harris solicited their opinions “as to the necessity for and efficiency of marines on shore 
and afloat, in connection with the Navy.”  He also asked if Marines had “not been 
generally effective wherever employed”; were “a necessary part of the crew of a vessel 
of war”; and also whether “an increase of numbers” was warranted by “the exigencies of 
the service.”  Not surprisingly, Harris received at least forty-nine favorable responses 
from notable officers ranging from Rear Admirals David Farragut, Samuel F. DuPont, 
and David Porter, to Lieutenant Commander William Jeffers and Lieutenant Winfield 
Scott Schley.  But Harris took it one step further by publishing the responses for 
distribution to a wider audience “who may feel an interest in the matter.”  In January 
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1864 he provided copies of the book to Welles and other leaders, hoping to sway them 
through the collective words of the Navy’s own officers.14  The testimonials proved 
successful and Congress did not bring up the issue again during the war.  
For Harris, it was his last significant accomplishment in office.  On 12 May 
1864, John Harris died, and his passing rated only a single short sentence from the New 
York Times sandwiched amid more newsworthy capital stories:  “Col. John Harris, 
commanding the Marine Corps, died here yesterday.”  With Lieutenant General Ulysses 
S. Grant’s Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House just ending and 
Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s army beginning its drive south into 
Georgia, there were too many significant military developments taking place to dwell on 
Harris’ death.15 
  Undoubtedly Welles felt much the same way, particularly since he was then in 
the middle of his own crisis over an expensive and flawed light-draft monitor program.  
Yet Harris’ death also provided the secretary with the opportunity to fix the Corps’ 
leadership problems.  Accordingly, he invested a little time deliberating on just what 
course of action to take while he continued to personally handle the day-to-day decision 
making for the USMC in the same manner he had done since early 1861.16   
The traditional approach of simply advancing the next senior officer to 
Commandant did not appeal to him, and in his estimation no candidate leaped to the 
forefront.  Indeed, as Welles remarked in his diary, Harris’ “death gives embarrassment 
as to a successor.”  The problem was that by this time Welles had lost confidence in the 
capabilities of most senior Marines.  The next ranking officer, Colonel William Dulany, 
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was sixty-four years old and had a well-deserved reputation for being stubborn and 
irascible.  Dulany was also at that time facing charges of misbehavior at his current post 
as commanding officer of the Marine Barracks at the Norfolk Navy Yard.  Still, Dulany 
boldly forwarded Welles a letter reminding the secretary of his seniority and inquiring 
when he might assume the commandancy, a missive that Welles pointedly ignored.  
Next in seniority to Dulany came Lieutenant Colonel Ward Marston, a petulant, vain, 
and argumentative man, who had been previously relieved by Harris of his command of 
the barracks in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for incompetence.  Attempts by Harris to 
retire Marston had been forestalled by a vigorous letter writing campaign that Marston 
orchestrated to convince anyone he could reach that he was the victim of 
misunderstandings and malice.17 
Looking deeper into the ranks, Lieutenant Colonel John Reynolds had 
operationally proven himself as the commander of several of the short-lived battalions, 
but his recent highly-publicized court-martial and running feud with other officers 
provided ample enough reason to exclude him from the office.  Reynolds proved to be a 
polarizing force in the Corps.  Next in line was Major Jacob Zeilin, another officer with 
recent tactical command experience, but who had also been reassigned on at least four 
occasions in the past decade due to periodic bouts of illness and complications from 
wounds he had received in the First Battle of Bull Run.  Major Addison Garland was 
next senior after Zeilin, but that officer had a somewhat checkered history between his 
surrender of the Marines aboard the Ariel and having developed a contentious 
relationship with the commandant of the navy yard at Mare Island, California.  The two 
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remaining field grade officers, Majors Isaac Doughty and William Shuttleworth, were 
competent officers, but had done little during the war to set themselves apart as leaders 
or to stand out in any way.  The options were not appealing. 
Of those choices, Zeilin had the best political connections of the bunch through 
his ties to several prominent Pennsylvanians.  In the end, and considering that Welles 
was already looking ahead to Lincoln’s reelection bid, politics may have provided the 
tipping point in deciding who would become the next Commandant.  Faced with so 
many meager alternatives, Zeilin’s selection at least offered the possibility of gaining 
political favor at a time that the administration needed it.  Also a factor was deciding 
what to do with the more senior officers, since they might prove a hindrance to any more 
junior officer selected for the commandancy.  In the end, Welles “Concluded to retire the 
marine officers who are past the legal age, and to bring in Zeilin as commandant.”  Still, 
he lacked confidence in that decision, woefully confiding in his diary that “There seems 
no alternative.”  For a full month after Harris’ death, Welles mulled over the situation 
before notifying Zeilin.  The following day he informed Dulany, Marston, Reynolds, and 
Doughty that “The president has been pleased to direct that your name be entered on the 
Retired List of Officers of the Marine Corps.”18   
Since assuming his office, Welles had not hesitated to retire officers who he 
believed were past their prime or could no longer competently perform their duties.  
Right after assuming his post as secretary, Welles summarily dismissed naval officers 
who exhibited any inclination to sympathize with the South.  In 1862, frustrated by a 
lack of progress in the Mississippi Squadron and concerned about the health of the unit’s 
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commander, Welles replaced Admiral Andrew H. Foote with Charles H. Davis.  He then 
just as quickly relieved the latter, replacing him with David Dixon Porter.  Similarly, he 
relieved Samuel DuPont, Silas H. Stringham, William Mervine, William W. McKean, 
and others from prominent posts for lack of progress against the enemy or for failing to 
exploit naval successes to advantage.  Welles sought and received permission to institute 
a Naval Retiring Board to screen out officers who had “become incapable of performing 
the duties of their office.”  At the same time, Welles often resorted to reaching down and 
promoting officers to higher positions that would have been unheard of before the war.19   
But strangely, Welles unfortunately did not take the same approach with regards 
to the Marine Corps’ officers.  When he did pass over some of the Corps’ most senior 
officers to promote Zeilin one could argue that he did not dig deep enough since Zeilin 
simply reflected the same unimaginative ideas that Harris had fostered.  As historian 
David Sullivan bluntly describes him, Zeilin “had both feet firmly planted in the status 
quo; his vision of the future of the Corps obstructed by the same fog that plagued his 
predecessor.”  This is an accurate picture, as Welles must also have known, yet he 
selected Zeilin nonetheless.  Had Welles acted earlier, and with more decisive officer 
cuts as he did with the Navy, the Marine Corps might also have benefitted as an 
institution from the infusion of new blood and new ideas.  Furthermore, even after 
deciding to pass over four senior officers and select Zeilin, Welles then allowed the 
retired officers to serve out the remainder of the war as commanders of barracks.  And at 
least one of the officers, Lieutenant Colonel Ward Marston, soon made Welles regret the 
decision to allow him to stay.  Marston, as commander of the Marine Barracks in 
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Boston, bilked thousands of dollars in bounty money that had been entrusted to him by 
his Marines.  Although Marston was court-martialed for the offense and dismissed, the 
incident further tarnished the already battered reputation of the Corps’ senior leaders.20 
As Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles should be held partially accountable for 
the Marine Corps’ uneven performance during the war.  In addition to not selecting and 
empowering competent leaders who might have better prepared the Corps to meet the 
new challenges of the war and fill the operational requirements of the various squadrons, 
Welles also neglected to pay the same degree of attention to the needs of the Corps that 
he gave to the Navy.  More importantly, Welles merely attacked the symptoms of an 
organization in crisis and did not take positive action to make doctrinal and 
organizational changes to the way the Corps operated, despite the apparent need to do 
so.  His own field commanders were pressing him to provide Marines who were 
organized, trained and equipped to fight ashore from the sea, but the Corps’ senior 
leaders continued to insist that men were needed to fill traditional shipboard 
detachments.  With more attention paid to battalion innovations, Welles might have been 
able to institute real change in the way Marines were employed, but he let the 
opportunity slip away.   
But what structural improvements might have been made that could have 
enhanced the Corps’ abilities to perform as larger tactical units?  Comparing the 
structure of the U.S. Marine Corps with that of similar units from other nations is one 
way to consider that question.  By analyzing how the U.S. Marine Corps was initially 
organized, a clear picture also emerges of how it was intended to function.   
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Although the U.S. Marine Corps and the British Royal Marines have some 
commonality in terms of basic roles and missions, there are some important differences 
in each organization’s structure that affect how they are employed.  As a seafaring 
nation, Great Britain has a long history of raising marine units that date back to at least 
1664, when England created a special Lord High Admiral’s Regiment to provide a force 
of soldiers under the direct operational control of the Admiralty.  The concept gave naval 
officers the ability to project their combat power ashore, and, over the decades, a 
dizzying succession of marine units were formed and disbanded, expanding and 
contracting with the growth and reduction of the navy itself.  Several units and command 
relationship structures were attempted before Parliament in 1755 authorized for the first 
time a sizeable permanent marine corps of about 5,000 men organized into fifty 
companies of about 100 men apiece.  These separate companies were further assigned to 
one of three “Grand Divisions,” sited at Britain’s major naval installations at 
Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Chatham.  A captain commanded each company, assisted in 
his responsibilities by one first lieutenant and two second lieutenants.  In addition, 
Parliament allocated each company four sergeants and four corporals to provide mid-
level leadership and supervision over the men.  A lieutenant colonel commanded each 
division, one major and an adjutant were added to assist him in performing his largely 
administrative tasks.  The missing piece, a senior officer and staff to administer the 
Corps as a whole to provide the command link between the Admiralty and the separate 
divisions, did not come about until several years later when Parliament authorized a 
“commandant resident.”  The Commandant, stationed in London where he could best 
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coordinate the activities and support for the entire British Corps of Marines, finally 
brought the efforts of the several divisions of marines under one commander.21   
Several companies and divisions were later added to, or taken away from the 
total authorized structure of the Corps as Great Britain passed through periods of war 
and peace.  The British marines expanded during the American Revolution to a peak of 
146 companies boasting a total of about 25,000 men by 1782, including several ad hoc 
battalions formed specifically for land service in North America.  One of those 
battalions, commanded by Major John Pitcairn, participated in the operation that 
precipitated the Revolution by firing on American militiamen at Concord and Lexington.  
And although the Corps of British Marines expanded from time to time, the company-
based structure remained generally intact.  Additionally, by 1860 the British Royal 
Marines (the title Royal being granted by King George III in 1802) gained a total of six 
artillery companies that gave the Marines their own organic artillery support for 
conducting operations ashore.22   
An important point is that the company-based structure provided great 
operational flexibility to the Royal Marines.  The companies served as the basic tactical 
unit, promoting a greater standardization of training and proficiency throughout the 
Corps.  This method of organizing the Marines did not preclude the employing of men as 
separate smaller detachments on board ships, but simply meant that when Marines were 
assigned that way, they could easily be reformed back into their company structure when 
needed.  This arrangement had several advantages over the practice of establishing large 
numbers of separate and independent permanent small detachments as practiced by the 
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U.S. Marine Corps.  First, it placed the responsibility for the best allocation of Marines 
into the hands of the company commander, the officer most familiar with the individual 
men and their capabilities.  The company commander could then easily make 
adjustments in his unit’s training to fill voids, thereby increasing the proficiency of the 
company as a whole and promoting a sense of esprit de corps.  Second, the assigning of 
Marines to companies rather than small detachments promoted group cohesion and 
stability, important elements that forged close bonds between the members.  Third, the 
company units could easily and simply serve as the building blocks for the creation of 
larger combat formations if needed (battalions or regiments).  By maintaining high levels 
of readiness at company drill, occasional practice as battalions and regiments gave the 
Marines increased familiarity with their roles when functioning as part of the larger 
formations, certainly more than separate detachments would gain when they were rarely, 
if ever, part of a larger permanent unit.       
There are indicators that American leaders originally had the British Marine 
organizational model in mind when they first considered forming their own Corps of 
Marines during the American Revolution.  However, that concept changed radically 
between the Corps’ first appearance in congressional records and the time that it actually 
materialized.  On 10 November 1775, the Continental Congress resolved to raise two 
battalions of Marines, yet the same document added that they be “considered as part of  . 
. . the continental Army,” and not part of the naval establishment.  Nonetheless, when the 
first five Marine companies were formed later that same year, they were detailed mainly 
in support of naval operations.  And with the permanent transfer in 1777 of three of 
316 
 
those Marine companies to the Army, the few remaining Marines served predominantly 
in small detachments on warships for the remainder of the war.  While operating as 
detachments, the actions of the Marines were accountable not to some senior Marine 
officer, but instead to the captain of the vessel they were assigned to.  This practice 
further fragmented the Corps and through time firmly established the precedent for how 
American Marines should be employed in the minds of the naval officers of the 
generation.  With the Revolution’s end, the Continental Marines, like the Continental 
Navy, were viewed as unnecessary and therefore disbanded, but the precedent for its 
concept for employment had been solidified in the minds of American naval leaders.23  
When the Corps was recreated on 28 May 1798, it is clear that Congress had the 
small detachment model in mind when it created the new Marine organization.  
Discussion among the members of the Committee for the Protection of Commerce and 
the Defense of the Country illustrated the relatively minor role they expected from the 
members of the new unit.  Congress’s interests at that time were predominantly focused 
on simply ensuring that the vessels of the new Navy went to sea equipped with Marine 
detachments.  Furthermore, they viewed the senior Marine officer’s role primarily as 
personnel administrator entrusted to keep the various ships’ detachments filled with 
Marines.  When asked by one committee member whether “these men could ever be 
[brought] together” to form a battalion, Representative Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts 
answered that he “could not say that these marines could be brought together to be 
disciplined,” but that the “major [Commandant] would superintend the whole, hear 
complaints, and attend to the recruiting service.”  As a parting comment, one member 
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publicly hoped that “when the bill was brought in, this corps of marines would not be 
made a permanent part of the Military Establishment.”  Although that minority view was 
overruled in the act produced, the comments reflect that Congress did not contemplate 
forming an organization that would fight as independent companies or battalions.  It 
intended instead to create a decentralized service comprised of separate ships’ 
detachments, each reporting to the vessel’s captain.  The Corps’ senior officer would 
administer the unit, but was not expected to command it in the field.  In addition, the 
manpower allotted for the Corps depended principally on the total number of Marines 
needed to fill the required detachments on board the Navy’s ships, with the only excess 
being that of the Major Commandant.  This was a very different concept of employment 
than that seen in the Royal Marines’ company organization.24   
As years passed, Congress added to the Corps’ numbers, but still the expectation 
remained that the total number of men came from an aggregate of the amount needed to 
fill the various detachments.  It was not until the commandancy of Archibald Henderson, 
and in particular his successful fielding of battalions for separate service with the Army 
during the Second Seminole War and the Mexican War that the concept of larger Marine 
formations took hold in the American military establishment.  Some of the resistance to 
the idea undoubtedly sprang from frugal bureaucrats eager to wring out perceived 
excesses from an already sparse national military structure.  But Henderson’s successful 
examples illustrated the practicality and flexibility of employing Marines in that manner, 
paving the way for other similar units in future conflicts.  Nonetheless, no fundamental 
changes were made to the Corps’ structure to permanently allow a battalion.  The Corps’ 
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overall manning levels continued to be predicated on a simple tally of the number of 
men needed to fill the requirements of ships’ detachments and shore barracks 
commands.25   
That same basic concept for staffing and employing the Marine Corps continued 
well into the post Civil War decades, until in the 1890s the Corps’ first permanent 
battalion appeared in the Spanish-American War.  Although during the Civil War many 
naval squadron commanders requested larger formations of Marines to meet their 
increased operational requirements, the basic field unit authorized by law continued to 
be the separate detachment.  This placed the Commandant into a dilemma every time he 
was tasked to provide larger combat units.  In order to provide the larger units needed, 
the Commandant had to eliminate or under-staff ships’ detachments to gain the men to 
create a battalion, a move that both Harris and his successor, Jacob Zeilin, proved 
reluctant to undertake.  Conservative Commandants did not seize on wartime needs to 
prompt Congress to take action on a simple solution that would have enhanced the 
Corps.  Faced with the clear requirement to provide battalions for service with the 
various squadrons, it would have been best to have the structure for such units to be 
included into the authorized organization of the Marine Corps.  By doing that, the 
battalion(s) would have become a permanent part of the Corps’ structure and not victims 
of the whims of politically connected naval officers.  But neither Harris nor Zeilin took 
that step, and instead routinely repeated mundane calls for increases of manpower to 
merely fill vacancies “both at the yards and on board ship,” actions that did not solve the 
basic structural deficiencies and perpetuated the problems of fielding larger combat 
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units.  Battalions were needed for onshore and riverine operations, as the insistent 
requests for them by field commanders indicated, and the obvious and most beneficial 
solution would have been to include the structure for such units into the Corps’ overall 
manpower requirements.  And wartime had demonstrated both the political and military 
needs to make such a basic change.26   
Interestingly, that is precisely the course of action that the Confederate States of 
America pursued when it created its own Marine Corps on 16 March 1861.  Instead of 
simply copying the existing structure of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), the easiest 
solution and one that many of the former USMC officers were intimately familiar with, 
the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America instead originally 
specified a “corps of marines,” as a battalion-sized unit.  The Confederate Marine 
battalion, commanded by a major, was further subdivided into six one-hundred man 
companies, each commanded by a captain (see Figure 8-1), thereby becoming the first 
American Marine Corps to adopt a tactical field organizational model.27  Although 
discussions of the reasons for organizing the Confederate States Marine Corps (CSMC) 
as it did are lost to history, one fact is evident:  the organizational structure of the CSMC 
was distinctly different and unique from its rival USMC.  The variation from the 
traditional model indicates that Confederate leaders may have had a special concept in 
mind for employing their Marines.     
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Figure 8-1.  Organizational Model of the Confederate States Marine Corps as 
Created on 16 March 1861.28 
 
 
With a Marine battalion already actively engaged against Federal forces at Fort 
Pickens, Florida, Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory convinced 
Congress to expand the CSMC to meet its commitments.  Less than two months after its 
initial creation, an “Act to Enlarge the Marine Corps” increased the unit to regimental 
size and authorized a total strength of forty-nine officers and 944 enlisted men (see 
Figure 8-2).  Although early studies of the CSMC have noted that the new structure was 
“similar to those authorized for an army ten-company regiment,” there was more to it 
than that.  The new organizational structure of the CSMC contained important 
differences that transcended any superficial similarity with a Confederate Army 
CSMC 
Battalion 
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regiment and provided clues to how the Confederate leaders envisioned employing their 
Marines.29  
 
 
Figure 8-2.  Expanded CSMC Structure, 21 May 1861.30 
 
 
The reorganization act expanding the CSMC to a regimental-sized unit also 
maintained the company as its base unit, which may be used as evidence that leaders 
valued the flexibility that the company structure offered the CSMC as a concept of 
employment.  However, other important refinements were included that both 
acknowledged and supported the CSMC’s capabilities to employ Marines in smaller 
detachments when needed.  The new organization increased the numbers of lieutenants 
and non-commissioned officers in each of the companies, giving those units a sufficient 
number of small-unit leaders to both facilitate the creation of separate detachments and 
CSMC 
Regiment 
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to adequately supervise the men when serving away from the direct control of the 
company commander.  Although this newer table of organization did not specify an 
intermediate battalion level of command, the CSMC continued to form and employ 
battalions throughout the war, often using its regimental headquarters personnel to fill 
required battalion command and administrative positions.  This structure allowed the 
subordinate element leaders great flexibility in reallocating their personnel to match their 
operational requirements, an efficient and frugal way of maximizing their personnel 
resources.31  
The expansion act also authorized a billet for a Colonel Commandant, filled three 
days later through the appointment of Colonel Lloyd J. Beall, formerly of the U.S. 
Army.  After assuming command, Beall soon forwarded several recommendations for 
further adjustments to be made to the CSMC’s structure, citing increased requirements 
for the extended deployment of Marines afloat.  Beall specifically requested that more 
noncommissioned officers be added to the table of organization to enhance the 
leadership, supervision, and training capability in small detachments, particularly during 
extended deployments.  Specifically, Beall argued that he had “found by experience that 
the peculiar service of marines requires a larger proportion of noncommissioned officers 
and musicians than the land service, from the fact that the Corps is liable to be divided 
up into small detachments as guards on board of ships and at naval stations, and that 
these guards are not complete without one or two noncommissioned officers and a 
musician to each.”32   
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Administratively and logistically, Confederate Marine detachments, companies, 
and battalions were normally provided with supplies, arms, ammunition, pay, and other 
support by the army or navy command to which they were assigned at the time.  The 
CSMC maintained its own paymasters and quartermasters as well, providing the 
headquarters with some degree of centralized control over its expenditures and the 
ability to deal with unique payroll and supply issues.  For command and control 
purposes, Marine units in the field relied on a mixture of telegraph, correspondence, and 
messengers to maintain contact with the headquarters in Richmond, providing reports on 
events within their area of responsibility, while concurrently cooperating with the local 
commander to whom they were assigned.  Commanders of detachments reported to 
company commanders, who in turn reported to the battalion commander (if operating 
under one) or directly to the Marine Corps Headquarters in Richmond.  Headquarters 
provided guidance, direction and orders accordingly to either the battalion or company 
commander, as applicable.  In this manner, Secretary Mallory and Colonel Beall applied 
a method of command and control that could best be described as “centralized 
command, decentralized execution,”33 a type of system that can be highly responsive to 
the intent of the commander, yet allows for great flexibility and initiative on the part of 
subordinate leaders.34   
The advantages of the CSMC structural model over that of the USMC’s 
detachment-based organization are clear and distinct.  The adopting of companies as the 
base tactical unit represented a significant advancement in the development of the 
American Marine Corps experience.  Despite having significantly fewer personnel than 
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its northern cousin, the CSMC demonstrated its ability to rapidly form battalions and 
redeploy as individual companies several times throughout the war.  Companies posted 
to serve with specific Confederate naval squadrons assigned detachments to individual 
ships as needed, and then just as quickly pulled the detachments back to reform the 
companies, giving the CSMC the capability of meeting its combat requirements with 
little loss of cohesion and minimal personnel turbulence.  Those same companies could 
also be easily formed into battalion units when the situation dictated, and then just as 
rapidly be reallocated as separate companies to completely different operational areas, 
depending on the situation.  Although the CSMC seldom could boast of having more 
than 600 Marines, the Corps’ operational coverage throughout the Confederacy attested 
to the superiority of its organizational model.  Confederate Marines became quite adept 
at operating as separate companies attached to specific naval squadrons or as part of an 
army unit.  For example, Company A of the CSMC deployed as a separate unit eight 
times to six of the eleven states of the Confederacy (see Figure 8-3).  The CSMC’s 
prescient structure allowed it to be more flexible in adapting to changing field situations 
while still maintaining a high degree of cohesion and standardization.35 
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Figure 8-3.  Map Showing the Deployments of Company A, CSMC.36 
 
 
In a similar fashion, Confederate Marine battalions also served at several 
locations during the war:  at Pensacola, Florida; Drewry’s Bluff, Virginia (participating 
in two key battles); Charleston, South Carolina; Wilmington, North Carolina; and finally 
at Saylor’s Creek, Virginia (see Figure 8-4).  As mentioned in previous chapters, the first 
American Marine unit to field a battalion in the Civil War was the CSMC, not the 
USMC.  A Confederate Marine battalion was also ordered to conduct an amphibious raid 
into Maryland, but the ambitious project was cancelled shortly after embarking aboard 
ships for movement to the objective area.  And although battalion actions account for 
only a small portion of battles and engagements that Confederate Marines participated 
in, their services were appreciated and recognized by Confederate leaders.  Analysis of 
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the repositioning of these battalions indicates that Southern naval leaders considered 
Confederate Marines to be a valued resource.  The quick movement of that asset from 
one area to another in response to enemy threats suggests that the senior Confederate 
leaders came to consider the CSMC as a force-in-readiness that could be rapidly 
employed; an expeditionary force for the Confederate Navy that could be relied upon in 
extreme conditions.  It also illustrates the efficiency of the CSMC system whereby the 
various companies were easily and seamlessly fit into the forming of battalions much 
like building blocks, and went on to serve in combat as an integrated and well-trained 
unit.  The USMC’s forming of battalions, by contrast, involved pooling Marines from a 
large number of detachments with little or no history of having worked together 
previously.  As a result, the Federal Marine battalions required much more training and 
preparation to gain the same level of proficiency to operate as a battalion.37  Therefore, a 
comparison of the structural differences between the CSMC and USMC models 
indicates that the Confederate Marine Corps’ structure was superior in many ways to that 
of its Northern cousin.   
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Figure 8-4.  CSMC Battalion Deployments during the War.38 
 
 
Finally, another unit that merits comparison with the USMC is the short-lived 
and unique Mississippi Marine Brigade that served on the waterways of the Union 
Army’s Western Theater in 1862.  Army commanders frustrated with the widely 
dispersed fleet of Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote turned to a civilian, Charles Ellet, Jr., 
for assistance in providing them with transport ships.  In conversations with Secretary of 
War Edwin Stanton in March and April 1862, Ellet convinced the secretary to authorize 
him to convert several steamers he owned into a “ram fleet” for service with the army 
operating in the Mississippi River basin.  In short order Ellet formed his flotilla, armored 
the vessels with timber, reinforced the prows for ramming, and received a promotion to 
colonel, the highest rank Stanton could confer without going to Congress.  Ellet then 
arranged for select officers (including many of his family members) to be transferred to 
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his command and he formed a composite organization of militia, volunteers, and 
civilians that reported only to Ellet.  In turn, Stanton subordinated Ellet to the 
flamboyant Major General John C. Frémont.  In effect, despite directing Ellet to always 
cooperate with the appropriate naval commanders, Stanton had created a quasi-military, 
marine-style organization that operated on the waterways, but was accountable only to 
the Army for its movements and actions.  As one might expect with such an unusual 
arrangement, quarrels soon broke out between Foote’s replacement, Rear Admiral 
Charles H. Davis, and Ellet, but the latter bluntly rebuffed any attempt at cooperation.  
The Army now had a naval task force of its own, one that historian Chester Hearn 
describes appropriately as “Mr. Stanton’s Navy.”39 
Soon, Ellet’s unique, makeshift force was conducting operations up and down the 
river in conjunction with the Army, but with very little coordination with the Navy.  On 
24 June Alfred Ellet replaced his brother as commander of the ram fleet and the 
Mississippi Marine Brigade, as it was called.  The brigade participated in the Battle of 
Memphis, and in many of the smaller engagements that took place in and around 
Vicksburg, Mississippi, as part of the Union Army’s drive to seize that position.  
Plagued by massive desertions from the civilian members of the brigade and the transfer 
of military members, Ellet nonetheless contributed positively to both the army’s and the 
navy’s operations on the river by conducting raids with his mobile infantry, cavalry and 
artillery “marines” to deter rebel guerrilla attacks that had plagued Union forces.  
Nonetheless, the independent nature of the brigade grated on the sensibilities of the new 
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naval commander of the Mississippi Squadron, Rear Admiral David Porter, who soon 
complained of the situation to Welles.40 
For his part, Secretary Welles had wasted no time lobbying in both the legislative 
and executive branches for control over the ships of the Ram Fleet, arguing convincingly 
that he should control all the nation’s warships.  On 2 November, the secretary gleefully 
recorded in his diary that “Congress wisely ordered a transfer of all war vessels on the 
Mississippi to the Navy. It was not by my suggestion or procurement that this law was 
passed, but it was proper.”  Some confusion, however, remained concerning Ellet’s 
flotilla.  Congress’ action “greatly disturbed Stanton, who, supported by Halleck and 
Ellet, opposes a transfer of the ram fleet as not strictly within the letter, though it is 
undoubtedly the intent of the law.”  The issue, it seemed, centered principally on the 
desires of the unit’s leader, and not on military practicalities and the need for unity of 
command in all operations.  As Welles remarked, “That Ellet should wish a distinct 
command is not surprising.  It is characteristic.  He is full of zeal to overflowing; is not, 
however, a naval man, but is, very naturally, delighted with an independent naval 
command in this adventurous ram service.”  But he correctly pointed out the central 
concern:  “there cannot be two distinct commands on the river under different orders 
from different Departments without endangering collision.”41  Simply put, the military 
requirements outweighed Ellet’s preferences for independent operation. 
Eventually, the showdown between the Secretaries of War and Navy was settled 
by the commander-in-chief personally.  On 7 November 1862, President Abraham 
Lincoln signed an executive order placing Ellet’s ships under the command of Admiral 
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Porter.  But Ellet’s Marine Brigade remained under Army control.  The unit was 
organized into three components; a regiment of infantry, a battalion of cavalry, and four 
batteries of artillery, tactically spread over available ships.  Although tasked from time to 
time with conducting counter-guerrilla operations and related tasks, the unit suffered 
throughout its existence from command problems, chronic desertions and personnel 
shortages, and was generally considered by the commanders of both the Army and Navy 
forces in the West more as an operational curiosity than an asset.  Although the unit 
managed to capture a great deal of cotton throughout the war, the overall effectiveness of 
the brigade has remained the subject of significant debate.  Writing on the final 
mustering out of the last of its men in January 1865, one observer recorded that the 
brigade “has cost the Government immense sums, and so far as practical good is 
concerned is not worth one red cent.”  Furthermore, he sarcastically noted about Ellet’s 
transports that “These arks made very comfortable summer resorts, and as such were 
largely in demand.”  Of their performance, he stated “They were generally where they 
were not wanted and seldom at hand when needed.”42    
The history of Ellet’s Ram Fleet and Marine Brigade represents a clear example 
of an opportunity missed by both the Navy and Marine Corps.  The naval services could 
easily have capitalized on the situation, and might even have gained the backing of some 
Army leaders had Welles, Porter, Harris or others offered to create such a unit 
themselves.  A large sum of money and resources had been made available to the Ellets 
to essentially experiment with the concept of forming a riverine task force, but it seems 
clear that given the same resources, the Navy Department could have produced a more 
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effective organization to accomplish similar missions with much better results.  
Throughout, in addition to the obvious confusions over command and control of the 
group, the Ellets’ effort proved crippled through their own failures to understand the 
military complexities of what they were attempting.  By stubbornly insisting on family 
control of all aspects of the unit they created a force filled largely with civilian invalids, 
military convalescents, and fiercely independent ship captains and crews.  These factors 
and others combined to make the force considerably less efficient in the military arts 
than if a similar unit had been formed by the Navy, Marine Corps and Army working in 
concert.  Instead, the Ram Fleet and Marine Brigade provided yet another example of an 
outstanding opportunity missed by the military establishment.  
But the lessons learned from the formation of the unit extend beyond the 
limitations of its employment, most of which are attributed to the weaknesses of the 
brigade’s leaders and the fractious nature of its command relationships.  Faced with an 
acute lack of naval combat assets while fighting a riverine war, the Army leadership 
attempted to create their own unit to perform what it considered were valid combat 
requirements.  It attempted to create a task-organized military unit with its own organic 
naval transportation and fire support.  However, in creating such a unit, an anxious 
Stanton placed too much trust and confidence in one man (Charles Ellet) in the hopes of 
gaining quickly an amphibious strike force.  Instead, Ellet, more interested in 
maintaining independence of his unit from outside interference, became a source of 
irritation among commanders rather than improving cooperation.  Although the original 
concept made good military sense and was intriguing, the weaknesses caused by the 
332 
 
circumstances of its creation proved impossible to surmount and the unit failed to 
achieve its potential.  
Perhaps the greatest legacy of the Marine Corps during the Civil War era 
involved its energizing of a new generation of officers who demanded reforms to correct 
the many problems they observed and experienced in the conflict.  Overall, there existed 
a great disparity between the more senior officers and the junior officers that they led, as 
illustrated already throughout this study.  In particular, few of the older breed of officers 
led through personal example or exhibited tactical competency that inspired respect and 
confidence among junior officers for their capabilities and leadership.  Many were aged 
or infirm to the point that they actively avoided serving in field units or on sea duty, jobs 
that required a higher level of fitness, fortitude, and tactical proficiency.  The situation 
was made more acute when one considers that at the time the Marine Corps ranked last 
behind the other two services in terms of officer professionalism, a point that was not 
lost on the junior officers who worked closely with both Army and Navy officers during 
the war and observed the differences firsthand.  One of those junior officers, Captain 
Robert Huntington, who got his first taste of battle at Bull Run in July 1861, captured 
this situation well in a letter written to other, like-minded officers.  Talking directly 
about the two camps that split the officer corps, Huntington defined the differences in 
mindset:  “To the one, the present is the best moment; the other looks to the future.  It is 
the irrepressible conflict between conservativism and progress.”43    
In his study of the Marine Corps from 1880 to 1898, historian Jack Shulimson 
agrees with the periodization of military professionalism first forwarded by Samuel 
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Huntington in his classic book, The Soldier and the State.  Shulimson argues that the 
forging of a professional officer corps began during the 1880s and reached its 
“transitional period” between 1885 and 1889.  It was in the 1880s, signaled by the 
opening of the Naval Academy to those seeking a Marine Corps commission and an 
intervention in Panama, that he asserts “foreshadowed the employment of future Marine 
expeditionary forces,” that the work of whom he terms “navy progressives,” began 
discussing expanded landing operations and proposing larger roles for the Marine Corps 
in naval operations.44 
An alternative view advanced here is that the reform movement took root earlier, 
amidst the friction and frustration experienced by junior Marine officers toward their 
senior leaders during the Civil War, thereby pushing Shulimson’s transitional period 
back at least fifteen years.  For his part, Shulimson acknowledges that there were 
officers who advocated reforms earlier than his periodization, but dismisses their efforts 
as being confined to small numbers with little to encourage them in their crusade.45  
Nonetheless, the dialoge that these early reformers established and the network of like-
minded individuals that they forged served as the foundation for that movement and had 
far-reaching consequences. 
Significantly, most of the individuals that Shulimson depends upon to support his 
position began their careers shortly before or during the Civil War.  Many of these same 
men began clamoring for reform and change early in their service.  Their arguments for 
the creation of a more professional and relevant force only became more strident and 
insistent throughout the decades that followed.  These officers formed close bonds with 
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their peers and also many of the officers of other services that they worked with, 
corresponding frequently and exchanging ideas on how to better the Corps.  These same 
men also contributed to professionalizing their fellow officers by writing articles and 
opinions concerning their ideas for transforming the Corps, and by publishing books, 
manuals and related documents that better standardized techniques and procedures. 
In the immediate postwar period, the rapid shrinking of the number of active 
Navy ships prompted predictable debate over what the size of the Marine Corps should 
be.  When the question of whether to abolish or shrink the Marine Corps resurfaced 
again in 1867 and 1868, few congressmen actually favored outright disbanding of the 
unit, and more pressing military and budgetary issues almost guaranteed the immediate 
tabling of any such proposals.  Besides, attrition in the enlisted ranks through desertions 
and lack of reenlistments soon pared the numbers down to just about the same strength 
that the Marine Corps had in 1861, making it still as difficult as ever for the 
Commandant to fill even the greatly reduced calls for Marines on ship and shore.46   
On the officer side, promotions returned to their prewar glacial pace.  New 
officers could expect to be lieutenants for as many as fifteen years or longer.  This 
condition further frustrated the junior officers who saw any possibilities of their being 
promoted vanish as the more senior officers clogged up the system.  At first, the junior 
officers fought and won some relatively small battles.  In 1868, Zeilin reluctantly 
forwarded a bold petition from discontented junior officers asking that the sword that 
had been adopted under Harris’ tenure be discarded in favor of the traditional Mameluke 
sword made famous by Presley O’Bannon’s exploits against the Barbary Pirates in North 
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Africa in 1803.  Welles acceded, and Marine officers were again armed with the 
distinctive symbol of the Henderson years.47  Other disagreements between junior and 
senior officers followed, but the frustration over the path the Marine Corps should take 
in the future eventually broke surface in the 1870s, spearheaded by one of the most 
outspoken of the group, First Lieutenant Henry Clay Cochrane.    
Born on 7 November 1842 in Chester, Pennsylvania, Cochrane left a teaching 
position after the outbreak of the Civil War and applied for a commission in the Marine 
Corps.  In August 1861, he passed the subsequent examination, but could not actually 
serve as a Marine lieutenant until his twenty-first birthday.  In the interim, Cochrane 
volunteered as an acting master’s mate in the Navy and served aboard the gunboat USS 
Pembina during Admiral DuPont’s seizure of Port Royal and Beaufort, South Carolina.  
He participated also in the Atlantic coast operations at Wassaw Sound, the St. Johns 
River, and the landings at Fernandina, Florida.  On 10 March 1863, Cochrane received 
his promotion to second lieutenant of Marines and reported to Corps Headquarters in 
Washington, D.C.48 
After about five months of duty and instruction, Cochrane received orders to the 
Marine Barracks at Cairo/Mound City, Illinois, arriving at that post in August.  Several 
months later, Cochrane was selected to accompany a presidential visit to the dedication 
of a new National Cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and it was there, on 19 
November 1863, that he witnessed President Lincoln delivering his famous Gettysburg 
Address.  On returning to Illinois, Cochrane was among the few officers of the barracks 
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assigned by Rear Admiral David Porter to lead long-range combat patrols into Kentucky 
to conduct anti-smuggling and counter-guerrilla operations.49 
Cochrane was assigned to command the Marine detachment on board the USS 
Black Hawk in March of 1865, remaining until that ship burned and sank on 22 April 
1865.  He then transferred to the USS Tempest for the duration of the war, receiving a 
commendation from Rear Admiral Samuel Phillips Lee for his service.  Cochrane held a 
number of billets over the next four decades both on sea and land.  He served with a 
detachment of Marines dispatched in July 1877 to restore order after violent railroad 
strikes in Maryland and Pennsylvania.  Cochrane also commanded a seventy-man 
detachment to reestablish the American Consulate in Alexandria, Egypt, in July 1882 in 
the wake of that city’s bombardment by British naval forces.  The following year he was 
appointed as the American representative to the coronation of Russian Czar Alexander 
III, and in 1885 commanded the Marine contingent that restored order in Panama.  In 
1889 Cochrane was assigned as commander of the Marine detachment that took part in 
the prestigious Universal Exposition in Paris, France.  Cochrane also participated in the 
employment of the First Marine Battalion to Cuba during the Spanish American War in 
1898 and led the Marines assigned to the U.S. Relief Expedition during the Boxer 
Rebellion in 1900.  The following year he commanded Marines in the Philippine 
Insurrection and retired on 10 March 1905 as a brigadier general.  Cochrane had by then 
served forty-two illustrious years in the Marines.50  
Cochrane was a prodigious writer, lecturer and, most importantly, a critic with 
the courage to challenge authority.  Throughout his military career he maintained a 
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steady correspondence with peers, superiors, journals, and newspapers.  Cochrane used 
his acquaintances as a sounding board for ideas regarding one of his favorite subjects – 
how to make the Corps a more professional and capable organization.  In addition, 
through his many public speaking engagements Cochrane educated his lecture attendees 
on life in the naval services, promoting a larger awareness of the Navy and Marine 
Corps.  But it was Cochrane’s valiant lobbying efforts to shape a new Corps structure 
that are most noteworthy.  Importantly, Cochrane became frustrated by the Corps’ 
apparent inability to learn from its past mistakes, and he was not alone.  One 
acquaintance, writing on the same subject, lamented that “The [Civil] War was our great 
opportunity, & we owlishly neglected it.” 51 
In 1875, Cochrane circulated a “confidential,” privately published pamphlet to a 
circle of peers and newspapers that outlined twenty-five recommendations to reorganize 
the Marine Corps.  In it, Cochrane called for drastic action to conduct either “a 
resuscitation or a funeral” for the Corps.  The current state of the organization demanded 
that the nation either get rid of the Corps, or fix it.  And he had plenty of ideas on how to 
repair it.  Citing a long litany of offenses that senior officers had been guilty of, “murder, 
adultery, drunkenness, debauchery, fraud,” and so on, he asked that the unit be delivered 
from their hands and reformed.  “Those who entered the service in 1861 can readily 
recall instances of every crime I have mentioned being committed by marine officers,” 
and he proposed a mandatory retiring age of sixty-two.  He asked for “respectable and 
competent men” as officers, specifically recommending they be drawn from the service 
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academies, a longstanding desire that had basically been ignored.  He also indicated that 
the Corps should seek out “a better class of men” and was certain they could be found.52 
Structurally, Cochran recommended drastic reorganization.  First, he advocated a 
brigade organization with regiments, battalions and companies, believing that 
“competition may encourage effort” between units.  Proper regulations were needed, and 
a better promotion system with parity between services.  Rigid mental, moral, and 
physical examinations were needed to ensure only the fittest officers would be promoted.  
Furthermore, he argued that the Marine Corps, instead of fixing its problems on its own, 
adopted instead an “ostrich policy” and merely kept its collective head down while 
undergoing almost annual attacks on its continued existence by the press and Congress.53  
In essence, he asserted that the current state of affairs was intolerable; in fact any of the 
extreme actions recommended, abolishment or reform, were preferable to continuing to 
function as it did. 
Cochrane’s reforms certainly described improvements that would have 
significantly increased the professionalization of the Corps, had they been implemented.  
But the missing piece addressed only peripherally was describing what missions the 
Corps should be performing.  Although by this time both the Navy and Marine Corps 
were wedded to a primary mission of providing ships’ detachments for Navy vessels, 
few officers had yet to realize that many of the criticisms levied against the Corps were 
rooted in the decreasing importance of that task.  Whatever the merit of the rest of 
Cochrane’s ideas for fixing the Corps, the closest he came to addressing the issue of 
identifying a valuable and relevant mission was his peripheral demand for organizing 
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into field units – regiments, battalions, companies – and his proposal that it become a 
naval artillery brigade.  But those ideas represented only two of the twenty-five separate 
reforms forwarded.54  Although it would be almost another quarter century before the 
Corps identified that mission, it was certainly a start. 
Not surprisingly, Cochrane’s pamphlet received greater attention when reviewers 
discussed its contents in the Army and Navy Journal.  Further discussion in the 
commercial press generated intense debate.  Cochrane’s peers, of course, sided with him 
and praised his efforts to push for change while the Corps’ “old guard” predictably 
condemned the piece.  Captain Louis Fagan, commissioned in June 1862 and a veteran 
of Zeilin’s Marine Battalion, the disastrous Fort Sumter night attack, and the ill-fated 
Fort Fisher Naval Brigade, congratulated Cochrane.  Fagan called the pamphlet “the best 
& only thing that has been done for the Corps in the last half dozen years.” 55   
Earlier, Fagan had published his own thoughts regarding the issue of reforming 
the Corps in a letter to the editor of a capital newspaper.  He bluntly stated that if “the 
Marine Corps is to be a place for self-seekers, drunkards and timeservers . . . I say the 
sooner it is wiped out the better.”  Instead, he prayed that the Corps would be “refreshed 
and strengthened.”  His criticism was reprinted in the Army and Navy Journal with the 
comments that it had already “created considerable discussion” among the Corps’ own 
officers interested in fixing its shortcomings.  But since actions to implement required 
reforms, “being almost entirely without the cooperation of the older officers, from whom 
better things should be expected, it has made little headway.”  Fagan also had harsh 
words for the Corps’ new Commandant, Charles G. McCawley, who had about that 
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same time replaced Zeilin, who retired in the Fall of 1876.  “How unfortunate that 
McCawley is sick - - to [sic] much sitting down, I guess.  We are unfortunate, as soon as 
we got rid of one cripple [Zeilin] we get another.”56      
But to his credit McCawley actually supported reform to a much greater degree 
that did his two predecessors.  The new Commandant quickly directed all of his officers 
to drill Marines in the “School of the Company” and “School of the Battalion.”  He also 
directed that Emery Upton’s “Tactics” be used as the primary reference for that training, 
further specifying that each commander report their progress to headquarters every 
month.   McCawley also worked diligently to remove from the Marine Corps officers 
who failed to meet acceptable standards of conduct and proficiency.  By the end of his 
first year in the post, some critics had to acknowledge the positive change his leadership 
had made.57 
Earlier, in 1873, Captain James Forney had traveled to Europe and visited 
Marines of several nations to gain insight into changes that might be made.  On his 
return, Forney recommended that the USMC be restructured into tactical units such as 
companies and battalions, and that it adopt the strict training regimen he had observed 
within the British marines.  In 1876, acting under orders from McCawley, Cochrane 
convened a conference consisting of Fagan, Captain Charles Heywood (a future 
Commandant), and several others to evaluate those and several other recommendations.  
The attendees seconded Forney’s recommendations and added others, but were 
disheartened when their ideas were not implemented by Congress, despite a favorable 
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report from the committee on Naval Affairs.  Although the reformers would not give up, 
the changes they advocated were still two decades away.58    
Cochrane is an example of the far-sighted professional reformers who saw 
service in the Civil War.  Similarly motivated officers echoed his calls from several 
quarters, including Captain McLane Tilton, who entered the Corps on 2 March 1861.  A 
veteran of the reinforcement of Fort Pickens and the attack on Fort Fisher, Tilton found 
himself after the war in a number of assignments at sea.  In 1870 he was in the Far East, 
and rightfully concerned about rising tensions between the United States and Korea.  
While discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of the weaponry used by 
both the Marine Corps and the Korean defenders with the Corps’ quartermaster, Tilton 
could not help but comment that the Koreans were better armed than the Marines.  Tilton 
had earlier made evaluations of several weapons for the Marine Corps and was rightfully 
concerned that many of the detachments were still armed with inferior weaponry.  He 
caustically added that “One man with a Breech loader is Equal to 12 or 15 armed as we 
are; and in the event of our landing, or even chasing any “Coreans” [sic], armed with an 
excellent repeater, what ever could Americans do, with a blasted old Muzzle Fuzzle 
[muzzle loader] !!!”  He implored the Corps quartermaster (and senior ordnance officer) 
to try and gain better weaponry, entreating him to “Don’t allow red tape to stand in our 
way!”59 
Likewise, many Marine Corps officers also understood the need to standardize 
and professionalize the training and day-to-day functioning of Marines under their 
charge.  In the years following the Civil War, many of the officers took the initiative to 
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publish their own orders, regulations and procedures to establish and promulgate key 
information within their units.  While serving as the commander of the Marine Barracks 
at Annapolis, Maryland, in the mid-1870s, Tilton wrote, published, and distributed a 
detailed set of “Internal Regulations of the Garrison” for his Marines.  The following 
year a revised set was published that took into account several changes.  In this manner, 
Tilton and his peers diverged from the practices of his predecessors and developed more 
fully rules and regulations for their commands, rather than rely simply on verbal orders 
passed down from watch to watch.  By providing printed copies to all hands, Tilton 
increased the common understanding of orders, procedures and understandings within 
his unit, contributing to the overall good order and discipline of the Marines.60 
These efforts and the contributions of many other officers illustrate the desire 
among the more junior officers of the Corps to improve their lot and make the 
organization a more professional one.  Their only problem was that they did not yet have 
the rank, seniority, or political standing to implement and achieve their goals, but time 
itself would make that happen.  Indeed, it is the efforts of these same individuals that 
Shulimson points to as evidence of an increase in the professionalizing of the Corps, but 
he picks a time ten to fifteen years later.  In the meantime, that same “new breed” of 
officers, assisted by the hard work of their non-commissioned officers, continued the 
fight to gain improvements in the way that the Corps was structured, manned and led.  
Having been forged in the crucible of fire that was the Civil War, these men were 
stubbornly determined not to let those experiences break them, but to instead channel 
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them to help shape the Corps into a more modern, efficient, and effective service for 
their successors. 
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CHAPTER IX 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
At the onset of the Civil War era the U.S. Army consisted only of a small 
collection of companies and battalions dispersed widely throughout the expanding 
nation, each unit linked with some often distant regimental headquarters for its 
administration and command.  As late as the opening months of 1861, the entire strength 
of the regular Army totaled only about 16,000 officers and men, commanded by a mere 
handful of general officers.  Of that number the Secretary of War commented that “there 
are not more than about 11,000 men available for active service in the field.”  
Nonetheless, once the conflict began, the rush of volunteers rapidly expanded the Army, 
transforming it for a few years into a massive, highly cohesive organization comprised 
of field armies, corps, divisions, and brigades on a scale that could scarcely have been 
imagined in the antebellum years.  More than one million soldiers were under arms.  In 
the process, the Army reinvented itself and produced “the first of the great modern 
[generals].”1 
The U.S. Navy crafted in some ways an even more remarkable transformation.  It 
began the war with fewer than 40 serviceable vessels, most of them using the old 
technologies of wood construction and sail propulsion.  Yet before the war was over it 
created and successfully employed a modern naval force that historian Kurt Hackemer 
characterized as “perhaps the best navy in the world for coastal defense and riverine 
operations.”  This new navy grew in strength sevenfold, from about 9,000 sailors and 
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officers in early 1861 to almost 60,000 by war‟s end.  Moreover, this new navy 
embraced innovative technologies and quickly grew from a pitifully small, scattered 
collection of ships led by largely autonomous captains to become instead a capable, 
well-integrated, and squadron-directed fighting force of modern weaponry commanded 
by admirals.  By war‟s end the Navy had expanded in size to over 600 vessels, many of 
them new iron-hulled or armor-clad designs, and most incorporating steam propulsion 
and armed with some of the most modern of naval weaponry.  To more effectively 
service and support the organization, the Navy modified its Bureau system and more 
closely regulated the training and administration of its officers and sailors.  Through 
experimentation, the service nimbly adapted itself to a new national military strategy, 
seizing ports and gradually tightening its grip on the Confederacy‟s coast while 
concurrently cooperating with Army units in riverine and littoral operations.2 
Compared to the successful expansion and experiences of its sister services, the 
Marine Corps regressed as an institution.  Seagoing Marines in 1865 performed 
essentially the same missions their predecessors undertook during the War of 1812 a half 
century before:  they served in small detachments to assist the vessel commander in 
maintaining good order and discipline.  Other Marines guarded shore installations.  In 
stark contrast to their performance in the Mexican War, the Corps‟ senior officers 
stubbornly resisted the forming of larger battalion units and some discouraged any 
attempt to employ Marines under army command.  Although the Corps earlier had 
sought out opportunities to prove its expeditionary capabilities in the field, from the 
Secession Crisis on it avoided or diluted efforts to continue along that path.  Frustrated, 
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senior military authorities eventually stopped calling on the Marines to perform 
challenging tasks, thereby allowing the Corps to revert to its comfortable, yet less 
relevant or important roles. 
Discerning the factors that account for the Marines‟ regression is significant to 
understanding the circumstances of the effects of modernization, the Corps, its status 
during and after the war, and its difficulties from 1865 to the 1890s.  Several historians 
have honed in on the sudden death in office of the Corps‟ longstanding commandant, 
Archibald Henderson, as a central factor to explain the organization‟s disappointing 
performance in the Civil War, an observation bolstered by the fact that it occurred 1859, 
on the cusp of the war.  While this is a valid assertion, a deeper analysis demonstrates 
other factors not addressed in previous studies.   
First, the clear changes in leadership styles and operational priorities between 
Henderson and his replacement John Harris are distinct and readily apparent.  The 
former Commandant had wholeheartedly supported innovative efforts to expand the 
Corps‟ participation within the nation‟s military establishment beyond that of their 
limited roles as ships‟ guards and shore sentries.  Henderson had also pushed to increase 
the professionalism of his officers and men.  On the other hand, Harris, although a 
quietly competent administrator, proved unimaginative and generally uninterested in any 
efforts to expand of the role of his Marines, even when repeatedly requested to do so by 
superiors and operational commanders alike.  In stark contrast to his predecessor, Harris 
exhibited little interest in assuming new roles and missions beyond the traditional, even 
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when confronted with increased evidence of the value of those tasks to the nation, the 
war effort, and the Corps itself. 
Yet there is more to the situation than the obvious changes in operational 
priorities that resulted from Henderson‟s death and Harris‟ assumption of the 
commandancy.   A second notable factor was that the Marine Corps had long suffered 
from a crisis of identity:  critics had raised difficult and entirely germane points about 
the Marine Corps as a service, even questioning the issue of whether the military 
establishment really needed a Marine Corps.  Were the tasks preformed by Marines on 
board ships and ashore relevant and valuable to the Navy?  Were Marines worth the 
investment of men and materiel?  Were there better tasks for Marines, ones that would 
benefit both naval services and improve their combined combat capabilities?  Or were 
Marines simply continuing to perform functions that were traditional but fast becoming 
obsolete in the face of changes in both modern naval warfare and service practice?   
To his credit, Commandant Henderson had long wrestled with those very 
questions, and his answers led him to doggedly pursue a course that he believed would 
transform the Marine Corps into “the military arm of the Navy.”3  To Henderson, this 
meant that the Corps needed to train to perform infantry, artillery, even engineer tasks to 
enhance its ability to fight enemies as a valuable component of landing parties.4  By 
extension, Henderson also pushed hard to take opportunities for Marines to participate as 
larger combat formations alongside Army forces in extended land combat.  He 
successfully proved his concept by employing Marine battalions during the Second 
Seminole War and in the Mexican War.  Marines also bolstered their fighting reputation 
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through participating in a number of naval expeditions in the antebellum years and 
earned further respect by quelling John Brown‟s Raid in 1859 in a politically sensitive 
operation.  In each of those evolutions the Marine Corps filled a valuable niche and 
became for a time a national force in readiness. 
Several factors aided Henderson in his transformative campaign.  First, the Navy 
was experimenting with new technologies such as steam propulsion, armor, and 
advances in weaponry.5  To begin with, the Navy was unsure how those same new 
propulsion, armament, and weapons systems might affect its own tactics, techniques, and 
procedures.  By extension, naval leaders remained oblivious to how those same factors 
might have consequences for the naval services‟ requirements for Marines.  Second, the 
Navy‟s concurrent adopting of certain naval reforms improved sailor morale and reduced 
the frequency and severity of disciplinary infractions.  Those same initiatives decreased 
the need to station Marines to help enforce discipline aboard ship, directly negating one 
of the traditional roles of the Corps.  Some naval leaders even considered deploying 
warships without Marine detachments and experiments along that line soon hinted that 
the absence of Marines from ships did not necessarily equate to greater incidences of 
disciplinary problems or mutiny.  Third, with the Navy focusing on its own 
modernization effort, it largely ignored the Marine Corps as a service and generally left 
it to its own devices where internal improvements were concerned.  During Henderson‟s 
tenure, the forceful commandant exploited that indifference to some extent to achieve 
progress toward his goals that made the Corps more capable of flexible military 
operations in support of the Navy.   
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Since he was essentially left on his own where future plans for the Corps were 
concerned, Henderson deftly leveraged his political skills, connections, and the seniority 
of his unusually long tenure to successfully lobby for support of his initiatives.  He also 
educated political and military leaders on the achievements and potential of his Marines, 
thereby creating new proponents for the Corps.  To the end, the long-serving 
Commandant effectively guided his command toward his objective of creating a more 
nimble and capable military force. 
Yet despite his many successes, Henderson also failed in several important 
respects.  His first failure involved not institutionalizing his concept for the Corps and in 
not establishing mechanisms within it to continue those initiatives beyond his own 
tenure.  The publishing of a long-range plan for the Corps, coupled with the orders and 
directives to implement it would have not only ensured widest dissemination of them, 
but also better inculcated his ideas and thereby made them more lasting.  Although he 
attempted to do this to some extent, the weak link proved to be within the Corps‟ own 
senior officers.  Some of those men remained generally unconvinced of the need for the 
Corps to adapt to modern times.  Instead, many of them wished only to continue their 
tenure as barracks commanders, viewing their post as a sinecure that they rated by virtue 
of seniority.  Although Henderson had made some progress in controlling the Corps‟ 
senior officers, a significant percentage resisted any attempt by headquarters to impose 
greater authority over their actions.     
The second failure was in Henderson‟s not identifying, preparing, and training a 
successor (or successors) to take over the reins of the Corps when he departed.  
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Henderson had served as the Corps‟ Commandant for almost forty years, longer than 
most of his Marines had been alive.  Throughout his term, Henderson controlled 
virtually every aspect of the Corps‟ functioning, and he served as the critical central link 
between his organization and the Navy Department.  The closest equivalent of a second 
in command to the Commandant was the field grade officer who held the position as the 
Corps‟ Adjutant and Inspector, the individual responsible for the training, qualifying, 
and preparing of all Marines, both officer and enlisted, for duty.  Although empowered 
to act on the Commandant‟s behalf on many issues, the Adjutant and Inspector was not 
an heir-apparent:  the selecting of Commandants had traditionally been accomplished 
solely on the basis of seniority.  But by establishing a system whereby his successor 
could have been identified and prepared beforehand, Henderson could have better 
prepared that individual and ensured that his priorities and initiatives were continued 
after his exit.  Such prior preparation might have also minimized the impact of drastic or 
general changes to the unit when a new leader suddenly assumed command. 
Third, although Henderson had always kept his superiors advised of his reforms 
and ideas, the initiative to pursue those goals remained on his shoulders and 
consequently died with him.  Through sheer force of personality coupled with longevity, 
Henderson remained the single most influential person for modernizing the Corps during 
this period.  Although he continuously pushed from below, seldom did his superiors in 
the Navy Department get behind his initiatives and make them truly their own.  With a 
little effort beforehand, Henderson might have used his influence to win greater support 
for his ideas within Congress and the Navy Department.  By gaining support of his 
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initiatives in the Navy Department and among its senior political and military leaders, 
Henderson could have better ensured that his ideas would survive his absence.  
Establishing such support would have aligned his efforts to improve the military value of 
the Corps with the actual requirements of the Navy.   
Following Henderson‟s death, the appointing of John Harris as the new 
commandant had great consequences for the Marine Corps during the Civil War.  The 
positive momentum established by Henderson slowed to a halt and in some ways 
reversed itself.  Although Harris made no significant changes in the administering of the 
Corps from the policies set by Henderson, it nonetheless soon became apparent that the 
new Commandant had different priorities.  Harris proved less interested in the roles and 
missions Henderson experimented with and more concerned with returning to the 
traditional methods of employing Marines.  Disagreements over the training and 
preparing of new Marines occurred almost immediately between Harris and his Adjutant 
and Inspector, Major Henry Ball Tyler, Sr.  Major Tyler believed Harris was diluting 
Henderson‟s initiatives, and he attempted to get Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey to 
side with him.  A civilian official with extensive political experience in several offices 
(congressman, state governor, and U.S. Attorney General), Toucey had little 
understanding of the Navy, and even less of the Marines and land warfare.  Therefore, 
Toucey simply distanced himself from the argument, essentially allowing Harris to 
follow his own priorities.6  As the differences between Harris‟ lack of vision and 
Henderson‟s accomplishments grew, it created friction between advocates of 
Henderson‟s initiatives and the new commandant who ignored them.   
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These differences in operational concept became more apparent during the 
Secession Crisis.  Facing pressures produced by significant resignations and desertions, 
the already understrength U.S. Army found itself without sufficient manpower to 
provide garrisons for some of the critical forts that protected the nation‟s capital region.  
Rightly concerned, the Secretary of War requested assistance from the Marine Corps and 
Secretary Toucey agreed.  Toucey directed Harris to provide Marines for two vital 
fortifications, but the Commandant only grudgingly assigned troops to that duty.  Instead 
of building upon these deployments, and seeking to expand the Marine Corps to fulfill 
them, Harris took the opposite tack and argued for the Marines‟ relief from the 
assignments.  Although the crisis provided the Corps with a golden opportunity to curry 
political favor and quite possibly gain additional structure, Harris contended it was not a 
Marine Corps mission and convinced Toucey to allow him to withdraw the forces.  The 
opportunity soon passed, but Harris had made it known that he did not favor employing 
his men with the Army, as his predecessor had done.7 
Meanwhile, the Secession Crisis further tested the leadership of Commandant 
Harris, and found him lacking.  Officers began leaving the Corps in great numbers, and 
Harris may have exacerbated the situation.  Some officers might have been prompted to 
leave in part due to personal conflicts with Harris, or as a result of lack of confidence in 
his leadership.  A few highly valued and experienced officers with few ties to the South 
resigned their commissions.  Some of them joined the Confederate military and became 
valued leaders in their own right.  Their loss both hurt the USMC at a time of need and 
benefitted their new units.  During the crisis, the U.S. Marine Corps suffered from the 
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sudden loss of over 50 percent of its seasoned company-grade officers, the largest 
percentage loss of all the American military services.  Harris may have contributed to the 
scope of that loss, and he certainly did little to stem it.  
In addition, only when directed to do so by the incoming Secretary of the Navy, 
Gideon Welles, did Harris form a battalion for land service with the Army.  However, 
where in the past Henderson had assigned experienced Marines to the unit as a way of 
best ensuring its combat capabilities and increasing its likelihood of success, Harris 
filled it instead with new recruits who had little or no experience.  Many were issued 
their weapons for the first time only days before departing for the battlefield.  As a 
result, the battalion performed just as poorly in combat as the equally raw and 
inadequately prepared volunteer and militia units it served beside at the first Battle of 
Bull Run.  For their part, many senior military commanders expected more from a 
regular military unit, and the Marine battalion‟s substandard performance disappointed 
them.8   
Although clearly responsible in part for the unit‟s substandard performance, 
Harris instead implied that the battalion‟s failure was due to the Marines being employed 
contrary to their traditional roles and missions.  He asked Secretary Welles to not allow 
Marines to serve with the Army in the future and curtly requested to reassign the 
remaining battalion personnel “to their more legitimate duties in the Corps.”9  It is worth 
mentioning that, despite sometimes dire shortages of soldiers, the Army did not again 
call on the Marines to provide a battalion or regiment for land service during the 
remainder of the war.  
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If Harris thought that the issue of forming Marine battalions would simply go 
away, he was soon dispelled of that notion.  From the time that the first naval blockading 
squadrons were formed early in the war, the commanders of those organizations 
consistently and repeatedly requested larger Marine combat formations to assist them in 
the prosecution of their operations.  Almost every squadron commander asked that he be 
provided with such a unit at one point or another, several even specifying that the 
Marines be specially trained to conduct amphibious landings.10  Many of these senior 
Navy leaders had been guided by their experiences with Marine battalions in operations 
during the Mexican War, where such units had proven their utility in many situations.  It 
was another opportunity missed not only by Commandant Harris, but also by Secretary 
Welles.  Senior Marine leaders continued to comply only grudgingly with requests for 
battalion units, arguing that they had insufficient manpower to provide them, essentially 
prioritizing naval requests for larger units below even the need to provide Marines for 
garrison barracks commands located far from the field of battle.  After being dissatisfied 
by Harris‟ inadequacies, Welles would have been fully justified in relieving him as 
Commandant.  Yet he did not, and the Corps limped along at a reduced level of 
efficiency.  
When their appeals for Marine battalions were turned down, frustrated squadron 
commanders usually turned to their own assets and created their own Marine battalions 
out of their several organic ships‟ detachments.  Although the forming of such ad hoc 
units was less effective than if purpose-built Marine battalions had been trained and 
provided, squadron commanders‟ efforts in building their own ad hoc Marine units 
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confirmed an important point:  it validated the operational requirement for Marine 
battalions within the squadron structure.  To the various squadron commanders, the 
requirement for tactical Marine units, even less-efficient, temporary ones, outweighed 
the requirement to maintain small Marine detachments aboard each ship.  As the 
operational commanders offshore demonstrated, the combat needs of the squadrons 
should have been taken into account and filled as a matter of the highest priority.  
Instead, senior Marine leaders were allowed to essentially ignore the demands of the 
squadrons as they continued to fill instead the less efficient detachments.  Again, fault 
lay with Harris - - but also with Secretary Welles for not replacing Harris with someone 
who would have at least tried to meet the needs of the Navy.     
On this key point, the Marine Corps failed to live up to the Navy‟s expectations 
as defined by the various squadron commanders.  Harris and his successor, Jacob Zeilin, 
equally uninterested in forming larger, tactical Marine units, routinely cited chronic 
manpower shortages as a rationale for not providing landing battalions.  But manpower 
was not the problem as much as where the Marines were serving and the duties they 
performed.  Several battalions might have been formed if the Marines had moved men 
from the various barracks commands or from ships unlikely to be engaged in combat, 
but Harris and his senior officers never entertained that option.  Eventually, through 
constant repetition, even the Navy Secretary became convinced of Harris‟ rationale for 
why the Commandant could not provide battalions.   
It is important to understand that from its inception the Confederate States 
Marine Corps (CSMC) purposefully adopted a radically different structure than that of 
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the American Marines.  When the South created its own Marine Corps, it deviated 
significantly from the existing Federal unit and instead crafted a tactical structure that 
proved more adaptable, flexible, and efficient than that of the USMC.  The CSMC 
adopted the company as its basic tactical unit, and located them with its naval squadrons.  
Depending on analysis of the military situation, separate companies could be rapidly 
combined to form battalions when needed, and were just as easily redeployed to higher 
priority assignments.  This innovative employment concept and structure allowed the 
CSMC to achieve significant results with the few men it had available.  Detachments 
served on board warships when needed, leaving it up to the company commander, in 
consultation with the supported squadron commander, to best determine the distribution 
and hand-select the men to fill posts.  Importantly, the company (or battalion) 
commander could better supervise both unit training and the combat employment of his 
forces, and the organization benefitted from having an established chain of command, 
standardized procedures, and a more keen awareness by the leaders of the individual and 
collective strengths and weaknesses of the Marines they led.  Therefore, the CSMC‟s 
employment scheme proved more modern, efficient, and effective than the antiquated 
system of fielding individual detachments that Harris and his successors stubbornly 
clung to throughout the Civil War.11  
Comparison of the USMC‟s structure with that of other marine units reinforces 
the point.  The British Royal Marines had long before adopted a company-based 
structure.  Furthermore, the British added artillery companies to the mix, providing 
increased combat support for its field units.  Similarly, Harris‟ and Welles‟ errors meant 
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that the U.S. military lacked authorized units organized, trained and employed for 
amphibious operations, leading the U.S. Army in the Mississippi River Valley to create 
its own force, the Mississippi Marine Brigade.  However, the failure of the Army to 
coordinate its effort with the Navy, and its over-reliance on a civilian contractor for the 
experiment‟s execution led to problems that prompted the Army to dissolve the unit.12  
In any event, the experiment once again validated the concept of a combined arms 
combat force trained in amphibious warfare within the U.S. military structure, a need 
that would go unfilled for some time. 
Some scholars have discounted historical criticism of the Marine Corps during 
the Civil War by focusing on the remarkable performance of the individuals themselves 
in undertaking the missions assigned to them.  Specifically addressing the performance 
of the Marine battalion at the First Battle of Bull Run, historian David Sullivan asserts 
that it “performed as well as, if not better than, any other military organization thrown 
into the battle.”  He makes a similar argument that the courageous individual action of 
Marines throughout the war “was equal to any who have borne the title „United States 
Marine.‟”13  With regard to individual performance in combat, the issue was never in 
doubt:  Federal records contain ample testimony of the heroic actions of Marines and 
sailors in the hundreds of engagements they participated in during the Civil War.  The 
real issue is whether the Marines were well-organized, trained, and equipped for the 
missions expected of them by both Army and Navy commanders:  the simple answer is 
that they were not.   
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Sullivan misses that point completely in his analysis.  Yet he rationalizes the 
consequent cracking of the Bull Run battalion in battle as being caused by the unit being 
manned by “incompletely trained, callow youths.”14  Clearly, the failure of the unit to 
perform to expectations belonged with the commander who purposely formed the 
battalion with the rawest of recruits, rather than filling it with experienced Marines.  In 
creating that battalion, Harris deviated from previous similar experiences by not filling 
the ranks with veterans, making it appear that the manning of individual ships‟ 
detachments occupied a higher priority status in his mind.  In any event, Harris‟ action 
likely doomed the unit to failure, and for that decision the Commandant should be held 
accountable. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as Sullivan is correct in asserting that “the stigma” of the 
Marine‟s performance at Bull Run “was a disgrace to the honor and traditions” of the 
Corps and “completely unwarranted,” he cannot discount the damage that was done to 
the Corps‟ reputation at the time or how the incident came to shape Army-Marine 
relations throughout the remainder of the war.  He mentions the sting of Harris‟ own 
assessment of the Marines‟ performance, but does not point out that Harris did little to 
set the record straight, and that the Commandant used the event to his own ends.15  
Harris clearly hoped to avoid future commitments to support the Army, believing it not a 
valid mission for Marines.  
Surprisingly, none of the previous studies of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Civil 
War have analyzed in what ways senior leaders outside the Marine Corps also bear 
responsibility for the Corps‟ failings in the war.  The Marine Corps was an element of 
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the Navy Department, and the Secretary of the Navy was ultimately responsible for that 
service to the same degree as he was responsible for the Navy itself.  Yet although it is 
clear that Gideon Welles felt frustrated in the performance of Harris and several other 
senior Marine officers, the secretary failed to take corrective action to the same degree 
that he did within the Navy.  In the latter service Welles justifiably relieved several 
officers from their commands when he became concerned over their performance and 
how it might affect the war.  Yet despite the many indicators that he disapproved of 
actions of Harris and other senior Marines, the Secretary still refused to relieve them.  
Only when Harris died in office did Welles take the time to deliberate on the situation, 
mulling in his diary that the choices of successors were not good.16  And when he did 
decide on a replacement for Harris, he did not dig deep enough into the ranks to affect 
any major change in the administering of the Corps, selecting a man who proved almost 
as conservative as Harris. 
  By not correcting recognized deficiencies and fostering change within the 
Corps, Welles essentially abrogated his responsibilities over the service.  As head of the 
Navy Department, Welles held responsibility not only for everything the Corps did or 
failed to do, but also to synchronize that service‟s efforts with that of the Navy to ensure 
that the Corps was best meeting its obligations.  But during the war, his subordinate 
operational commanders repeatedly provided specific notice of what their expectations 
were of Marines under their command, and the Corps failed to meet them.  Welles also 
failed:  he did little to fix the Corps‟ problems, thereby perpetuating them.  For that 
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reason alone Welles deserves a share in the blame for the Corps‟ failures to adapt and 
meet the challenges of better supporting the war effort. 
Sullivan also misses a major point by asserting that “only the limitations of the 
law prevented the Corps from taking a more active part in the conflict.”  He correctly 
identifies that the Navy was levying more manpower demands on the Corps than the 
Marines could ever fill with their current structure.  Once again, Archibald Henderson 
had previously demonstrated that in wartime Congress could agree to expand the Corps.  
And since the Civil War provided greater national stresses than the Mexican War had, it 
further increased the chances that the Marine Corps would expand.  Sullivan astutely 
posits that had the Corps been authorized more Marines, the Navy would have found 
ways to employ new units.17  However, this assumption collides with the reality that 
previous expansions had been predicated on the assumption of new roles and missions 
for the Marines, the exact situation that Harris and others were avoiding.  Although the 
Corps did expand modestly during the war, the added structure was used to fill vacancies 
in detachments on board ships, and not employed in forming larger units as advocated by 
naval squadron commanders. 
Furthermore, other leadership failings were not taken into account.  During the 
Civil War, due to limitations on enlistment bonuses and time of service, the Marine 
Corps never recruited to its authorized level, nor could it hold onto its men when they 
were recruited.  The Corps consistently had one of the highest rates of desertion among 
the services.  These recruiting and retention problems are yet another indicator of 
leadership failings and a lack of institutional imagination and innovation.  Little effort 
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was made to solve the old problems of recruiting in new ways, such as expanding its 
recruiting base or recruiting African Americans, as both other services did.  Instead, the 
Corps continued to recruit as it always had, with predictably poor results.  Besides, from 
the start when presented with ideal opportunities to increase the Corps‟ structure, when 
Marines were requested to garrison forts and form new units for service with the Army, 
the Marine leadership fought against those assignments and argued it was not their job.  
With that response, who could blame Congress for quite reasonably looking elsewhere to 
gain the needed forces?  Besides, if the Marine Corps would have been given extra 
personnel, Harris might have simply used them to fill out more detachments for ships 
and to top off barracks commands, his top two manpower priorities.    
The magnitude of the opportunity that the Marines missed was great and likely 
set back the Corps‟ development for several decades.  As for the increased demands by 
the Navy for Marines, the very nature of their blockading mission placed the naval 
vessels and personnel in close proximity with the enemy for extended periods of time.  
Furthermore, blockading drew the U.S. Navy into the rivers and ports of the Southern 
coastline, forcing it to fight in the littorals.  Squadron commanders needed military 
forces familiar with naval combat that could move ashore and fight enemy soldiers on 
and near their own coasts.  As the war developed, so did the necessity of seizing ports, 
towns, and transportation facilities to deny their use to the Confederacy.  These 
operations required forces greater in size to those of the enemy they faced, and the 
Marines were initially ideally positioned to fill that niche.  However, with the Corps‟ 
senior leaders committed to fighting primarily as a collection of detachments from 
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several vessels, their self-imposed limits led the Navy to instead seek Army troops.  As a 
result, the Marines‟ failure to recognize the opportunity and adapt to changing combat 
requirements doomed their effort to mostly peripheral, small-unit actions conducted 
within larger operations. 
One positive benefit of the Corps‟ assignments and performance during the war 
is that it fostered within a new generation of leaders the sense of purpose to correct the 
several deficiencies that they observed and experienced within their organization.  The 
nature of the employment of Marines left the combat actions predominantly in the hands 
of the younger and more junior officers.  The senior officers of the Corps largely 
avoided active field service throughout the war, with several notable exceptions.  As the 
combat experiences of the “new breed” of leaders soon vastly exceeded that of the old, 
many of these company-grade officers met and shared their ideas about improvements 
they felt should be made, and were mostly rebuffed by their seniors.  Those same 
officers also discussed their situations and opinions with officers from other services 
whom they fought alongside, and some began to actively correspond with others of like 
mind, sharing their thoughts within a larger forum and presenting suggestions for 
improvements to the Corps.18   
After the war, these same officers continued to correspond, meet, and sometimes 
heatedly debate the several problems that they observed within the Marine Corps, both 
operationally and professionally.  They intended to improve the warfighting capabilities 
of the Corps and to increase the level of professionalism, particularly within the officer 
ranks.  Some made frequent use of the early military journals and public newspapers as a 
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forum for exchanging and refining their ideas for changes within a larger and broader 
audience of men from all services.  Their collective sense of frustration over the lack of 
influence that they had in the decision-making process became increasingly evident in 
their writings and particularly in some of the bold recommendations they proposed.  One 
even went so far as to propose that if the Marine Corps did not fix its evident 
weaknesses, then the organization should be disbanded.19 
Eventually, that same generation of officers who cut their teeth in combat as 
detachment and company commanders during the Civil War gained seniority and the 
consequent power to make the changes that many believed were long needed.  It is these 
officers who become the force for reform that historian Jack Shulimson refers to in his 
studies of military professionalism at the end of the nineteenth century.  According to 
Shulimson, the Corps‟ own push toward increased officer professionalism rested on two 
separate strains.  The first consisted of a refining of the “outward traits that characterized 
most professionals.”  That refinement began even before the Civil War, but it was a slow 
process, indeed.  But many Marine officers had long clamored for increased 
professionalism.  The second strain involved the creating within the Navy‟s structure and 
mission a “professional jurisdiction that the Marine Corps had to carve out for itself,” 
essentially refining its mission within the Navy Department‟s overall role.20  One of the 
main purposes of this dissertation has been to show that both elements of that process 
were in place and active during the Civil War period.21  Essentially, that search for a 
mission and the impetus for increasing the overall level of professionalism within the 
Corps may be one of that unit‟s greatest legacies that arose from the conflict. 
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What are Marines for?  That question has been asked in various ways for most of 
the Marine Corps‟ existence, and is indeed raised on occasion even into the twenty-first 
century.  But the greatest era of uncertainty over the question may have been during 
America‟s most deadly and demanding war of all – the Civil War.  During that conflict, 
that same question was raised many times by a wide variety of military and political 
leaders, often in frustration, and cut to the quick of some of the Corps‟ most fundamental 
problems.  And most tellingly, there were probably as many distinct answers to the 
query as there were people posing it.  John Harris and Jacob Zeilin would have answered 
it quite differently than the Navy‟s most illustrious squadron commanders, John 
Dahlgren, Samuel DuPont, David Dixon Porter, or David G. Farragut.  Archibald 
Henderson could have answered that question quite forcefully.  Unfortunately for the 
Corps itself, some of its junior leaders like Robert Huntington, Henry Clay Cochrane, 
Louis Fagan, and future Commandant Charles McCawley would most likely have 
answered the question more along the lines of DuPont and Dahlgren than like Harris or 
Zeilin.  But despite the fact that the real issue of what the Marine Corps‟ roles and 
missions should be -- expeditionary units and power projection ashore -- would not be 
realized for decades to come, thanks to their wartime experiences, a new generation of 
leaders resolved themselves to answering it. 
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1 This analysis is based on the data contained in War Department, “Army Register, 
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Military History, 2 vols., James C. Bradford, ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishing, Ltd., 2010), 1:  388-90, quote from 388. 
 
3 Henderson to Secretary of the Navy Mahlon Dickerson, Headquarters Marine Corps, 
Washington, D.C., 7 October 1834, Record Group (hereafter abbreviated as RG) 
127 (Field Organization Records, Records of the United States Marine Corps), 
Entry 4 (“Letters Sent, August 1798- June 1810 and March 1804- February 
1884”) (hereafter “Letters Sent 1798-1884”), National Archives and Records 
Administration, Washington, D.C. (hereafter abbreviated as NA). 
 
4 Joseph G. Dawson III, “With Fidelity and Effectiveness:  Archibald Henderson‟s 
Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps,” Journal of Military History 62 
(October 1998), 727-753. 
 
5 Details of the Navy‟s experimentation with new and emerging technologies can be 
found in Chapter II. 
 
6 For examples, see Henry B. Tyler, Sr., to Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey, HQMC, 
26 April 1859 and 1 December 1860, with Toucey‟s notes and endorsements, RG 
80 (General Records of the Department of the Navy, Records of the Secretary of 
the Navy), Entry 14 (Letters from the Commandant and Other Officers of the 
Marine Corps), NA.  Several other examples of the exchange of correspondence 
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8  Secretary of War Simon Cameron to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, War Dept., 
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Officers of the Marine Corps), NA. 
 
10 For example, both Admiral Samuel F. DuPont and his successor, Admiral John 
Dahlgren requested such units, as did Admiral Stephen P. Lee.  See Chapter VII 
for details.  
 
11 For a detailed analysis of the CSMC‟s employment scheme and its benefits, see 
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Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1993), passim; Jack Shulimson, “Military 
Professionalism:  The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880-1898,” 
Journal of Military History 60 (April 1996), 231-42, quotes from 241.    
 
21 See the discussion of the push for reforms among junior Marine officers in Chapter 
VIII. 
  
376
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
Primary Sources 
Archives. 
Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greeneville, Delaware.   
Henry Francis DuPont Collection of Winterthur Manuscripts (Mss 9-1050). 
Illinois State Historical Library.  Springfield, Illinois. 
Crandall Warren Daniel Collection. 
Amos W. Bellows Diary. 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 Civil War Photographs Collection. 
 Geography and Map Division. 
 Manuscripts Division. 
Accession 438 (C.S.N. Miscellaneous Papers). 
Cartter Family Papers. 
David D. Porter Family Collection. 
Francis and George Gardner Papers. 
Gideon Welles Collection. 
Harrison Family Papers Collection.  
Rodgers Family Papers.  
Winfield Scott Papers. 
 Naval Historical Foundation Papers. 
  
377
 
 John A. Dahlgren Papers.  Letter Book C, 28 August – 10 October 1863. 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.  
Record Group 24 (Bureau of Naval Personnel, Deck Logs). 
Muster Rolls of the United States Marine Corps. 
Muster Rolls of United States Ships. 
Record Group 45 (Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and  
 Library).    
 Board of Naval Commissioners to the Secretary of the Navy, 1815-1842. 
“Letters Sent.”   
Court Martial Records. 
  Confidential Letter Book of the Secretary of the Navy. 
  “Home Squadron Letters.” 
  “Record of Confidential Letters.” 
  Subject File VR, “United States Marine Corps.”   
________.  Record Group 80 (General Records of the Department of the Navy, Records  
   of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy). 
  Entry 1:  “Letters to the Commandant and Other Officers  
   of the Marine Corps.”  (“Letters Sent”).   
Entry 7:  “Copies of Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to the  
 Commandant and Officers of the Marine Corps.” ("Letters Sent"). 
Entry 14:  “Letters From the Commandant and Other Officers of the 
Marine Corps, January 1828 - December 1886.” (“Letters  
  
378
 
Received”).   
________.  Record Group 94 (Records of the Adjutant General‟s Office, 1780s to  
  1917).  
Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Soldiers Who Served During the 
Mexican War in Organizations from the State of Florida. 
________.  Record Group 107 (Records of the Office of the Secretary of War). 
“Military Books,” Book no. 45, 1 July – 31 August 1861. 
________.  Record Group 109 (War Department Collection of Confederate Records). 
  “Collected Bound Records of Confederate Executive, Legislative, and  
   Judicial Offices (“Rebel Archives”), 1860-65.” 
    Chapter II (Military Commands). 
  Entry 12:  “Letters Received, Adjutant & Inspector General.” 
  Entry 193:  “Compiled Military Service Records.” 
Part 1 (Staff Officer Files). 
  Entry 379:  “Auxiliary Register No. 4, New Orleans, La.” 
________.  Record Group 125 (Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General). 
  Entry 57:  “Records of the Proceedings of Marine Retiring Boards.” 
________.   Record Group 127 (Field Organization Records, Records of the United  
  States Marine Corps).     
Correspondence Files:   
“Office of the Commandant, 1798-1939.”   
“Letters Received - Adjutant and Inspector‟s Department.”   
  
379
 
“Paymaster‟s Department (1808-1909).”   
“Records of the Quartermaster‟s Department.”   
Entry 4:  “Letters Sent, August 1798 - June 1810 and March 1804 -  
 February 1884.”  (“Letters Sent, 1798 - 1884”). 
Entry 10:  “General Records.”  
Entry  42:  “Letters Received, 1818-1915.”  (“Letters Received”).  
Entry 153:  “Journal of Marine Battalion Under Lt. Col. Robert W.  
 Huntington, 1898.” 
“Letters From the Quartermaster of the Corps.”  
“Letters Received by the Adjutant and Inspector.” 
“Letters Received – GR.” 
“Letters Received – HD.” 
  Marine Corps Maps and Photographs. 
  Muster Rolls of the USMC, 1798-1940. 
  “Orders Issued and Received, HQMC, August 1798 - February 1886.” 
   “Marine Corps Orders, 1815-1822.”  
“Marine Corps Orders, 1851-1884.”   
   “Orders and Circulars Issued by the Commandant, 1805-1860.”   
________.  Still Picture Records Section, Special Media Archives Services Division. 
National Archives, United Kingdom. 
 Out Letters Relating to Marines, 1755 – 1756. 
 Privy Council Register, January, 1754 – December 1755. 
  
380
 
New York Historical Society, New York, N.Y. 
 Gustavus Vasa Fox Collection. 
New York Public Library, New York, N.Y. 
 Offsite Collections. 
  Edwin North McClellan, Materials and Sources of “History of the United  
   States Marine Corps.”  Unpublished Manuscript. 
New York State Archives, Albany, N.Y. 
Robert Galbraith Papers. 
U.S. Army Military History Institute.  Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 
Civil War Miscellaneous Collection. 
U.S. Marine Corps Historical Division, Archives and Special Collections, Alfred M. 
Gray Research Center, Quantico, Va. 
Bartlett File (Henry A.). 
“Journal Kept by Lieut[enant] H[enry] A. Bartlett, U.S. Marine Corps.”  
 Broome Papers (John Lloyd). 
Cochrane Papers (Henry Clay).   
 Journal of Henry Clay Cochrane, USMC. 
 “Memorandum Book, 1865-1881.” 
Private pamphlet, The Status of the Marine Corps:  A Plan for its 
Reorganization.  Annapolis, MD:  privately printed, 1875.   
Danenhauer Ledger (Henry K.). 
Donnelly Papers (Ralph W.).   
  
381
 
  Unpublished manuscript, “Henderson Family History.” 
Unpublished manuscript, “38 Missing Marines.” 
Ferry Collection (Bernard). 
Fields Papers (Colonel Thomas Y., 1825-1905).   
Flayderman Papers (Norman). 
Graff Papers (Raymond). 
 Pamphlet, Internal Regulations of the U.S. Marine Barracks at  
  Annapolis, Maryland.  Annapolis, MD: privately printed, 1875. 
Harris Papers (John). 
Henderson Family Papers. 
Henderson Papers (Alexander). 
Henderson Papers (Archibald). 
Hitchcock Papers (Robert E.).   
 Huntington Papers (Robert W.).  
Jameson Papers (James).   
Jones Papers (Enoch).  
Maddox Papers (William A.T.). 
Meade Papers (Robert L.).  
 Unpublished manuscript, “Journal of Robert L. Meade.” 
Miller Papers (Samuel).  
Murdock Papers (John K.).   
O‟Conner Papers (Daniel).   
  
382
 
 “OV” File. 
 Rare Book Collection. 
Reid Papers (George C.).   
Ridell Papers (George).   
Sullivan Papers (David M.).   
 Tilton Papers (McLane). 
Tyler Papers (Henry Ball, Jr.). 
“ZB” Biographical File. 
Zeilin Papers (Jacob). 
U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.   
 Early History Branch.  Collection:  Early Navy Biographical (“ZB”) Files. 
 Photographic Branch. 
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Va. 
James W. Albright Diary.   
Armistead, Blanton, and Wallace Family Papers.   
Bolton Family Papers. 
Civil War Diary Collection.      
Civil War Photograph Collection.   
Conolly Diary, Thomas Conolly Papers. 
Giles Buckner Cooke Papers. 
Drewry‟s Bluff (1864) Collection.   
Ezell Family Papers. 
  
383
 
James Henry Fleming Papers. 
Jeremy Gilmer Map Collection.   
Harkins Family Papers. 
Joseph E[ggleston] Johnston Letter (Mss1 W4597 e 38). 
Keith Family Papers. 
Lee Family Papers. 
Mason Family Papers. 
 Minor Family Papers.   
John K. Mitchell Papers. 
Edwin Anderson Penick Diary. 
Rochelle Family Papers. 
Section 4:  “Commonplace Book of J[ames]. H[enry]. Rochelle.” 
 John Simmons Shipp Diary. 
Smith Family Correspondence. 
Sneden‟s Map and Diary. 
Thom Family Papers.  
United Confederate Veterans Collection.  
 
Published Primary Sources. 
Basler, Roy P., ed.  The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln.  9 vols.  New Brunswick, 
NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 1953. 
  
384
 
Church, Frank L.  Civil War Marine:  A Diary of the Red River Expedition, 1864.  Edited 
and annotated by James P. Jones and Edward F. Keuchel.  Washington, D.C.:  
History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1975.  
Colston, R. E. “Watching the „Merrimac[k]‟.”  The Century 29 (March 1885), 764-65. 
Dahlgren, Madeleine V., ed.  Memoir of Admiral John A. Dahlgren, Rear-Admiral, 
United States Navy.  New York:  Charles L. Webster & Company, 1891.   
DuPont, Samuel F.  Samuel Francis DuPont:  A Selection from his Civil War Letters.  
John D. Hayes, ed.  3 vols.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1969. 
Fox, Gustavus Vasa.  Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox:  Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, 1861-1865.  Robert Means Thompson and Richard 
Wainwright, eds.  2 vols.  New York:  Naval History Society, 1918-19. 
Goldsborough, Charles Washington, ed., The United States’ Naval Chronicle.  
Washington City [D.C.]:  James Wilson, 1824. 
Greene, Commander Samuel Dana.  “In the Monitor Turret.”  The Century 29 (March 
1885), 754-63. 
Green[e], Israel.  “The Capture of John Brown.”  North American Review 141 
(December 1885), 564-69. 
Harris, John, Compiler.  Letters from Naval Officers in Reference to the United States 
Marine Corps.  Washington, D.C.:  Franck Taylor, 1864.   
Hayes, John D., ed.  “The Battle of Port Royal Ferry, S.C., With the Entry for New 
Year‟s Eve and Day 1862, From the Journal of John Sanford Barnes.”  New York 
Historical Society Quarterly 47 (April 1963), 109-36. 
  
385
 
Hayes, John D. and Lillian O‟Brien, eds.  “The Early Blockade and the Capture of the 
Hatteras Forts, From the Journal of John Sanford Barnes, July 19 to September 1, 
1861.”  New York Historical Society Quarterly 46 (January 1962), 61-85. 
Keeler, William Frederick.  Aboard the USS Monitor, 1862:  The Letters of Acting 
Paymaster William Frederick Keeler, U.S. Navy, to his Wife, Anna.  Robert W. 
Daly, ed.  Annapolis, MD:  United States Naval Institute, 1964. 
Lamb, William.  “The Defense of Fort Fisher.”  Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.  
Robert Johnson and C. C. Buel, eds.  4 vols.  New York:  Century Co., 1887.  4:  
642-54.     
________.  “Fort Fisher:  The Battles Fought There in 1864 and ‟65.”  Southern 
Historical Society Papers 21 (1893), 257-90. 
Niles, Hezekiah.  Niles’ National Register.  75 vols.  Philadelphia (and numerous other 
locations), 1811-1836. 
Parker, William Harwar.  Recollections of a Naval Officer.  New York:  C. Scribners‟ 
Sons, 1883. 
Peet, Frederick Tomlinson.  Civil War Letters and Documents of Frederick Tomlinson 
Peet.  Newport, R.I.: Printed by the author, 1917. 
________.  Personal Experiences in the Civil War.  New York:  Printed by the author, 
1905.  
Polk, James K.  Diary of James K. Polk.  Milo M. Quaife, ed.  4 vols.  Chicago:  
McClurg Co., 1910. 
  
386
 
Porter, David Dixon.  The Naval History of the Civil War.  [1886], reprinted by 
Minneola, NY:  Dover Publications, 1998. 
Remey, Charles M., ed.  Life and Letters of Rear Admiral George Collier Remey, United 
States Navy, 1841 – 1928.  10 vols.  Washington, D.C.:  Charles Mason Remey, 
1939. 
Reynolds, John G.  Proceedings of a Marine General Court Martial, Convened at 
Washington City, May 7, 1862, for the Trial of Lieut. Col. John Geo. Reynolds, 
U.S. Marine Corps.  Washington, D.C.: Henry Polkinhorn, Printer, 1862. 
Scharf, John Thomas.  History of the Confederate States Navy from its Organization to 
The Surrender of its Last Vessel.  New York:  Rogers & Sherwood, 1887. 
Semmes, Raphael.  Memoirs of Service Afloat, During the War Between the States.  
 Baltimore:  Kelly, Piet & Co., 1869. 
Welles, Gideon.  Diary of Gideon Welles:  Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and 
Johnson.  Thaddeus Welles, ed.  3 vols.  Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1911. 
________.  Diary of Gideon Welles:  Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson.  
Howard K. Beale, ed.  3 vols.   New York:  W.W. Norton & Co., 1960.  
Wood, John Taylor.  “The First Fight of the Iron-Clads.”  The Century 29, issue 5 
(March 1885), 738-54. 
 
Official Published Documents and Reports. 
Confederate States of America.  Acts and Resolutions of the First Session of the 
  
387
 
 Provisional Congress of the Confederate States held at Montgomery, Ala.  
 Richmond, VA:  Enquirer Book and Job Press by Tyler, Wise, Allegre and 
Smith, 1861. 
________.  Acts and Resolutions of the Second Session of the Provisional Congress of 
the Confederate States held at Montgomery, Ala.  Richmond, VA:  Enquirer 
Book and Job Press by Tyler, Wise, Allegre and Smith, 1861. 
________.  Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865.  
 7 vols.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1904-1905.  
________.  Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the 
Confederate States, to January 1, 1863.  Richmond, VA:  MacFarlane & 
Fergusson, 1863. 
________.  Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the 
  Confederate States of America, to January 1, 1864.  Richmond, VA:   
  MacFarlane & Fergusson, 1864. 
________.  Register of the Officers of the Confederate States Navy, 1862.  Richmond, 
VA:  Enquirer Book and Job Press, 1862. 
________.  Regulations for the Navy of the Confederate States, 1862.  Richmond, VA:  
 MacFarlane & Fergusson, 1862. 
________.  The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the 
Second Session of the First Congress; 1862.  Edited by James M. Matthews.  
Richmond, VA:  R. M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1862. 
  
388
 
Maryland State Senate.  Correspondence Related to the Insurrection at Harper’s Ferry, 
17th October, 1859 (Document Y).  Annapolis, MD:  B.H. Richardson, 1860. 
U.S. Congress.  American State Papers.  38 vols.  Washington, D.C.:  Gales and Seaton, 
1832-1861.  
________.  Annals of Congress.  18 vols.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO. 
________.  Congressional Globe.  44 vols.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO. 
________.  Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789.  34 vols.  Washington, 
D.C.:  GPO, 1904-1937. 
________.  Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of 
America.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO. 
________.  Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States of America.  
Washington, D.C.:  GPO. 
________.  Journal of the Senate of the United States of America.  Washington, D.C.:  
GPO. 
________.  The Public Statutes at Large for the United States of America (Statutes at 
Large).  18 vols.  Boston:  Little, Brown.   
________.  U.S. Congressional Serial Set.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO. 
U.S. Government.   1860 U.S. Census, Population Schedule.  Microform Publication 
M653.  Roll 103.  National Archives and Records Administration. 
________.  Register of the Officers and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United 
States, for the Year 1860.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1860. 
U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Personal Papers Catalog.  Charles Anthony Wood, 
  
389
 
compiler.  Washington, D.C.:  Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 
1974.   
U.S. Naval History Division.  Civil War Naval Chronology, 1861-1865.  Naval History 
Division, Navy Department.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1971.   
U.S. Navy Department.  Laws Relating to the Navy and Marine Corps, and the Navy 
Department.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1865. 
________.  Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the  
 War of the Rebellion.  30 vols. and index. Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1894-1922. 
U.S. War Department.  The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War.  By George B.  
 Davis, Leslie J. Perry and Joseph W. Kirkley; Calvin D. Cowles, comp.   
 [1983].  New York:  Barnes and Noble Books, 2003. 
________.  The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records  
 of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 vols. and atlas. Washington, D.C.:   
 GPO, 1880-1901. 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals. 
The Age.  Richmond, VA.  
American Advocate.  Hallowell, ME. 
Army and Navy Journal.  New York, NY. 
The Century.  New York, NY. 
Chronicle and Sentinel (Daily).  Augusta, GA. 
City of Washington Gazette.  Washington, D.C. 
  
390
 
Daily Evening Bulletin.  Philadelphia, PA. 
Evening Star.  Washington, D.C. 
Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper.  New York, NY. 
Gazette.  Alexandria, VA. 
Herald.  New York, NY. 
Harper’s Weekly.  New York, NY. 
Ledger.  New Albany, NY. 
Mercury.  Charleston, SC. 
National Advocate.  New York, NY. 
National Intelligencer.  Washington, D.C. 
Newport Mercury.  Newport, RI. 
New York Times.  New York, NY. 
 Philadelphia Inquirer.  Philadelphia, PA. 
Picayune.  (Daily and Weekly).   New Orleans, LA. 
Scientific American.  New York, NY. 
Sioux Falls Argus Leader.  Sioux Falls, SD. 
Spectator.  New York, NY. 
Weekly Mail.  Montgomery, AL. 
 
Secondary Works 
Books, Publications and Extracts. 
Aldrich, M. Almy.  History of the United States Marine Corps.  Captain Richard S. 
  
391
 
Collum, comp.  Boston:  H. L. Shepard, 1875. 
Anderson, Bern.  By Sea and By River:  The Naval History of the Civil War.  Westport, 
CN:  Greenwood Press, [1962] 1977.  
Bauer, K. Jack.  The Mexican War, 1846-1848.  New York:  Macmillan, 1974.  
________.  Surfboats and Horse Marines:  U.S. Naval Operations in the Mexican War, 
1846-48.  Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1969. 
Blakeney, Jane.  Heroes, U.S. Marine Corps, 1861-1955.  Washington, D.C.:  Guthrie 
Lithograph, 1957. 
Bradford, James C., ed.  A Companion to American Military History, 2 vols.  Malden, 
MA:  Blackwell Publishing Co., 2010.  
________., ed.  Captains of the Old Steam Navy:  Makers of the American Naval 
Tradition, 1840-1880.  Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 
________., ed.  From Cannon and Cutlasses to Aircraft and Missiles:  Readings in the 
History of U.S. Seapower.  Mason, OH:  Thomson Custom Publishing, 2002. 
________., ed.  Quarterdeck & Bridge:  Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders.  
Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997. 
Brooks, Richard.  The Royal Marines, 1664 to the Present.  Annapolis, MD:  Naval 
Institute Press, 2002. 
Browning, Robert M.  From Cape Charles to Cape Fear:  The North Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron During the Civil War.  Tuscaloosa:  University of Alabama 
Press, 1993.     
Buker, George E.  Swamp Sailors:  Riverine Warfare in the Everglades, 1835-1842.  
  
392
 
Gainesville:  The University Presses of Florida, 1975.   
Callahan, Edward W.  List of Officers of the Navy of the United States and of the Marine 
Corps, 1775-1900.  New York:  L.R. Hamersly & Co., 1901.   
Canney, Donald L.  African Squadron:  The U.S. Navy and the African Slave Trade, 
1842-1861.  Washington, D.C.:  Potomac Books, 2006. 
Chapelle, Howard I.  Fulton’s “Steam Battery:” Blockship and Catamaran.  U.S. 
National Museum.  Bulletin 240.  Washington, D.C.:  Smithsonian Institution, 
1964. 
________.  The History of the American Sailing Navy.  New York:  W.W. Norton, 1949. 
Coker, Charles F. W.  Register of the Henry Clay Cochrane Papers, 1809-1957.  
Manuscript Register Series, no. 1.  Washington, D.C.:  Marine Corps Museum, 
1968. 
Colletta, Paolo E., ed.  American Secretaries of the Navy.  2 vols.  Annapolis, MD:  
Naval  
 Institute Press, 1980. 
Collum, Richard Strader.  History of the United States Marine Corps.  Philadelphia:  L. 
R. Hamersly, 1890.   
Cook, Adrian.  The Armies of the Streets:  The New York City Draft Riots of 1863.  
Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1974. 
Cox, Samuel S.  Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 1855-1885.  Providence, RI:  
J.A. & R.A. Reid Publishers, 1885. 
Donnelly, Ralph W.  Biographical Sketches of the Commissioned Officers of the 
  
393
 
 Confederate States Marine Corps.  [1973]; 3rd ed., edited by David Sullivan.  
Shippensburg, PA:  White Mane Books, 2001. 
________.  The Confederate States Marine Corps:  The Rebel Leathernecks.  
 Shippensburg, PA:  White Mane Books, 1989. 
Dudley, William S.  Going South:  U.S. Navy Officer Resignations and Dismissals on 
the Eve of the Civil War.  Washington D.C.:  Naval Historical Foundation, 1981.   
Ellsworth, Harry.  One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934.  
 [1934]; Reprinted, Washington, D.C.:  History and Museums Division, United 
States Marine Corps, 1974. 
Fuller, Howard J.  Clad in Iron:  The American Civil War and the Challenge of British 
Naval Power.  Westport, CN:  Praeger Press, 2008. 
Gragg, Rod.  Confederate Goliath:  The Battle for Fort Fisher.  New York:  Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1991. 
Hall, Claude H.  Abel Parker Upshur, Conservative Virginian, 1790-1844.  Madison:  
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964. 
Hearn, Chester G.  Admiral David Dixon Porter:  The Civil War Years.  Annapolis, MD:  
Naval Institute Press, 1996. 
________.  Ellet’s Brigade: The Strangest Outfit of All.  Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State 
University Press, 2000. 
________.  When the Devil Came Down to Dixie:  Ben Butler in New Orleans.  Baton 
Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1997. 
Heinl, Robert Debs.  Soldiers of the Sea:  The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962.  
  
394
 
[1962]; 2nd edition, Baltimore:  Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1991. 
Hogenboom, Ari.  Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008. 
Huntington, Samuel B.  The Soldier and the State:  The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations.  Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press of the Harvard University 
Press, 1957. 
Johnson, John.  The Defense of Charleston Harbor, 1863-1865.  [1889]; reprinted.  
Freeport, NY:  Books for Libraries Press, 1970. 
Leeman, William P. The Long Road to Annapolis:  The Founding of the Naval Academy 
and the Emerging American Republic.  Chapel Hill:  University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010. 
Mahon, John K.  History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842.  Revised edition.  
Gainesville:  University Presses of Florida, 1985. 
McKee, Christopher.  A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession:  The Creation of the  
 U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815.  Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 
1991. 
McPherson, James M.  Battle Cry of Freedom: the Civil War Era.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1988. 
Metcalf, Clyde Hill.  History of the United States Marine Corps.  New York:  G. P. 
Putnam‟s Sons, 1939.   
Millett, Allan R., and Jack Shulimson, eds.  Commandants of the United States Marine  
 Corps.  Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 2004. 
  
395
 
Millett, Allan R.  Semper Fidelis:  The History of the United States Marine Corps.  
[1980]; Revised and expanded edition, New York:  Free Press, 1991. 
Moskin, J. Robert.  The U.S. Marine Corps Story.  [1977]; Revised edition, New York:  
McGraw – Hill Book Co., 1982. 
Moten, Matthew.  The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession.  
College Station, TX:  Texas A&M University Press, 2000. 
Nalty, Bernard C.  “At All Times Ready . . .;” The United States Marines at Harper’s 
Ferry and in the Civil War.  Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet.  
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, 
D.C., 1966. 
________.  The Barrier Forts:  A Battle, a Monument, and a Mythical Marine.  Marine 
Corps Historical Reference Series, No. 6.  Washington, D.C.:  Historical Branch, 
G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962.    
________.  The United States Marines at Harper’s Ferry, 1859.  Marine Corps 
Historical Reference Series, No. 10.  Washington, D.C.:  Historical Branch, G-3 
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1959.    
________.  United States Marines at Harper’s Ferry and in the Civil War.  Marine 
Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet.  Washington, D.C.:  Historical Branch, G-
3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1966.    
________.  The United States Marines in the Civil War.   Marine Corps Historical 
Reference Series, No. 2 Washington, D.C.:  Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1961.    
  
396
 
Paullin, Charles Oscar.  Paullin’s History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911:  A 
Collection of Articles from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.  Annapolis, 
MD:  U.S. Naval Institute, 1968.   
Quarstein, John V.  A History of Ironclads:  The Power of Iron Over Wood.  Charleston, 
SC:  The History Press, 2006. 
Reed, Rowena.  Combined Operations in the Civil War.  Annapolis, MD:  Naval 
Institute Press, 1978. 
Reynolds, Clark G.  Navies in History.  Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1998. 
Roman, Alfred.  The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the 
States, 1861 to 1865.  2 vols.  New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1884. 
Schaff, Morris.  Sunset of the Confederacy.  Boston:  J. W. Luce and Company, 1912. 
Schecter, Barnet.  The Devil’s Own Work:  The Civil War Draft Riots and the Fight to 
Reconstruct America.  New York:  Holtzbrinck, 2005).  
Schneller, Robert J. Jr.  A Quest for Glory:  A Biography of Rear Admiral John A. 
Dahlgren.  Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1996. 
Schroeder, John H.  Commodore John Rodgers:  Paragon of the Early American Navy.  
Gainesville, FL:  University Press of Florida, 2006. 
Shulimson, Jack.  The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880-1898.  Lawrence:  
University Press of Kansas, 1993. 
Smith, Charles R.  Marines in the Revolution:  A History of the Continental Marines in 
the American Revolution, 1775-1783.  Washington, D.C.:  History and Museums 
Division, 1975. 
  
397
 
Sprout, Harold and Margaret.  The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776 to 1918.  
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1946. 
Still, William N., Jr.  Iron Afloat:  The Story of the Confederate Armorclads.  Nashville,  
 TN:  Vanderbilt University Press, 1971. 
________., et al, eds.  Raiders and Blockaders:  The American Civil War Afloat.  
Washington, D.C.:  Brassey‟s, Inc., 1998. 
Sullivan, David M.  The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War – The Final Year.  
Shippensburg, PA:  White Mane Publishing Company, Inc., 2000. 
________.  The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War - The First Year.  
Shippensburg, PA:  White Mane Publishing Co., Inc., 1997. 
________.  The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War – The Second Year.  
Shippensburg, PA:  White Mane Publishing Co., Inc., 1997. 
________.  The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War – The Third Year.  
Shippensburg, PA:  White Mane Publishing Co., Inc., 1998. 
Symonds, Craig L.   Decision at Sea:  Five Naval Battles that Shaped American History.  
Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2005. 
________.  Lincoln and his Admirals.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008. 
________.  The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy.  Annapolis, MD:  
Naval Institute Press, 1995. 
Trotter, William R.  Ironclads and Columbiads:  The Civil War in North Carolina, The 
Coast.  Winston-Salem, NC:  John F. Blair, Publisher, 1989. 
  
398
 
Tucker, Spencer.  Arming the Fleet:  U.S. Navy Ordnance in the Muzzle-Loading Era.  
Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1989. 
Venzon, Anne Cipriano.  Leaders of Men:  Ten Marines Who Changed the Corps.  
Lanhan, MD:  Scarecrow Press, 2008. 
Weddle, Kevin J.  Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont.  
Charlottesville, VA:  University of Virginia Press, 2005. 
Weigley, Russell F.  History of the United States Army.  New York:  Macmillan, 1967. 
________, ed.,  New Dimensions in Military History: An Anthology.  San Rafael, CA:  
Presidio Press, 1975. 
Work, David K.  Lincoln’s Political Generals.  Urbana:  University of Illinois Press, 
2009. 
Workers of the Writer‟s Program of the Works Progress Administration in the State of 
Virginia.  Prince William:  The Story of its People and Its Places.  Richmond, 
VA:  Whittet and Shepperson, 1941. 
 
Articles and Book Chapters. 
Brooke, Jr., George M. “The Role of the United States Navy in the Suppression of the 
African Slave Trade.”  Reprinted in From Cannon and Cutlasses to Aircraft and 
Missiles:  Readings in the History of U.S. Seapower.  James C. Bradford, ed. 
Mason, OH:  Thomson Custom Publishing, 2002, 143-154 
Coker, Charles F. W. “Biographical Sketch of Henry Clay Cochrane” in Register of the 
Henry Clay Cochrane Papers, 1809-1957.  Manuscript Register Series, Number 
  
399
 
1.  Washington, D.C.:  Marine Corps Museum, 1968. 
Cooling, B. Franklin, III.  “Civil War Deterrent:  Defenses of Washington.”  Military 
Affairs 29 (Winter 1965-66), 164-78. 
Dawson, Joseph G., III.  “With Fidelity and Effectiveness:  Archibald Henderson‟s  
 Lasting Legacy to the U.S. Marine Corps.”  Journal of Military History 62  
 (October 1998), 727- 53. 
Donnelly, Ralph W.  “Archibald Henderson, Marine.”  Virginia Cavalcade 20 (Winter 
1971), 39-47. 
Krivdo, Michael E.  “Confederate States Navy and Marine Corps.”  In A Companion to 
American Military History.  2 vols. James C. Bradford, ed.  Malden, MA:  
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Co., 2010, 1:  460-71.  
________.  “Last Action of the „Henderson Era,‟” Fortitudine 34 (October 2009), 7-11. 
McClellan, Edwin N[orth].  “The Capture of Fort Fisher.”  Marine Corps Gazette 
(March 1920), 59-80. 
McKee, Christopher.  “The US Navy, 1794-1860:  Men, Ships, and Governance.”  In A 
Companion to American Military History, 2 vols.  James C. Bradford, ed.  
Malden, MA:  Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Co., 2010, 1:  378-87. 
Merrill, James M.  “The Fort Fisher and Wilmington Campaign:  Letters from Rear 
Admiral David D. Porter.”  North Carolina Historical Review 35 (October 1958), 
461-75. 
N.A.  “Archibald Henderson-An Era.”  Marine Corps Gazette (July 1960), 28-33. 
Shulimson, Jack.  “Military Professionalism:  The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer 
  
400
 
Corps, 1880-1898.”  Journal of Military History 60 (April 1996), 231-42. 
Van Hoose, G. W.  “The Confederate States Marine Corps.”  Marine Corps Gazette (13 
September 1928), 166-77. 
 
Theses and Dissertations. 
Gardner, Donald Ray.  “The Confederate Corps of Marines.”  M.A. thesis.  
 Memphis State University, Memphis, TN, 1973.   
Gasser, James Charles.  “Confederate Marines in the Civil War.”  M.A.  
 thesis.  Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, AL, 1956. 
Krivdo, Michael E.  “Marines in Gray:  The Birth, Life and Death of the Confederate 
States Marine Corps.”  M.A. thesis.  Texas A&M University, College Station, 
TX, 2006. 
Marini, Alfred J.  “The British Corps of Marines, 1746-1771, and the United States 
Marine Corps, 1798-1818:  A Comparative Study of the Early Administration 
and Institutionalization of Two Modern Marine Forces.”  Ph.D. dissertation.  
University of Maine, Orono, ME, 1979.   
Ryan, Jeffrey T.  “On Land and Sea:  The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War.”   
 Ph.D. dissertation.  Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 1997. 
 
Miscellaneous References. 
Callahan, Edward William, ed.  List of Officers of the Navy of the United States and of 
the Marine Corps from 1775 to 1900.  New York:  Haskell House, 1969.   
  
401
 
Heitman, Francis B., ed.  Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army: 
From its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903.  Washington, 
D.C.:  GPO, 1903. 
U.S. Department of Defense.  Joint Pub 1-02.  Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms (Electronic edition).  Managed by the Joint 
Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., as amended through 17 
October 2008.  Accessed on 24 February 2011.  
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. 
________.  Joint Pub 3-0.  Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.  
Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 2009.  Accessed on 20 May 2010.  
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0/. 
U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 (MCDP 6), Command and  
 Control.  Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1996. 
________.  Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3 (MCDP 1-3), Tactics.  
 Washington, D.C.:  GPO, 1997. 
U.S. Navy Department.  Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships (Internet 
Reference Publication).  Washington, D.C.:  Naval Historical Center.  Accessed 
on 2 September 2009.  http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs. 
________.  U.S. Naval History Sources in the United States.  Washington, D.C.:  U.S. 
Navy History Division, 1979. 
  
402
 
VITA 
 
Michael Edward Krivdo earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in history from 
Texas A&M University in 1984 as part of the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning 
Education Program (MECEP).  Following his retirement from active duty, he received 
his Master of Arts degree in military and diplomatic history from Texas A&M 
University in 2006.  He also received his Doctor of Philosophy degree in military and 
diplomatic history from Texas A&M University in 2011.  His research interest is modern 
American military and naval history, focusing on the development of the Marine Corps. 
Michael Krivdo can be reached at the History Office, U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command, E-2929 Desert Storm Drive, Fort Bragg, N.C., 28310.  His email 
is:  michael.krivdo@ahqb.soc.mil.  
        
